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Editorial

This last week we have been raised with different news, the arrest by bodies and security forces of different violent radicals who, either through indoctrination and capture, funding or attempted imminent attack operated in different European countries. This latest detention in Palma de Mallorca has brought justice to six people related to jihadist terrorism, four in Palma de Mallorca, one in the UK and another in Germany. This group forms the set of arrested of this operation antiterrorist carried out by the Spanish police.

Since the Paris bombings and their relationship with neighboring Brussels, the Belgian security forces have been controlling the different, more radical areas in search of possible radicalized ones. In December last year they raised the level of alert to 4 of 4, the maximum possible in this European country. Afterwards, everything and intelligence indicating the possibility of an imminent attack, lowered the level to 3. Let us not forget that Belgium has, in terms of per capita proportion, the largest number of young Europeans who have traveled to Syria and Iraq to radicalize since the appearance of Daesh (of the more than 8,000 Europeans who are fighting in these countries about 500 are Belgians. While the number does not seem high, to put it in proportion with the Belgian population is when the magnitude of that figure is better appreciated).

Despite being very important the monitoring of the radicalized by the intelligence services and police in order to avoid the attacks that can execute in the West, more important is to prevent and prevent these young people from becoming part of this section of recruitment. A process that leads them to kill for a religion that has nothing to do with Islam. Know and control the spaces where these young people can be in contact with recruiters, such as social networks, prisons, juvenile centers and train the officials and caregivers who work in them so that they are able to detect the inmates who enter the circuit Penitentiary with the aim of capturing or introducing these children into radical discourse.

Let us not forget that not only are the victims of these assassinations the victims of these attacks, but also the whole muslim community whenever there is a catastrophe of this kind and the young people that we have not been able to protect from falling into the hands of these terrorist groups.

David Garriga

Co-Director



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In cover: Battalion of Special Police Operations BOPE. The Battalion of Special Police Operations known by its acronym BOPE, is the elite troop of the military police of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Experts on combating drug trafficking gangs also have anti-terrorist capabilities.

-Research unit at the of the end of the Bulletin-



Fuerzas
Antiterroristas del Mundo

This edition has 11 Sections with 17 Articles written by 13 European, 1 asian, and 3 Latin American analysts. The responsibility for what is said in each article rests with its respective author. TRIARIUS does not necessarily share the different views expressed in this journal, but presents them in the interests of freedom of expression and seeking the widest possible diversity in the analysis of the phenomenon of terrorism.

The last great ideologist of jihadism

by Enric Caballería (Spain)



Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi

In bulletin number 7 of *Triarius* I wrote about the main historical ideologues of international jihadism. On this occasion I would like to speak of the last living ideologue of this phenomenon. This theologian is relevant because today he still writes speeches and fake referents on how to do jihad around the world. I'm talking about Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (1959-) is a Palestinian-Jordanian theologian and currently the only Jihadist ideologue alive. He thinks that jihad should be directed first against the Arab governments and then towards the distant enemies. He understands that the closest rival is more important because his influence is greater in the Arab world. Therefore, jihad must be directed against the adjacent enemy and then to the nearest enemy and so on continuously. Attacking the most distant opponents first only distracts from the main objective. He considers that the Arab leaders must be overthrown, for they are idolaters and apostates who ignore the will of Allah and collaborate with the infidels. In addition, he argues that the purpose of the armed struggle must be to create many small zones of Islamic influence where jihadists can spread their ideas and recruit new supporters. These territories and their inhabitants are the seeds of the future caliphate. This strategy proposed by al-Maqdisi reflects his perspective on how to better promote Islamization. He believes that it is more effective to combine jihadist tactics (armed struggle) with the methods of the purists (preaching and education).

Therefore, the purpose of jihad is not to convert, but to liberate. In the work *Millat Ibrahim* (The Religion of Abraham), al-Maqdisi evokes the prophet Abraham's faithfulness to monotheism and emphasizes his rejection of idolatry to substantiate his concept of jihad. Qur'anic verse 60: 5 describes the sincerity and loyalty of the prophet Abraham, who submits with devotion to the one God, Allah. His sincerity towards the oneness of God is again evident when he destroys the idols praised by his community and repudiates them. Then Abraham and his followers said the words "bura-a-u" or "free from", which demonstrates their dissociation with sinners.

Al-Maqdisi uses this verse to explain his interpretation of the concept of *al-wala'wal-bara'* (loyalty and detachment), a classical Islamic notion that exhorts Muslims to show solidarity with other Muslims and antipathy towards unbelievers. This idea is an essential element of his doctrine of jihad. According to him, the story of the prophet Abraham shows that it is a fundamental obligation to accept monotheism and repudiate the infidels. In addition, he proclaims that the relationship between Muslims and non-believers must be of enmity and hatred.

To support his ideas, Al-Maqdisi also quotes the theologian Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who said that the two basic principles of Islam are to accept monotheism and fight against innovation. Al-Maqdisi urges Muslims to imitate Abraham and enunciate the words "free from" to the Arab regimes and their supporters including their armies, Intelligence services, police forces, courts, laws, constitutions and values. Thus, believers can affirm their devotion to monotheism and demonstrate their rejection of idolatry and the sin that exists in their societies. He further recommends that Muslims make accusations of apostasy and direct jihad both against Arab governments and their followers and the institutions that support them.

Similarly, Al-Maqdisi is very critical towards democracy, since it places sovereignty in men and not in God. It indicates that this ideology is very similar to a religion and that its "sacred book" is the constitution. He also says that Arab parliaments are polytheistic institutions and refuges for pagan beliefs, because in these "temples" representatives and other politicians are prized as "idols" and "gods." Therefore, he warns that this form of government of Greek origin is yet another religion, but it is not Allah's religion. The teachings of this theologian have

influenced many jihadists including Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (1966-2006).

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The Mujahideen of the People of Iran Heroes or villains? An example of terrorist group demobilization

Alfredo Campos (Spain).



Introduction

The People's Mujahideen of Iran (also known by the acronym PMOI, MEK or MKO) or "Moyahedin-e Jalq" in Persian was an organization founded in 1965 by a group of students from the University of Teheran, whose radical ideas were centered on the armed revolt against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, whom they considered a puppet of the United States. This organization established its basic principles in a mixture of Marxist ideas and Islamic values that were translated in the revolutionary struggle, as well it reflects its name "Mujahedin-e Khalq" (The Holy Warriors of the Town). In fact, the organization has been involved almost ever since its founding in a series of terrorist attacks and armed attacks on foreign facilities, government agents and foreign nationals from Western countries who supported the previous Iranian government. Its leader since 1979 was Masoud Rajavi, although allied initially with Khomeini in the fight against the shah, soon the differences between both leaders came to light thus having the organization to go into exile since in Iran many of its members were imprisoned Or executed. Subsequently, the organization was led jointly with his wife Maryam Rajavi.

History of the problem

The organization was initially established in France but later expelled from that country and hosted by the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein in the 1980s, who provided them with protection, financing, weapons,

ammunition, vehicles, tanks, military training and Use of several military bases distributed throughout the country. The purpose of all this was to serve as an armed auxiliary militia in Iraq's struggle against Iran. In the aftermath of the conflict, Khomeini having announced a ceasefire, the Mujahideen launched the operation Forough Javidan (Eternal Light) under the orders of the Rajavi marriage, in a desperate attempt to seize power and end the Iranian regime of the provoking ayatollahs A popular uprising against this. The operation was a complete failure losing the Mujahideen more than a quarter of its fighters (approximately 1500).

When the war between the two countries ended, the group continued to provide "services" to Saddam Hussein as part of the repression of the Kurdish and Shi'a riots that took place in Iraq in the 1990s. Commanders of the MEK, there are press reviews that cite Maryam Rajavi encouraging her fighters to "put the Kurds under their tanks and save their bullets for Iran's Revolutionary Guards," along with the fact that her husband, Massoud, Was granted a high military distinction, the medal Rafedeen, on the part of Sadam Hussein.

After the overthrow of the Saddam regime, in 2003 the US occupation forces negotiated with the Mujahideen the surrender and disarmament of the group, as well as the protection of its members at the main base, Ashraf Field (near Baghdad) Granting them the controversial status of "protected persons" under the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention.

Finally, once the responsibility for the custody of the members of this group is transferred to the Iraqi authorities, they are unable to effectively carry out this action by omission or action, as the camp was subjected to various attacks by Shiite armed militias , Dying some of its members. The Iraqi government negotiated the transfer of Ashraf camp residents to the Liberty camp and finally stated their intention to expel them from the country as it did not consider their presence "pleasant" in that country. For this reason, various efforts by International Agencies and Agencies determined the need to resettle the members of this group that still remained in Iraq, to different countries distant to the zone of conflict.

The group was designated as a terrorist organization by several Western countries. In particular, the European Union included it in its list for the period

2002-2009 (Common Position 2001/931 / CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and its various updates), and in the latter year Excluded from the list on January 26, when it formally declared abandonment of arms, marking the milestone of being the first organization of its kind to be removed from that list.

Conclusion

Despite its limited impact on recent conflicts in the Middle East, the case of the demobilization of this group is an interesting object of study from which many lessons can be learned and learned from the mistakes made. Can the threat be considered as neutralized? This group today considered one of the main of the democratic opposition of Iran, got to be constituted in a sort of sect or cult, led with iron hand by the marriage Masoud and Maryan Rajavi, within what they themselves denominated "ideological revolution" Establishing a whole system of devotion to leaders and a rigorous code of behavior that included military training and weapons management, self-reprobation sessions, compulsory divorce, celibacy, forced separation of family and friends from gender segregation. The ultimate objective of all

these guidelines was none other than to achieve the total subjection of the followers to the leaders, so that they serve their political and military aims and interests. Most of the members of this group (approximately 800) have been resettled in Albania where they live tolerated by the Albanian government for humanitarian reasons, despite the reluctance of many experts. Will they be a threat again in the future? The fact is that its members have not received the treatment of members of a terrorist organization and, moreover, they have been considered as a valuable source of military intelligence, obviating the connections of this group with other organizations such as the Islamic State, known in Military circles. On the other hand, the appropriateness of the relocation of this contingent to Albania is questioned, since its resettlement to most of the western countries is denied because it affects national security, where they remain confined to a closed complex, taking into account the high levels of Corruption and delinquency as well as the easy access to arms that exists in this European country. The answers to all these concerns only time will bring them.

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Transverse plan for coexistence and prevention of violent radicalization in the city of Málaga

by David Garriga (Spain)



When we speak of prevention and counter-narrative in the face of violent radicalization one of the tools that comes to mind and that all experts in the subject consider fundamental is the importance of training and awareness of society to reduce those degrees of radicalism and prevent them from going further, becoming a radicalism that will come to action.

A pioneering project to raise awareness and build an active and resilient citizenship that promotes social cohesion, improves coexistence, respects religious freedom and worship and avoids marginalization and radicalism, we find it in the Transversal Plan for Coexistence and Prevention Against the Violent Radicalization coordinated by Julio Andrade (Deputy Mayor of Málaga) and Ruth Sarabia (General Director of the Government Area) and worked in conjunction with the Intelligence Center against Terrorism and Organized Crime (CITCO) of the Ministry of Interior of Spain in the city of Málaga.

Within the four main objectives of the fight against terrorism (Prevent, Protect, Persecute and Respond), this plan focuses its resources and efforts on the first of the four pillars, on prevention. A

prevention in response to a national need to treat the phenomenon of violent radicalization.

Its main objective is to prevent people from joining terrorism by working on the root causes or causes of violent radicalization and terrorist recruitment. Complementing this way, the actions that are already developing the different bodies and security forces.

In order to carry out this purpose, the Plan works with two specific objectives:

A) On the one hand, those related to an internal development of transversal strategies to prevent violent radicalization, to make the city of Málaga a safer and more resilient city.

B) On the other hand, to be able to expand its good practices and formalize the achievement of joint objectives of interculturality, tolerance, religious respect, respect for differences and beliefs, etc.

In addition, the Plan proposes the creation of Local Groups to Combat Violent Radicalization coordinated by the Security Forces at the local level and which, under the supervision of the National Group, will integrate the rest of the local social sectors to know, to prevent and to treat the foci Detected.

The conceptual frame of reference used for this plan has been to separate radicalization (the development of extremist ideologies and beliefs) from the pathways of action (which may be participation in terrorist acts or not) and to target resources to their main target audience, As they would be, on the one hand the citizenship in general, on the other hand the different groups especially vulnerable as they could be women, youth and young people protected and ex-guarded and minors. Also the staff of the City Council, areas, companies and municipal bodies, schools and institutes, training centers, associations, religious bodies, institutions, etc.

The Plan for the Coexistence and Prevention of Violent Radicalization is articulated in 9 axes of action that foresee the development of 245 actions and concrete measures.

These guidelines on which the Plan pivots are:

Axis 1. Prevention and programmed intervention

Axis 2. Institutional actions and cooperation

Axis 3. Awareness-raising and training
Axis 4. Gender equality and promotion of Muslim women in the social, cultural, health and productive spheres
Axis 5. Social and intercultural mediation
Axis 6. Management of coexistence, religious and multicultural diversity
Axis 7. Education and development of attitudes and skills in minors and youth
Axis 8. Strategic communication: internet and social networks
Axis 9. Research and analysis.

It has been estimated that it is a priority to first develop Axes 1, 2 and 5 as elements that support the further development of all the measures contemplated.

Four working bodies have already been created that will make possible the participative and professionalized development of this Transversal Plan:

- Development partnership for the Promotion of Coexistence and the Prevention of Violent Radicalization. It was formed last April. It allows networking and groups the agents involved in this area. The Codenaf Association, Moroccan

Association for the Integration of Immigrants, Asociación Emicicipada, Asociación Incide, Málaga Acoge, Accem, Federation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender-Andalusian Association, Asociación Prodiversa, Movimiento contra Intolerance, Red Cross and Caritas.

- Local Group. Also created in April 2017. Led by the Councilor for Social Rights, Julio Andrade, brings together the Security Areas and Social Rights.

- Technical Committee for the Prevention of Violent Radicalization. Integrated by professionals of the Social Rights Area.

- Advisory Board. Formed by a group of experts and staff of the Forum for Peace in the Mediterranean.

Once these objectives have been developed and the effectiveness of their strategies and actions verified, the results obtained can be shared with other cities under the coordination of the relevant institutions.

A plan, undoubtedly, pioneering and necessary to fight against the violent radicalism that has darkened and more and more attacks on our society in recent years.

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Al Qaeda: Fight in the Cyber Space

by Marc Fornós (Spain)



ISIS hacked the official page of the Argentine Army

Every time we connect in the networks, we see more and better prepared soldiers of the DAESH Cyber-Caliphate, where they mark the leadership in cyberspace, to which terrorism of jihadist etiology refers, propaganda, newsreels, radios, groups of Social networks, followed by gears that makes the machine of the cyber-caliphate of the DAESH continue expanding without any remedy, which this propaganda also contributes groups related to its struggle not belonging directly to the DAESH, at least not officially, as can be The group that carried out the hacking of the website of the Argentine Army, where he established a high and clear message in which he threatened directly, indicating "ISIS IS IN ARGENTINA AND SOON SOON TO GO TO KNOW ABOUT US ..."

So, if we believed that this was not enough, it resurfaced, and this time prepared for the cybernetic battle AL QAEDA. Their leaders in the different areas have already begun to seek more prominence through videos and advertisements, claiming perhaps their share of "SHARE", but not enough with it, has begun to carry out a more aggressive campaign in the digital world.

Al Qaeda has begun to create different TELEGRAM channels by emulating the agency "AMAQ" or "NASHIR", thus disseminating its

achievements in the African zone, as in the Sham zone, and establishing news channels of information of the day to all its Partisans, or even more non-partisan to the creation of a UMMAH under the SHARIA law, without being critical of the Islamic State directly, but rather by perceiving that a common goal is sought, but with a different "doing" Reach the same supporters of the DAESH, and why not, the transfer of some to their ranks.

But these channels have not been the only ones, they have done to immitate the opening of more channels of doctrine and formation, in this case not of armed formation nor creation of arms, as it was the last delivery of the DAESH with a file of creation of Homemade weapons, more than 600 megabytes in videos and PDF manuals, for that purpose. If not more in the revenue of silencing with the idea or main doctrine of their formation, and with that they have created a channel of "manuals of Al-Maqdisi" where they diffuse their manuals of doctrine and numerous texts of the influential salafista clerigo more named and with More prestige of Al Qaeda, in what doctrine is concerned, and in which his texts become viral in the networks, among his followers.

While some believed that the battle of AL QAEDA with the DAESH focused only on the territorial zone of conflict or by the establishment or who led the

Ummah, now with more force the battle is centered in the digital zone.

Another of the proposals of the followers of Al Qaeda that have been offered to them, is a new digital magazine that already has two editions called AL-HAQIQA, where in these first numbers its great leaders in Jihad give prominence, but with An eye put into campaign in the West and very subtle for the conquest of more adepts in the western area, teaching and narrating the exploits of other Western assumptions, from Abu Basir to Britani of LONDONENSE origin, or Abu Jandal AL-HOLANDI, letting understand Of being clear examples for AL QAEDA Jihad.

Al Qaeda has also made inroads into social networks as it could not be overlooked, Al Qaeda

knows that the DAESH has a great force of attraction and capture in that field, therefore they could not be less, so they have opened accounts On Twitter and Facebook to follow the same path and to establish a channel of direct communication with potential followers in the western zone.

Even if with everything explained we still believe that there was nothing more to cover or to imitate the Daesh, the answer is that as far as the NASHEEDS (Islamic music) are also object of imitation, as has been said by part Of great eminences in the world of business - and terrorism is a type of business as well - "if something works imitate", and this is being done by AL QAEDA and with very good reception by the radicals.

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How did terrorism employ the media? Reading and analysis.

by Muhammad Nusari (Yemen)



"Terrorism" has become the most prominent phenomenon on the map of our modern world, not the violence of solid structures, but the violence of unrestrained reality. Violence on the map of the media is subject to a process at all levels intensifies the violence in our contemporary world many dimensions, it is violence is not detonated by the effectiveness of one variable is not interpreted by one hypothesis, which is violence made by many variables, intersecting variables in certain places and violence erupts in these Placements, which suffer from stress over power, are directed at the explosion of violence. Information and communication technologies that convey images of other societies where the negative effects of the same variable have been eliminated in the last two decades. The globalization of information and communication technology A world on the basis of cultural homogeneity or, as some call it, the unification of the world, international companies have sought global production and consumption, and social and political activism have begun to activate the slogans of democracy and human rights to mobilize marginalized groups to take an active place in the new world order.

Together, these developments have widened the map of violence on the squares of Third World societies, where the culture of third societies collided

with the values embodied in the new economic pattern. To impose this pattern, the United States relied on power as a means of imposing this pattern globally, That jihadist groups, and that this alert to become an introduction to violence, which sometimes directed against the political regimes that failed to protect them, sometimes against the parameters of world powers, and sometimes against some groups suspected of sympathy or alliance with world powers that impose oppression, and on the other failure Economic development in the Arab countries, the deterioration of social conditions within the Third World societies, and the spread of many negative phenomena, starting with the deterioration of development rates and low levels, and the spread of the oppression of political regimes and their brutality and sponsorship of corruption, which led to the emergence of many social forces that led to violence. Young people are one of the main forces that adopt violence against political systems, considering that this youth group constitutes the majority of the population and believes that it has the right to the present and the future, which is capable of understanding the reality and able to change it, and the manifestations of corruption and its surrounding stories. Therefore, there is a need to overthrow the political systems in particular, and that unemployment is spreading among them and impede

the development of their lives as well as tension and deprivation, which makes young people a present and permanent force in the violence, especially violence directed at the structure and symbols of the political system, When they realize their suffering compared to the residents of high-end neighborhoods, or when they realize that political systems do not pay attention to their needs. The modern media and information technology have developed the awareness of these disadvantaged groups, against the political system or the society.



The media gave political legitimacy to terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda, as one of the few who are said to be standing against Israel and the United States. - Raising fear and terror. - The media largely depends on the extent to which they can find local partners, depending on their training, military experience, and financial assistance, as well as the role of the media in this regard. - The Internet is one of the tools of soft power and efforts in the face of terrorism on the Internet, is a war of ideas can be dealt with through public diplomacy aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the people.

- There are two types of threats made by terrorism through the Internet:

1 - Internet terrorism, which aims to harm individuals, and property through the spread of viruses, and manipulation of information via the Internet.

2 - Use the Internet as a communication medium.

- Terrorist Media Strategy:

- Establishment of the Media Department of Al Qaeda in 1988 as part of the organizational structure of the organization aimed at celebrating the Mujahedeen, attacking Arab regimes, communities, America and Israel.

- Influencing public opinion, spreading its ideas about its operations, and attracting new followers across the world.

The role of the media in spreading the phenomenon of terrorism It is not arbitrary to make

Salafi jihadists or extremists, or terrorists, use modern technology to spread their ideas and threats, and employ these thousands of electronic media sites as a communicable, convenient, cheap, And dissemination. In addition to being a complex of activists to attract, recruit, train and pass ideas and attitudes in different languages to different social strata, exploiting the slack and destruction of young people who use this technology has become a platform for people with no platform, groups and individuals to spread hatred and extremism and violence and a means of communication among members of the organization, Sympathize with them or perform them or their opponents in order to instill terror and sedition in them while presenting themselves to the world as real campaigners, noble humanitarian messages, and community issues. The Internet is used to mobilize and mobilize the public, who have limited levels of education with emotional and passionate slogans to find supporters and thus maintain survival and continuity, and uses the Internet in communications and instructions given the rich information provided by the cost or trouble with the difficulty of identification in front of millions Using computers and the network, and thus difficult access to members of the organization, in addition to the planning and coordination of operations, and funding through the Internet, and to disseminate ideas and instructions and techniques of vandalism and destruction, and the dissemination of toxins In the minds of young people, and exploiting their social and cultural status, because young people consider websites to be a haven and out of control, as well as parental or store controls. This facilitates the access of terrorists to youth and their lack of experience and ignorance of facts that enable them to scrutinize ideas and discover lies, lies and toxins. Which are propagated by terrorists.

Terrorists also use the Internet and the media in general to spread their successes or to spread atrocities that accuse the presumed adversary of attracting new young people or publishing images of suicide bombers and commenting on them in order to either show false championships or to feed hatred and indignation among sects. Crime, violence and terrorism, by mastering the dissemination of certain events, and dialogue with leaders, which makes matters worse, portraying these terrorists as real heroes who have the courage to make them superior to the enemy and the world's largest military and technical arsenal. We are already facing a global phenomenon that draws the attention of all peoples and governments to their ability to threaten social security and stability, to influence the political

situation, to strike national economies by targeting personalities and to create chaos in order to inflame terrorist acts and their destructive effects on society. One of the methods used by terrorists is to market their purposes and targets through the media in order to mislead the security services on the one hand and to control the public opinion on the other by publishing news and pictures of terrorist activities, because their marketing helps to achieve and complete terrorist objectives. For them is a positive indicator of the success of terrorist action to the extent that it was associated with the fact that any terrorist operation was not covered by the media, it is a failed operation, and on this basis these terrorists resort to the media to cover their activities and operations give them the attribute of success .. "British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher described this "free" propaganda with the oxygen necessary for terrorism, which he cannot do without, because coverage of the terrorist media event achieves tactical and strategic gains for its sponsors. "Who benefits from this? Free promotion, is the media or terrorism? Terrorists benefit by free publicity for their actions to polarize and demonstrate technical, qualitative and numerical superiority, because television or media interviews with terrorists are tantamount to reward. And thus give them opportunities to communicate with the many masses to highlight their motives and problems and justify their action, which resonates with some good, and therefore join the terrorist organizations claiming that they defend their interests.



Terrorists take advantage of the media rush for the press, in the publication of horrific images, the frequent losses and damage, coupled with the views of terrorists, serving the terrorist act, making the media, directly or indirectly, a useful tool in the service of terrorism, The Internet actor and other media, which promote destructive obscurantist ideas and recruit young people. All these things confirm that the media has become a dangerous weapon in the hands of terrorists. They are able to influence societies and individuals, not to mention the fact that terrorist rhetoric through the media can push the

fragile factions to adopt the terrorist option and create a sympathetic stream of terrorists. The terrorist organization was able to attract scholars, doctors and engineers, and not only the fragile class, which makes the impact stronger. The Internet may be used to convey information, and to communicate between dormant cells. This reality is fueled by some of the official media, sometimes non-specialized, whose level of knowledge is not allowed to cover the delicate craft with terrorist violence, may negatively affect finding appropriate solutions , And the inability to understand the rhetoric of extremist groups, and their systems and intellectual and organizational reference, the coverage is either haunted or humiliated, which affects the credibility of this coverage and limit the ability to influence because of the tyranny of the dimension of propaganda dimension of the media objective. It is possible to say that the Arab-Muslim media focuses more on the event than on the phenomenon. It will be able to present the details of the events and highlight the destruction; the wound, the blood and the mutilated bodies, rather than focusing on terrorism as a phenomenon whose causes and causes are absent. Cultural, political and economic, and what makes it as a phenomenon abstract and absolute, and is treated as an isolated phenomenon in time and place of isolated people also, not being linked to the context of political, economic, social, and in addition to the tyranny of the news side of the side In addition, the official media outlets lack specialized media cadres capable of approaching the phenomenon and treating it in a way that cures the recipient and the follower, not to mention the Limited capacity in terms of experts and specialists in the areas of security, social, psychological and educational, and lack of boldness between the media and academic institutions, the lack of coordination between academics and research centers specialized in the phenomenon and the media platforms.

In light of the spread of the phenomenon of terrorism internationally and locally, and the failure of security approaches, the importance of the media role and the need to activate the role played by the media in facing this threat, which threatens everyone because of its ability to influence the minds and reach all people in all their classes and categories, and affects their ideas and their various and varied So that he has supporters in all the world's scoundrels, so the extremist ideology should be addressed in the media and prevented from influencing public opinion, especially in youth, for not injecting new blood into the veins of terrorism, because facing the phenomenon is not enough legal

procedures alone, A comprehensive strategy that concerns the cultural system of the family, the media and the school, while the terrorist organizations are keen to achieve constant communication with the masses through the use of public and electronic media (especially the Internet), and establish special links with some Arab media, Poor sympathizers.



The roles played by these media in helping to incite violence and develop extremism and terrorism - directly or indirectly - can be summarized as follows:

1 - The area of absolute freedom granted by the Internet to the adherents of those ideas in the dissemination and promotion of media and provide them with the opportunity to publish their statements and statements, books, movies and recordings throughout the world with ease and unprecedented ease, That the number of Internet users in the world exceeded one billion people by December 2008.

2 - Follow the policy of intimidation and exaggeration, in some media to achieve the excitement of the press and public appeal for the purpose of material profit in the face of fierce competition.

3 - broadcast by some newspapers and the media of news and pictures, but articles develop this thought, albeit indirectly indirectly under the cover of false freedom

4 - The dominance of the news media coverage and the absence of coverage of the analytical and explanatory nature, which leads to the survival of media treatment on the surface of the event or phenomenon weaken their ability to persuade and lose effective and tangible impact.

5 - lack of some of these means to experts and specialists in the areas of security, social, psychological and educational to convince the viewer of the reality of the event and not to follow the media amplification, which often lead to the opposite results In addition to focus on the therapeutic issue of the phenomenon of terrorism, Moving from focusing on details of terrorist operations and official and popular reactions to providing insights that help the reader or viewer to form a correct opinion.

6 - The creation of some satellite channels to display scenes and tragic scenes and the portrayal of damage repeatedly and exaggerated, in addition to broadcasting the views of terrorists without the opportunity to identify and respond to them, which is dangerous, which in turn lead to negative reactions of some that serve the terrorist act, Many of the people involved in the terrorist act arrested in Iraq were influenced by what Al-Jazeera and others were exposed to and decided to join organizations that incite suicide bombings and suicide bombings.

Our world has truly become a small cosmopolitan village, destined to be one event in the sense that

One event that occupies the whole world. On this basis, we assume a large overlap between variables

And the circumstances that cause terrorism at the global and national level. Especially since we live in the time

The recent media has become one of the necessities of life as a result of major media developments

Which does not exclude any individual within society, both young and old, and young men and women, and imposed patterns

New behaviors on individuals have not been known before. It is something that holds life and type

Relations between individuals and social institutions. Given the media's entry as a major partner

In the socialization and in the formation of public opinion on the one hand and the acquisition of the media in time

Present on our interests and attention, and besieged us everywhere we go, and in all

Times, we are exposed more than ever to the contents of what we see, hear or read

Daily messages.

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The Imam: from spiritual guide to pickup of minors for DAESH

by Antonio Martín (Spain)



According to the most general definition, an Imam is the person who directs the prayers in the mosques. It is said that every Muslim can be his own Imam, although today this figure is professionalized, including university courses that validate the knowledge of religion in a standard much higher than the common believer.

Mosques, Madrasas, Cult Centers, floors and backstallings of various shops ... are places considered critical where the captors of the terrorist group Daesh haunt like eagles to their prey from a distance, waiting for the ideal moment to make their first contact.

This figure is widely used by the terrorist group to capture minors and not so minor, for the mere fact of being considered a spiritual leader that the whole community follows and respects. Who by his knowledge is able - according to his interests - to decant an ideology of the Muslim society towards a more moderate slope or towards a more extremist and radical.

One of the objectives of the intelligence services (SI) and Security Forces (FCS) of their respective countries is to follow up the speeches that these Imanes perform to their parishioners and the procedures used for this purpose, including the classes of Arab and other religions that take place in mosques and worship centers, with a greater emphasis on the follow-up of those to which minors come.

Those who only preach in private for only a few, and hand-picked by their way of seeing the world, are the true objectives that are so much in the interest of locating all IS and FSC. In addition to those Magnets that were detached from the public figure to focus on the shadow in a more radical speech.

As Mohamed Alami Susi, founder and president of the Moroccan Friends of the Moroccan People Association (1999) in Barcelona, said in his interview last May in the digital newspaper *El Español* that governments have ignored the indications and suggestions To which persons without degrees of magisterium practice as such teaching children officially, adding that many of the Magnets do not even have knowledge in Theology to exercise. Coming to Spain and doing and undoing at will.

Is support for Daesh by these collecting magnets true or is there an economic background?

A preacher who only thinks of his own interests, is an entrepreneur of recruitment and recruitment. The more children recruited the more income, the more income, the better life, leaving behind a terrible coming for these young people and for a society that would lead to disastrous consequences in the very near future. Retiring in time with a small fortune acquired.

The IS and the FSC do not provide support for arrests of suspected terrorists, among them imams, linked to funding, logistical support and how not mostly by recruiting and indoctrination of minors or acting as an intermediary as a scout for a pickup.

The last two arrests in October last year in Spain were on the island of Ibiza, Abdelkrim the Merabet of 31 years Maslid al Fath Mosque Imam and Jalal Rockxy of 35 years considered by the investigation as an auxiliary magnet of Abdelkarim. Both imputed for the crimes of praise, apology and indoctrination especially of minors.

Some minors who with the authorization of their parents and proud to be able to profess their religion freely attend regularly to the mosque or cult center closest to their homes. An innocent and confident young people who go hand in hand with a magnet respected and praised by the Islamic community in the area.

The function of these magnets is to make the first selection of those that they consider apt to be potentially captured for their indoctrination. Later they will be invited to be part of a study group after the prayers or to carry out activities in or outside the mosque, such as sports, excursions etc There is also the option of referring them to the Madrasa for studies on Islam whether they are intensive or long lasting with any kind of excuse such as "you would be a great spiritual guide", "you can become someone" etc ... Of course madrasas of ideology Extremist that form them according to profiling.

Once these young people become part of these closed groups, more and more, they will become a single block in which each of them will watch over others, thus creating a stronger union in their indoctrination and the acceptance of the Extremist ideology.

These groups of children will begin to receive in the first place a bestial dichotomy to soften those innocent minds to be filled with extremist ideology. Subsequently a teaching of the Daesh version of the Quran that will turn into dehumanized little ones who will only see others as infidels and not as people of other religions or opposing thoughts. Culminating in graduation in Jihad as a new lost soul who fought for an extremist cause to achieve the goal of his long-awaited Sharia-dominated Islamic caliphate.

Trampling and killing anyone who does not walk in the same direction as them.

Some will have as mission to reach combat territories having facilitated the way, others with worse luck will be indoctrinated to become martyrs like "bomba bombs", and some will end up being recruiters of other minors.

Minors who, with an excessive and innocent illusion for wanting to continue professing their religion, have been mentally abducted by those who call themselves magnets, staining with blood that guide of wisdom and spirituality so well known to do the majority. Building a better society for the future of these young people, carrying the knowledge towards the others of a religion that professes the union and peace between all.

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Radicalization in Western prisons: 6 questions and answers.

by Javier Torregrosa



Muslim Prisoners in Prayer

Many issues related to radicalization have been dealt with long and deeply in this newsletter. From a great multitude of opticians, each author has contributed his vision of how this process is developed, what are its characteristics and how individuals can enter or leave the process. It is logical, in fact, that one of the major issues analyzed in these texts is related to how an apparently normal individual can become an extremist willing to fight or kill for his ideology. One of the greatest fears they are trying to establish is precisely this: that we do not feel at ease when a Muslim is near. And precisely because of this, this analysis is so important from different perspectives.

One of the modalities that is less commonly spoken, within the concept of radicalization, is the radicalization in the prison environment. Perhaps because it is an issue apparently more "remote" from the ordinary citizen, or perhaps because of the little empirical basis published on the subject, the truth is that radicalization in prisons is treated as a somewhat anecdotal element: there are, but few people talk about it. To what extent is this phenomenon important for terrorist groups? Does it really exist, or does it occur in isolated cases? If it exists, has it evolved over time?

Precisely, taking advantage of the situation, I considered it convenient to analyze some studies on this process, almost forgotten by many analysts and researchers of the terrorist phenomenon. In this case, read four interesting research, I intend to provide a brief summary of the information that anyone can get after reading them. If, in any case, any doubt arises for the reader, you can find all the bibliographical references at the end of this article. Here are some interesting questions related to radicalization in prisons, with their corresponding answers:

Is there a phenomenon of radicalization in prisons?

Undoubtedly, and as all the studies analyzed seem to share, this phenomenon is quite real, with several well-known examples of people becoming radicalized in these environments (for example, and even though it does not belong to Europe, the case of José Padilla in the USA). In these cases, an individual with extremist beliefs enters the prison and, in the event that certain conditions (low vigilance, access to vulnerable people, etc.) are met, a recruitment process begins which can conclude with the radicalization of one or more inmates.

Has this phenomenon been studied in European prisons?

The studies analyzed focused on several countries, many of them from Europe (Spain, France or United Kingdom) or considered Western (Australia or USA). In all cases there were recognized examples that supported the existence of such a phenomenon, although the strategies for dealing with it have always been different. Therefore, there is no specific culture or country in which these catchments are not being carried out, even if the means of control is different.

What types of prisoners may be most vulnerable to such extremist ideologies?

The great concern that exists in this point is precisely that shared by many analysts who seek profiles in external individuals: there is no concrete profile. Anyone, if there are certain psychosocial conditions, could embrace these extremist beliefs, and therein lies their danger.

It is true that a number of risk factors have been detected, many of which we have already commented on in the case of the Manchester terrorist, which may be useful for detecting individuals. But these factors have not been contrasted in the penitentiary population and, in turn, it is complex to analyze factors of the individual in an environment that does not invite them to be themselves, but is at all times a source of conflicts and insecurity for them.

Has the radicalization process evolved in penitentiary settings?

In this sense, Khosrokhavar (2015) is quite straightforward to point out that yes, while the rest do not analyze it in depth. In the case of the first author,

what he says is that there has been a change to the process of radicalization centered on two conditions: showing that an individual is being radicalized, and the size of the groups in which they act.

In this case, Khosrokhavar is arguing that, over time, has gone from a more "open" attitude to radicalize a more "introverted" or closed: it is very hidden physical appearance, prayers or behavior , And at the same time it tries to approach a single individual (maximum two), in what he knows as "duos" or "triplets". He has also developed the figure of "self-radicalized", with certain similarities with the lone wolf.

In any case, where the profiles before were more evident and highlighted, now they are not so much.

Is there a solution to this situation that has proven to be especially useful?

This is where the various researches differ slightly. In general, all take an intermediate position in ensuring that elements can be useful, but most agree on certain aspects. On the one hand, the importance of counter-narrative and programs that separate prisoners from extremist ideologies easy to assume. On the other hand, the importance of finding an intermediate point between the total freedom of jihadist prisoners within the prisons and the segregation or isolation of them. In turn, the importance of monitoring. And finally, the control over the relations that these prisoners maintain with others in the penitentiary context.

But above all, as proposed by Trujillo, Gutiérrez and González-Cabrera (2009), it is important that prisoners (both radicals and non-radicals) have minimally covered their affective and security needs, the lack of which often leads To greater vulnerability in radicalization. This can be quite complex since prison policy is very different from one country to another (for example, it is more closed in the United States than in European countries, and it is not

similar in Spain or the United Kingdom, which already suffered problems with Terrorism, than in France).

What is the procedure to carry out this process?

As proposed by Trujillo et al. (2009), the process is usually similar to that in the external prison environment, but at present (and as Khosrokhavar indicated) in a much more hidden and controlled way. Cohesion with the group and identity with it, as well as respect for the jihadist leaders, is much worked. Many times the presence of one of them in prison favors the process of radicalization of individuals.

Finally, those radicals who begin to legitimize all terrorist actions are those who can subsequently be chosen or recruited to perform work in favor of such groups.

Although there are only a few brushstrokes about how radicalization works in prisons, the information we get from academics and experts is clear: Prison radicalization is a real problem. Therefore, it is very important that we not forget that this environment, which is already complicated, aggressive and hostile to the inmates, can also create in them a vulnerability that the collectors know how to use very well to bring them closer to the few things that Give some security: ideologies (in this case, radical).

In conclusion, and as always, we must take into account that the phenomenon of radicalization is present in our day to day, and that it is our duty as analysts to make people aware that the response can not always be punitive or reactive (and that These investigations discard as useful), but must try to be integrative, attractive to all vulnerable individuals and able to counter-narrate those people who try, day by day, that more and more people join the ranks of any terrorist group .

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TRIARIUS

**Hispanic-American Observatory on
International Terrorism**

Mission

The Hispanic American Observatory on Terrorism constantly monitors the phenomenon of terrorism at the global level, disseminates information and analysis in order to generate a culture of prevention in society, as well as contributing to the academic community.

Vision

By 2020, the Hispanic American Observatory on Terrorism will be an international benchmark, both academically and informative. It will bring together intelligence and security professionals from the Spanish speaking countries with whom it will create an academic community.

Values

Respect for cultural, religious and ethnic diversity.
Rejection of violence and terrorism as a mechanism for achieving political ends.
Respect for human rights.
Plurality of points of view.
Objectivity in information and analysis.

Critical Assets. Threats and Security

by Daniel Martínez



The "Critical Assets" of the Nations would be the set of physical facilities, which in case of an attack or some accidents, would have an impact on the physical and economic security of the residents or the normal functioning of essential services from a country.

The definition also includes human capital, which works in these critical infrastructures, as essential elements, formed by networks and / or supply chains, for example energy, water and food, on which urban and industrial areas depend, region.

Critical assets (sum of the technicians responsible for critical infrastructures, including services, resources used as information technologies and networks, physical equipment, etc.), need adequate protection, within the framework of national laws and regulations. Of various international regulatory directives, because disruption or destruction, in whole or in part, would have a considerable impact on the population, particularly in the area of health, safety or economic welfare, among other sectors.

Critical Assets - Schools:

- 1.- Structuralist (substantive, objective, real)
This doctrine emphasizes Critical infrastructures.
- 2.- Activist (functionalist, subjective, evaluates capabilities).
This method emphasizes the people responsible for critical infrastructures.
- 3.- Mixed. Study scenarios and interests.

Initial working procedure

1.- Primary Survey of Critical Assets

It would include the 3 powers of a State, autonomous entities and decentralized public and private services.

2.- Study of Threats and Vulnerabilities

Perform risk analysis and determine the level of security.

3.- Risk analysis. Identify:

- A.- Critical assets and value each one.
- B.- Threats and probability of occurrence.
- C.- Vulnerabilities that would favor the execution of those threats and the projected security controls.
- D.- Impacts and evaluate related risks.

Probability

Level of risk Threats Critical area affected Indications
Rationale
Background Vulnerability
Insecurity
Weaknesses
high
Half
Low

Methods of attack

- 1.- Sabotages.
- 2.- Espionage.
- 3.- Attacks.
- 4.- Crimes.
- 5.- Viruses.

Objectives

- 1.- Means of communication.
- 2.- Power source.
- 3.- Databases and documents.
- 4.- Logistic chains.
- 5.- Human resources.
- 6.- Physical structures.

Driving the crisis. Planning

- 1.- Security study of the critical asset.
(Physical, Personal, Documents and Communications).
- 2.- Contingency plans before each eventuality.
 - A.- Asset and Liability Security Plans.
 - B.- Plans during the crisis.
 - C.- Plans after the crisis.
- 3.- Orders to the tactical elements.

Alert Levels

Collect information and process it to perform two types of analysis: strategic and tactical. The analyst should determine hypotheses (possible and probable assumptions) according to regional and global clues, background and scenarios.

The analyst according to the SWOT matrix (Strengths of the State, Opportunities, Weaknesses or Vulnerabilities and Threats), must present the level of alert and several Lines of Action, always

considering the rules in force and the concept of the authorities.

Low Alert Level, when the risk is potential, the security device would be the routine.

Medium level (probable risk, partial device).

High Level (imminent risk, activate special forces).

Basic levels of crisis management

1er. Level: National Strategic.

Executive Branch: Structure policies and strategies to combat terrorism, for example, as well as decision-making in the face of a crisis.

2nd. Level: Operational Joint.

The center of gravity of the crisis lies in this intermediate level of coordination, command and control, in which the Ministry of the Interior must be represented, and according to the gravity, the Armed Forces and public and / or private institutions necessary to solve the crisis .

3er. Level: Tactical.

Take control of the operations for the solution.

Conclusions:

Critical assets should be drafted by countries with no regulations, to draft a National Center for the Protection of Critical Infrastructures, taking into account the legal framework of countries with vast experience, including Spain .

Anti-terrorist security forces should make physical reconnaissance of all critical assets chosen.

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New international terrorism, an invisible threat

by Emmanuel Moya Osorio



The Bataclan, in Paris - France, reopens a year after the attack, with a concert by Sting.

Terrorism is the act by which attempts are made to frighten the population through violence, the purpose of which is to exert pressure on governments to establish a regime, establish a religious ideology or simply destabilize a government administration by making it appear that it is weak. Nowadays, terrorism does not have a specific definition, since it can be done in different ways. In this respect, international organizations from different countries can not agree with the conceptual definitions of this crime, which is more than anything else. A criminal act of great impact that has been gaining strength and dynamism worldwide.

Previously, in most cases the attacks were carried out with car bombs as did the organization Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, better known as ETA, others were carried out with people who immolated themselves, that is, people who were exploded with explosives that they brought attached to the body, this was usually done in public places to cause the greatest possible damage, also hijacked planes in order to exert pressure through a latent threat of damage to the hostages taken. In general these were the most common ways we were constantly in the media.

The attacks on the Twin Towers in the United States (Sept. 2001) are the most important reference

in the modern history of international terrorism, since that event very strict controls were created in the airports, was widely legislated in the matter worldwide, Several laws included not only the criminalization of the crime of terrorism but also the financing of terrorism along with money laundering and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In spite of the above, these efforts have not been sufficient to curb the events that are more frequent in the world, this time not only is what happens in the zone of Middle East and countries in conflict, Europe is being threatened by her own people who are influenced to commit assaults of various kinds. The most famous terrorist groups such as Daesh or Islamic State, Boko Haram, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, the Taliban movement, Al buSayaaf, Lashkar-e-Tayiba, Al Shabaab, to mention only some of the most dangerous, have been prevented at the moment of entering weapons to the countries where the attack will be carried out, is where they began to devise new forms of operation.

Today, terrorism has changed and modernized, it is very difficult to prevent it, because before the innovative mechanisms of intelligence by security agencies and better controls at airports and customs, terrorists come to different and simpler forms This was the case of the attack on January 7, 2015 in

Paris, when a group of armed and masked men attacked the satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo with machine guns during the day, killing 12 people and injuring 11 others. Attack was attributed by Al-Qaeda (the Al-Qaeda branch in Yemen). From that day on, the terrorist attacks have not ceased, on the contrary, have intensified.

Other important events were those that occurred on November 13, 2015 in the Bataclan (Paris France), an entertainment venue where a rock concert in which about 130 people died as a result of a shooting, the authorship of the attack was claimed By the jihadist Islamic State organization, later in 2016, the new target was Brussels (Belgium) where there were two attacks, one at the airport and another at the subway in the capital where 35 people died, one more in Nice, France. Which killed 86 people with a truck in a public square (Daesh or Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack), again that same year near Würzburg (Germany), a

young Afghan man injured several people with an Axe.

Thus we can list a number of acts committed by terrorists, but what really draws attention to this, is the new way in which these acts are carried out. We must resort to new mechanisms of prevention and identification of people, paying full attention not only to the nationalities of individuals but to the profiles and body language of the same that indicate possible impending watering.

It is extremely difficult to know what and where the new attack will be, that is why the exchange of information between intelligence agencies is fundamental, to review social networks is now a matter of National Security, to keep the population prepared in case of risk, as well Such as providing timely information and complaint mechanisms on suspicious individuals seeking to carry out a crime of this nature.

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
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Notes on Geopolitics and Terrorism

by Ramón Ernesto Lorca Giménez



The new gas freeways towards Europe.

There are two convulsive zones that, due to the peons who act in their conflicts, geopolitically are more complicated than at first glance seems, The first is the Afghan-Pakistani border and the second is the border between Iraq and Syria. In the 1st converge the interests of two nuclear powers: China and India, lately also the US is interested in that area (although it has never been far from being) Would the US support India if it supports Afghanistan against Pakistan? Would Russia support China with Pakistan in a conflict against Afghanistan if the US does with India and Afghanistan? And Daesh, what is your interest in the area?

This is an area with a board open to many strategies, including that of the Taliban who interact on both sides of the border but are not going to get wet in favor of either country. Is Russia interested in this conflict? It has already entered the conflict with Ukraine for the reason of not losing access to the sea, which is militarily and strategically very important for them, in addition to being economically (gas). Later we enter into it. Is it also Syria? Is this why Russia so strongly supports the Syrian government? Can the economic war also be transferred to this conflict, and for this reason neither the US nor Russia will agree if in theory they fight against Daesh both? If knowledge is perception, here we are very far from knowing something.

Does the economy affect the current conflicts of Syria-Iraq, and Russia-Ukraine? Can one start

between Pakistan and Afghanistan with the US and RUSSIA through the excuse of DAESH?

These two States have little or no control over the population, (Pashtu majority). It is an abrupt and mountainous area, there is no control over the arms trade, it is a territory always in dispute, consisting of similar ethnic groups in both territories. The main actors in this territory are: USA, PAKISTAN, CHINA AND INDIA.

Because China is seen by Pakistanis as true friends and allies, and in turn the Afghans see the Hindus in the same way, this ends up bringing the area into a rather atypical political framework, as these two countries: Pakistan and Afghanistan is not a good friendship, and both China and India have nuclear capabilities, and the Punjab area is an area where Hindus and Pakistanis have been fighting for many years, even though ethnic groups on both sides of The border are the same, those in the Pakistani area will not favor their neighbors over the Pakistani government, and in turn the Pashtuns living in the border area of Afghanistan will not act against the interests of the Pakistani State, So that this in turn does not cut the influx of weapons, which come from Saudi Arabia and Iran. The ISI Pakistan Secret Service is one of the leading arms suppliers.

Also the different religious branches are united, as much Shiites, as Sunnites and in turn Wahhabi (Saudi Arabia). At the same time, Daesh may think that it would be beneficial to enter that area in order to affect the interests of his enemies (especially the

United States and Arabia Saudi), in addition to hoarding more territory for his caliphate, So it is an area of great convulsion.

If we also enter one of the terrorist organizations that live in that area, for example: LASHKAR E TAIBA "The Army of the Pure", whose leader is HAFIZ MUHAMMAD SAEED.

Saeed professes a religious current similar to Wahabism called AHL AND HADDIT. "The Haddit could be translated as precepts." Their main objective is the recovery of lands lost and stolen by the "infidels", and that they continue to take very much into account as does DAESH; Well, this terrorist organization has: 10 Madrasas, 150 offices, 136 schools, have the 2nd system of ambulances in the country, as well as field hospitals, as well as weekly publications such as magazines, publications on the internet. etc. This gives them a lot of power and influence over the population of the regions where they operate. If so, how do the native population see these terrorists as such ?, that is a task virtually impossible if we consider that they do for the people things that their government does not, taking advantage in the process to indoctrinate them in favor of their fight.

They use these means to recruit followers, used the so-called "tunnel mode", having a basic and an advanced recruitment, practically all the origin of their recruits comes from the province of Punjab. The main channel of recruitment is the Madrasas of which - as already mentioned - have 10.

The main source of funding comes from Saudi Arabia, through donations, and also from the Persian Gulf. The armament is practically supplied by the ISI.

They also have an international apparatus, established in the United Kingdom, but it has been reduced and limited since LASHKAR AND TAIBA was designated as a terrorist group.

The border between Iraq and Syria, is another place that currently does not stop in the news for the logical influx of information due to the armed conflict that occurs there but why that area ?, is it casual? Nothing in these conflicts is. These terrorists do not really care to look for some excuse to carry out their insane actions, even if that reason is fictitious. However, in this particular case the reason given is the Sikes-Picot agreements.

Sikes-Picot Agreement

The plan for the Middle East deal between the British and French following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, according to the Sykes-Picot agreement:

The Sykes-Picot agreement was a secret pact between Great Britain and France, with the consent of Russia still pre Soviet, for the distribution of the possessions of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East after World War I. Ratified in May 1916, the agreement stipulated that despite the promises made to the Arabs in exchange for their uprising against the Turks, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine would be divided into areas managed by British and French.

Finally, at the Peace Conference in Paris (1919) a division of territories between British and French was chosen in the form of mandates from the League of Nations.

The agreement takes its name from its two main negotiators, Sir Mark Sykes (for Britain) and François Georges-Picot (for France). After the triumph of the Russian Revolution, the agreement was published by the Bolsheviks on November 23, 1917.

Terrorists operating in these areas use this agreement and the damage received by Western deception - a century ago - as a further argument to justify their actions and recruit adherents.

Security of Energy Supply in Europe

Europe gets 30 percent of its gas imports from Russia, paying about \$ 250 billion of annual energy bill. In recent years the EU has improved its energy security through various gas diversification projects. The current situation is very different from the last gas crisis of 2009 between Russia and Ukraine, for the following reasons:

The southern gas corridor project will allow gas imports from the Caspian region to be avoided for the first time in Russia for a few years, thus losing its monopoly on gas exports from that region to Europe.

Currently, much more LNG (liquefied natural gas) can be imported as a short-term measure, with more LNG terminals and new ones planned to be opened in Poland and Lithuania in 2015 and in other countries (such as Croatia) by 2020 This will mean that there will be new possibilities for imports from countries such as the US and Israel.

The EU can also import much more LNG, since its terminals did not use 73 percent of their regasification capacity in 2013. In the last two years Europe has reduced its LNG imports by 45 percent. However, European LNG imports will be expensive as they have to compete with Asian import prices, which double or triple the Europeans.

New gas interconnections between Central and Eastern European countries have interconnected EU "energy islands" and allow for better gas supply in case of crises, in addition to new reverse flow

capabilities. However, not all "energy islands" have been interconnected. The EU's short-term measures are still limited, at least for some member countries, although that will change in two to three years.

The gas supply situation in the EU has also changed. Russia transports only 53 percent of its gas exports to Europe - compared with 80 percent in 2009 - through the Ukrainian gas pipeline network, due to the opening of the Nord Stream gas pipeline.

Winter is not the best time of year for Russia to resort to gas supply cuts. Europe has had fairly mild winters, leaving the gas storage tanks relatively full. The continent consumes much less gas in spring and early summer than in winter, a time when any cut would have a much greater effect on the security of Europe's energy supply.

Most EU countries could face a 90-day supply deficit through a combination of alternative sources, the most important element being gas storage tanks. Even the Baltic countries, which still depend 100 percent on Gazprom gas, have developed a series of countermeasures in the face of any further cuts in Russian gas supply.

Now the main question is whether the EU will actually fulfill its announced policy of increasing the diversification of its gas imports, or whether it will maintain (or even increase) its dependence on Russian gas.

Support from countries such as Bulgaria, Austria, Italy and others to the South Stream pipeline highlights the gap between EU declarations and the concrete outcome of their common energy policy.

The South Stream gas pipeline is the most expensive gas import project in the area, which will further increase gas prices in the EU, which are already quite high (three times more than in the US). This will happen at a time when the EU has announced its intention to reduce energy and gas prices to maintain its economic competitiveness, and in which many other cheaper gas supply options are available.

Ultimately, the South Stream pipeline can actually increase the EU's dependence on Russian gas, and undermine the economic justification for all other diversification projects in Southeast Europe, given that regional gas demand is quite low and regional dependence Of high Gazprom gas. If Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus and Croatia instead developed their own conventional underwater gas and shale gas projects, they could increase their gas production, create many more sustainable jobs and offer gas exports through pipelines Much shorter and cheaper than those of Russia to the other European countries.

The strategic question is no longer whether Europe has alternative options for diversifying its gas imports, but whether EU member countries have the political will and strategic vision to oppose Russian pressure, to formulate coherent national strategies and to make their interests and National strategies to comply with the EU's common energy and gas diversification policy.

What impact can these European problems have on the current war situation in Syria (and vice versa)?

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USA And North Korea, about to collide. A ship that could be a cyber weapon.

by Javier Valencia Martínez de Antoñana



This article is based on a series of information that is being analyzed and contrasted at the time of writing. It is based on an incident that occurred on June 17, 2017 in the Sea of Japan, specifically 104 kilometers (64 miles) southwest of Yokosuka and 12 miles (12 kilometers) southeast of the city of Shimoda, both cities located in Japan. In that incident, the DDG-62 USS Fitzgerald destroyer of the US Navy collided with the MV ACX Crystal, a Philippine-flagged freighter. Seven sailors died in the collision.

Effects of the collision on the USS Fitzgerald

On the same day, an urgent action bulletin was received from the Russian Ministry of Defense. A few hours later, from the Russian Federation, it is stated that notification was received from the US Pacific Command. (USPACOM) with the following information: "Hostilities would likely occur soon throughout the Sea of Japan region." The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) of the Russian Federation

appears to be directly related to this incident with North Korea, arguing that the country could have pirated the autopilot controls of the freighter, through its well-known Unit 180.

According to Russian Ministry of Defense analyzes, sea and weather conditions in the area of the collision at the time of this incident show that the waters had a sea state classification, according to the Douglas Sea Scale , Of 2 (0.10-0.50 meters of wave height), a classification of Swell 1 (very low or medium and low or low), a classification of visibility, according to the United States Department of Defense (PDF) Of 9, ie excellent visibility (more than 50 Kilometers or 30 nautical miles) and on the Beaufort Meteorological Scale, a "B" (Blue Sky / 0-2 / 8 cloudy) level.

For all of the above it can be argued that sea and weather conditions have no contributing factor in this collision. The next steps on the part of the Ministry of Defense are the analyzes of the Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) of the USS Fitzgerald and ACX Crystal. After this, it is discovered that the

USS Fitzgerald was operating without the AIS but the ACX Crystal was using it.

The AIS is a tracking system that has become something like the "Internet of Ships", the Shodan of ships. It is a tool for anyone to identify and track ships traveling the world through the Internet browser and mobile applications. AISs connect directly through serial ports to shipborne navigation systems, buoys, and other navigation markers and are reflected in these applications for later location and monitoring.

According to Russian Ministry of Defense sources, ACX Crystal's AIS tracking data analysis shows that the cause of this collision was due to a radical alteration of its course, making a loop without any reason in the open sea and later, Directing his course directly against the USS Fitzgerald, accompanied with an important increase of speed.

ACX Crystal AIS Monitoring Log on June 17, 2017

According to sources from the Russian Ministry of Defense, audio recordings of the USS Fitzgerald bridge confirm that the US destroyer's sailors tried to avoid collision with the freighter, something that could not be avoided since in the final moments the freighter increased its speed considerably.

For its part, from the US There is no confirmation to the Russian analyzes, with a total hermetism about the incident and with the lines of investigation totally open.

Motive and opportunity

There is a dangerous precedent to this event that gives a plausibility to it. On June 15, two days before the "accident" between the USS Fitzgerald and the ACX Crystal, a similar incident occurred when the Russian Federation warned that the yacht named Katalaxa, which was in transit from Taiwan to the Russian city of Vladivostok, Was allegedly abducted by North Korea, losing complete control over its radio and electronic system from the vessel and entering North Korean waters.

Sources from the Ministry of Defense and the SVR said that after a thorough examination of electronic shipboard systems, it was demonstrated that the autopilot had been pirated and caused the ship to end in North Korean jurisdictional waters. The North Korean government confirmed that the vessel was in the port of Rajin and that it would be released around 22:00 local time Thursday. Ambassador Alexander Matsegora personally dealt with all matters relating to the incident, which ended with the release of the vessel and its crew. North Korean

officials have never explained how the Katalaxa ended in North Korean waters.

The attack vector

According to SVR analysts, the attack vector in the Katalaxa incident was the autopilot team. This vessel was fitted with NAVIPILOT 4000 system, which is monitored by ECDIS Northrop Grumman Sperry Marine. For its part, the ACX Crystal freighter was equipped with a more sophisticated version called Northrop Grumman Sperry Marine VisionMaster FT Integrated Bridge System (IBS). As can be seen, both systems have been manufactured by the British company Sperry Marine Northrop Grumman.

In addition to the above, so it seems, along with the coincidence of the autopilot system brand, both incidents occurred overnight.

As already mentioned, the final result of the investigations carried out by the SVR analysts indicates that both incidents would be classified as cyber attacks whose attribution directly indicates Unit 180 of North Korea.

Unit 180

Unit 180 could be defined as an agency attached to North Korea's premier e-war intelligence service, officials and Internet security experts who have defected from that country have learned. North Korea has been under suspicion in major attacks on North American and South Korean financial networks and more than a dozen other countries. Technical evidence has also been found that could link North Korea to the global cyber attack with the ransomware called WannaCry.

The members of Unit 180 are generally people with a high knowledge of offensive hacking and cyberwarfare and operate outside their country, with the intention of protecting it from possible links with the attacks. In addition, they do so because of the need to avoid the enormous communication restrictions that exist in North Korea. They are people completely infiltrated in the labor market of the country to which they travel and have a good coverage to be able to carry out their attacks without arousing suspicions.

The IP addresses from which the attacks of this unit come are usually located in China.

Conclusiones

Desde hace años, la doctrina de las Fuerzas Armadas de distintos países del mundo establece, además de los campos de batalla tradicionales (terrestre, aéreo y marítimo), un cuarto en auge, sin

el cual hoy en día ningún Estado Mayor planificaría operaciones: el ciberespacio. Este nuevo campo de operaciones, en el que se libran acciones defensivas y ofensivas, tiene además una peculiaridad, es virtual.

A falta de contrastar la información publicada en el artículo por fuentes occidentales y neutrales, hay que destacar que el escenario es plausible, basta con asistir a conferencias de ciberseguridad relacionadas con el “Internet de las Cosas” o en “Sistemas de Control y Automatización Industrial”, para comprobar en explicaciones teóricas o prácticas, que acceder a estos sistemas para posteriormente explotar las vulnerabilidades es una realidad.

En esta guerra en el ciberespacio, no solo actúan países con potentes recursos económicos

(ciberespionaje chino, ataque a centrifugadoras iraníes o a instalaciones críticas ucranianas). Países con escasos recursos han sabido sacarle rédito a grupos de hacker formados y alimentados por su Gobierno para, especialmente, realizar labores ofensivas en el ciberespacio en apoyo a su política de defensa o acción exterior. Es el ejemplo de Corea del Norte o, más cercano, el de Marruecos (acciones contra la causa saharauí).

En España, además de la normativa vigente y los actores que trabajan en materia de ciberseguridad, existen noticias recientes que apuntan que desde el Gobierno se estaría trabajando en el “fichaje” de expertos con capacidades “ciber” ofensivas, una idea que a juicio de CV2GROUP representa un paso más en las necesidades actuales de un país que no puede quedarse rezagado en el ciberespacio.

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DAESH air strikes

by Jordi Escofet



The use of drones in present-day strife (Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria) has been a major military strategic advance for coalition troops. They have been useful to achieve enemy intelligence objectives, to attack their positions, to control large strips of terrain at a high altitude, without being seen or detected, to be direct support to the troops on foot ... an endless number of uses that have Benefited a lot from the terrestrial units and even more to the intelligence analysts, since it has been possible to obtain information in real time, being this very important before the making of fast and effective decisions.

DAESH military leaders, who know how to use their drones and their advantages, investigated the use of drones and their new strategies, not forgetting that they have not invented anything in modern warfare, they have only copied the procedures of the Western armies And have adapted it to their technical capabilities.

Initially in 2014 they used the civilian drones type "Phantom 3" or hexacópteros - with an average cost in the market of 600 \$ and a scope of 2000 m - for the mission to observe the enemy advance, the defensive positions of the same and to watch the lines Of defense before making an attack and to be able to use better the tactics to follow so that it was more effective looking for the greater power of destruction at its reach.

Seeing that the drones as a weapon of intelligence gave them good results, they proceeded to develop a modified dron capable of launching some type of explosive device.

Why I say explosive device? Because they have been able to use regular ammunition for this purpose, such as the following:

- Hand grenades type F1 (French) and Mk2 (USA) adding an impact fuse and a tail to give it stability. With an approximate weight of 600g and an explosive charge of 57g of TNT.

- Rifle grenades, due to their design have not been modified since when they impact they make an explosion at the moment.

- Large caliber ammunition, from 20 to 40 mm modified for launching, adding a stabilizing tail and an impact fuze.

- 40mm grenades (USA, M403A1 HEDP) range from the following calibers: 40x46 (low speed launcher: the one suitable for rifles) and 40x53 (high speed launcher type Mk19). The capabilities of these grenades are:

1. High explosive power (HE):
2. High explosive dual-purpose power (HEDP):
3. High-Speed Shrapnel (HVCC):

They are the most used in Iraq because of the surplus of military material of the Americans that were used in the two wars.

In some cases, the use of two 40 mm grenades assembled to increase the detonation power has been used.

- Ammunition created by DAESH. There is no record of the types of explosives and fuses they carry; The most common is that they use the extracted from the military powder depots. Although a photograph has been obtained it is difficult to extract information from it but it is known that the material used is plastic to make them lighter.

- Types of ammunition which, due to their low visibility and use, are unknown in their shapes, types and sizes.

- Incendiary bombs: Both military use and those made by hand with products available at any supermarket or drugstore.

- Propaganda: Another of the very common uses. Is the launch of propaganda on the "enemy" lines of DAESH

The use of drones capable of "bombing" is a new threat that is characterized by its ability to attack unexpectedly, silent and from the sky (third dimension), which the soldier perceives as a ghost attack that generates terror to him Know where it comes from.

The drones are handled by a triggerman ("trigger man" who activates the charge when he thinks fit, in this case, when he drops it on the target).

I put this link so that they see the work in real time of the triggerman in the moment of making the decision to attack his objective:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9OOBT4FjG3M>

Results of drone bombardments:

Mortal Victims: 39

Wounded: 103

Military Vehicles Destroyed: 6

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How to combat the Drones from the Front

- Through the use of rifles in the same combat positions, we remember that the first drones to be of civil use were not designed to carry ammunition so the weight of the same forces them to fly low and with reduced speed.

- Electronic warfare: Through early detection systems in the form of "shields" that cover the frequency ranges used by commercial drones by adding a radar system to detect the course and speed of the device and finally the newest system that allows us to find the Position of the dron operator.

- Raysun MD1 cannon is used in Iraq to control and demolish the drones used by DAESH. The system interferes with the GPS and ISM signals, which allows the control and control of the device to find the position of the operator.

- Drones: The Iraqi police and army use the same system of DAESH drones to attack them where the tactic allows, generating the same terror and sense of insecurity within the cities where it fights.

I leave this link to see how the FCS of Iraq work:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YzOyjKX2_Qc

The future of drone use by DAESH

In future, according to Europol, drone attacks are expected to be carried out on "crusader" countries as a form of terrorist attack and propaganda that is difficult to detect and has a high capacity for destruction in areas where many people are in a small space.

Currently, DAESH has encouraged its supporters to use unmanned aircraft to expand terror in the West and commit attacks on European soil with incendiary bombs on strategic targets (1).



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The Hispanic American Observatory on Terrorism Bulletin is a tool for disseminating specialized knowledge in terrorist analysis, intelligence and security. Its objective is to present information in a clear, concise, enjoyable way, without academic pretensions, but with a certain level of rigor and academic formality. It is aimed at professionals in the security, defense, intelligence, and criminology sectors, the diplomatic corps, government officials, as well as all citizens concerned about the complex reality we are experiencing in relation to terrorism.

SAHEL: A step forward

by José Luis Franco



When the government of Mali in December 2012 officially requested aid to the European Union, and under the UN resolutions, the EU immediately sent troops to form without military intervention, in Bamako, creating the Headquarters of what would be the EUTM Mali (European Union Training Mission) and deployed in the country.

Undoubtedly the formation of troops is a cornerstone for the pacification of the country, and during and after any military intervention, allowing to form the rank of base troops, which is predicted that one day, with adequate knowledge, will allow this troop to create a hierarchical command that will handle missions autonomously in the future and establish a genuine Armed Forces.

France acquires a special role in this mission, as in the operations of Serval or Barkhane attack, authorized by the UN, due to the co-responsibility of having been French excolonia.

But is this effort enough to pacify SAHEL? It is a strip of 3.8 million square kilometers configured by several states (Mali, Chad and Niger) bordering Mauritania, Senegal, Sudan, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. Of an endemic insecurity, since in its inhospitable extensions it houses flimsy states, scene of conflicts and of illicit traffic of all type and current priority scene of action for the jihadist terrorism. The vision of troops and media in Iraq and Syria, with a mediatic protagonism resulting from the "Americanist" policies and interventions and the clash of these with the Russian, does not allow to see with clarity a problem that acquires an enormous dimension for the Security of Europe. The approval on 23 June of the dispatch of G5 troops (Chad,

Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali) is a signal that action must be taken by the closest countries and with a greater involvement in the conflict. EUTM support is essential, but it is fought in a scenario of Hybrid Warfare and must act firmly, attacking terrorist targets with the right intelligence and with specific troops. Because it is an extensive terrain, arid and with possibilities of open combat, where if it is not trained the failure can be total, acquire special importance the hand strokes certain, more own of units of Special Operations, supported from the air being very selective in the pursuit of objectives and the elimination of these.

France has all this infrastructure in Mali, with Intelligence base, Air Force, Desert Battle group and special forces. With the involvement of these G5 countries, EUTM as training and France leading military operations and with the participation in intelligence and logistical support of the American Command in Africa (USAFRICOM), important operations have been carried out, such as the elimination by a Command of French special forces of Wadoussène ag Mohamed of AQMI, it is observed that this is the right way, but special emphasis must be placed on the attack and destruction of operational bases and settlements, as well as displacements of convoys and for that it depends on all type Operational intelligence: HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, etc ...

I think it is appropriate to follow the effective line, from the exploitation of a NATO concept, but totally valid here, the EBAO "effects based approach to operations" whose definition is the "application of the different instruments of the allied potential that, together with the cooperation with actors Unrelated to the ALLIANCE, will create the precise effects to achieve the planned objectives, thus achieving the final desired situation. There are 26 nations currently operating, with an important contribution from the Spanish Armed Forces and the Civil Guard. Exploiting the aerial supremacy of the support contingent, providing ground attack aircraft and attack helicopters, would imply a lower cost in the lives of soldiers and an immobilization of insurgent troops, since in deserts the ability of movements mimicked with the environment is nil.

This has been seen in examples of success that would have to be exploited in the territory, such as the attack on an AQMI cell where six members were removed and weapons and explosives were

destroyed in a combined Franco-Mauritanian operation with US logistical support, a Mauritanian airborne forces, along with an advance of French Special Forces or in 2003 where a column of the Algerian GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) was totally eliminated by planes of several countries when it crossed Niger from Mali, with the support of The American Intelligence. George Marshall, the US chief of staff during the IIWW, said, "Our enemy will never be a single country, but rather

hunger, poverty, despair and chaos." He was a visionary of what happens in the Sahel. Spanish General Esteban Verástegui, with the experience of being the head of the first integral mission of the European Security Sector Reform Union (RSS) in Guinea Bissau, warned of the "temptation to look at the Armed Forces as Solution to all problems "and the Sahel requires multiple solutions, right now war, but laying the basis of social, political and economic at the same time.

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Evolution of Jihadist Terrorism in Spain

by Pilar Rangel



The profile of the jihadist terrorist in Spain has evolved since the creation in June 2014 of the self-proclaimed Caliph of the Islamic State (Daesh) to the present time in which we are in the majority of cases with Spanish nationals converted to Islam becoming increasingly young and radicalized, either within their environment or through Social Networks. It also increases the role of women in the recruitment work primarily and indoctrination.

The beginning usually begins through a sensor that keeps track of it until the process of transformation to embrace the Jihad, linked to the access of all kinds of propaganda and information to which they can access through the different Social Networks. At this point it is very important that European countries contribute through Europol to the withdrawal of the Internet from propaganda content. The data up to October 2016 show a figure of 15,421 references of this type of content, of which 88.9% have already been withdrawn, according to the latest Report of the Internet Content Notification Unit created in July 2015.

There is also another novel figure as the foreign fighters, the returnees, who presents a new threat but are controlled because they would be from being an active member in a traditional terrorist cell to exercising individual jihad. At this point it is important

to emphasize the use of intelligence shared with other countries to detect the phenomenon of returnees. Especially is times like the present where they are being driven from Syria and Iraq mainly.

However, the main danger that we face is to detect that person is being radicalized in a silent way and does not have to be a foreigner. Thus we find many cases mostly nationalized Spanish but originating in Morocco, cases that occur mainly in cities such as Ceuta and Melilla and areas such as Levante or Catalonia mostly.

The role of women every day is more important in Jihadist terrorism and has evolved from its origin to that it contributed to be the mother and wife of a terrorist to the work of recruitment and indoctrination. To put it in some way, the woman is the most versatile in Jihadist terrorism because she can exercise any type of activity.

Likewise, the issue of financing Jihadi terrorism is important because it is closely related to the different types of mafias: immigration, illicit trafficking and organized crime.

In order to solve all these aspects it is fundamental that there is uniformity in European legislation so that, although the information is shared, the legislations are different so the solutions will also be different. For this it is necessary to start from basic premises like the definition of terrorist crime, indoctrination or how the figure of the returnee will be treated.

Thus, we can congratulate Spain in the fight against Jihadist terrorism because it is a reference at international level and also in the fight against violent radicalization with campaigns as successful as STOP RADICALISMOS, from which investigations are initiated on the basis of citizen complaints made Through the internet or the telephone that is available to you.

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The Peace Process with the National Liberation Army

by Douglas Hernández



Guerrillas of the National Liberation Army

Juan Manuel Santos Calderón is the seventh president of Colombia who has tried to find a negotiated solution to the conflict that has afflicted the country for 50 years. These attempts to achieve peace have not only been with the FARC but also with other armed groups, including the National Liberation Army (ELN).

The ELN emerged at the same time as the FARC. The first approach to the national government took place in the 1980s, with Belisario Betancur being president, who, in order to achieve progress, recognized the guerrillas as valid interlocutors, hoping to achieve a comprehensive agreement. It is worth noting that for Betancur peace was a priority of his mandate. However the ELN was precisely the group that least welcomed the political project of Betancur. In general, no progress was made in the attainment of peace.

This frustrated attempt was followed by that of President Virgilio Barco, who approached the so-called Simón Bolívar Guerrilla Coordinator (CGSB), an organization that brought together the FARC, ELN, M-19 and dissidents of the People's Liberation Army (EPL). Again the ELN did not want to participate in the development of a joint agenda. President Barco's peace model was based on dialogue, demobilization and disarmament. From his government emerged the Ministry for Peace.

Under the government of President César Gaviria, the Constituent Assembly was convened to

convene political, economic and social sectors for the construction of a new Political Constitution that would meet the aspirations and needs of all sectors in pursuit of social justice. This process allowed the demobilization and disarmament of several groups outside the law, including the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) and Quintín Lame. In spite of the attempts made, an agreement with the FARC and the ELN was impossible.

President Ernesto Samper later attempted peacemaking, particularly with the ELN, but it was not advanced due to the problems that the national government had on accusations of presumed nexuses of the presidential campaign with drug trafficking. On this occasion the ELN expressed interest in advancing a process, including convening a national convention, and presenting an "Urgent Proposal for Colombia". The crisis of legitimacy of Samper's government, and time, played against this process.

The next president, Andrés Pastrana, gave priority to the dialogues with the FARC, probably for being the group more numerous and with greater capacity to do damage. However, this process with the FARC, which included the creation of a huge area of distension where the military was withdrawn so that the guerrillas were safe while negotiating, was a failure. Failure that overshadowed some advancing secondary approaches with the ELN.

Although the general perception about the government of President Alvaro Uribe is hard-hitting against the guerrillas, the reality is that in parallel they were made approaches for a negotiated exit. Hence, at the beginning of his first term in August 2002, the new government's readiness to continue the quest for a peace process with the ELN was announced in a statement. However, things changed during the 8 years of President Uribe's government, beginning with his refusal to acknowledge the armed conflict (and therefore there would be no valid political interlocutor) and also for the strengthening of the "security policy Democratic "position that emphasized the military solution.

Now President Juan Manuel Santos Calderón, also tries to advance a dialogue with this guerrilla group. The progress of the talks would have been hampered by the kidnapping of Congressman Odin Sánchez and a soldier named Fredy Ernesto Moreno, who had to be released by the ELN as a "gesture of peace." All this debacle took several months and was resolved in November 2016, when the head of that organization announced that the ELN would release Odin Sanchez.

The national government appointed Juan Camilo Restrepo as chief negotiator, and appointed an advisory team. The ELN has expressed its willingness to achieve a bilateral ceasefire with the government, arguing among other things, the opportunity represented by the Pope's visit to Colombia, to reduce the intensity of the conflict and benefit the population. However, it presents some conditions, like this:

- First, it expresses, it must end "the aggression against the popular movement and the political

tendencies that are for the changes in Colombia, and take concrete measures against the authorities and the command of the public force, which are allied with the paramilitarism."

- Second, "non-compliance with human rights guarantees agreements acquired with the social movement must cease".

- Third, "actions that cause confinement, displacement, blockade and control of food, medicines and goods necessary for the work and survival of communities".

- Fourth, "The judicialization of social leaders and social protest," and

- Fifth, "the subhuman overcrowding of the prison population, with effective measures of humanitarian relief."

Several cycles of negotiation have already taken place, but in the middle of the war. The ELN makes constant attacks on units of the Military and Police Forces with the intention of showing strength and increasing their bargaining power, but this also plays against them as the population's perception of the process becomes negative. In fact, there is an important rejection to the peace process that was advanced with the FARC, that is exploited by the political opposition to discredit the government of Santos. It is argued that much of the FARC's armament and personnel would have been passed to the ELN with a simple "change of cuff." In this case, time is also an essential factor, since the period of President Santos could end without having reached the end of the conflict with the ELN, which, after the departure of the FARC, is the most important guerrilla group And dangerous in Colombia.

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Security in semi-public or semi-private sites

by Eduardo Padrón



Wounded at the Manchester Arena.

I had been collecting information about security in soccer stadiums, shopping malls, bus terminals, hotels, etc. for a few weeks. And before beginning to write the article, the bombing of the Manchester Stadium happens, which unfortunately has done me good to gather information of interest.

The day after the bombing, on a Spanish television program, they interviewed a Spanish witness who had come to the stadium, and said two things to review in the interview. The first is that after the attack the security personnel did not know what to do, and they looked at each other and did not know how to act, they did not know whether to open the evacuation doors, etc. And the second was something like that she heard the explosion and thought of an attack, but believed that that could not be happening to her. Once again terrorism we see it as something in distant countries, which can not be happening to us. And as I said in bulletin number 6, if the Forces and Security Corps (FFCCSS) lack protocols of action, the more private security personnel.

One of the things I wanted to express in my mental sketch of the article for a few weeks was the impression, or certainty, that private companies have delegated safety work in their facilities to public safety, when in countries like Spain, May be developing personal security work of private security companies, which are authorized to carry weapons and vests of ballistic protection, but of course has an

economic cost. We have to think that we demand in our society, an attack that kills people, and that the economic benefits are greater, or greater security and that the benefits are lower.

Are there expendable citizens?

If you look at our malls, we see them "guarded" by private security personnel who do not even have the rank of private security guard, unarmed, but are already in the hands of security assistants. What type of training can these temporary employees have? For a salary that does not reach the interprofessional minimum wage will they provide a good security service? What characteristics have been sought for your recruitment? Does your training really matter and means to companies or is it a cosmetic measure? Will they have the authority to prevent anyone from pressing them? Will they be supported by their contractors or only used to give the sense of security? Unfortunately, the answers to these questions, the readers of this article, already know what they are.

I have not yet gone to a shopping mall or other semi-public recreation area of the population and that at the entrance I looked at the trunk of my vehicle or palpated under my jacket or observed inside a backpack even randomly. Spanish private security legislation empowers private security personnel, ie security guards, to inspect and register persons who are going to enter the premises, not

being able to compel, but to prevent access, if they do not accept these inspections . Are businessmen willing to lose a certain amount of sales because there are people who do not agree to be inspected? Once I went to an event of agglomeration of people and I observed signs of "Prohibited to carry arms with any type of license ...", that is to say that the FFCCSS of service and out of service that were armed in that enclosure were violating the norm, Perogrullo regulations are sometimes created. This measure reminds me of the one that exists in the airports, personnel that in the public highway are agents of the authority, watching over the security of all and of the State, inside the airport its armed entrance is prohibited.

A terrorist attack of this type in a hotel, shopping center, stadium, or other place of public recreation, will carry more losses than those produced in the security spending by the private companies in its facilities. The militarization of the streets is a mistake in which Spain should not fall. As much as a government wants to give a sense of responding to a threat, the FFCCSS have their tasks,

as well as the internal intelligence agencies, and the Army is for external threats and its personnel trained for such threats, not having any kind of Experience in dealing with the national, civilian population.

In the television program he commented at the beginning of the article, a national politician spoke, in which he said that the measures being taken in the United Kingdom and Spain, were cosmetic. The truth that I feel identified with this position, because having deployed personnel as in France belonging to the Army, without police training, I see the streets reckless. There are no police training the FFCCSS, at least the non-staff. In an analysis after the bombings of the Bataclan ward by different emergency and police agencies involved, it was shown how the soldiers had not fired, having to be pressured by the agents involved to use their armament to protect them, because the AK47 Which the terrorists used, had more firepower than police weapons.

What is the purpose of the FFCCSS? What about a private security company?

"War is a matter of vital importance to the state; A matter of life and death, the road to survival or destruction. Therefore, it is imperative to study it deeply."

Sun Tzu-The Art of War

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Low Cost? Only airlines

by Javier Vales



Investigators examine the truck used in the bombing in Niza. (Reuters)

Niza, Germany, London, even Times Square, etc ... something they have had in common with the related low cost attacks committed with pedestrians, have read well, pedestrians.

Security is paramount for citizens and as such we must use all possible means available to us, either with technology or with human capital.

How to avoid these abuses even though someone wants to commit them?

There are manufacturers that already mount in their vehicles people detectors or pedestrian alert system, it should be by community standard mandatory installation of this system in all types of vehicles, thus eliminating such risk or at least put obstacles.

The pedestrian detection system uses a radar to detect obstacles in the front area of the vehicle, whether they are pedestrians or vehicles. The system is located behind the front ventilation grille and is capable of fully braking the vehicle if there is a high risk of collision or collision.

What do we do with trucks or vans?

From a certain weight of the vehicle in addition to having mandatory installation of this

pedestrian warning system, we should install a lock code of the heavy vehicle which will be associated with a GPS.

What if the truck is stolen from the company or while I make the deal?

To start the heavy vehicle, we should at the time of moving it enter that code plus key, without that code could not move from the parking lot.

It can not be said that the code would change every day, we would never repeat it in our fleet, making it impossible to give this information to a third party before.

And to associate with GPS?

As it would be to use an immobilizer connected to the control unit of the vehicle or even limit it in speed, being a heavy vehicle at 20 kilometers per hour we would put the maximum speed allowed to move and thus would not cause a road blockage.

If this had been done in the truck robbery of the Christmas 2016 attack in Germany by not giving signals to the driver, who stole the vehicle, the German highway police would have been able to

locate and immobilize him, since a Vehicle of that tonnage at such a low speed, would draw attention in the road control cameras.

We will always use the GPS code, as this will give us real data of the vehicle, we will never associate vehicle to registration, since these can be manipulated and would leave without effect the code of action, therefore to GPS code of Immobilization or Limiter of Speed to 20KM / H to the switchboard.

The advantage is that the control unit can not be removed from the mechanical equipment, because if this is replaced it would take a lot of time and before a quick action would be an obstacle.

How do I control the traffic of these vehicles in big cities?

It is clear that sowing our cities with concrete blocks or giant planters is not as aesthetic as we can find.

My proposal comes out of the ground, either with larger hydraulic bollards and interspersed, in parallel or with sharp elements that activate from a control point of cameras, rising from the ground.

We would also use license plate readers that would warn us of a stolen vehicle circulating through a critical area in safety

With these elements, together with the State Security Forces, we would make a kind of security capsule, which would not let any element that wants to attack enter and, by the way, have full control of what moves around and be able to neutralize it.

How do I control major events on soccer fields, concerts or conferences?

First we should do it in spaces in which its surroundings are ample, to be able to have a global vision from the air as from land of everything that is happening, as this is almost impossible we should assign a number of even streets for the entrance to the event And an odd number of streets for the exit of the event.

If the Football Field has direct access from six streets, we would use streets 2, 4 and 6 (always with the street totally clean of parked vehicles) for the entrance of fans or people to the event, the rest of streets would be sealed to any Use, no movement would be left in them, so I can perform a full and effective search to 100% of the attendees and control the surroundings removed the odd streets of their full

control and having them clean in anticipation of having to do a quick eviction Of the place.

At the end of the concert, match, etc., ... we would use the odd streets 1,3,5 which have been previously reviewed during the event to obtain, in this way, a safe way for all attendees.

It does not help me, the fans are already on the street, nothing is going to happen here, you have to give them an exit and a safe entrance, you have to be sure that those who enter do not carry anything suspicious or who are at the exit can do something , We have to give security to the citizen in every place and above all to control the movements of people from the air so as not to massify streets and not to harm them.

What do we do with the bridges?

The past outrages on the London Bridge indicate that the target in the outrage is to create the greatest number of injuries, both physically and psychologically for a good part of their lives.

In order to avoid the invasion of the vehicle or even to produce Wounded by Firearms, my proposal is an Armored Glass Line, delimiting sidewalk and street, this glass of a height no greater than a meter and a half, in which they could shelter crouching or pulled In the floor next to the glass, the pedestrians before a burst of shots, also with this element would avoid the entrance of the vehicle to the sidewalk.

The Shielded Glass would be of maximum strength and always certified in its manufacture and tested for its effectiveness, by UNE / EN / ISO regulations.

It should be remembered that the armored security glass is composed of two or more sheets joined by interposition and between them we find sheets of plastic material to increase their effectiveness as well as to avoid their breakage completely.

With this proposal we are not harming the global image of the environment or avoiding the entrance of light or air, to the pedestrian, while we watch over their safety.

Here are my proposals for Active Security in Forecasting Attacks, I am sure they are better, but I invite you to hold a debate to always improve and annoy the citizens minimum, offering them a climate of tranquility while the others watch.

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Antiterrorist Forces of the World

Audentes fortuna iuvat



Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais BOPE



The Battalion of Special Police Operations known by its acronym BOPE, is the elite troop of the military police of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

They are characterized by incursions into the favelas of the country against organized crime and drug trafficking, which has made these slums poor, their center of operations. Criminals have long been using powerful armament that exceeds the capabilities of the conventional police. This is where a unit like the BOPE endowed with very high levels of training and typically military armament becomes indispensable to deal with them.

To break into danger zones, sometimes requires the use of armored trucks, which are officially called "peacemakers", but are informally known as "Caveirões". These vehicles can carry a unit of 11 men, and protect them from attacks with weapons up to caliber 7, 62 mm.

The BOPE acts in high risk situations and in areas generally dominated by criminal gangs, which increases the dangers to which these brave men are exposed. They are also able to act against terrorist threats, as evidenced by their deployment to provide security for the Olympics in Brazil.

There have been two films based on this special unit, called Elite Troop and its sequel Elite Troop 2. These films do not show a precisely positive image of the Battalion, and in fact the BOPE has been entangled in some scandals, however they weigh much more their blunt actions as the strong arm of the law in high-risk urban areas, facing dangerous and ruthless criminals who want to impose their will on honest citizens. They do the work, which others would not be able to do.

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(In order of appearance)

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