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## EDITORIAL

It is inevitable that we start talking about the issue of COVID-19, since this is a global threat that today affects most countries in the world. We ask everyone to take good care of themselves. In the first note of this edition, we reproduce a statement by Antonio Guterres, Secretary General of the UN, where he talks about the subject.

Step by step our senior analyst, Guadi Calvo, presents us with an approach to the complex peace process in Afghanistan, revealing multiple details that make it difficult for it to materialize in the terms announced by the United States government. Then, he tells us about the Yemeni problem, detailing the situation of the different state and non-state actors, in this conflict that has already lasted several years and thousands of victims, with no end in sight to the suffering of civilians.

Then, Juan Pablo Pardo Retortillo, an officer of the Spanish Navy, gives us a military, geostrategic and prospective analysis related to Morocco and the threat it represents to the interests and present and future security of Spain.

A call for global solidarity by the Secretary General of the United Nations Antonio Guterres continues. In it, he analyzes the general situation with Covid-19 and proposes courses of action at the national and international cooperation levels.

In the article *Ethiopia: The long caravan of the invisible*, Guadi Calvo makes us aware of the terrible drama that Ethiopian migrants experience daily, who, fleeing misery and different forms of violence, try to reach more prosperous countries, living a true hell on the routes they must travel, and not a few dangers in the place of destination, if they manage to reach it.

However, Ethiopia centers its hopes on the completion and commissioning of the *Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)*, which will provide abundant energy to the population and industry, and will surely attract significant investment, having the "small problem" of that by damming the Nile, Egypt is negatively affected, that it sees in this a threat to its survival as a nation, and that it could be driven to a war, yes gentlemen, a war over water. Please read Guadi Calvo's article on the subject.

Then we have an article by Ulises León Kandiko where he illustrates the role of ICTs in Comprehensive Disaster Risk Management (GIRD). Certainly a document of interest in the current conditions of vulnerability to climate change and other threats that could cause entire societies to collapse.

It follows a statement from the Secretary General of the United Nations calling for a global ceasefire in order to confront the pandemic.

Finally, we have an article that presents some of the capabilities that the Colombian Air Force has acquired after its decades-long fight against narco-terrorist groups that threaten democracy.

Know to win!

*Douglas Hernández*

Editor



This newsletter has a Spanish version.

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## TRIARIUS

We have been alerting our readers for more than three years about the different threats that hang over society and our families. We have urged them to help us spread the magazine among their friends and relatives, and we have strongly requested them to help us with articles and analyzes that contribute to strengthening collective security, in addition, we have encouraged them to prepare for a possible crisis situation that would cause collapse society and force us to take extreme measures. In this same box, in different editions of the magazine, we have invited you to store food, to take precautions regarding the safety of your homes, and also to take precautions in case public services are suspended. We constantly invite you to take action “in case something happens”, well, it is already happening. We hope you have paid attention.

On the cover, **Personnel of the 95th Chemical Company of the US Army.** See more information at the end of the magazine.

TRIARIUS privileges freedom of expression, however, the responsibility for what is said in the articles is exclusive to their authors.

Very special thanks to the international analysts who have sent us their articles for this issue free of charge.

# COVID-19: We will get through this together

By António Guterres (UN)



*António Guterres, Secretary General of the United Nations Organization*

The coronavirus (COVID-19) is disrupting our environment. I know that many people are nervous, worried and confused. It is completely natural.

The health threat we face is unlike any other we have ever experienced.

On the other hand, the virus is spreading, the danger is growing, and our health systems, our economies, and our daily lives are under great stress.

The most vulnerable are the most affected, especially our elderly and people with pre-existing conditions, also those who do not have access to stable health care, and those who live in poverty or in precarious conditions.

The social and economic fallout from the combination of the pandemic and slowing economies will weigh on most of us for a few months.

But the spread of the virus will reach a peak. Our economies will manage to recover.

Until then, we must act together to slow the spread of the virus and take care of each other.

It is time to be cautious, not to panic. From science, not from stigma. From facts, not from fear.

Although it has been classified as a pandemic, we can control this situation. We can slow transmission, prevent infection and save lives. But doing so will require unprecedented measures of a personal, national and international nature.

COVID-19 is our common enemy. We must declare war against this virus. This means that countries have a responsibility to prepare, accelerate and intensify measures.

How? Applying effective containment strategies; activating and improving emergency response systems; dramatically increasing testing capacity and patient care; preparing hospitals, ensuring they have the necessary space, supplies and staff; and developing vital medical treatments.

All of us also have our responsibility – to follow medical advice and take the simple and practical steps recommended by health authorities.

In addition to representing a public health crisis, the virus is infecting the world economy.

Financial markets have been hit hard by the uncertainty. Global supply chains have been disrupted. Investment and consumer demand have collapsed, and this carries a real and growing risk of global recession. United Nations economists estimate the virus could cost the world economy at least \$1 trillion this year, perhaps much more.

No country can face this situation alone. More than ever, governments must cooperate to revitalize economies, increase public investment, boost trade, and ensure targeted support is provided to the people and communities most affected by the disease or most vulnerable to negative economic effects, including women, who often bear a disproportionate burden of care work.

A pandemic makes it clear that humanity is a family whose members share essential bonds.

Preventing the further spread of COVID-19 is a shared responsibility for all of us.

The United Nations, including the World Health Organization, has been fully mobilized.

As members of the family of humanity, we are working around the clock with governments, providing international guidance and helping the world deal with this threat.

We fully sympathize with all of you.

We are in this together, and we will get through this, together.

03/16/2020

Fountain:

<https://www.un.org/sg/es/content/sg/articles/2020-03-16/covid-19-we-will-come-through-together>



**fuerzasmilitares.org**  
el portal militar colombiano

# Afghanistan: The Taliban and al Qaeda, dangerous friendships

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



*US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani during the meeting in Kabul.*

According to the announcements made in Doha (Qatar) on Saturday, February 29, the United States and the Taliban had reached an agreement (See Afghanistan: Agreement or Safe Conduct for Trump?) that would end the war of almost nineteen years, which it constitutes the longest that Washington had maintained throughout its history.

Although it was enough to review the advances made by the terrorist organization as of 2015, and how little by little it has achieved territorial control of Kabul, to whose troops it was constantly producing significant casualties, to which we must add the expropriation of state-of-the-art weapons and communications equipment, while they seemed immune to US air attacks, the question was: how would this agreement be taken within the organization, when they seem, once again, so close to the victory?

Although it is also true that many of the fighters have grown weary

from decades of war, while the villagers who provide them with food, and often shelter, are more reluctant to support the mujahideen, who are turning from attacking military targets to civilians. Despite this, the Afghans are skeptical about the conclusion of the agreement, since they doubt that the leaders can control the middle managers and the most radicalized combatants, whose actions in the last six years have produced, each year, more than 10 thousand civilian victims between dead and wounded.

In the areas controlled by the Taliban, almost 60% of the country, the situation of the population is extremely difficult, since the populations live in extreme poverty, constantly on alert due to war actions and without the possibility that the formal government from Kabul, give them some help.

On the other hand, a few hours after the Doha agreement was announced, Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, the Taliban's top

leader, declared "victory" in the name of the entire Muslim nation and the mujahideen", a statement in which he also emphasized the idea of the Islamic Emirate of the Taliban.

After the agreement, it became clear that there are two extremely complex points to resolve: the first is the exchange of prisoners to which the Kabul authorities, who did not participate in the negotiations, categorically refuse, since they fear leaving 5,000 militants, generally well-trained and ideologically convinced, who could immediately rejoin the organization founded by Mullah Omar, which would greatly increase the power of action of the fundamentalists, who are in no way going to disarm their organization, while that the prisoners, the vast majority of them soldiers and policemen, held by the Taliban, are only a thousand, that they could add little to the security forces, since they lack training and have very low combat morale, since they have only enlisted as a "job opportunity".

### **A difficult alliance to break**

The second point, and no less serious, is the "al-Qaeda" issue, since the agreement stipulates that the Taliban would remove all its support and cut off any link with the organization founded by Osama bin Laden. Washington has insisted that the Taliban will have to deny any cooperation with groups or individuals who may pose a threat to US security. Therefore, they will not be able to allow anti-American groups to recruit or train in Afghan territory, nor will the Taliban be able to provide documentation to militants so that they can travel abroad.

These measures, which in practice are impossible to execute, despite the fact that a joint monitoring committee was established to evaluate the progress of the commitments, since both organizations, as well as their leaders, have a very long relationship, in which they have produced important rivalries. In the Doha agreement, the ways and mechanisms with which the United States could monitor these guidelines do not appear either.

When Afghanistan was invaded in 2001 in search of bin Laden, clearly responsible for the attacks on the New York towers, the then leader of the Afghan organization, Mullah Omar and his men at a very high cost of casualties and territorial losses, and that the Americans, tempted the Taliban with material benefits and, in addition to immunity for the high-ranking leaders, maintained their loyalty to the old ally, protecting him along with his men. Without any information being leaked about its location, until it could only be reached by the United States, almost ten years later, already established in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad, under the control of the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), the all-powerful Pakistani espionage service.

For his part, bin Laden's successor, the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, will take his bayat (oath of allegiance) to Mullah Akhundzada, when he became the new amir al-mu'minin or prince of the believers,

after the assassination of the his predecessor Akhtar Mansour, which subordinates al-Qaeda to the Taliban, a pact that has remained untouched until today.

Also, Sirajuddin Haqqani, leader of the well-known and lethal Red Haqqani, responsible for the bloodiest attacks that have been carried out in Kabul in recent years and a very important partner of the Taliban, has not distanced himself from al-Qaeda either. Jalaluddin Haqqani, who died of natural causes in 2018, father of Sirajuddin, a key player in the anti-Soviet war, was one of bin Laden's earliest allies from the early 1980s. What makes it improbable in practice that what was declared by the Secretary of State of the United States, Mike Pompeo, in Doha on the 29th, that the Taliban were not only going to break their alliance with al-Qaeda, but that they were going to collaborate with the CIA teams that remained in the country to lead the actions against al-Qaeda and Daesh Khorasan.

Since 2014, the leadership of al-Zawahiri decided to install what is known as al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent (AQIS), precisely to collaborate with the Taliban in what would be its relaunch, after the interregnum of extensive US control that forced many mujahideen to return to their villages, merge with the civilian population, or settle in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan, to await the moment of the offensive that occurred in 2014, when President Barack Obama decided to begin the withdrawal of US troops . AQIS also operates in Bangladesh, Burma, India, and Pakistan, in addition to Afghanistan.

AQIS members are mimicked by the Taliban, to the point that US officials detain AQIS members in Afghanistan, identifying themselves as mujahideen of the Islamic Emirate, to avoid being brought before international courts. The Indian Asim Umar, the first emir of AQIS, was killed in September 2019, in an attack by joint Afghan-American forces when he was meeting with Taliban leaders in the camp of that organization in Musa Qala, in Helmand province, showing

the close relationship between the two groups. So Pompeo's statements place Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada in a dead end.

Since the publicized agreement was known, and after a week of a ceasefire, very sui generis, the Taliban resumed its attacks against the Afghan army, carrying out some eighty attacks which were answered by the United States with air strikes against positions of the insurgents.

After the announcement on Saturday 29, there were some 70 deaths throughout the country throughout the week, including seven civilians, the rest were Afghan soldiers while the Kabul forces killed about 20 insurgents.

The Taliban's deadliest operation was carried out by its elite group known as Sara Kheta (Red Unit) outside the city of Kunduz, in the north of the country, where they attacked several army checkpoints early Wednesday, killing at least 15 soldiers. This attack came just hours after President Trump spoke on the phone with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, second in command of the organization and who had been in Doha, when the agreement was announced.

But other vectors of violence play in Afghanistan, such as Daesh Khorasan, which on Friday morning carried out an explosive attack in western Kabul, killing 27 people, while another 55 were injured when a tribute was paid to Abdul Ali Mazari, assassinated by the Taliban in 1995, a politician from the Shia minority, Hazara, a propitiatory target for Daesh men, in which none other than Abdullah-Abdullah participated, the Afghan government's deputy, who was evacuated to a safe place along with other local personalities who participated in the act. Immediately in a statement the Taliban spokesman, Zabihulá Muyahid, denied that his organization was involved in the event.

Next Tuesday the 10th, the intra-Afghan talks will begin, where President Ashraf Ghani's men will have to face a Taliban commission, to continue discussing a peace in which no one seems to trust too much.

Image Source:

<https://www.elperiodico.com/es/internacional/20200323/pompeo-visits-afghanistan-to-try-to-save-the-peace-process-7901165>

**Guadi Calvo**

(Argentina) Argentine writer and journalist. International Analyst specialized in Africa, Middle East and Central Asia.



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# Yemen: The uncertain hour

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



*Houthi warriors, defenders of Yemen against the Saudi invasion.*

The devastating Houthi attack on the Saudi oil refineries in Abqaiq, the largest in the world, and the Khurais oil field (See: Saudi Arabia: Between Vietnam and 9/11) last September, which forced Riyadh to reduce its production to almost 50%, quickly led to King Salman and his son, the strong man of the regime and factotum of the war against Yemen, of which Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman will be five years old on the 25th, to sit in an informal negotiating table with Houthi delegates at the end of that same September. With the terrifying resonance that, for the Saud, left one of Trump's first statements, after the bombings: "The September attacks were against Saudi Arabia and not against the

United States." The differentiation caused the Saudis to panic.

What initially seemed to be a great incentive to slow down the war, having been corroborated on almost all fronts, after more than five months the talks have never been able to draw a true map of negotiations, which conclude in an agreement, the war a new escalation has begun, although this time the only victims will no longer be only Yemenis. Which could cause the Saudis to be more "gentle" when it comes to negotiating.

The Houthi rebels have resumed missile attacks against Saudi Arabia and the Saudis their airstrikes against Sanaa, the violence intensifying on the front-

line east of the city of Sanaa, the country's capital, controlled by Houthis since 2014. missile attack on January 19, against a Saudi coalition military camp, killed more than 100 people, and left about 150 wounded in a missile operation in Marib province, east of Sanaa, the capital of the country. Some sources insist that many of the victims were civilians and others even that the attack was against a mosque, although neither of the two accusations have been corroborated. The attack came in response to the start of the offensive by pro-Saudi troops in the Naham area, north of Sanaa.

In mid-February, Houthi resistance forces had shot down a Tornado fighter jet with a surface-to-

air missile in al-Jawf governorate in the north of the country. After the shooting down, a crowd gathered around the wreckage of the downed plane, so as revenge the Saudi command bombed the place, killing about thirty people and injuring another 15, mostly civilians. Although the coalition has recognized the fact, they have justified themselves by arguing the vague figure of "collateral damage". At the same time, Riyadh denounced that the Houthis forces had opened fire on the two Tornado pilots, who had ejected after being hit by the missile, presenting it as a violation of international humanitarian law, without having the same qualms as their bombings. since the zero hour of the war, they have sentenced entire populations to death, sweeping villages, towns and entire neighborhoods of the country's most important cities off the map.

According to United Nations statistics, always very biased when it comes to accounts, which could incriminate an ally of the United States: since March 2015, after the start of the asymmetric war in Saudi Arabia, one of the best-armed armies in the world, against the poor population of Yemen, organized behind the Ansarullah movement, better known as Houthis, have brought ten million people to the brink of famine and 80% of the almost thirty million Yemenis need help, another three millions have been displaced, epidemic diseases such as cholera have killed more than 5,000 people, and two and a half million children under the age of five suffer from severe malnutrition. While the number of deaths as a result of the war, for years has been maintained at 10,000, although the real figure must be close to 50,000.

The new escalation of war that threatens to break out, not only with greater intensity, in Yemeni territory, can openly settle in

territories of the Saudi south, with a Shiite majority. There are those who consider in this equation the factor that, in the north of Yemen, is where the Houthis militias are strongest, if this scenario materializes, it would necessarily and without further excuses force an open intervention by the North Americans, since the presence of any force that might present itself as an enemy of the Saud family would be enough to spark popular uprisings that could literally set the kingdom on fire.

### **The war of a thousand faces**

In this framework, the possibility that the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran could face each other directly in the Yemeni-Saudi theater is not remote. With the attacks on Aramco last September, the world - but particularly Iran - has learned of the precariousness of Saudi economic security and the weakness of its defensive capacity, beyond the fact that both the United States and Israel have already taken care of that issue, although with Iran you never know, no one could have foreseen his categorical response to the assassination of General Suleimani, executing his hitman, Michael D'Andrea (See: Suleimani, a dark day of justice).

Until now, the most spectacular blows of the war have been dealt by the Houthis, at a price infinitely lower than the enormous fortunes that the kingdom has invested and will continue to invest, not to win the war, but only so that its king and his princes continue to have their heads in place.

At the same time, in recent months the Houthi-Iran alliance has become much stronger, which allows the presence of a significant number of Revolutionary Guard officers. This is simply verified by the confirmation that on the same day of the martyrdom of General

Qassem Soleimani, near the Baghdad airport, (See: Qassem Soleimani Who will stop death?) in Yemen, the highest-ranking Iranian official in Yemen, commander Abdul Reza Shahlai, in Sanaa managed to escape from an attack almost identical to the one that killed Soleimani. Although the reason for the failure was not known, when the Pentagon was consulted, its spokesperson, Commander Rebecca Rebarich, said: "The Department of Defense does not discuss alleged operations in the region", so it would not be strange if they try again, although We will only know if that time is "successful". In 2008, the US Treasury designated Shahlai as a terrorist for "threatening the peace and stability of Iraq and the Government of Iraq," while the State Department offered a \$15 million reward for information on "the whereabouts or their financial activities, networks and associates in Yemen and the region."

Given the dark presence of Saudi Arabia in Yemen, which politically and militarily also filters into their country, both Riyadh and Washington have whitewashed the incorporation of a key player in Yemen since long before the start of the war and even in the years of the former president. Ali Abdullah Saleh, overthrown in 2012, al-Qaeda for the Arabian Peninsula or AQAP is considered one of the most effective branches of the global terrorist network, which he manages since the death of Osama bin Laden, the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahri. For many, this franchise is the most combative, made up of militiamen hardened by years of fighting, dating back to the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan, with high training and state-of-the-art weapons. Which could somehow contain the victorious display of the Houthis. Although for many with the death of the leader of AQAP,

Qassem al-Rimi (See: Trump: all for power, all against Iran.) The United States can fully objectify its actions against the Houthis.

Washington, on the other hand, will in no way be able to allow a profound change in the Saudi kingdom, which is not only its first purchaser of weapons among an endless list of products, but fundamentally the dissolving factor for any advance in world unity. Arab, of what, produced that unity, in a short time could become a threat to the survival of the Zionist enclave, which occupies Palestine. So you have to read with particular attention everything that happens in Saudi Arabia, whose internal differences, in this case literally: *palatial*, which have led to the arrest

of several very close members of the Saud family, last Friday, March 6, among them Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, brother of King Salman, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, nephew of the monarch, whom the king just assumed in January 2015, removed from the line of succession to put his son Mohammed bin Salman. The disgraced princes were apparently plotting to overthrow King Salman and his son. Later the news broke that Prince Nayef's younger brother, Prince Nawaf bin Nayef, was also detained. Beyond the Shakespearean intrigues, jealousies and envy, without a doubt MsB, is in good health, knows that they have many pending accounts among their own, we

should remember the great raid that occurred in November 2017, when hundreds of senior officials, businessmen and members of the royal family were arrested for "corruption", perhaps these latest arrests are just the preamble to others. The murder of the regime's functional journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, who at some point seemed to recover some of his dignity, which he paid with his life, and the recent espionage of mega tycoon Jeff Bezos, owner of Amazon, have put him in the sights of many, although without a doubt his greatest crime has been the war against the Yemeni people, who are going through their most uncertain hour.

Image Source:

[https://www.middleeasteye.net/sites/default/files/styles/article\\_page/public/images-story/houthis\\_sanaa-afp-9\\_21\\_19.jpeg?itok=\\_EHPH16R](https://www.middleeasteye.net/sites/default/files/styles/article_page/public/images-story/houthis_sanaa-afp-9_21_19.jpeg?itok=_EHPH16R)

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# Morocco: the “indirect” threat

By Juan Pablo Pardo Retortillo (Spain)



*F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter-bombers of the Royal Moroccan Air Force*

**SUMMARY:** The recent modernization of the Moroccan Armed Forces, especially in the land and air armies, forces those responsible for Spanish national defense to rethink the nature of the possible threats that Morocco represents. This article will analyze these threats, especially those derived from the adoption by Morocco of an "indirect" strategy, determining its degree and proposing possible responses.

**KEYWORDS:** "Indirect" strategy, Morocco, Spain, Canary Islands.

## **Geostrategy of Morocco**

The traditional concern of the Canary Islands-Gibraltar-Balearic Islands axis as the main threat to the security of Spain becomes more topical due to the purchase by the Moroccan Armed Forces of new, powerful and modern military weapons, especially with regard to their armies of land and air.

Indeed, the Moroccan army is no longer the same as it was at the time of the invasion of the Perejil islet (2002), not even the same as it was just five years ago. Its Armed Forces have experienced a substantial improvement both qualitatively and quantitatively. This definitive advance is explained by the peculiar geostrategy of Morocco, which we will briefly summarize:

To the east: Morocco borders Algeria and its powerful army (more powerful and numerous than the Moroccan), which makes it the main "direct" threat. This threat has increased in recent years due to the intense arms race in Algeria (500 Russian T-90S battle tanks, 300 armored transport vehicles, etc...).

To the north: Morocco borders the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla, a source of permanent conflict with Spain due to considering them as part of the Alawite kingdom.

To the south: Morocco borders the Western Sahara where, after the independence of these territories from Spain, it maintains a latent conflict against the Polisario Front, in its eagerness to annex these territories and their deposits and resources.

To the west: Morocco borders the Atlantic Ocean and the Spanish islands of the Canary archipelago, for which it also feeds annexationist desires, undoubtedly seeking the future exploitation of deposits on its continental shelf.

It is to respond to the demands of these four probable scenarios of conflict that the Moroccan Armed Forces have made their latest arms purchases.

## Modernization of the Moroccan Armed Forces

The current modernization of the Moroccan Armed Forces has reached its three armies, although it has gained maximum interest in the ground and air armies. Thus, among other weapons, approximately:

- 400 Abrams M1A1 main battle tanks.
- 100 VT-A1 main battle tanks.
- 600 tracked armored transports (TOA).
- 130 self-propelled howitzers.
- Numerous WS-2D missile launcher trucks.
- 1,200 VAMTAC vehicles and 1,000 Humvees vehicles.

And as far as the air force is concerned, approximately:

- 24 F-16C/D.
- 25 F-16V Block 70/72

These are undoubtedly considerable and respectable figures, especially considering that both the M1A1 battle tanks and the F-16 aircraft have been acquired from the United States together with a complete modernization and updating of the same, which makes them fundamental factors to take into account when analyzing their possible use by Morocco.

## Moroccan Strategies

Taking all of the above into account, from the analysis of the Moroccan Order of Battle (ORBAT), or disposition of its forces in peacetime, the following conclusions are reached:

1. The deployment of the Moroccan Armed Forces is oriented towards the main "direct" threat: the Algerian army. With a distribution of its armored and mechanized brigades connected to each other by the country's road network, and easily linked, reinforcing each other when and where necessary. This scheme responds to the traditional and powerful defensive strategy based on interior lines, and says a lot about the military capacity and wisdom of the Moroccan high command. It would be a serious mistake on the Spanish part to underestimate them.
2. There are no forces deployed directly against the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla, although the most powerful armored brigade is also the closest to Melilla, only 100 kilometers away, and can be quickly reinforced as we have previously mentioned. In any case, this indicates a marginal character of its northern flank. Despite being the object of a permanent claim against Spain, it is obvious that the Moroccans do not expect an attack by the Spanish forces stationed in the two cities, nor an amphibious landing on those coasts. At the moment, the "indirect" Moroccan strategy for this flank involves the gradual increase in the Muslim population of Moroccan origin in the two cities (as an obvious spearhead and fifth column in the event of a conflict), apart from reserving any other measure of the kind logistics (cutting off supplies, etc...).
3. The acquisition of the F-16 combat aircraft has meant a turnaround in quantity and quality in relation to the Moroccan western flank. In other words, regarding the front of the Canary Islands, now the tactical superiority corresponds to the Moroccan military forces. It is on this western flank that the Moroccan forces can attempt some partial success by resorting to "indirect" strategies, as will be discussed later.
4. The limitation of the 1991 international treaties for the demilitarization of the Sahara zone prevents the Moroccans from deploying modern weapons in said zone, which obliges them to maintain a park of old units so as not to leave said flank unprotected. The current situation is stagnant.

In conclusion, with the eastern flank (Algeria) duly defended in depth, and the southern flanks (Sahara) and north (Ceuta and Melilla) in a momentary situation of stalemate and with few or no real possibilities of "direct" use of the war potential, the western flank (Canary Islands) is the only one in which, using "indirect" strategies, the status quo can still be changed and the time and surprise factor can be used to achieve political objectives.

But in order to be able to infer the strategies that the Moroccan army is carrying out or could carry out, we not only have to take into account its new weapons acquisitions and the possibilities that we have already outlined, but we also have to take into account macro or exogenous factors, that is, that is, those at the level of international grand strategy.

The main exogenous factor corresponds to the geographical location of Morocco which, together with Spain, are the two countries that control one of the keys to access the Mediterranean Sea: the Strait of Gibraltar. And this circumstance is of great interest to the greatest current thalassocratic power: the United States. Thus, we have that Spain belongs to the defensive *simaquía* (NATO) of the American Hegemon, while Morocco holds the accreditation of "Important Non-NATO Ally". This implies that, as occurred in the Perejil islet conflict, any conflict between Spain and Morocco will be closely monitored by the United States, which will be able to tip the balance towards the winner of its convenience and decide the fate of the conflict. . The fact that the most common origin of the military equipment of both countries is the United States (or its allies), only expands the control that the

United States has over both, since it can strangle the logistics of said means at its pleasure. (something they already did in the Malvinas war against Argentine aviation).

### Possible Conflict Scenarios

We have already commented on the wisdom in the Art of War that, thanks to the decisions made in the deployment of their forces, the Moroccan commanders demonstrate.

Specifically with respect to Spain, it is observed that they avoid a direct approach in the natural line of expectation (Ceuta and Melilla), while in reality they play with the time factor and with indirect strategies on its western flank (Canary Islands), the authentic strategic objective due to the deposits of the continental platforms. If we add to this the correct use of tactical force (new F-16 aircraft) and the surprise factor, those responsible for the Spanish defense should feel concerned and start taking preventive measures, since the expansionist tendency of the Moroccan regime is well known, expressed in his famous map of Greater Morocco that hangs on the walls in some important Rabat offices and that includes the Canary Archipelago as part of its physical geography.

| Comparison Armed Forces of Morocco and Spain. |                     |           |                       |        |
|---|---------------------|-----------|-----------------------|--------|
|   | MOROCCO             |           | SPAIN                 |        |
|   | Model               | No.       | Model                 | No.    |
| <b>Air Force</b>                              | F-16C/D             |           | Eurofighter EF2000    | 66     |
|   | F-16V               | 25        | F-18M/BM              | 65     |
|   | Mirage F1M          | 25        | F-18A+                | twenty |
|   | F-5E/F              | 22        |                       |        |
| <b>battle tanks</b>                           | M1A1 SA Abrams      | 400       | Leopard 2E            | 219    |
|   | M-60A3              | 400       | Leopard A4            | 60     |
|   | T-72 / VT-A1        | 170       |                       |        |
| <b>tank destroyer</b>                         | AMX 10              | 100       | Centaur               | 84     |
|   | AML 90              | 120       |                       |        |
| <b>Vehicles</b>                               |                     |           | Pizarro               | 262    |
| <b>helicopters</b>                            | Gazelle             | 22        | Tiger                 | 24     |
| <b>Artillery</b>                              | 155M-198            | 35        | 105 Light Gun         | 56     |
|   | 155FH70             | 30        | 155 SIAC              | 66     |
|   | 155 M-109 ATP       | 248       | 155 M-109 ATP         | 96     |
| <b>naval force</b>                            | frigate FREMM       | one       | Aircraft carrier      | one    |
|   | Floreal frigate     | two       | B. Amphibious Assault | two    |
|   | Discovered Corvette | 4         | F-100 Frigate         | 5      |
|   |                     |           | F-80 Frigate          | 6      |
|   |                     |           | BAM Meteor            | 6      |
|   |                     | Sub. S-80 | 3                     |        |
| <b>Naval Aviation</b>                         |                     |           | Harrier AV-8B Plus    | 12     |
|   | helicopters         | 3         | helicopters           | 30     |
| <b>Cash</b>                                   | Earth               | 175,000   | Earth                 | 80,000 |
|   | Sea                 | 15,000    | Sea                   | 22,000 |
|   | Air                 | 13,500    | Air                   | 22,000 |

**Table 1:** Comparative military power between Spain and Morocco. Source: self-made.

Let us remember that, for the time being, the Moroccans have already recently launched a diplomatic offensive (two laws) with the unilateral proclamation of the delimitation of waters exclusively exploited by the Maghreb country, which (apart from appropriating the waters of Western Sahara and exploiting of its resources) creates overlaps with Spanish waters in the Canary Islands, specifically in relation to a great object of desire: the Tropic seamount, located 500 kilometers southwest of the island of El Hierro, in which the largest tellurium deposit ever recorded. Tellurium is a material considered strategic in the technology industry, of great value for making solar panels and high-speed conductors for mobile phones.

And on the horizon of this entire issue, the problem of the control of irregular immigration from the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan West Africa that Morocco carries out on the explicit and paid commission of the EU and Spain, and that the government of Rabat used at convenience as pressure in other types of bilateral issues.

As we can see, the indirect Moroccan strategy is perfect, since, in order to ensure the achievement of an objective, alternative objectives must be available: in this way it "attacks" the weakest part, richest in resources and worst garrisoned (Spain only features the 20 F-18 A+ fighter planes of the 462 Squadron, the oldest and

least modernized in the Air Force, acquired second-hand from the United States and in urgent need of replacement), while "entertaining" and keeping the attention of Spain in tensions in Ceuta and Melilla and with the pressure of immigration (a strategy very similar to that of the Muslim beacon country: Turkey). The Moroccan commanders are aware that in a war the real objective is the minds of the hostile leaders, not the bodies of their troops, and that the balance between victory and defeat pivots on mental impressions, since the true purpose of the strategy lies in reducing the possibility of resistance.

Would it be possible for another Moroccan "Green March" to appropriate some of the Canary Islands (Fuerteventura or Lanzarote), thus forcing some negotiations and giving them as good a result as in 1975? A peaceful march by a "flotilla of boats" full of unarmed civilian immigrants accompanied by several troop transports and air support from the new Moroccan F-16s, all under the cover of a convincing propaganda campaign as a curtain? of smoke? It is not as far-fetched a plan as it may seem at first.

Let us remember that, in 1975, the United States and France (always seeking to harm Spain and the Hispanic ethos) agreed with the Moroccan occupation of the Sahara (also because Algeria and the Polisario Front were close to the Soviet Union), and that in Despite being an attack on the territory of a NATO nation, the Perejil conflict was defined by the United States as merely an "unfriendly gesture", which prevented military support from the rest of the coalition countries for Spain, ending the conflict with the formalization of an agreement by which the islet remains uninhabited and without symbols of sovereignty (that is, largely rewarding Moroccan behavior).

If history is the teacher of life, it is noteworthy that the Moroccans seem to have learned the historical lessons very well, just the opposite of the Spanish. Moroccan strategists have shown great mastery of indirect strategy techniques, they know that the purpose of the strategy is to dismantle the enemy, and its consequences can be the dislocation of the enemy or a greater facility to disintegrate it in the conflagration that occurs after. Said dislocation may imply partial combats or violent actions of a certain relevance, but devoid of the character of a battle (for example, a preventive air attack by the Moroccan F-16 against the 20 Spanish F-18 with few human casualties, thus guaranteeing the superiority aerial in subsequent actions?).

Another advantage for the Moroccans of attacking on this flank of the Canary Islands is that, accustomed to the eternal dispute over Ceuta and Melilla, a coup de force on this flank would disrupt the dispositions of the Spanish armed forces and the psychological plane of their leaders by force a sudden "change of front" and dislocate the distribution and organization of its forces.

And if the Moroccans manage to make this dislocation occur at an unexpected moment (surprise effect) and make their Spanish adversary "suddenly" realize that he is at a disadvantage, or feel that he is unable to counteract his opponent's action, then the chances of success of your indirect strategy are almost certain.

### **The Spanish Position against the Indirect Threat**

Faced with such an indirect threat, what military measures can Spain take to eradicate it? Among others, the following:

1. Immediately replace the old F-18 combat aircraft of the 462 Squadron, at least with modern Eurofighters, to regain tactical superiority over the new Moroccan F-16s, thus eliminating one of the most important factors in the equation of indirect strategy.
2. In parallel, carry out an energetic work of complaints and propaganda at the UN and at all levels, to counteract Moroccan legislation and its awareness campaigns and legitimizing smokescreen for future hostile actions.
3. Carry out maneuvers with the Fleet in the overlapping areas of exclusively exploited waters, in order to "show muscle" to the enemy and reassure the Spanish population of the Canary Islands. These maneuvers must include an amphibious landing in Fuerteventura or Lanzarote, in such a way that it serves as a test of a hypothetical war scenario, and also generates first-hand information on the cost and logistical problems of a similar operation.
4. Maintain a constant state of alert regarding Moroccan movements in the area, and prepare an action plan in the event of a new "Green March".
5. Finally, develop a network of alliances with Morocco's enemies: Algeria and the Polisario Front, in order to maintain a constant pressure clamp that both exert, thus preventing the Moroccans from embarking on uncertain war adventures on their western-Canary front. Solving first, of course, the question of the unilateral expansion of Algerian waters, in which it includes areas of the Balearic island of Cabrera... coincidence or causality?

### **Conclusion**

The new acquisitions of weapons by Morocco, especially the modern F-16 fighter planes, have completed the formula for an effective "indirect" action on the Canarian front. It is urgent that the Spanish authorities take measures to return to the previous status quo, under penalty of facing in inferior conditions and by surprise an indirect Moroccan strategy action with great possibilities of success. Learning from the lessons of history, and

not trusting hypothetical allies with multiple interests in the area, will be the best path for a new Spanish containment strategy in the area, which guarantees the rights of Spain and peace for the Canarian population. .

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Image Source:

<https://fineartamerica.com/featured/royal-moroccan-air-force-f-16-block-52-giovanni-colla.html>

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2020

# EUROSATORY

8 AL 12 DE JUNIO 2020 / PARIS

LA FERIA  
**MUNDIAL**  
INELUDIBLE



**1,802**   
expositores **+14,7%**  
de 63 países  
65,9% son internacionales  
**65 startups en Eurosatory LAB**

**98,721**  
**Asistencia total**  
(expositores, visitantes,  
prensa, organizadores)

**227**  
**Delegaciones oficiales**  
de 94 países  
y 4 organizaciones  
(en representación de 760 delegados)

**696**  
**periodistas**  
de 44 países

**75 Conferencias**  
**2 102 Reuniones de negocios realizadas**



# Statements by the Secretary General on COVID 19: A call for solidarity

By António Guterres (UN)



*António Guterres, UN Secretary General*

We are facing a global health crisis unseen in the 75-year history of the United Nations, which is spreading human suffering, infecting the global economy and disrupting people's lives.

A global recession, perhaps also unprecedented, is almost certain.

The International Labor Organization has just reported that by the end of this year, workers around the world could lose up to US\$3.4 trillion in income.

It is, above all, a human crisis that requires solidarity.

Our human family is stressed and the social fabric is being torn apart. People are suffering, sick and scared.

Current responses at the national level do not take into account the global scale and complexity of the crisis.

What is needed now is coordinated, decisive and innovative political action from the world's leading economies. We must recognize that the most affected will be the poorest and most vulnerable countries, especially women.

I welcome the decision of the G20 leaders to convene an emergency summit next week to respond to the colossal challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, and I look forward to participating in it.

The central idea that I want to convey is clear: we are in an unprecedented situation and the usual rules no longer apply. We cannot resort to the usual tools in such unusual times.

The creativity of the response must match the unique nature of the crisis, and the magnitude of the response must match its scale.

Our world faces a common enemy: we are at war with a virus.

COVID-19 is killing people, as well as attacking the core of the real economy: trade, supply chains, businesses, jobs. There are entire cities and countries in lockdown. Borders are closing. Businesses are struggling to stay open, and families trying to stay afloat.

But, in managing this crisis we also have a unique opportunity.

If the crisis is managed well, we can move the recovery in a more sustainable and inclusive direction. Conversely, poor policy coordination could fix – and even worsen – inequalities that are already unsustainable, undoing hard-won development gains and poverty reduction.

I call on world leaders to join forces and give an urgent and coordinated response to this global crisis.

I see three critical areas for action:

### ***FIRST, FACE THE HEALTH EMERGENCY***

Many countries no longer have the capacity to treat even the mildest cases in specialized health facilities, and many of them are unable to respond to the enormous needs of older people.

Even in the richest countries, the health systems cannot cope, due to the pressure to which they have been subjected.

Health spending must be increased immediately to meet urgent needs and increased demand - expand testing coverage, strengthen facilities, pay health workers and ensure adequacy of supplies - while fully respecting human rights and avoiding stigma.

It has been shown that it is possible to contain the virus, and it is imperative to do so.

If we let it spread like wildfire, especially in the most vulnerable regions of the world, it would kill millions of people.

And without further delay we need to stop adopting health strategies at the national level, each country for itself, and instead ensure, in full transparency, a coordinated global response, also helping countries less prepared to deal with the crisis.

Governments must give the strongest support to the multilateral work against the virus, led by the World Health Organization, whose calls must be met without exception.

The health catastrophe shows that we are just as strong as the weakest health system.

Global solidarity is not just a moral imperative: it is for the good of all.

### ***SECOND, WE MUST FOCUS ON SOCIAL IMPACT AND ECONOMIC RESPONSE AND RECOVERY***

Unlike what happened in the financial crisis of 2008, the answer in this case does not lie in injecting capital into the financial sector. This time it is not a banking crisis; and indeed, banks must be part of the solution.

Nor is this a usual shock to supply and demand: this is a shock to society as a whole.

The liquidity of the financial system must be guaranteed, and banks must take advantage of their resilience to provide support to their clients.

Let us not forget that we are essentially facing a human crisis.

What matters most is that we focus on people: low-wage workers, small and medium-sized businesses, and the most vulnerable.

This means that wage support, insurance and social protection must be provided, to prevent bankruptcies and job losses.

It also means that fiscal and monetary responses must be devised so that the burden does not fall on those with the fewest resources.

Recovery must not come at the expense of the poorest, and we cannot create a legion of new poor.

We have to get the resources directly to the people. Several countries are adopting social protection initiatives, such as cash transfers and universal income.

We need to go one step further and make sure that support reaches those who are totally dependent on the informal economy and those countries that are least able to respond.

Remittances are vital in the developing world, especially now. Some countries have already committed to reducing remittance fees to 3%, well below current average levels. The crisis demands that we go further and get as close as possible to zero.

In addition, the G20 leaders have taken measures to protect the citizens and the economy of their respective countries by waiving interest charges. We must apply that same logic to the most vulnerable countries in our global village and ease their debt burden.

In general, adequate financial services need to be guaranteed to help countries in difficulty. The IMF, the World Bank and other international financial institutions have a key role to play in this regard. The private sector is essential for finding creative investment opportunities and protecting jobs.

And we must not give in to the temptation to resort to protectionism. Now is the time to break down trade barriers and restore supply chains.

If we look at the bigger picture, the disruptions in society are having a profound impact.

We must respond to the effects of this crisis on women. The world's women disproportionately bear the burden in the home and in the wider economy.

Children are also paying a heavy price. Right now, more than 800 million children are not going to school, which is where many of them get their only meal for the day. We must ensure that all children have equal access to food and education, reducing the digital divide and the costs of connectivity.

Now that people have to isolate themselves and their lives become disrupted and chaotic, we must prevent this pandemic from becoming a mental health crisis. And young people will be the most at risk.

The world needs to continue to provide core support to programs for the most vulnerable, for example through refugee and humanitarian response plans coordinated by the United Nations. Humanitarian needs must not be sacrificed.

### ***THIRD AND FINALLY, WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO “RECOVER BETTER”***

The 2008 financial crisis demonstrated beyond doubt that countries with strong social protection systems suffered the least and recovered the fastest.

We must ensure that the lessons are learned and that this crisis is a milestone in terms of preparing for health emergencies and investing in essential public services of the 21st century and the effective provision of global public goods.

We have a framework for action for that: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement on climate change. We must keep our promises for the people and the planet.

The United Nations, and our global network of country offices, will support all governments so that the global economy and the people we serve emerge stronger from this crisis. That is the logic of the Decade of Action to meet the Sustainable Development Goals.

Today more than ever we need solidarity, hope and political will to overcome this crisis together.

Thanks a lot.

03/19/2020

<https://www.un.org/sg/es/content/sg/speeches/2020-03-19/remarks-virtual-press-encounter-covid-19-crisis>

# Ethiopia: The long caravan of the invisible

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



*Migrants walk through the arid landscape near Obock. Photo: IOM*

Ethiopia, with its almost 108 million inhabitants, of whom 70 percent are under 30 years of age, has become one of the largest “suppliers” of economic migrants and refugees from Africa, to which must be added 2 million internally displaced, due to political violence and climate issues.

The routes most used by thousands of these young people trying to find their destiny, far from the reality that condemns them to poverty, are towards the Mediterranean, seeking to reach the Libyan ports to jump to Europe, which represent about 5,700 kilometers; the southern route: with final destination South Africa, about 6,800 kilometers, of diseases that must drag through Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique; although for “security” reasons, like the smugglers, they use, after Kenya,

the diversion that takes them through Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe.

But the preferred destination of the Ethiopians is Saudi Arabia, along with other monarchies of the Persian Gulf, during 2019, some 190 thousand Ethiopians tried to reach the kingdom excited by its riches and consider that being Muslim nations, they will have a better reception than in the green Nazi Europe and xenophobic South Africa. Although they will discover the truth more than 2 thousand kilometers ahead, after exhausting weeks of traveling through deserts, sea crossings, a war, to finally try to cross the last frontier, as hostile as any of Europe or the United States.

The majority of the Ethiopian migrants belong to the Oromo ethnic group, the majority in the country with some thirty million

members, extended in the central area and to the south of Addis-Abeba, considered the most economically disadvantaged, for which reason their caravans are mostly on foot, while the other two main ethnic groups, the Tigray and the Amara, have sufficient resources to travel by vehicle. It is the Oromos, particularly those who suffer the most from the consequences of the long pilgrimage due to climatic conditions, lack of food and exhaustion, which mean that there are many deaths, while many of them are robbed and almost all the women are raped in different points along the way, so it is not strange that when they reach the end of the route they are pregnant, with all the burden that this means.

In the last ten years, crowds of desperate people have crossed the

fiery roads of northern Ethiopia, passing through the never kind Eritrea, to continue on to the village of Gâláfi, in Djibouti, where veritable crowds gather in search of the port of Obock, in the Gulf of Tadjoura, on the Red Sea. From there they will embark on boats of dubious safety, always overloaded, which sail approximately one hundred kilometers to the shores of fiery Yemen. It has been recorded that through the sectors through which the intense migratory flow circulates, the economy of the towns that cross has been invigorated.

In Obock, every evening, about a thousand migrants gather, who patiently wait for the smugglers, at a price strictly stipulated by the appearance of the "passenger", ranging from 700 to 2,000 dollars, to embark them for the sea crossing. that, from Yemen, they can reach the kingdom of the Saud.

Although already on Yemeni soil it begins to be part of another business, run by the harami (criminals), armed gangs made up of Yemenis and Ethiopians who kidnap migrants en masse and transport them in trucks to illegal detention centers called "farms" where they are tortured, amputating limbs, burning them with melted plastic, hanging them head down, trying to get them to call their relatives, to ask them to pay the ransom, which for most of these families means selling everything they have: animals, land and tools.

This route, considered the most dangerous migratory current in the world, has been active for many years, as early as April 2013, the United Nations had pointed out the drama of Ethiopian migrants, demanding international aid, which has not yet been produced after almost seven years. Two factors have greatly complicated this transit, first, that the number of those trying to reach the Saudi kingdom is increasing, even surpassing those who intend to reach Europe, and the war that, starting in 2015, Riyadh unleashed against Yemen. , so that the transit of migrants is increasingly dangerous, triggering the number of missing persons. Before 2015, it

was already known that hundreds of these migrants were kidnapped and held in places of confinement called "farms", waiting for the families of the victims to pay the ransom. Even the Yemeni government carried out several operations in search of his release. As a result of these procedures, the Yemeni authorities, in the midst of the civil war, were forced to open shelters for those rescued in the city of Sanná, the Yemeni capital, for their subsequent repatriation to their countries of origin, mainly Ethiopia.

After the civil war that was followed by the genocidal war in Saudi Arabia, which focused its air operations on the Yemeni capital, the sites dedicated to the congregation of asylees, like the majority of the city, disappeared under the Saudi bombs, unknown the fate of many of those refugees, without knowing how many died, how many managed to escape and how many were forcibly recruited by one of the many factions participating in the war.

Although the risk that some of the multitudes of kidnapping gangs lurk practically along the entire route, both in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Yemen, is the most evident, the possibility of dying on the sea crossing is also not it is remote. As the number of migrants and boats that come and go from Djibouti to Yemen is unknown, it is also not known how many of the "passengers" may fall into the sea or directly die when the boats capsize, since there is no international organization that monitors them. about the topic.

### **Knocking on the gates of the kingdom**

Saudi Arabia is one of the few nations in the world that is not a signatory to the 1951 United Nations convention, in which refugee status is recognized, so that those who manage to penetrate its borders are left to the free will of the authorities, even before doing so, since there are numerous cases in which Saudi border guards shoot to kill, "to deter them", for simply loitering near the border line. Many of those who have managed to

approach some point of the almost 1,500 kilometers of the Saudi-Yemeni border, report that meters before the line it is common to find bodies riddled with bullets by the Saudis, who are left there as persuasive elements to detain migrants. . Even so, there are thousands who manage to penetrate that line, which is why the raids against migrants, ordered by the authorities, are constant and massive. Those detained before being deported, spend capricious periods of detention, crowded mainly in the prison of Jizan, the city on the Red Sea about 50 kilometers from the border with Yemen, which is the first to which migrants arrive, today highly militarized by war.

The subhuman conditions in which their prisoners live, until they can be repatriated to their countries of origin, are truly sinister, they hardly receive any food, the mistreatment is permanent, they must live in overcrowded cells, without any hygiene measures, sleeping on and stepping on excrement all the time, also fighting for space with rats, which chronically generates outbreaks of cholera, tuberculosis or dysentery.

Several days a week, always at night, planes from Riyadh arrive at a non-commercial hangar, on a corner of Bole airport, in Addis Ababa, where hundreds of returnees are "unloaded" in extremely pitiful conditions, that add up to approximately 10,000 a month, and that upon their return must suffer government abandonment. Since 2017, Riyadh has launched a systematic process of deportation of irregular migrants, since then about 350,000 have arrived in Ethiopia and been sent back. Upon arrival, a few are registered by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and treated by Doctors Without Borders, which selects from among the 300 to 400 people who get off each plane, those who are in the worst condition, while the rest are thrown into the streets of Addis Ababa without money or support of any kind, many of them hungry, almost naked and barefoot. Perhaps hundreds of kilometers from their villages, there are minors

among them, who do not even understand the adventure they have just experienced and the one that awaits them as soon as they step onto the street. International attention is focused on the migratory flows that seem to "threaten" Europe, trying not to reach its shores, 20 thousand of them have died in the Mediterranean since 2014, ignoring the hundreds of thousands of Ethiopian migrants and from other countries, who travel alone to South Africa or Saudi Arabia, like long caravans of the invisible.

Image Source:

<https://www.iom.int/en/news/Ethiopian-migrants-decision-making-in-the-focus-of-a-new-study-in-djibouti>

# Egypt-Ethiopia: The waters go down murky

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



*Overview of the construction of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)*

After nine years of negotiations, Egypt and Ethiopia are at an impasse over the impact that the filling and commissioning of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (ERGE) will finally have on the Blue Nile, which will become the largest hydroelectric plant on the continent, providing electricity to the 108 million Ethiopians and that will give its economy, although growing, lacking resources, so this energy potential will be the fundamental key for its take-off.

In 1978, the president, Anwar Sadat, after signing the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, understood that unilateralism in the management of the Nile, due to the proposal to build dams in Ethiopia at the headwaters of the Blue Nile, led him to declare: "The only issue that could bring Egypt to war again is water." In 1989, the Egyptian Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) had warned: "The next war in our region will be over the waters of the Nile, not over politics."

The commissioning of the dam, which is being built on the Blue Nile, which contributes 84 percent of its

course to the Nile, began construction of the GERD in April 2011, with a value of close to five billion dollars, financed by Chinese capital and that is already 70% complete and its filling will begin in July, will have a strong impact on the Egyptian course of the Nile, essential, not only for its agriculture, but also for the operation of the Aswan Dam. Its other tributary, the White Nile, pays only 16 percent of its flow.

Thanks to the Nile, Egypt gets ninety percent of its freshwater needs and if only two percent of its flow is removed, more than 200,000 small farmers would be affected, so the completion of the dam will be disastrous for Egypt, since it is estimated that the water used by GERD is sixty percent. To save the contingency, the government of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, since last year has established a series of restrictions on the use of water, with fines and other penalties, although it is unknown how much more it will have to reduce the use of it, once that GERD is fully operational.

The delay in the Ethiopian-Egyptian-Sudanese talks has put Cairo diplomacy on high alert, since the negotiations are still stuck and the time to reach an agreement is running out. When Ethiopia and Egypt should be coordinated, significant concessions, to avoid a clash that, from the diplomatic field, could jump to more forceful measures, where the military option is also very possible, Addis Ababa, on February 26, suspended its participation in the tripartite talks, in which the United States mediated. So Donald Trump contacted the Egyptian president to assure him that he would continue with his mediation effort.

The situation leads Egypt into a desperate trap as its economy has been hit hard by the sharp drop in tourism since 2016, its largest source of income, by the actions of Wahhabi terrorism, which has forced the president, General Al-Sisi, to a significant investment in weapons, in order to eradicate these groups that operate mainly in the Sinai Peninsula, with a mega action coordinated by the armed and security forces, called



Operation Sinai 2018, which has put the nation in war footing and which is about to turn two years old, they have barely been able to make a dent in the Willat Sinai, the most important organization that operates in that nation, a tributary of global al-Qaeda.

In this last week, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Sameh Shoukry, undertook a tour of seven countries of the Arab League (LA), which, although it attracted the support of its partners, in real terms the situation remains exactly the same. Despite the fact that, as detailed by Egyptian spokesmen, "If water means electricity for Ethiopia, it is a matter of life and death for Egypt."

The dam, which stands just 20 kilometers from its border with Sudan, will double the country's power generation capacity, leaving Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya and possibly Egypt in terms of energy exports. an annual gain of about one billion dollars, in addition to improving navigation and irrigation, since the Blue Nile is prone to major floods, and the sediment it carries reduces the energy production capacity of the small dams it has in your course. For Addis Ababa, these benefits would be key, given the deep economic crisis that leads hundreds of citizens each year to leave the country: (See: Ethiopia: The long line of the invisible)

In time, Sudan will benefit from the GERD, as it will significantly increase irrigation, which increases Egyptian concern.

In 2015, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt had finalized a Declaration of Principles that stipulated responsible use of the Nile River, which would not cause significant damage to other countries. What has finally been nothing.

The Egyptian position sought, in order to safeguard the Aswan dam,

to secure an agreement with Ethiopia, which obliges it to release a certain amount of the flow of the Blue Nile together with stipulations by which Cairo could monitor the Ethiopian commitment, since Egypt estimates that it will take between twelve and twenty-one years to overcome the impact of the decline in the water supply.

### **The Ethiopian goodbye**

The withdrawal of Ethiopia has left the negotiations at a critical moment. The country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the Egyptian claims unacceptable, which it classified as advantageous only for Egypt. In the meetings in which only Sudan and Egypt participated on February 27 and 28, with the presence of the United States, an agreement would have been reached, despite the fact that the main party involved, Ethiopia, was missing, so the Cairo, thus intends everything to give legality to the agreements.

The World Bank, which has participated in the negotiations as an observer, has offered to collaborate with its technical expertise to work out an agreement, since it has played a key role, in nothing less than the dispute between India and Pakistan, in the "Indus Water Treaty", which was very effective.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, winner of the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, for having ended the conflict of more than twenty years between his country and Eritrea, feels that his country is in an almost unknown stage of growth, being the largest of Africa, with the possibility of consolidating itself as a regional power, being able to transform the country forever by lifting it out of poverty and, thanks to energy, making it attractive for investment.

Ahmed, on August 16, puts his reelection in the presidential elections at stake, he knows that giving a blow against Egypt would make him the first place to win.

For his part, General al-Sisi needs to maintain Egypt's old leadership in the Middle East and Africa, so he cannot afford a similar crisis with falling water supplies. The impact would affect thousands of hectares, until today productive, which, if the dam issue is not reversed, would generate a massive internal displacement, fundamentally towards Cairo, with its services already collapsed due to the constant arrivals of internal migrants, now from Sinai, which will possibly generate political upheavals.

The possibility of a war, with those peoples, from whom for centuries it exploited its raw materials and supplied itself with slaves, is not alien to the collective imagination of the Egyptian people, much more, for its river, its most valuable possession, in that geography. that confines it to the desert, and without the Nile, condemns the country to disappearance. Although some hope survives, the American pressure on Ethiopia could produce a change of route of Abiy Ahmed, at the last minute. But for the moment, Ethiopia is isolated and Egypt cornered.

The mythical Nile, the longest river in the world, whose course crosses eleven countries along its little more than 6,300 kilometers, which go from the equatorial rivers that feed Lake Victoria to the Mediterranean, accompanies the evolution of humanity from the beginning of the story: In countless moments its current has been stained with blood, although until now its waters only go down cloudy.

Image Source:

[https://www.taringa.net/+info/egipto-warns-ethiopia\\_13shd0](https://www.taringa.net/+info/egipto-warns-ethiopia_13shd0)

# ICT in Comprehensive Disaster Risk Management: The Need for Information

By Ulises León Kandiko (Argentina)

Certainly with technological advances, life as it was known a quarter of a century ago has changed and significantly, the processes are not the same, the way of communicating and interacting added to the immediacy of things is light years away from just barely 2 decades ago.

But there is something that is still as valid as in the very beginnings of humanity, and that is that information grants power, decision-making power, the power to take the best course of action to deal with both everyday issues (whether I carry an umbrella or not) and those of a strategic (the convenience of signing a multilateral agreement between States).

Comprehensive Disaster Risk Management (GIRD) is no stranger to this situation. Communities at risk need information such as water, food and medicine, or shelter before, during and after disasters. - Markku Niskala, Secretary General of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).

In this first approximation on the impact and use of ICTs in IDRM, the idea revolves around providing a framework to match the available technology with IDRM processes through:

- Provide an overview of information needs in different disaster management activities;
- Discuss risk communication as a framework for exchanging information with the public;
- Provide examples of the specific needs in response to disasters, recovery and reconstruction after the disaster with ICT solutions used to respond to those needs; Y
- Provide an overview of ICT solutions.

Access to reliable, accurate and timely information at all levels of society is crucial immediately before, during and after a disaster. Without information, individuals and Institutions are often forced to make crucial decisions based on incomplete and conflicting reports and, in the best of circumstances, mere guesswork. Information on disaster risk and disaster events should also be shared with the general public as stakeholders in the ISRM process. ICTs have their advantages in the exchange and management of information that can be used to improve IDRM.

## **Information needs in disaster situations**

It is generally recognized that different ISRM measures have different information needs for different audiences. Prevention, mitigation, preparedness planning and recovery planning activities require baseline data on the Country and its main risks to carry out risk assessment and analysis. Disaster response, rehabilitation, and reconstruction activities need real-time information about the impact of a disaster and the resources available to combat it. Information needs to be easily collected, processed, analyzed and shared so that stakeholders can respond effectively.

Countries should also have disaster information strategies to manage critical baseline information, which can be used for pre-disaster preparedness, emergency response during disaster, and post-disaster needs for damage and loss assessment, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Such baseline information could be collected through intensive risk mapping and assessment of major disaster-prone areas (1). The Information Management Cycle, shown in Figure 1, is one way of understanding this process.




Figure 1. Information management cycle.

Data are measurements or observations of a variable, including numbers (eg, number of internally displaced persons), words (eg, majority ethnic group of internally displaced persons), or images (eg, photo of latrines in the camp). By itself, the data is not useful. Through data analytics, raw data is turned into information through the act of extracting useful information for decisions and actions. Examples include: "The displaced person community is 60% larger than the host community and they are from a different ethnic group than the host population. Their camp has only one latrine for every 80 families."

Information is converted into disaster risk knowledge through a learning process, and timely and correctly applied knowledge is converted into practical activities on the ground. The hands-on activities will in turn generate new data that can be collected and analysed. Therefore, the entire information management process is not linear; rather it is a continuous cycle.

The table to the side provides a short list of the different information needs for the four phases of IDRM, it is like a snapshot of different information needs in different disaster management activities.

### disaster response

For people caught up in emergency situations, the need for information is often acute. They are often separated from their families, lack adequate food and shelter, and are frightened and confused by events around them. Programming tailored to their needs can provide a lifeline of essential information (2).

After the 2004 tsunami in Thailand, a large number of people expressed dismay that they did not have enough information about aid and aid processes. For some, this meant that they felt they had no options or understood them. During the immediate aftermath of a disaster, the information people need is simple: what just happened and where are their family and friends? Over time, however, other equally critical information needs arise. For example, people may need to know the location of food and water, how to access hospitals in the area, how to prevent illness, or determine the timeline for receiving compensation. In other words, people are beginning to want to know what relief, services, and compensation are available to them. Therefore, managing expectations through

| LAS PRINCIPALES NECESIDADES DE INFORMACION   | EJEMPLO DE ACCIONES QUE SE PUEDEN TOMAR SEGÚN LA INFORMACIÓN DISPONIBLE   |
|--|---|
| <p><b>Mitigación</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Planes y decisiones de desarrollo a nivel nacional, local y comunitario.</li> <li>• Características sociales, demográficas y económicas.</li> <li>• Planes de uso del suelo, planes de gestión ambiental.</li> <li>• Información de la red de servicios públicos.</li> <li>• Mapas de peligros y vulnerabilidades.</li> <li>• Zonas de riesgo.</li> <li>• Información geológica e hidrometeorológica.</li> <li>• Planes GIRD.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identificar la variación espacial y temporal en la severidad del peligro, ocurrencia y probabilidad y / o variaciones en la vulnerabilidad.</li> <li>• Identificar las brechas y los activos de servicios e infraestructura.</li> <li>• Identifique y comunique los "puntos críticos" de alto riesgo donde los impactos de desastres son más graves.</li> <li>• Identificar las medidas de mitigación estructurales y / o no estructurales apropiadas y priorizar los recursos.</li> <li>• Evaluar la idoneidad de los planes de uso y desarrollo de la tierra.</li> <li>• Dirigirse a campañas de divulgación pública y elegir mensajes, fuentes y canales apropiados</li> <li>• Recomendar códigos y ordenanzas apropiadas.</li> <li>• Promover la educación sobre riesgos entre los tomadores de decisiones, destacando cómo las decisiones de desarrollo pueden afectar los riesgos.</li> </ul>  |
| <p><b>Preparación</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Perfiles de peligro del país.</li> <li>• Ubicaciones de refugios e infraestructura crítica.</li> <li>• Mapas de peligros y vulnerabilidades.</li> <li>• Zonas de riesgo.</li> <li>• Poblaciones en riesgo.</li> <li>• Acceso a servicios de telecomunicaciones y electricidad.</li> <li>• Equipo, personal de emergencia y voluntarios para respuesta a desastres.</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identificar la variación espacial y temporal en la gravedad del peligro, ocurrencia y probabilidad y / o variaciones en la vulnerabilidad. Identificar lugares apropiados para el almacenamiento de recursos, áreas de preparación, rutas de evacuación y Centros de Operaciones de Emergencia.</li> <li>• Identificar las brechas y los activos de servicios e infraestructura.</li> <li>• Mejore las estrategias de advertencia identificando canales, fuentes y mensajes apropiados antes de un evento.</li> <li>• Mejorar la planificación de la evacuación mediante la identificación de zonas potenciales, refugios, rutas y la ubicación de poblaciones con necesidades especiales de evacuación.</li> <li>• Desarrollar y visualizar un escenario de peligro e impacto durante un ejercicio.</li> <li>• Realizar campañas de educación pública, incluida la incorporación de la conciencia del riesgo de desastres en los planes de estudio escolares.</li> <li>• Realizar ejercicios y simulacros de emergencia.</li> </ul> |

effective communication is vital during any emergency situation, while ineffective communication at this stage can create false expectations and misunderstandings about the assistance to come and the role of actors, including the government and other aid agencies, in question.

Another important aspect of information and communication during disaster response is that lack of information actually causes stress and exacerbates trauma (3). In Sri Lanka, after the 2004 tsunami, many people feared that the waves were divine punishment; The Belgian Red Cross helped dispel these myths by explaining the science behind the disaster.

Information and knowledge have always been a key element in humanitarian action, but recent emergencies and disasters have shown how vital their role is in providing a foundation for effective and informed advocacy, decision-making and resource allocation to the affected population, as well as for humanitarian actors. Timely, accurate, and independent/objective/unbiased information is critical to saving lives and strengthening recovery; The power lies in its effective management, analysis and application.

### The use of mobile phones in disaster response

According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the total number of single-line mobile phone subscriptions reached 5 billion in 2017, but SIM card sales exceed 7.9 billion, with rapidly increasing penetration rates in developing and least developed countries. According to sources from the Mobile World Congress, it is estimated that almost a billion mobile phone users will be added in 2025, reaching 5.9 billion subscribers, which is equivalent to 71% of the world population forecast at that time. Subscriber growth during this period will be driven by developing countries, particularly Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, as well as sub-Saharan African and Latin American markets. Furthermore, by 2025, 5 billion subscribers are expected to use their mobile phones to access the Internet, up from 3.3 billion in 2017 (4).

Mobile phones have played a role in all stages of the ISRM cycle, from early warning during the pre-disaster period, one-way and two-way communication during the actual disaster, to recovery immediately afterward. The International Federation and other organizations have used mobile phones to enable affected families to re-establish contact or reassure relatives that they are safe during the immediate aftermath of a disaster. For example, in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, Red Cross volunteers helped reunite 3,400 tsunami survivors with their families, often using satellite phones. Mobile phones are also increasingly being used to improve the transparency and accountability of aid delivery processes.

The Haiti case study provides an unusual example of SMS (5) being implemented as a one-way and two-way communication system. Though in hindsight: "Evidence argues that the same code should not be used for both purposes. Haitians who heard reports that they could channel support requests through 4636 became frustrated when it appeared that one-way messages were returning in response (6) ".

Despite this confusion, the overall results of the SMS public health campaign appear to have been positive. In a telephone survey after the campaign, he reported positive responses from all 450 subscribers who participated in the survey. More than 97 percent said that the information received from the SMS 4636 service was practical and reliable, particularly health information. More significantly, 74 percent of subscribers said they changed their behavior based on information provided in a 4636 SMS message.

| LAS PRINCIPALES NECESIDADES DE INFORMACION  | EJEMPLO DE ACCIONES QUE SE PUEDEN TOMAR SEGÚN LA INFORMACIÓN DISPONIBLE  |
|---|--|
| <p><u>Respuesta</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mapas de peligros y vulnerabilidades.</li> <li>• Información geoespacial sobre el evento del desastre: "¿Dónde está? ¿Qué hay en el área? ¿Como llego hasta ahí?"</li> <li>• Actualización de la situación: poblaciones afectadas, personas que necesitan rescate, carreteras, refugios, etc.</li> <li>• Información sobre los últimos desarrollos en los esfuerzos de ayuda.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Alertas de destino utilizando canales, fuentes y mensajes apropiados.</li> <li>• Anticipar los posibles impactos en las áreas de interés.</li> <li>• Anticiparse a las posibles necesidades a corto plazo en todas las áreas de interés. Identifique y comunique refugios apropiados y lugares de atención masiva</li> <li>• Familiarizar a los equipos de respuesta a desastres con áreas de interés.</li> <li>• Proporcionar una línea de base para caracterizar claramente los impactos de desastres a corto plazo.</li> <li>• Proporcionar una línea de base para monitorear el progreso de las actividades de respuesta.</li> <li>• Realizar evaluaciones de pérdidas y daños.</li> <li>• Ayudar al público a conectarse con familiares, amigos y colegas en áreas afectadas.</li> </ul> |
| <p><u>Recuperación y Reconstrucción</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evaluación de daños y necesidades.</li> <li>• Las mismas necesidades de información que para la mitigación.</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identificar y comunicar ubicaciones para centros de asistencia de recuperación.</li> <li>• Proporcionar una línea de base para identificar nuevos peligros y / o patrones en la vulnerabilidad.</li> <li>• Evaluar la adecuación de los planes de reurbanización.</li> <li>• Identificar las medidas de mitigación apropiadas.</li> <li>• Identificar los cambios apropiados en las</li> </ul>  |

Although mobile technology has many useful features for IDRM, there are still a number of limitations to be aware of. Mobile networks are subject to congestion, which can cause delays in receiving messages and inability to make calls. Early warning, for example, can be more effectively disseminated through other broadcast technologies that cover broader target geographic areas, or through direct warnings such as sirens. In the case of Haiti, the short length of text messages can sometimes be a source of confusion and misunderstanding, which can result in the inability of aid requests to be effectively transmitted to aid organizations.

### **Communication and social media support**

During the initial stage of most emergencies, information is scarce and often unreliable. Normal information channels such as radio stations and mobile phone networks can suddenly become unavailable, meaning that information becomes inaccessible to those most affected. An example in the Asia-Pacific area is Télécoms Sans Frontières (TSF) (7) which has the ability to deploy a team from one of its three bases (Pau, France; Bangkok, Thailand; and Managua, Nicaragua). to reach an emergency location within 24 hours. TSF provides communication tools to all actors on the ground, including the United Nations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), facilitating the coordination of relief and response efforts. In addition, TSF offers free phone calls to people affected by the disaster.



Recent technological innovation has also improved the quality and quantity of disaster response measures. One of the examples is the increasing use of social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter and Flickr. Social media is not only an effective tool for monitoring and engaging public discourse during the crisis process, it also enables a cultural shift in how the public views their role as an empowered taxpayer. Emergency management and crisis communication have become more participatory.

### **Facebook and Typhoon Megi in the Philippines**

Aid officials in the Philippines have credited social media sites like Facebook and Twitter for keeping the death toll from Typhoon Megi to just 10. Thousands of people were persuaded to move to safer places or take precautionary measures earlier. Megi struck on October 18, 2010. Officials said, "The value of the alerts for us was that we managed to get the message out earlier." Alexander Rosete, a spokesman for the Philippine National Red Cross, told Integrated Regional Information Networks: "Now that we are using the Internet, the services are free and we send you messages at no cost. It is also more reliable and faster because almost everyone is on social networking sites.

With the development of social networking tools, members of the public can participate more actively in the information management process. This is leading to the innovation of crowdsourcing, where tasks can be distributed to a large group of volunteers to complete. Crowdsourcing is also used to obtain feedback and information from the public. Due to the global awareness of major disasters, there are a number of initiatives promoting crowdsourcing as a solution for disaster response information management. Examples include allowing members of the public to report their needs in a disaster, or recruiting volunteers from around the world to help with data processing such as translating text or analyzing maps.

Disaster response involves many actors, including government first responders, national and local leaders, trained volunteers, participating civic organizations such as Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the media, community organizations and members of the international community. Disaster response management requires a system to bring all these actors together in harmonious efforts, and because the effectiveness of each actor

depends on the speed and usefulness of shared information, ICTs have a role to play in disaster response management. effective response to disasters.

The need for access to information and communication does not end when the immediate consequences of a crisis give way to the long-term challenge of reconstruction. Information is essential as communities aim to return to a state of normality. For example, once basic needs are met, disaster survivors will seek information on how to return to work, how to participate in rebuilding, and how to influence the recovery agenda of aid organizations and governments. Technologies used in the early stages of disaster response can and should be harnessed to serve longer-term reconstruction and development goals. Databases can be developed to match job needs with employment and investment opportunities as they become available, for example.

### **Public information and the role of the media**

The media can play an important role both in public education, in disaster preparedness and in disseminating advice after a crisis. Through education and empowerment of affected communities with relevant knowledge, enabling them to influence public action and policy towards disaster preparedness and mitigation, the media can contribute to reducing loss of life and property.

During the initial period of a disaster event, sharing helpful information with affected populations in languages they understand, through media they trust, can provide a life-saving resource. Therefore, it is necessary to have a prior understanding of the best channels through which populations in disaster-prone areas obtain information. Local media should certainly be one of the key channels to provide immediate information to the public in their local language. During disaster preparedness planning, disaster managers can take steps to ensure that local media in disaster-prone areas have the ability to quickly mobilize or resume work and provide educational services to the public in emergency situations. Along with local media, there are also many local communication sectors, such as local faith networks, local civil society groups, and marketing companies, that can effectively provide culturally sensitive and localized information with a detailed understanding of local risks and sensitivities

### **ICT solutions**

ICTs are providing an increasing number of solutions in all government and commercial sectors, including IDRM. An ICT solution generally comprises technology, software and data standards.

There are a wide variety of different technologies available that can add value to IDRM interventions, and solutions will often combine several technologies. Technologies must always be appropriate for the user, even if this means only using pencil and paper.

**Databases.** Databases are used to store, analyze and retrieve data in electronic form; They will usually be part of any ICT solution.

**Web applications.** Web applications are a popular technology for providing user interfaces with ICT solutions. They can be accessed through a web browser such as Internet Explorer or Firefox, which means that no additional software needs to be installed on a user's computer. They are flexible and can be configured to be available on the public Internet, on a closed intranet, and even configured on a single computer. Smartphones and other devices can also access web applications.

**Geographic Information System (GIS).** "A computer system capable of storing, manipulating, and displaying geographically referenced information... Practitioners also consider the total GIS to include operating personnel and data input to the system" (8). Since much of the information related to IDRM has a geographic component, GIS platforms will be part of most ICT solutions for IDRM.

**Sensors.** Devices can be used to monitor hazards and provide alerts when hazards occur. Examples include weather satellites, river water gauges, ocean buoys to detect tsunamis, and seismographs to detect earthquakes. It is important to consider these sensors as part of the complete ICT solution that will transmit sensor data and notify relevant officials or populations. Remote sensing refers to the process of recording information from sensors mounted on satellites or aircraft.

**Radio transmissions.** Broadcasts through existing radio stations can be an effective way to share information with the public. Radio is considered an "old" ICT, but it should not be forgotten with the advent of many new technologies. Radio access can be shared easily and relatively cheaply among many people, serving both literate

and illiterate populations. Broadcasting remains powerful and has been used to spread early warning messages as well as to raise awareness and educate the community.

**Mobile phones.** Mobile phones have several different uses for ICT solutions for IDRM beyond their functionality for voice communication. Cell broadcast can be used to display messages on all mobile phones within a geographic cell. SMS or text messages can be used to collect information from the public and are often more robust than voice communication after a disaster when telecommunications infrastructure may be damaged or overloaded. Increasingly, mobile phones can connect to the Internet, allowing for better information sharing and reporting. Mobile phones are also becoming smarter and contain computer-like functionality, such as cameras and the Global Positioning System (GPS), allowing them to be used as data collection devices.

**Social media.** Social networks are technologies that allow people to easily create and share their own news, photos, videos and other information within their social networks and publicly on the Internet. Social media challenges traditional information flows in IDRM activities. In the past, information about populations affected by disasters may have been collected and verified by professional responders working for authorized agencies. Now this information can be reported by the population itself. However, as these often unstructured and unverified reports may be reported by large numbers of people, information overload can occur. Stakeholders involved in IDRM activities should consider how they can best engage with social media and use it in their ICT solutions. In addition to broadcasting breaking news and its use in times of crisis, social media tools have also been used at other stages of the ISRM cycle: for early warning, recovery coordination, fundraising, awareness raising, campaigning and Capacity building. They also provide alternative avenues for psychosocial support for survivors.

**Software.** Any ICT solution will likely contain software components. Different options are available for supplying software:

- **Off-the-shelf trading software.** Standard commercial software is developed by companies and then sold or licensed to other organizations. It offers the benefits of a proven solution and the ability to customize a solution to suit an organization. The cost of the software may be in the form of a one-time payment or an ongoing license fee. These may also include some sort of service agreement to provide a certain level of ongoing support and modifications.
- **Custom software.** Sometimes it can be considered more efficient to develop custom software for an ICT solution. This could be done by internal software developers employed by an organization or by an external consultant or company. When developing custom solutions, it is important to ensure that the organization has the ability to provide ongoing support for the solution and address additional issues that may arise after the software is deployed. This consideration must be taken into account in the project budget. If the original developers are no longer available, it will be much more difficult for a new developer to provide additional support. In some cases, developers of custom solutions may retain ownership of the software's source code, which will prevent any other developer from working on the solution.
- **Free and open source software.** Free and open source software can be used, copied, studied, modified, and redistributed without restriction. These freedoms that are for everyone (developers and users) are very important for IDRM since FOSS (free and open source software) allows immediate access, ownership and control of ICTs. It is often supported by communities, which can include businesses, volunteers, academics, and non-profit organizations that work collaboratively to develop software that is mutually beneficial. Sahana Open Source Disaster Management software is one of the increasingly available solutions for IDRM. Some degree of customization can be provided under contractual agreement, and can be obtained from a variety of different companies and organizations.

*Sahana is a free and open source disaster management system. It is a web-based collaboration tool that addresses common coordination issues during a disaster, from finding missing persons, managing aid, managing volunteers, to effectively following up with government groups, NGOs, and victims themselves.*

**Data standards.** As ICT solutions become more common and interact with various people and organizations, problems will arise if the information to be shared is in different and possibly incompatible formats. Data standards help integrate ICT solutions by ensuring that data can be shared in one format by different software packages without the need for manual conversion. This is especially important for ICT solutions for IDRM, as they can be used by many agencies that may have their own existing ICT systems.

Open and non-discriminatory standards are preferred because there is no dependency on a single entity. All types of products can implement them and all stakeholders can participate in their development. The Internet is a great example, as its foundation is based on open standards such as TCP/IP and HTTP.

**Lifecycle.** The life cycle of an ICT solution must be considered in the context of the different types of interventions in IDRM. It's good to take note of the lifecycle concept because organizations may assume that a solution can be installed immediately and will always work as intended. An ICT solution can be considered to go through these stages: (1) Requirements and specifications, (2) Implementation and training, and (3) Maintenance.

- **Stage 1, Requirements and Specifications:** The first stage in the development of any ICT solution is to identify the problem to be solved and collect the requirements for the solution. These will be used to help identify the technologies that are required and develop a specification that describes the solution to be implemented.
- **Stage 2, Implementation and training:** It is essential that the users of an ICT solution are well trained so that they are familiar, capable and willing to use it in their work. ICT training is generally best done after installing a component of the solution. For example, field staff may be trained in how to read sensors and record data, or technical staff in a ministry office may be trained in using a database. In some circumstances, users and beneficiaries of the ICT solution may participate in testing and provide feedback on the new tool prior to its implementation. This will take more time, but can contribute to the development of a more effective product that meets the needs of users. An ICT solution for disaster response may not be used frequently, so training on its use may need to be repeated periodically to ensure learning is not lost. An effective method of training is to run a simulation or mock use of the solution. If members of the public are also involved with the solution, such as the implementation of an early warning system or an emergency information hotline, then it is important that they are aware of it, understand its use and know the appropriate actions to take. take on the information received.
- **Stage 3, Maintenance:** The infrastructure of any ICT solution must be maintained for it to function reliably. All hardware such as computers, servers, and communications equipment have a limited lifespan, after which failure becomes more and more likely. Bugs can often be found in the software after the initial implementation, or additional features or modifications will be required. It is important to consider how they will be implemented.

It is also important to ensure that there are appropriate backup copies of all GIRD information in various locations to ensure that if there is a loss of data, the system can be recovered efficiently. After the 2010 Haiti earthquake, a significant amount of government information was lost when government offices collapsed.

So far, as I mentioned at the beginning, the idea was to capture a general vision of the use of ICTs in IDRM, focusing on the importance of Information. In future deliveries I will be expanding how the use of ICTs impacts the Preparation, Mitigation and Response processes.

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# Secretary-General's call for a global ceasefire

By António Guterres (UN)



Our world faces a common enemy: COVID-19.

This virus does not understand nationality or ethnicity, faction or faith. He attacks everyone, relentlessly. Meanwhile, armed conflicts continue around the world.

The most vulnerable - women and children, people with disabilities, marginalized and displaced people - pay the highest price.

They are also the ones most at risk of devastating losses from COVID-19.

Let us not forget that in war-torn countries there has been a collapse of health systems.

Health professionals, already in short supply, have frequently been attacked.

Refugees and other people displaced by violent conflict are doubly vulnerable.

The aggressiveness of the virus illustrates the madness of war.

That is why today I call for an immediate global ceasefire in all corners of the world.

It is time to “lock down” armed conflicts, suspend them and focus together on the real fight of our lives.

To the warring parties I say:

cease hostilities.

Put aside mistrust and animosity.

Silence the guns; stop the artillery; stop air strikes.

It is crucial that they do...

To help create corridors so that vital help can arrive.

To open up invaluable opportunities for diplomacy.

To bring hope to the places most vulnerable to COVID-19.

Let's take inspiration from the coalitions and dialogue slowly taking shape between rival parties to enable new ways to deal with COVID-19. But not only that; we need much more.

We need to end the evil of war and fight the disease that is devastating our world.

And this begins by ending fighting everywhere. Now.

That is what the family that we are humanity needs, now more than ever.

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<https://www.un.org/sg/es/content/sg/speeches/2020-03-23/secretary-general-appeal-for-global-ceasefire>

# Some capabilities of the Colombian Air Force

By Douglas Hernandez (Colombia)



*In the foreground an IAI Kfir fighter-bomber of the Colombian Air Force.*

In the early hours of the morning the town's police station shakes with three successive explosions, opening the way to a heavy fire of rifles and machine guns, they are being attacked by about two hundred FARC guerrillas. The relationship is quite unfavorable, since only 20 men work at the station and not all of them are on duty.

The explosions are due to the "tatucos", a name given to domestic gas cylinders filled with explosives and shrapnel, which are launched with very little precision through a system similar to a mortar, which causes serious collateral damage to the civilian population. and the infrastructure.

The policemen react and take position in the trenches or behind the sandbags that surround the police station. The radio operator immediately reports the news to the higher level, and the reaction and counterattack plans are activated. The walls are full of hundreds of small holes, the police know that if reinforcements do not arrive quickly, when the ammunition runs out they will be captured by the enemy and their future will be uncertain, they could be executed

on the spot, or kidnapped to spend years in remote jungles, it is not known which is worse.

The Command and Control Center of the Colombian Air Force is alerted to the situation and instructions are immediately broadcast to the air units in the area. Precisely, the FAC has bases in different regions, and also deploys its aircraft in direct support of surface troops, to reduce reaction time in the face of these eventualities.

It is established that an AC-47T "Ghost" plane will fly to the area to serve as an Air Intelligence Platform, this taking into account its great flight autonomy. Upon reaching the vertical of the town, he begins to slowly orbit it while with his FLIR device he breaks the darkness of the night in search of the guerrillas who are harassing the police station. He detects a large concentration of enemies in the streets surrounding the station, and a group waiting outside with five trucks, apparently the reserve. The crew of the AC-47T makes radio contact with the police personnel and informs them that help is already arriving, which encourages them to continue resisting.

The FAC Command and Control Center launches an AH-60L Harpia III helicopter with all its weapons, and which also embarks two Selected Air Platform Shooters - TEPLA. He also sends two Kfir C.7 equipped with laser-guided bombs to the scene, they fly at high speed because the situation is urgent.

On the ground, thanks to previous intelligence work, the guerrillas have identified the houses where the policemen live and have gone looking for them there. They have captured three who were not on duty, taken them to the main square and executed them. It can already be inferred what will be the fate of those who resist...

All the crews of the air elements that act in the operation are in night mode, operating with Night Vision Goggles (NVG). When the Harpy helicopter arrives in the area, the AC-47T pinpoints with its FLIR laser the exact point where the enemy's reserve concentration is located. In turn, the Harpy III engages them with its own FLIR, and after making sure that there are no houses nearby, it proceeds to a massive attack with rocket fire and GAU machine guns, the trucks in which the criminals tried to flee are

destroyed, surrounded of the corpses of his men in reserve.

The images of the operation, captured by the Phantom's FLIR, are being transmitted online to the FAC Command and Control Center via data link.

The Harpy takes position on the town and is placed laterally, here the Selected Shooters on Aerial Platform (TEPLA) come into play. Using precision rifles to avoid collateral damage, they shoot at the guerrillas who are attacking the policemen in the town, starting with those closest to the Police Station.

The guerrillas realize what is happening and begin to flee, apparently, they had an escape plan because they progressively converge at concentration points on the outskirts of the town, forming two groups that flee in opposite directions. When the guerrillas are far enough from the populated center, the aircraft receive instructions from the Command and Control Center: the group that flees north will be attacked by the AC-47T Ghost, and the one that flees south will be laser-marked by the Harpy. III for an LGB attack. Sure enough, the ghost plane readies its GAU machine guns and when the plane is in position, it unloads thousands of bullets on the enemy concentration, eliminating them all.

The Harpy III remains in static flight at a safe distance from the target, which is moving on foot, about 80 guerrillas who are quickly fleeing towards the river, where they probably have boats waiting for them. The laser, imperceptible to the human eye, is on them. About five miles from the target, each of

the Kfir drops an LGB Griffin bomb, already locked onto the laser, the planes make a sharp turn and return to their base at Air Combat Command No. 1. The bombs travel quickly the distance that separates them from the objective, to explode right in the center of the column, killing all the narco-terrorists. The Ghost records everything with his FLIR camera.

The policemen who were at the station can go out to assess the damage. Five of his companions have died and there are two seriously injured, the station is in ruins, as well as some of the houses around it, as a result of the inaccurate impact of the "tatucos". Apparently, there are more than a dozen civilians who lost their lives, and 20 guerrillas are found killed inside the town with accurate shots to the head. Outside the town the guerrilla unit was annihilated.

At dawn, trucks arrive with a Mobile Police Squad of the National Police, as well as personnel from the Prosecutor's Office to carry out legal expertise with the deceased. Ambulances attend to the wounded; the civilian population is in shock. The aircraft have returned to their bases to await a new mission, which is not long in coming.

The Colombian Air Force has a long tradition in supporting surface forces, mainly due to the issue of guerrilla groups that have operated in the country for decades. Different fixed-wing and rotary-wing platforms have been acquired over the years, offering different tactical possibilities. In terms of aerial weapons, the constant has been the use of bombs, rockets and machine

guns, and more recently sniper rifles.

The above narrative describes the typical operations that took place in Colombia until relatively recently, which contributed to bringing the FARC group to the negotiating table. The commanders of this group of criminals, seeing the general strengthening of the Armed Forces and that in particular the technical and operational capabilities of the FAC had been developed to the point of preventing any operation involving the concentration of their men in the rural environment, They thought of moving on to urban operations, where the firepower of the Air Force could not be used, but in the big cities of Colombia a highly technical police and different units of Urban Special Forces awaited them, not to mention the relentless and accurate TEPLA. Arriving at such a complicated situation for the guerrillas that they preferred to negotiate.

The Armed Forces do everything possible not to lose the capabilities acquired, and at the same time transform the doctrine, moving from an eminently anti-subversive approach to another more oriented to conventional deterrence. Even thinking of participating in multinational operations, under the UN flag and even with NATO, the European Union, or bilateral operations with Western allies. These operations could, of course, include a component of the Colombian Air Force.

### **Douglas Hernandez**

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# Fuerzas Antiterroristas del Mundo

*Arduentes Fortuna Invat*



## U.S

### US Army - Chemical Corps - 95th Chemical Company



The Chemical Corps is the branch of the United States Army in charge of defense against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, but it is also responsible for developing offensive operations with these types of weapons, if necessary. The Corps was founded in the First World War, and its name has changed over time.

On June 28, 1918, the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) was officially formed, encompassing the "Gas Service" and "Chemical Service Sections". In the interwar period, the Chemical Warfare Service maintained its stockpile despite public pressure and presidential wishes for disarmament. Maj. Gen. Amos Fries, head of the CWS from 1920 to 1929, viewed calls for chemical disarmament as a communist plot. Those who thought so, managed to stop in 1925 the ratification by the Senate of the United States, of the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits "the first use" of chemical weapons in a conflict. It is worth noting that the protocol does not prohibit retaliation of the same kind, so that countries that have signed said protocol continue to produce and store chemical weapons, under the pretext of deterrence.

The US Army Chemical Corps has participated in the great wars that the United States has fought, such as World War I and II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. In addition, it maintains units deployed in different bases around the world, in anticipation of future conflicts involving the use of this type of weapons of mass destruction.

It is worth noting that elements such as flamethrowers and smoke generators are equipment that correspond to Chemical units, some of which, in turn, are part of Battalions or Brigades of Military Engineers.

Today, the issue of the possible use of chemical weapons is not restricted to state actors; on the contrary, it has been shown that there is a much more obvious danger in the use of said weapons by terrorist groups. Following the Sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo Metro, the US Congress passed legislation to implement a program to train civilian response agencies to chemical agent incidents. In addition, US Army Reserve chemical units began receiving specialized equipment and training to conduct mass decontamination operations on potential casualties.

From 1952 to 1999 the Chemical Corps School was located at Fort McClellan. Since closing in 1999 due to reorganization, the US Army Chemical Corps CBRN Warfare School is located at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. There are approximately 22,000 Chemical Corps members in the United States Army, including active duty, reserve, and Army National Guard personnel.

### **The Chemical Company in the US Army**

In the Field Manual *FM 3-101 Chemical Staffs and Units* it can be read that the US Army has different classes of company level units in the Chemical Corps. Among them, we have decontamination companies, motorized smoke generating companies, mechanized smoke generating companies, smoke and decontamination companies, NBC (Nuclear, Bacteriological and Chemical) reconnaissance companies, chemical companies, which fulfill all functions (smoke/decontamination /reconnaissance), heavy division chemical companies, and airborne/air assault chemical companies.



*Vehículo M1059 con generador de humo.*

A chemical company, provides equipment for decontamination, NBC reconnaissance, wide-area smoke generation, and chemical warfare staffing to higher echelon units. The company is organized into a staff section, a company command, an NBC reconnaissance platoon, and a smoke/decontamination platoon. This type of company is 100% mobile.



*Sistema M17 LDS*

The headquarters of the chemical company is made up of a command section and a maintenance section. The NBC reconnaissance platoon consists of a platoon command and three reconnaissance squads, each with two reconnaissance teams. The smoke/decontamination platoon is organized into a platoon command, two smoke/decontamination squads and a support squad.

The smoke/decontamination platoon is equipped with M1059 tracked vehicles (based on the M113) with smoke generators, and M17 LDS (Lightweight Decontamination System) series equipment.

The M17 LDS Lightweight Decontamination System is a compact, lightweight and portable decontamination system. It consists of a 7.3-horsepower motor, a self-priming pump to draw and pressurize water, a fan assembly to supply combustion air to the heater, a water heater with a 90-foot (27.45-meter) long coil of tubing, a self-priming pump for the heater fuel system and a small generator to supply electricity for ignition control and safety functions. The LDS is transportable on a 3/4 ton trailer, 5/4 ton cargo trucks, cargo planes, and helicopters (sling load).

The LDS provides pressurized water at temperatures up to 248 degrees Fahrenheit (119.88 degrees Celsius) at a rate of up to 9 gallons (34.06 liters) per minute. Draws water from a natural source up to 30 feet (9.15 meters)

away and 9 feet (2.75 meters) below the level of the pump. There is an additional 113.55 hectoliter (3000 gallon) water storage tank in case a natural water source is not available. The system is resistant to salt water.

### The 95th Chemical Company

It was created on February 6, 1942 and activated on March 3, 1942 in the Panama Canal Zone. On October 12, 1942 it is renamed as 95 Mixed Chemical Company (or compound). On December 9, 1944, it is reorganized and renamed as the Chemical Service Company. On October 16, 1950, she is assigned to the Regular Army. It is reorganized on March 27, 1954 and renamed 95 Chemical Company (95th Chemical Company), which is its current name. It was deactivated on March 28, 1955 in Korea, and was later reactivated on September 16, 1980 in Germany. It was deactivated again on August 15, 1995 in Germany, to be reactivated on September 16, 2001 in Fort Richardson, Alaska (after the attacks of September 11).

The unit participated in World War II, in the American theater (Canal Zone) and the Asia-Pacific theater. She also participated in the Korean War, in important operations throughout the conflict, for which she was awarded various decorations and mentions.

Below are some images of 95th Chemical Company maneuvers at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska. The photos show how a Striker is decontaminated using the LDS team.





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