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**Editor**

Douglas Hernández

**Triarius Analysts**

Julian Urrego, Guadi Calvo, Paulo Bustos, David Sarmiento, Juan Pablo Pardo, Marco Antonio Terroni, Douglas Hernández.

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**Contact information:**

**Douglas Hernández**  
Medellín Colombia  
Mobile: (+57) 321-6435103  
[director@fuerzasmilitares.org](mailto:director@fuerzasmilitares.org)  
[hernandez.douglas@hotmail.com](mailto:hernandez.douglas@hotmail.com)



## EDITORIAL

We send a cordial greeting to all our readers, and a special thanks to the people in the security and defense sector who, in all countries, have committed themselves to society, in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, even risk to your own safety. Thanks!

We begin this edition with an article set in Colombia, which explains what a "police order" is. The theoretical elements can probably be extrapolated to other countries in their essentials.

We immediately traveled to Nigeria with the guidance of Guadi Calvo, our senior analyst, to learn about the latest developments in the complex situation that exists there with the issue of terrorism of jihadist etiology.

Then, Paulo Bustos, from Chile, tells us about the participation of Chilean military and police personnel as security contractors abroad, and the internal political resistance that this generated in his country.

Did you know that South America served Germany as a "testing ground" for its military potential in the interwar period? Colombian historian David Sarmiento speaks about this topic. This issue is very important to understand that perhaps other powers are currently using this territory for similar purposes.

From Spain, Juan Pablo Pardo Retortillo -naval officer-, enlightens us about the errors that have the US Navy's LCS ships in check, which in general have to do with failures in logistics planning.

Next, from Brazil, Marco Aurelio Terroni explains the implications of the changes that have occurred in the defense sector of that country, and how it can affect peace and stability in the region.

Guadi Calvo then takes us to Afghanistan, to inform us about the latest developments in relation to the terrorist threat plaguing that country.

We close this edition with a review that tells us about the development of drones by the Colombian industry. Thank you for reading us.

Know to win!

*Douglas Hernández*

Editor



This newsletter has a Spanish version.

# TRIARIUS 077

## Content:

### **The Police Order in Colombia, p.4**

By Julián David Urrego Atehortua (Colombia)

### **Al-Qaeda presses on northern Nigeria, p.7**

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)

### **Interrupted Dreams..., p.10**

By Paulo Bustos (Chile)

### **South America as a testing ground for the German Army (1920-1933), p.13**

By David Sarmiento Rojas (Colombia)

### **The LSC ships: the logistical disaster, p.16**

By Juan Pablo Pardo Retortillo (Spain)

### **Dark Terrorism, p.19**

By Marco Aurélio Terroni (Brazil)

### **Daesh seeks space in Afghanistan, p.22**

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)

### **The development of drones by the Colombian industry, p.25**

By Douglas Hernandez (Colombia)



## TRIARIUS

When the most critical part of the pandemic forced governments to declare the strictest quarantine, many people found themselves in serious difficulties when they realized that they did not have enough food to lock themselves up at home for a long period, nor did they have the possibility of going out to supermarkets to stock up. From these events we must extract important lessons for survival. It would be the most incredibly silly thing if the same thing happened to us again next time. And it is that, according to experts, pandemics will occur more frequently in the future, and perhaps with more harmful/deadly microorganisms. Faced with these complex and perfectly possible scenarios, we must prepare ourselves properly. Please store non-perishable food, drinking water and items to purify more, medicines, lighting items, and a radio with new batteries. All of which will help you to face different kinds of emergencies. Do it now, don't leave it for later.

On the cover, **Soldiers from the Congo** in a military parade.  
See more information at the end of the magazine.

TRIARIUS privileges freedom of expression, however, the responsibility for what is said in the articles is exclusive to their authors.

Very special thanks to the international analysts who have sent us their articles for this issue free of charge.

# The Police Order in Colombia

By Julián David Urrego Atehortua (Colombia)

For any organized community, it is essential to have control of its population and especially, through the legitimate use of force, when it comes to decisions or guidelines that are aimed at safeguarding healthy coexistence and public order in the general interest of all. population. In this sense, it is up to us to talk about the police order, analyzing precisely what is it? Who teaches it? Who must comply? What are the ways to enforce such orders? And finally, what is the penalty for not obeying a police order?

So, let's start with its definition, what is it? for which we refer to our national police code or law 1801 of 2016, which in its article 150, stipulates:

**ARTICLE 150. POLICE ORDER.** *The Police order is a clear, precise and concise mandate directed individually or of a general nature, written or verbal, emanating from the Police authority, to prevent or overcome behaviors or acts contrary to coexistence, or to restore it (...)*

In this way, having a clear definition, it will be important to analyze who teaches it? For which it will suffice to say that any police authority can give an order of these, a situation that Article 198 of Law 1801 of 2016 clarifies, informing us precisely in Colombia who is invested with the title of police authority, let's see:




Image taken from PISCC 2019 Guide of the Government of Colombia. Page 11.

Having developed the previous questions, it will be the opportunity to know who must comply? For which we will refer to article 150 of Law 1801 of 2016, second paragraph, as follows:

*(...) Police orders are mandatory. People who disobey them will be forced to comply with them through, if necessary, the means, measures and procedures established in this Code. If the order is not immediately complied with, the authority will order the person to comply within a certain period, without prejudice to the pertinent legal actions (...)*

In this way, it will then be the opportunity to elucidate the following concern: What are the ways to enforce said orders? And for which it will suffice to transcribe article 149 of the national police code, which establishes:

**ARTICLE 149. POLICE MEANS.** *The means of Police are the legal instruments available to the competent authorities for the effective fulfillment of the function and activity of the Police, as well as for the imposition of the corrective measures contemplated in this Code.*

*Police means are classified into immaterial and material.*

*The immaterial media are those verbal or written manifestations that transmit decisions of the Police authorities.*

*They are immaterial means of Police:*

1. Police Order.
2. Exceptional permission.
3. Regulations.
4. Authorization.
5. Police mediation.

The material means are the set of instruments used for the development of the function and activity of the Police.

The material means of the Police are:

1. Transfer for protection.
2. Withdrawal from the site.
3. Transfer for police procedure.
4. Registration.
5. Registration to person.
6. Registration to means of transport.
7. Immediate suspension of activity.
8. <NUMERAL INEXEQUIBLE>
9. Entering the property without a written order.
10. Seizure.
11. Seizure of firearms, non-conventional weapons, ammunition and explosives.
12. Use of force.
13. Apprehension for judicial purposes.
14. Urgent support from individuals.
15. Military assistance.

Finally, only one question remains to be clarified, namely, what is the penalty for not obeying a police order? And for which we will have to point out that it is divided into two parts, the first, being in the criminal sphere, that is, criminal, and the second in the misdemeanor field, bone as a conduct contrary to coexistence, in this way, will incur in criminal conduct -law 599 of 2000- who:

**ARTICLE 454. FRAUD TO POLICE JUDICIAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE RESOLUTION.** *Whoever, by any means, evades compliance with the obligation imposed in a judicial or administrative police resolution, will incur a prison sentence of one (1) to four (4) years and a fine of five (5) to fifty (50) monthly legal minimum wages. in force.*

In the same sense, a fine will be awarded for incurring in conduct contrary to coexistence - Law 1801 of 2016 - who:

**ARTICLE 35. BEHAVIOR THAT AFFECTS RELATIONS BETWEEN PEOPLE AND AUTHORITIES.** *The following behaviors affect the relationship between people and authorities and therefore should not be performed. Its realization will lead to corrective measures:*

1. Disrespect the police authorities.
2. Failure to comply, disobey, ignore and impede the function or order of the Police.
3. Prevent, hinder, hinder or resist the identification or individualization procedure by the Police authorities.
4. Refusing to give truthful information about place of residence, domicile and activity to the Police authorities when they require it in Police procedures.
5. Offer any type of resistance to the application of a measure or the use of a Police means.
6. Attack by any means or throw objects that could cause damage or substances that represent a danger to the Police authorities.
7. Improperly use the unique security and emergency number system.

**PARAGRAPH 1st.** *The behavior expected from the inhabitants of the national territory towards the authorities requires a reciprocal behavior. The authorities, and in particular the uniformed Police personnel, must address the inhabitants with respect and respond to their concerns and calls with the utmost diligence. The inhabitants of the national territory will inform the competent authority if this is not the case.*

**2nd PARAGRAPH.** *Whoever incurs in any of the aforementioned behaviors, the following corrective measures will be applied concurrently:*

BEHAVIORS	CORRECTIVE MEASURES TO BE APPLIED	VALUE IN PESOS YEAR 2020
Numeral 1	General fine type 2.	\$234,080
Numeral 2	General fine type 4; Participation in a community program or educational activity of coexistence.	\$936,323
Numeral 3	General fine type 4; Participation in a community program or educational activity of coexistence.	\$936,323
Numeral 4	General fine type 4.	\$936,323
Numeral 5	General fine type 4; Participation in a community program or educational activity of coexistence.	\$936,323
Numeral 6	General fine type 4; Participation in a community program or educational activity of coexistence.	\$936,323

Numeral 7	General fine type 4; Participation in a community program or educational activity of coexistence.	\$936,323
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**PARAGRAPH 3rd.** *The fines imposed for the occurrence of the behaviors indicated in numeral 7 of this article will be charged to the bill for the service of the telephone line from which the call was generated. The operating company of the telephone service will transfer monthly to the respective territorial entities and administrations the sums collected for this concept as established in the regulations of this law. (...)*

**NOTE:** The values of the fines in the previous table are due to the arithmetic exercises established by article 180 of the national police code, and the legal minimum wage in force for the year 2020 in accordance with decree 2360 of December 23, 2019 of the Ministry of Labor.

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
Colombian Congress. (July 29, 2016 Bogotá DC) National Police Code. Law 1801 of 2016.  
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Colombian Government. (2019. Bogotá DC) PISCC Guide  
Ministry of Labor of Colombia. (December 26, 2019 Bogotá DC) Decree 2360 of 2019 By which the legal monthly minimum wage is set.

**Julian David Urrego Atehortua**  
(Colombia) Lawyer.

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# Al-Qaeda presses on northern Nigeria

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



When in March 2015, the leader of *Boko Haram*, Abu Bakr Shekau, took his oath of allegiance or *bayat*, to the *calif* Ibrahim (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi), founder of *Daesh*, *al-Qaeda*, he lost his main franchisor in Africa Western, so *Jamaat al-Ansar al-Muslimeen fi Bilad al-Sudan*, (The Vanguarders for the Protection of Muslims in the lands of Black Africa) better known as *Ansaru*, he was the only remote hope of continuing to maintain a presence in the troubled north of Nigeria. Since this organization, also known as *al-Qaeda in the lands beyond the Sahel*, operated in the same region as *Boko Haram*, by 2013, some analysts considered that both formations had merged, beyond differences such as the militiamen of *Boko Haram*, mostly from the state of Borno, also in its ranks there are numerous groups of Cameroonians, Nigeriens and Chadians, coming from the border

areas with Nigeria, in large numbers recruited in the *madrassas almajiri*, a system of *Koranic* schools financed by the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, especially the Saudi.

In the case of *Ansaru*, its militants are Nigerians, who have received training in 2003 in Mauritania and in 2007 in camps in southern Algeria, taught by members of *al-Qaeda for the Islamic Maghreb* (AQIM), as was the case with its two top leaders Khalid al-Barnawi and Abu Muhammed, trained on the battlefields of northern Mali.

The lack of a more precise geographical definition, since it is only specified with a vague "Lands of Black Africa", has led to many discussions about its origin and real existence, despite the fact that in 2012 the United Kingdom declared *Ansaru* "terrorist organization", the same as then Nigerian President Jonathan Goodluck did a year later.

After the arrest in April 2016 of his *emir*, Khalid al-Barnawi, replaced by Usama al-Ansari, added to the harsh clashes with *Boko Haram* and the Nigerian army, his actions were interrupted to the point of believing that said *khatiba* would have been dissolved. or had been absorbed by the many "sister" organizations that fight in the north of Mali and have now spilled over into Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad and that, since 2017, have been under the banners of *Jama'at Nasr Al Islam wa Al mouminin* (Group for the support of Islam and Muslims) the most important global *al-Qaeda* tributary organization on the continent together with *al-Qaeda for the Islamic Maghreb* or AQIM.

Although to the surprise of many *Ansaru*, on Thursday, August 6, it resurfaced with a deadly attack on the communities of Kurmin Masara, Apyia Shyim and Takmawai, in the north of Kaduna state. Nearly a

hundred *mujahideen* riding motorcycles killed at least 25 civilians, injuring an as yet unknown number of villagers. At the same time, several houses were set on fire, for which many of the residents had to seek safety in nearby towns.

Since January 2020, when he claimed for himself the ambush on the caravan of the *emir* of Potiskum from the state of Yobe, after a long ostracism of almost seven years, that *Ansaru* was not responsible for any operation.

The attack claimed by the *al-Qaeda-linked group* was reported by *Thabat News*, a semi-official outlet of the organization, which broadcasts statements and propaganda from *al-Qaeda* and related groups, similarly to *Daesh's Amaq News*. Although for some sources, the action of Thursday the 6th, would have been in truth an operation of armed members of the *Fulani herdsman ethnic group*, against local farmers, generally of the *Dogon ethnic group*, as part of their ancestral war that replicates in almost all the nations of West Africa and whose epicenter is in the central sector of Mali, where this type of attack has become one of the constants, which favors the chronic instability of the Sahelian country. This war between herders and farmers has been orchestrated by the terrorist organizations that are gaining ground, offering them protection and that have turned both communities into constant providers of new combatants.

Since last July 20, the attacks in northern Nigeria began to go through a period of overheating, that day about twenty people were killed in Kukim Daji. Local officials said that at the same time another attack occurred in a nearby town. A day later, another eleven people died in the village of Gora Gan when a group of approximately fifty men entered the village around seven in the morning, machine-gunning, looting and burning properties; on July 22, another 38 people were killed during the assault on two Kaduna villages, and another 33 civilians were killed on August 6, in the town of Zango Kataf. It is striking that all the chosen targets have been civilians and none military, so

it is believed that *Ansaru is committed to deepening the ethnic war, leading Fulani warriors in operations.*

#### ideological differences

What could happen in the north of Nigeria if the *Ansaru escalation* continues would be the appearance of a scenario similar to the one that is taking place in Mali, or more remotely it took place in Syria and it could also be taking place now in the north of Somalia and in some Afghan provinces, where by delegation of the *Taliban*, men from *al-Qaeda*, fight against the presence of *mujahideen* of *Daesh Willat Khorasan*.

In all those *khatiba geographies* (brigades) of *Daesh* and *al-Qaeda*, they are on a war footing with each other, leaving aside the fight that has brought them together in each of the scenarios mentioned.

The dispute between *Daesh* and *al-Qaeda* is not only about influence, resources and militiamen, both groups are ideologically different and have dissimilar perceptions about the definition of objectives, enemies, and the execution of their tactics, although from the religious point of view if they have coincidences in practice, which could be defined in the acceptance of the doctrine, the complete devotion to it and the daily execution of the precepts. At the same time they accuse each other of *takfir*, a term that defines the apostate or impious *Muslim*, freely used against anyone who does not strictly adhere to their vision of the *Koran*.

For the organization led by the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's successor, it is a priority to overthrow and replace the apostate regimes of *Islam*, although it is interesting to note that the only countries attacked by them have been "republican" governments with all the flaws of the case, such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen or Mali, compared to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) or Qatar, with ruling houses plagued by corruption, which could fit all possible accusations of apostasy, despite them they have never been

attacked, as is the case with the State of Israel, the sworn enemy of the entire *Muslim world*.

While *Daesh* concentrates its attacks against smaller targets, although when reviewing the consequences they are usually extremely tragic and notorious, the organization founded by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi chooses religious minorities such as the *Shia in Iraq or Lebanon*, the *Yazidis* of Kurdistan or the Afghan *Hazaras* and even attack groups that are ideologically related, but that they do not consider entirely faithful.

To achieve its objectives, *Daesh* resorts to tactics experienced in its long history of wars, in which it has made large troop movements and used heavy artillery to invade and occupy new territories, such as Sirte in Libya or Mosul, Iraq.

The presence of both organizations in Africa, or their dignitaries such as the *Islamic State Group in the Great Sahara* (*Daesh*) and the *Jama'at Nasr Al Islam wa Al mouminin*, (*al-Qaeda*) seeking open fronts in the most economically depressed nations and with almost terminal social crises, from the perspective of cultural, tribal, ethnic or religious integration. This indicates in itself a similar tactic of the two organizations and the same goal, which is to seize the natural resources of large areas, from where to pressure the real power: the United States, together with the old metropolises, particularly London and Paris. With whom they have been waging great combats since 2012.

The battles that are being waged in the Western Sahel (Mali, Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso) against Western troops supported by the armies of the countries of the region have shown the impossibility of an early defeat. There, as in Somalia, Egypt, Mozambique, the Maghreb and the north of Nigeria, where poverty and scarce job opportunities have pushed thousands of young people to join one of the organizations that, beyond ideological disputes, have a single goal in common, absolute power.



Image Source:  
<https://worldorder.com/maps/nigeria-geopolitics/>

**Guadi Calvo**

(Argentina) Argentine writer and journalist. International Analyst specialized in Africa, Middle East and Central Asia.



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# Interrupted dreams...

By Paulo Bustos (Chile)



*Soldiers of the Chilean Army. Illustrative image.*

We were around the year 2005, I was about 35 years old and I had finished my police career as a Specialist in Police Operations for Carabineros de Chile. I was looking for a job in a private company while I was also finishing my professional career as a Business Administration Engineer and from somewhere I learned that former commandos of the Armed Forces or Police were being required to join Private International Security Companies with jobs available in Middle East, Europe and America, among several other destinations.

Few times -in Chile at least-, had something been heard of this and this way was new in which those of us who had been training since we were 18 years old, could go out into the world to earn money that was not from the State and continue with something that was clearly more than a job, it was what you decided to do for the rest of your life.

Well, I got going, training to make up for the rest time and resume some things that could help me qualify, I spoke English very well having been on 2 missions in the Balkan area from 1998 to 1999, so I was ready to start an adventure that

I saw promising and positive, with something that I knew, learned and was able to carry out during several years of my youth.

Thus, in a couple of months, we were training with people just like me, people who, having the same interests and abilities, were part of the Armed and Police Forces in our country, several with trips or missions abroad as well. We formed a team, we talked and from time to time we shared a camera and common language, the same topics, experiences in weapons, skydiving, diving, explosives, mountains and several other things, which at that point it seemed incredible to me to be able to know, thanks to what had been a dream come true.

To summarize the story that many of the readers probably already know (train, sweat, enjoy, dream and achieve), one day I see on the news that a politician talks about a paramilitary group of mercenaries who are supplanting regular armies and that we were almost criminals, strangely I followed that news because in general I don't listen to politicians from anywhere. I saw the beginning

of a whole load of comments, assertions and judgments, that we were almost heartless, a bill to prevent them from hiring mercenaries in Chile and many other things. Well, I didn't get too upset... because I know very well that my country is dominated by the media in general and I assumed it would be something more than that, but without reaching port... I was wrong. Suddenly, and in a few more months, we were inventing formulas to be able to work in what we wanted and we thought would be a great professional and economic opportunity, and I was not mistaken in that, that is, we had to find ways to avoid what the politicians believed adequate to close our activity, but of course, all the rest of the professions and technicians, including themselves, could go out into the world to improve themselves, work and many other things. Many friends could not leave for various reasons, issues of resources, contacts or the need to work without being able to wait for the deployments or previous courses in other countries, there were several squeezed with their potential and in private security

activities in Chile or in hundreds of other more things. frustrated.

Personally no, because I was able to continue with new forms, more uncomfortable, more

expensive, but I was able. Annoying yes, we weren't criminals, crazed military men, or bad people. We would have wanted a treatment more in line with what we were and

what we contributed to our country, but well, several of us feel that human and economic recognition in other corners of this planet for several more years.

Image Source:

<https://armamente.cl/why-i-am-soldier/>

**Paulo Bustos**

(Chile) Private security professional.



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
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# South America as a testing ground for the German Army (1920-1933)

By David Sarmiento Rojas (Colombia)

In the 1920s, the Treaty of Versailles made it impossible for the German military industry to develop its war capacity, being forced to develop on civilian industry. It then became common for German war material production companies to open subsidiaries abroad to evade such a restriction and, in addition, German companies promoted the development of civilian material that would later feed the military industry. South America was one of the scenarios in which this took place.

In the case of aviation, the pressure to establish longer flights by civil airlines forced the development of better planes that fulfilled this purpose. Transatlantic routes to connect Europe and South America put French airlines in competition with German airlines for those routes. Having increasingly powerful aircraft and elaborated with better techniques, got the advantage over the other. In the German case, the development of this industry and being in that race meant progress in aircraft manufacturing, aluminum processing and engine manufacturing. That knowledge remained in the hands of German technicians who later took the opportunity to develop the aerial weapons used after Germany ignored the Treaty of Versailles in 1933.



**Figura 1:** El vuelo de correo aereo suratlántico de 5 días de la Luft Hansa entre Alemania y Argentina según horario desde febrero de 1934: Berlín – Sevilla – Las Islas Canarias – Bathurst (Gran Bretaña) – Recife – Rio de Janeiro – Buenos Aires (© Ferenc Fischer)

The German Navy had a different history than aviation in its development between 1919 and 1933. Germany could have a small navy of up to 15,000 men. However, for such a small size it was very active; The trips along the South American coasts of the German Navy were a constant after the Great War, the journey between the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic was done annually as an exercise. With this, the high command of the navy tested the range of its fleet, exercised on how to attack the distant routes of the British and French fleets, and took advantage of the geographical similarities of the South American subcontinent. For example, they used the Chilean fjords located in Tierra del Fuego to carry out exercises and maneuvers on how to take cover, simulating an attack on the Norwegian or Scottish coasts.



**Figura 3.** Las rutas de entrenamiento militar de los cruceros escuela de la Marina de Guerra alemana (*Berlin* 1925, *Emden* 1927, *Karlsruhe* 1932, 1935, *Schlesien* 1938) en el gemelo geográfico de los fiordes noruegos, en los canales del Sur de Chile y de la Tierra del Fuego (1925-1938) (© *Ferenc Fischer*)

On the Army side, in 1929, General Wilhelm von Heye, Chief of Staff of the German Army, toured Argentina and Chile. His intention was to study "the small armies" of the two countries since "these were comparable with the German circumstances of that time" and it was profitable for German interests.

For Heye, Chile was of particular importance for two reasons. First, he had a strong friendship and military relationship, twenty-four years old, with Major General Francisco Javier Díaz Valderrama, an expert in military literature and German war experiences. The second, because Díaz prepared military maneuvers for him in which 20,000 infantry, cavalry, artillery, sappers and air force (sic) met in order to maneuver and cross the Maule River, in Talca, a region of 3,000 square kilometers south of Santiago.



President of Chile General Carlos Ibáñez, with General Wilhelm Heye, 1929.

The maneuvers prepared by Díaz were very instructive for Heye in terms of technique and tactics, since the Treaty of Versailles made it impossible for the Germans to develop military aviation, bombing and practice with large-caliber artillery. The Chilean soldiers participating in the maneuvers were divided into two teams (blue and red teams), which showed the direct support of the heavy machine guns, the techniques of the sappers, the use of the infantry in conjunction with the fire force ( sic) and accuracy of hit of the large caliber guns used there against fortified concrete positions, added to the direct support bombardments provided by 21 aircraft, some of them manufactured by the German Junkers.

on the exercises and later delivered to Heye, along with relief models of the area in which the exercises took place.

General Heye could understand the development of the maneuvers that were carried out in Chile, since the army of the southern country developed the 1929 maneuvers from the experiences acquired in the Great War by the German army and maneuvered according to the technique of the weapons and tactics of the interwar German army. So by the time the men from both the blue and red teams maneuvered, Heye might have thought she was seeing the Teutonic army.

The maneuvers elaborated by Díaz actually showed the way in which the German high command could overcome the defensive concrete fortresses that were established at that time in Europe. The Chilean exercises did not simulate any scenario in which the Chilean army could operate. In fact, Peru and Bolivia did not have a chain of concrete defenses like the ones in the exercises and, in the case of Argentina, the rivers ran parallel to the axis of the Chilean advance in a hypothetical case of war.



General Francisco Javier Díaz Valderrama, 1927.

Thus, the 1929 maneuvers simulated a German-French or German-Polish battle in Central Europe, as chains of refuges on the Polish and Czech border to the east and chains of Belgian and French refuges to the west flanked Germany. . Likewise, in case of war, the German Army did have to cross rivers, as was shown in the Chilean exercises.

To conclude, it should be noted that, with the arrival of the Nazi party to power in Germany, contacts between the South American armies intensified, especially with the Chilean and Argentine armies, but due to the fact that the German officers had to begin to return to their country for having been called upon to serve their military purposes, military exchange began to decline by 1936.

\*This article is part of an investigation by the author entitled "German military influence in the Colombian army, 1929-1934".

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### David Sarmiento Rojas

(Colombia) Historian. Pontifical Javeriana University. Master's student in Strategy and Geopolitics. Superior School of War.

# The LCS ships: the logistical disaster

By Juan Pablo Pardo Retortillo (Spain)



**Summary:** The news of the premature discharge in the US Navy of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was recently published. The budget slowdown and, above all, the innumerable problems and costs derived from having ignored the laws of military logistics in its design and construction, are the main causes of this radical measure, which will be addressed in greater detail throughout the article. , proving once again that not even modern man and one of the most powerful Armed Forces in the world can despise the inexorable laws and military logistics principles.

Keywords: LCS, US Navy, logistics.

## Introduction

The surprising news of the premature retirement in the US Navy of the LCS test ships (launched between dates as early as 2008 and 2014, that is, with only six years old the most modern), could be the last rule logistics that the Americans fail to comply with (always famous for their exceptional power and logistics example), since it means abandoning the always profitable projects and production chains in the medium-long term.

Although the test ships are a "test bed" to transfer their experience to the following ones that are built, it is normal that the first ship is never discarded, but that it is adapted and modified as much as possible and kept operational for a long time. profitable period.

However, on the other hand, it may be the best option to take, given the budget slowdown imposed on the Navy by the US Congress, and the innumerable problems and high manufacturing and maintenance costs that have been incurred due to the abandonment of some of the the most elementary military logistics laws, since the principle of economy of effort establishes that something should not be acquired or manufactured that cannot be later maintained and/or supplied with the available logistical resources.

At its inception, the ambitious LCS project intended to provide the US Navy with a new "star ship". Indeed, the aim was to achieve a ship that was small in size (around 3,000 tons), modern, fast (more than 45 knots), versatile (with interchangeable mission modules), stealthy (with a low radar signature and ease of navigation in shallow waters and entry into small ports), with a small crew and cheap to build in large numbers, given that, after the demise of the "Oliver Hazard Perry" class frigates, the smallest warship that the US Navy could to



deploy was one of the "Arleigh Burke" class destroyers, which was unconscionable (and expensive) for many of its missions.<sup>1</sup>

What at first seemed like a reasonable project has ended up being abandoned, among others, for the following logistical reasons<sup>2</sup>:

### **Manufacturing Cost**

The first logistics section that the Americans have failed to comply with affects the calculation of the initial manufacturing budget for a ship with the characteristics outlined. Here there is evidence of a resounding failure in the principles of foresight and information, inappropriate for a Navy of the size and experience of the US Navy.

Thus, initially budgeted at 250 million dollars per unit, both the requirement and the high technology that has been wanted to implement, has caused the final cost to rise to 430 million per unit, approximately the same amount that the frigates have cost F-100 (6,200 tons) to the Spanish Navy, something completely unsustainable and unacceptable.

It is obvious that the management of a centralized body to carry out in-depth comparative studies between the different design alternatives, analyzing their repercussions, developing the financial and temporary framework of logistical support during procurement and throughout its life cycle, has failed.

There is also no record, perhaps due to having wanted to safeguard the secrecy of the technologies used, that it has been contemplated to facilitate the financing of the procurement by inviting other nations with similar needs to the project, thus promoting the commercial and marketing aspect of offers, although they have been achieved sell four units to Saudi Arabia and other countries have shown interest.

### **Crew & Technology**

In order to achieve a lower cost of the LCS, a design was thought to include high technology that would allow the number (and cost) of the human crew to be reduced as much as possible. This theme, which seems perfect on paper, usually works very well during the first years of the ship's life, but later it has been shown that it often happens that maintenance suffers, and too often, such a small crew is not capable of attend certain maneuvers or situations as it should, subjecting personnel to overloads. The "law of diminishing returns" has been breached, something basic that any logistician must know, and that is that, as a result of the growing technological complexity, the possibilities of failures and breakdowns and therefore the vulnerability of the Unit increase.

That is, the "friction" with a modern machine grows in proportion to the number and technological level of its components, and only a small fraction of the maximum theoretical capacity of said technology can be used in practice. Keep in mind the "attrition" of war, the real end result is not just arithmetic. For a good logistician, therefore, it was not necessary, and it was redundant, the recent report of the Hudson Institute center that made it clear that it is useless to embark on cutting-edge technologies that have not been sufficiently tested.

In line with this aspect, the exaggerated intention of achieving a "multipurpose" ship, in which, by changing certain modules, it was already prepared for different missions, has placed more emphasis on failing to comply with the principle of simplicity, according to which it is necessary to look for "zero friction", being careful with new inventions, having to better test those already consecrated by practice and experience. As Napoleon said, "*in war only the simple promises success*".

### **Homogeneity**

Of vital importance for future correct logistics management is the strict preservation of the principle of Homogeneity, that is, maintaining a maximum level of standardization at all levels, factors and resources.

This military logistics principle has been flagrantly breached with the LCS ships, since, at the time of taking out the tender for its manufacture, instead of declaring a winner and starting serial production of that model, the US Navy commissioned the two participating companies (Lockheed with its "Freedom" model and General Dynamics with its "Independence" model), the production of both versions, so there are two types of LCS, although both are supposed to do the same thing because both meet the same program requirements.

This has never happened before with any relevant weapons program, since it is too expensive to order a prototype that is then going to be discarded, and it supposes a gratuitous complication of the logistics of construction and maintenance, insofar as it multiplies the number of spare parts needed to effective use of systems and equipment. And it is that, the greater variety of weapons, equipment and materials, there will be greater "friction" and logistics will be an impossible chaos to solve. There will be duplication of maintenance teams, resources and a greater atomization that will not result in a greater benefit from logistical support.

### **Active Control**

Active Control is a quality management tool in organizations, which consists of continually comparing our equipment with all the factors that may affect it, analyzing its influence and effects throughout the entire campaign

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<sup>1</sup>FERNANDEZ, JJ (online) (accessed on: 08/07/20), Available at: [https://www.elconfidencial.com/tecnologia/2020-07-11/fiasco-buque-guerra-estados-unidos-scrapping\\_2677199/](https://www.elconfidencial.com/tecnologia/2020-07-11/fiasco-buque-guerra-estados-unidos-scrapping_2677199/)

<sup>2</sup>PARDO RETORTILLO, JP *Military Logistics Manual. The ISO 9000 of Military Logistics*. 2008, ISBN: 978-84-612-8027-8.

or life cycle. Specifically, for military logistics, they must be compared with the following critical factors: morale, weather, terrain and enemy activity.

It is clear that none of these critical factors have been taken into account when designing the LCS vessels, resulting in a myriad of technical problems <sup>3</sup>:

- Regarding enemy activity, the US Navy recognizes that ships are not capable of surviving by themselves, and that they need the cover of larger ships, since they are poorly armed for combat with other ships and have difficulty defending themselves against speedboats attacking in a swarm (their high speed did not prevent their defeat in simulated exercises). In addition, their small crews and reduced construction standards make them fragile in the face of possible enemy hits or damage. They couldn't even withstand the shock wave resistance tests carried out by the US Navy.
- Taking into account the terrain (sea) and weather, the Independence sub-type LCS vessels (with the trimaran hull), had structural problems in rough seas, and both types suffered from corrosion, communication and weathering problems. sensors.
- The crew rotation systems implemented (of which the US Navy has extensive experience) have not fully worked, affecting the morale and efficiency of the crew (frantic work rhythms), and aggravating mechanical problems.

Thus, in general they have turned out to be fragile ships, due to their size, system, construction standards and small crew, being prone to breakdowns, less flexible, more vulnerable and less dangerous to the enemy than was intended.

It definitely demonstrates the high price that a Navy must pay for breaking the laws of military logistics. The result has been a ship whose continuous problems force it to spend more time on corrective maintenance tasks than in operational periods, something logistically and operationally unsustainable for any Navy.

It is very likely that the US decisions to decommission the LCS test ships, phase out one of the models, converting it to a more expensive, beefed-up version, and reduce the number of those to be built, even if ultimately carried out extreme "surgical" measures to save what is possible in money and resources of all kinds, from a project riddled with errors, we estimate that even so the problems of all kinds that this failed model that starts from an erroneous conception will not have ended and the breach of the inevitable laws of military logistics. Although the best option would, of course, be to sell the ships manufactured up to now and begin again the planning and design phases of a new ship that, this time, respects and takes into account these laws and principles.

Image Source:

<https://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/12/20/mccain-blasts-navy-warships-report-pentagon-waste.html>

### **Juan Pablo Pardo Retortillo**

(Spain) Spanish Navy officer, expert and consultant in logistics, public procurement and quality management. Doctor in contemporary history.

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<sup>3</sup>FERNANDEZ, JJ (online) (accessed on: 08/07/20), Available at: [https://www.elconfidencial.com/tecnologia/2016-07-04/los-interminables-problemas-del-barco-most-modern-combat-of-usa\\_1226903/](https://www.elconfidencial.com/tecnologia/2016-07-04/los-interminables-problemas-del-barco-most-modern-combat-of-usa_1226903/)

# Dark terrorism

By Marco Aurélio Terroni (Brazil)



*Soldiers of the Brazilian Army. Illustrative image.*

The phrase of the French prime minister at the end of the 1st World War who said "*The war is too important to leave it in the hands of the generals*" to which France led in the final years of the 1st World War, is still completely valid and can be adapted for the current Brazilian political scenario. We can say that national defense is too important to leave it only in the hands of the military.

The new documents of the National Defense Policy, the National Defense Strategy and the National Defense White Paper, presented on Wednesday, July 22, 2020 by the Ministry of Defense to the Brazilian National Congress, are good examples.

The new defense documents bring significant ruptures in the way Brazil presents itself to its South American neighbors, threatening the emergence of a new arms race and a deterioration of regional security. Since the Paraguayan War (1864 to 1870), Brazil has forcefully threatened that it may go to war against another neighboring country to defend its interests, but never without direct mention of

Venezuela, the National Defense Policy says that Brazil "may be motivated to contribute to the solution of eventual controversies or even to defend their interests", of course a threatening tone when dealing with their neighbors throughout the history of the republic.

This change in the new texts can be attributed to the militarization of national defense, although this is a characteristic of the times, linked to national defense in Brazil. We can also recognize that the disinterest of society is presented in the automatic consent of these documents, generating ample freedom for the military in its drafting.

There were already disagreements about the content of the National Defense Policy, before the delivery of the documents to the National Congress. The Brazilian Center of Solidarity to the Peoples and Struggle for Peace, published a note denouncing that the change in tone as Brazil looks at its own

region is a problem and is dangerous for Brazil itself.

In any case, in the worst moments of regional crises, Brazil has never militarily threatened a neighbor as it did in this National Defense Policy. The militarist vision ignores all the efforts of peaceful resolution of controversies led, created and sustained by Brazil in history. The sustained efforts of regional cooperation in defense of the peaceful solution of controversies that South America has advanced, through Unasul, an institution that has a very high commitment from the Brazilian military, especially in the South American Defense Council. The Brazilian Constitution, in the chapters that define the parameters of its Foreign Policy, declares that Brazil will not be an imperialist threat to its neighbors, that it will seek the peaceful resolution of its controversies and, in particular, that it respects the sovereignty and free determination of the peoples.

In order to understand how we got here, we have to go back to the end of the 1990s, still in the first

term of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in 1996, when the first version of the National Defense Policy was launched, because at the time it was a historical milestone that sought to organize, under a democratic regime, the guidelines for restructuring and action of the Brazilian Armed Forces. After three years, one of the most important steps for the de facto beginning of civilian control of the military was the creation of the Ministry of Defense, closing the Ministries of Aeronautics, Army, Navy and General Staff of the Armed Forces. With the end of the dictatorship, a civilian politician, Elcio Álvares, remains at the head of the military commanders.

To say that the military accepts subordination to civilian power, much more is needed than a civilian minister and commander-in-chief, a position that in Brazil is that of the President of the Republic. But this is an important and respectful prerequisite until 2018, when Michel Temer appointed General Joaquim Silva e Luna to the Ministry of Defense, breaking with an important symbolism of democracy in civil-military relations. However, the ministry remains in military hands, with the appointment of General Fernan-do Azevedo e Silva by Jair Bolsonaro.

Returning to the defense documents, the PDN was the one that remained in force the longest, that is, until 2005, already under the government of Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva, when it had its first revision.

With this measure, its updating has better explained its concepts, such as the understanding of national defense and national security.

In 2008, another important milestone in the structuring of Brazilian defense documents was by the Minister of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs, Professor Mangabeira Unger, creating the first version of the National Defense Strategy. In the words of its articulator "defense to be worth, civil leadership", he had the idea that, once the laws were consolidated, the EDN would

address the Armed Forces, in a process of training, reconditioning and democratization.

The drafting process of the National Strategy was the first to include the participation and leadership of civilians, with specialists and ministers, being heard and participating in the drafting of the text.

The summit for the democratic consolidation of Brazilian defense documents took place in 2012, under the leadership of Minister Celso Amorim, head of the Defense portfolio when the first version of the White Paper on National Defense was launched, the first review of the Strategy of National Defense and of the National Defense Policy, which with the symbolic objective of subordination to civil power, "national" was written before "defense", thus forming the PND. There was a greater dialogue between the PND and the END, the first remaining charge of presenting a political vision of the country for its defense and the second what should be done to achieve the political objectives.

The broader White Paper seeks to present to society and at the international level how Brazil seeks to guarantee its defense, what it has at its disposal and what it has done to ensure it.

In 2012, the writing of the White Paper called the attention of Brazilian society like never before, and unfortunately that interest has never been repeated, for any document or legislation related to national defense in Brazil. There were several seminars in all regions of the country, which included the participation of military personnel, academics, journalists, NGOs, and representatives of the national defense industry. The optimism and cooperation between the military and civilians was important in the meetings and cemented the institutional cooperation between civilians and the military in the following years.

Since 2012, the documents have been renewed for four years, under the law, as a way to keep them always updated, thus a

measure of civil control and the international political scene. Perhaps the whirlwind of the political crisis that devastated the country at the beginning of 2016, with the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, reached the collaborative bases of the Brazilian defense documents.

The 2016 revisions decreased in quality compared to previous editions, showing that the updates came without having the previous document as a base. The lack of transparency in the wording of the new documents, confined to some military personnel from the Ministry of Defense, was frequently brought up and mentioned at the regional meetings of the Brazilian Association of Defense Studies between 2017 and 2018, which already pointed out a militarization of the debates on national defense documents.

Therefore, the recent explosion of the militarization of Brazilian politics was not born in the current government and the guidelines of the 2020 revisions of the three documents presented by the Ministry of Defense went on to reproduce that militarization, not only in the form of drafting of the documents, again done by the military and without dialogue with civil society, but also as Brazil officially begins to look at its defense scenario.

If the guidelines presented maintain their wording, of course a dangerous precedent is set for regional political stability.

Brazil, due to its size, has always been viewed with suspicion by its neighbors. Skill and historical commitment to the republican principles established by the chancellor, Baron de Rio Branco, have been necessary, as well as a growing construction of measures of democratic control of the Armed Forces and all this once again irresponsibly deconstructed by the military.

The most important thing is that Brazilian society, especially its representatives, constitutionally discuss the content of the three national defense documents, in order to review the wording of the PND, END and the LBDN, so as

not to cause risks of historical suspicion against Brazil and anticipate an arms race, which Brazil could not afford with its meager 1.4% of GDP in defense investments.

The delivery of the documents to Congress by Defense Minister Azevedo e Silva was accompanied by a request for greater investment in defense to reach 2% of GDP. The reason is to finance a reconditioning of the Armed Forces.

Still, a substantial increase in defense spending is an opposite message to the other countries in the region.

The new National Defense Policy, sent to the National Congress, information dated July 16, 2020, indicates that South America is no longer considered a conflict-free area.

The text highlights the possibility of *tensions and crises* in the continent that may lead Brazil to mobilize efforts to guarantee

national interests in the Amazon or help in solving regional problems.

The document contains twenty-one pages and brings an alert to the possibilities, without neglecting the conflicts in the strategic context, that may involve Brazil, so that it may be motivated to contribute to the solution of eventual controversies or to defend itself militarily.

The document calls for special attention to the South Atlantic, where the pre-salt reserves are concentrated, between Brazil and West Africa, a region in which there was recently an oil spill from an unknown ship, which caused environmental damage on the Brazilian coast.

The Blue Amazon, as it is called, fights the impact of crimes, including suspected espionage by foreign ships.

These observations are addressed to Russia, which had a ship monitoring the Brazilian Navy, accused of espionage by European countries and the United States.

Law 136 of 2010 on the organization of the Armed Forces, establishes that they be updated every four years; the Defense White Book, with public information on how the country's military structure is organized, the National Defense Policy with the country's eight objectives for the area, and the National Defense Strategy, with the eighteen guidelines for the scope of the goals.

The documents will be officially presented to the Defense Council, in a meeting at the Planalto Palace, with the presence of the presidents of the Chamber, Rodrigo Maia (DEM-RJ) and of the Senate, Davi Alcolumbre (DEM-AP), then they are sent to Congress.

The final version was submitted to Jair Bolsonaro, but the chief executive's participation in the drafting is secondary. Because they are State policies, according to the commands of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the new document presents elements of continuity with the previous ones.

Image Source:

<https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20190410/461574743825/bolsonaro-invadir-venezuela-expulsar-maduro.html>

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## Terroni, Marco Aurelio.

(Brazil) Veteran NCO of the Military Police of São Paulo, guardian of 3 medals of personal merit, 1 of military valor, 1 title of police of the year, 1 outstanding diploma, 1 peace milestone trophy, 1 outstanding veteran title and 45 compliments. He is a technologist and has a postgraduate degree in Ostensive Police and Preservation of Public Order I and II at the Superior School of Sergeants. He has specialization at the Federal University of Santa Catarina against drugs. He is a black belt in Karate by CBK, a professor of self-defense and non-lethal weapons for security officers, accredited by the Brazilian Federal Police. Writer of the book "O Policial eo Karateca – Profissões Paralelas", in Portuguese, [www.biblioteca24horas.com](http://www.biblioteca24horas.com). Author of more than six written and published works.

# Daesh seeks space in Afghanistan

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



*Taliban in Afghanistan.*

The attack on the prison in the city of Jalalabad, capital of Nangarhar province, 150 kilometers east of Kabul, on Sunday 2, left not only 29 dead and 50 wounded, but also a deep doubt about whether peace will ever be reached in Afghanistan.

The attack, which *Daesh Willat Khorasan*, the Central Asian affiliate of global Daesh, claimed responsibility for, lasted more than twenty hours, starting on Sunday night, when a car bomb exploded in front of the first checkpoints, which continued with the irruption of a group of ten militiamen who broke the guard by force of shots, managing to access the interior of the building, where there were approximately 1,500 prisoners belonging to *Daesh*, the *Taliban* and a significant number of common prisoners, of those who

managed to escape about a thousand, the vast majority of whom were recaptured. It was also known that some 400 more dangerous detainees for being in high-security areas of the prison were not released. It was reported that none of the highest-level prisoners in the terrorist structures were in Jalalabad, as most of them are housed either in the Kabul Central Jail or in a facility near Bagram, the largest military base in the country. the United States maintains in the country.

The combats that would have left at least ten attackers dead, would have lasted for about twenty hours, which speaks of the preparation and strength of the invaders.

At the time of the start of the *mujahideen operation*, the ceasefire decreed by the *Taliban* was still in

*force*, in commemoration of *Eid-ul-Adha* (Feast of Sacrifice), one of the most venerable celebrations in *Islam*.

This *Daesh operation* becomes one of the most complex carried out by the organization in Afghanistan, particularly in the province of Nangarhar, since this has been practically a sanctuary for the organization founded in Syria by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2014.

Among the men of the attacking commando, it is believed that some militiamen from the *Haqqani Network*, a group related to the *Taliban* who apparently left that organization after the peace agreements with the United States signed by the *Taliban* in Doha, Qatar, on February 29, for which they would have joined *Daesh Willat Khorasan*, whose new *emir* is Shahab Almahajir, according to

Afghan intelligence, an old member of the *Haqqani Network*, an organization whose origins date back to the years of the anti-Soviet war, and that today would have between 10 and 15 thousand *mujahideen*.

An Afghan official reported that fighters arrested after the attempted prison takeover had their fingerprints and eye prints scanned and compared with data from Afghan security files, revealing that most had already been arrested on other occasions. for being linked to the *Network* founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani in 1980.

One of the last great actions of *Daesh Khorasan* or ISKP, for its acronym in English, occurred in mid-May, when the Kabul maternity hospital was attacked, managed by *Doctors Without Borders* (MSF), an organization that had to close that center last June, where 16,000 children had been born during 2019. The fact, which left at least 25 dead, most of them women, many of them pregnant, although it was not claimed by any organization, although it is speculated that it was an action by this group, while the reasons that they have provoked it, although the experts attribute different reasons, among them since many victims belong to the *Hazara minority*, a group of *Shia origin*, whom the most ultramontane sectors of *Sunnism* classify as diabolical, for which they have been victims of countless attacks on its *mosques*, processions and community centers across the country, other experts attribute the attack to the fact that the maternity center was run by MSF or simply because the women who Those who attended that institution did not comply with the most closed precepts of *Islam* by being assisted by men and foreigners.

Regarding the attempt to take over the Jalalabad prison, it is no

coincidence that *Daesh* has carried out a similar operation at a time when the great discussion in the country is focused on the release of prisoners, as part of the Doha agreements. The *Taliban* had about a thousand men from the Afghan security forces held throughout the twenty-year war, while in the prisons of President Ashraf Ghani's government, there were about 5,000 *Taliban fighters*, most of whom They were already released, and that only the last 400 would remain, which would be the most "dangerous" and that at this moment a commission of notables is discussing in Kabul, the advisability or not of their release.

Although the prisons have been frequent targets of the Afghan insurgency throughout the entire war against the United States and its partners, managing to free hundreds of their "brothers", with this latest action *Daesh* speaks directly to the bases of the *Taliban*, many of them dissatisfied with the agreement with the United States and with the talks, which will begin on the next tenth with the delegates of President Ghani.

The intense actions of the North American aviation have managed to slow down the actions of *Daesh*, although it is expected that as the peace process between the *Taliban*, the United States and the Afghan government settles, the base of *Daesh* militants will surely mind will broaden, since for many militiamen war is not a matter of faith, but of dollars, which in a country where high unemployment rates have meant that the only certain job opportunity is war. It is to receive these non-conformists that *Daesh* is preparing, which in the three days prior to the attack on the Jalalabad prison, perpetrated nearly forty terrorist acts.

## **Taliban leader demands obedience**

In his brief annual message for the celebration of *Eid-ul-Adha*, the *Amir-ul-Momineen* or Prince of the Believers, the *Taliban 'stop leader*, *Mullah* Hibatullah Akhundzada, issued what can be considered a warning to his own troops, excited after the Doha agreements. The *mullah*, aware of the annoyance of his base, referring to the advantages that the agreement with the United States will leave, said that: "the *Taliban* are close to establishing an Islamic government", after almost twenty years of war, after the fall of his regime that ruled the country from 1996-2001. In another part of his Hibatullah speech, he repeated five times the need for the immediate establishment of a "pure *Islamic government*" with an "Islamic system of laws" for the country. This is a signal to the hardest sectors of his organization as well as a warning to pro-Western Afghan politicians who will have to discuss the future of the country with the *Taliban*. While on innumerable opportunities they have described the government as: "illegitimate", "impotent", "a puppet of the West" and perhaps the most serious offense "un-Islamic", for which, according to them: "it would never share power with the administration of Kabul".

As part of the Doha treaties, Washington should leave Afghanistan in April 2021. *Mullah* Hibatullah, down to the last Afghan, knows that this date means absolutely nothing, since the only ones interested in leaving are the United States. United to stop losing this war every day and the *Taliban* that without the US presence, by hook or by crook, will once again establish the regime of darkness, which will cause new and gigantic massacres for revenge and

discipline. Among the *Taliban lieutenants* the slogan is: "fight the armed *jihād* , until the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is established" which is what has kept the middle managers of the organization in check, and a mutiny has been avoided that would have thrown lose any chance that the United States can escape once and for all, from the trap they got themselves into, and the Taliban can come to Kabul again to take charge of the destiny of the country. That only a few hours after the ceasefire decreed by *Mullah Hibatullah* began, a car bomb exploded in Logar province, killing twenty people, although the Taliban claimed responsibility , the Afghan interior minister Massoud Andarabi said he had evidence that the attack was carried out by a local *Taliban commander* , showing the internal instability of the organization founded by *Mullah Omar* in 1994. The presence of *Daesh* in Afghanistan, added to the internal disorder of the *Taliban*, will make it impossible for the US to withdraw from Afghanistan, if Washington intends that even more blood is not spilled in the Central Asian country.

Image Source

<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan>



# The development of drones by the Colombian industry

By Douglas Hernandez (Colombia)



*CIAC Coelum Remotely Manned Aircraft. Photo from [www.militaryforces.org](http://www.militaryforces.org)*

The Colombian Aeronautical Industry Corporation - CIAC, a company belonging to the Defense Social and Business Group - GSED, leads the country in research and development on the subject of Remotely Manned Aircraft (ART). It must be remembered that ARTs have a military application, but also civil, they are of "dual use", for this reason the market is quite broad. In the magazine Money (2018) it is pointed out that, in the opinion of the experts, in the year 2050 it is possible that 80% of the income of the aerial sector will come from the design and manufacture of drones. By the way, the same source quotes General (r) Flavio Ulloa, who at the time was the CIAC manager, when he assures "For every dollar that is invested today in this type of development, US\$10 will be collected, once implement systems and production lines" At the CIAC facilities in Madrid, Cundinamarca, several drone

prototypes are being built. Of these, the oldest is the Iris, a first attempt that flew in 2011, whose fuselage was made of aluminum. Great experience was acquired with it, and it is still very useful since it serves as a "test laboratory" for other more sophisticated projects. Precisely, the CIAC is very committed to the production of three models of Remotely Manned Aircraft, a light, a medium and a heavy one, intending with this to cover the demand of the Military and Police Forces in Colombia, and also, of course, to export. The light model is the Coelum, a Latin word that means "Heaven". This aircraft weighs just 5 kilos, uses an electric motor, and has two batteries that power the motor and the systems integrated into the platform. It has a flight autonomy of 90 minutes at 3,200 meters above sea level, and a range of 15 kilometers.

When unarmed it can be carried by a soldier in a special backpack. Then it can be quickly assembled and launched in a matter of minutes. This ART will allow troops on the battlefield to have airborne information from several kilometers around them, considerably increasing their situational awareness. The Coelum, in its basic version, has a camera with 20x optical zoom, 40x digital zoom and an infrared sensor. The medium model is the Quimbaya. It weighs 80 kilos, has a flight autonomy of 10 hours, and a maximum range of 130 kilometers. This model works with a gasoline engine. It has a target tracking system, and its operation requires at least three people, working from a control station. The development of this ART required investments of the order of 5 million dollars. It was co-financed by Colombia's state oil company, Ecopetrol, and is expected to contribute to the

patrolling of oil and gas pipelines in the country. It is estimated that when it is on the production line in 2021, its unit cost will be between 2.5 and 3.5 million dollars, which makes it very competitive in the market for drones in its category.

It is opportune to clarify that the most expensive of these projects is not usually the aircraft as such, but the electronic or optical systems that are incorporated according to the client's requirements. The aircraft is just the platform to deliver these systems to the target.

Among the systems that can be incorporated into an ART are photographic and/or video cameras, which can have incredible magnifications, and the possibility of operating in the dark of night. They can carry different types of radars, communications listening devices and electronic warfare elements. Of course, everything will depend on the size and capabilities of the platform.

Colombian developments are aimed at reaching the level of sophistication of other Remotely Manned Aircraft on the market. According to public information, the Quimbaya includes the platform, equipped with a video surveillance camera, a remote control room, and a set of repeater antennas that are located on the ground.

The heavy model is the Atlante Plus. This aircraft weighs more than 500 kilos, its wingspan is about 13 meters. It has a flight autonomy that can reach 15 hours, and can carry a payload of about 100 kilos. This load can be made up of a radar and different types of sensors, the type and characteristics of which are considered reserved.

The Atlante Plus is being developed jointly with the European company Airbus. It is estimated that this ART will have a market cost of about 30 million dollars.

The Colombian Aeronautical Industry Corporation, CIAC, was founded 63 years ago, and since then it has been dedicated to doing aeronautical maintenance on planes and helicopters of the Colombian Air Force, and also those of the civil sector, undertaking manufacturing projects in More recently, for example, it was the

CIAC that manufactured the Calima T-90 training planes that are currently used by the Military Aviation School for basic pilot training, with great success. His most recent undertaking is the development and manufacture of drones, which he has been doing for 9 years, when he started with the model called Iris.

Brigadier General Iván Idalgo Giraldo, current manager of the CIAC, explained in an interview for the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo (2019), that drones are important for the Military Forces, and that at the time the need was seen to avoid exposing life of the different crews in hostile areas where military operations are taking place, and that in those circumstances it was better to send Remotely Manned Aircraft that could do the job.

In the same source, the declarations of Nicolás Castro Latorre, currently leader of special projects of the CIAC, are reviewed, where he points out that the ARTs that are being developed in the Corporation, allow surveillance, identification and monitoring of objectives, and additionally - equipped with the appropriate electronics - to intercept radio frequencies, which would allow the Public Force to identify communications and data transmission, and even, if so required in the development of operations, to block these signals.

The retired General and former CIAC manager, Flavio Ulloa Echeverry, stated that although Colombia is just taking its first steps in the issue of designing and manufacturing military drones, we must not lose sight of the fact that if Colombia manufactures the drones that its Armed Forces require, there may be savings for the country, which varies between 30 and 70% depending on the type of vehicle and the type of mission for which it is required. Additionally, he pointed out that different experts assure that by 2050 the drone market will represent 80% of the income of the entire aviation sector.

## The Drone Market

According to Dinero magazine (2018), in 2017 the sales of drones for civil use grew 34.3% compared to 2016, reaching US\$ 6,000 million. The same source points out that according to projections by Global Markets Inside, this market can reach US\$24 billion by 2024. Colombia hopes to participate in this business, and therefore all the advances in the sector are beginning to be integrated.

In 2018, the first Drone Industry Fair in Colombia was held in Medellín, with 50 exhibitors participating in 70 stands. This fair received more than 1,500 visitors, including foreign visitors. There were speakers from Germany, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, the Dominican Republic and Peru. Among the conclusions of the event, it was established that Colombia is at the same level as many developed countries, because in the country there are multiple entrepreneurs, projects, research groups, advances in security and defense issues, such as the aforementioned CIAC projects, or the systematic use of the ART of the Military and Police Forces, which provides Colombia with significant experience in the area.

Also emerged from this meeting, the consensus that there is a weak point, and this is the issue of legislation. In this regard, Wilson Ospina, Director of CODE Colombia Dron Expo, pointed out that Appendix 13 is currently being socialized for RAC 91, which regulates the operation and certification of unmanned aircraft systems, better known by the acronym UAS. (in Colombia ART). This will replace the current Regulatory Circular 002 of July 27, 2015. "The new document is clearer and more flexible, I would say, although it still has some points that should be reviewed. But for that they are socializing with the different actors in the industry." One point that must be considered is that there are not only aerial drones, but also marine, underwater and terrestrial artifacts, which makes regulation more complicated and

forces more State institutions to be involved.

Juan Carlos Salazar, general director of the Civil Aeronautics (Aerocivil), points out that a specific investment project was launched, with various purposes in relation to drones or Remotely Manned Aircraft (ART): the first of them is to develop the scheme regulation and put Colombia at the same level as the most advanced countries in this regulatory aspect, and the second has to do with promoting the growth of services and this industry in relation to the security sector. In addition, the director of Aerocivil pointed out that this entity is working to create an integrated airspace, where commercial aviation and drones can operate, following the same operational safety standards. Among the different R&D projects that exist in Colombia, there are those of public and private

universities, which guide future Aeronautical Engineers in the subject of drones, and there, the different research groups have presented various ART prototypes in continuous evolution.

In addition, as already mentioned, there are the projects currently being developed by the Colombian Aeronautical Industry Corporation, CIAC, one of them with the participation of the aeronautical giant Airbus. In the development of the ART of the CIAC, 20 professionals from areas such as aeronautical engineering, mechanical engineering, electronic engineering, and industrial engineering have been working since 2017. At this time two of the three prototypes are in the testing phase. By the way, Major Octavio Augusto Rincón of the Colombian Air Force, who as director of production of the CIAC, was

emphatic in stating in an interview that the idea is that with these Colombian projects the fleet of foreign aircraft currently used will be replaced. the country's Military and Police Forces, with a view to two very important objectives: technological independence and competitiveness. It is clear that CIAC wants to impact the Colombian market, but also the international one.

If the world military panorama is reviewed, it will be verified that Remotely Manned Aircraft are currently protagonists in war, and it is foreseeable that they will be even more so in the future. They are attractive to all Armed Forces due to their ability to operate at low cost, hit targets at great distances without endangering crews, and their ability to fly discreetly with an aerodynamic profile that is minimally perceptible by radar.

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## Douglas Hernandez

(Colombia) Founder and director of the website [www. Fuerzasmilitares.org](http://www.Fuerzasmilitares.org), he works as a journalist specializing in security and defense. He is a contributor to the *Air and Space Power Journal* -the institutional magazine of the USAF, now called *the US Air Force Professional Magazine, American Continent-*, and to the Brazilian magazine *Segurança & Defesa*. He is a Sociologist and Master in Education from the University of Antioquia (Medellín, Colombia), a PhD student. He has a Diploma in International Relations.

# Fuerzas Antiterroristas del Mundo

*Audentes Fortuna Iuvat*



## Republic of Congo Armed forces

The Republic of the Congo, also known by the names of Congo-Brazzaville and Congo, is a country in Central Africa. It is bordered to the north by Cameroon and the Central African Republic, to the south and east by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to the west by Gabon and to the southwest by the Atlantic Ocean and an Angolan exclave (Cabinda).



The population does not exceed five million inhabitants, resulting in a low population density. The official languages are French, Kikongo and Lingala; tribal religions are the ones with the most adherents. The economy of the Republic of the Congo continues to be based on agriculture and oil extraction.

The current Congolese territory was inhabited by the Bantu tribes until the arrival of the Europeans in the 16th century. It became a colony of France, under the name "French Congo". After gaining its independence in the mid-20th century, the country went through several political regimes until reaching the multi-party democracy that governs the country in the 21st century.

The Armed Forces of the Republic of the Congo (French: Forces armées de la République du Congo), also referred to less formally as the Forces Armées Congolaises or its acronym FAC, are the military forces of the Republic of the Congo. They are made up of the Congolese Army, the Congolese Air Force, the Congolese Navy, and the Congolese National Gendarmerie.

The dissolution of French Equatorial Africa in 1958, and France's impending military withdrawal from the Congo in August 1960, prompted the formation of the FAC. The FAC and state paramilitary agencies are headed by a Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, usually appointed by the President of the Republic of the Congo.

The Congolese army was created on January 16, 1961 and reflected the nature of the colonial security forces, which recruited from ethnic groups in the north of the country and consisted of junior Bakongo officers and a handful of senior French officers. President Alphonse Massamba-Débat, who took power in 1963, expelled all French personnel and sidelined the military in favor of independent political militias, which were trained by Cuban

troops. The Congolese militias and civil defense corps were later integrated with the FAC as the Armée Nationale Populaire.

Under the People's Republic of the Congo, the FAC was reorganized again, with Mbochi career soldiers making up the bulk of the new officer corps; however, its effectiveness and standards were gradually eroded by draconian political purges during the 1970s. A second major setback occurred during the 1990s, when mass defections led many FAC officers and enlisted troops to join the regional militias. The FAC was reformed for the third time after the Second Congo War, incorporating many former rebels and militiamen.

### **Army**

Tanks: T-54/55 (25), Type 59 (15), Type 63 (8), PT-76 (3), T-34/85.

Infantry fighting vehicles: Mamba APC, BTR-152, BTR-50, BTR-60 (30), WZ551, ZFB-05 (14).

Self-propelled guns: ZSU-23-4 (8)

Multiple Rocket Launcher: BM-21 Grad (6)

Small arms: AKM, AK-47, FN FAL, DShK, RPK, RPD, RP-46, MAT-49, Walther PP, TT Pistol, RPG-7.

Anti-aircraft guns: 37mm M1939 air defense autocannon, 57mm AZP S-60.

### **Marine**

The Navy has about 800 troops. In October 2007, the United States Navy provided training for Congolese Navy personnel in Pointe Noire, a port city that is the second largest settlement in the country.

As of 2019, the Navy operates a single Mil Mi-14 helicopter.

### **Air Force**

After achieving independence from France in 1960, the Congolese Air Force (Force Aérienne Congolaise) began with equipment such as Douglas C-47s, Broussards and Bell 47Gs, followed by Nord Noratlas tactical transports and the Sud Alouette helicopter. In the 1970s, the air force switched to Soviet equipment. This included five Ilyushin IL-14 transports and six Antonov An-24 turboprops and one An-26 in exchange for providing bases for Cuban MiG-17 operations over Angola. These fighters and some MiG-15UTI combat trainers were transferred to the FAC. In 1990 these fighters were replaced by 16 MiG-21MF/bis Fishbeds supplied by the USSR, plus a pair of MiG-21US trainers. Along with a Soviet training mission that remained until late 1991, during that time there were numerous accidents involving both Soviet and Congolese personnel. After the Soviets left, there was only limited funding for MiG operations and they were withdrawn. Six Mi-8 helicopters were delivered from Ukraine in mid-1997 before the Cobra rebel takeover.



In 1990, the Air Force was reformed to its current state. Most of the fighter jets it owned were scrapped in 2001. France and China provided most of the training for the Air Force in recent times.



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