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Editorial

In the usual channels of the terrorist group Daesh appeared last week a message that warned Muslims to stay away from public spaces in eight target countries of attack by these killers. These were: Belgium, France, Russia, United Kingdom and Italy in Europe and United States, Canada and Australia in other continents.

The terrible thing about the message is no longer that they dare to frighten the population by directing them the strategy of the winning cards of the chessboard but rather they subtly continue to sell that false and confusing speech for some, to confuse Islam and terrorism. This warning to all "Muslims" continues to create that confusion that is so convenient and interesting for them to dichotomize the Western population and convince.

We were also witnesses these days of an attack in central London by three murderers who killed eight innocent people in the middle of the election campaign for the elections held on 8 June. They continue to want to influence our vote and our policies to facilitate the way of entry into the West.

More training and cooperation between police forces, intelligence and civilian actors is essential to be able to curb this barbarism. This week a window of optimism opened in Barcelona, the first days of security and intelligence of the hand of CISEG - Community of Intelligence and Global Security, a non-profit, civil community and collaborator with the Latin American Observatory on terrorism TRIARIUS, in Which was delighted us with useful and current topics for our security and knowledge against this Daesh terrorism as they were profiling the future terrorists, the lone wolf, minors as Daesh's new target generation here in the west, detection tools Of lying and deception in interviews with jihadists, intelligence and private security against these assassins and as a program end, a pioneering and essential project was presented to prevent violent radicalism in the West, the so-called "Transversal Plan for Coexistence and Prevention of Violent Radicalization In the city of Malaga ". He did not leave indifferent to any assistant interested in matters of security and intelligence. Europe mobilizes against violent radicalism, slowly, but it moves.

David Garriga

Director



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Fuerzas
Antiterroristas del Mundo


On the front page: Tarantula Team, Special Assault Command No. 35 of the South Korean Army. The Tarántula Team, is a unit of Special Antiterrorist Forces composed only of women, depends on the Defense Command of the capital of South Korea.

-Information of the unit at the end of the Bulletin-

The phenomenon of terrorism

The different trends within the contemporary Salafist current

by Enric Caballería



Currents Salafists today. Own elaboration for TRIARIUS, June 2017.

In issue 6 of this newsletter I wrote about the origin of Salafism and how this current of Islam influences jihadist ideology, but within Salafism there are different visions. The Salafist current, like other tendencies within Islam, is not a homogeneous group. On the contrary, there are some significant differences between Salafists on how to better defend and promote Islam. I think it is essential to explain and analyze the differences.

According to researcher Quintan Wiktorowicz, Salafists can be divided into three groups: purists, politicians and jihadists. He explains that all Salafists share the same religious belief, but differ in the methodology (manhaj) or the means by which they promote their beliefs. The most important aspects of this creed are belief in monotheism, rejection of innovation, the importance of literally interpreting the Qur'an and the Sunnah, defending the implementation of Islamic law, condemning any form of idolatry, opposing Theological diversity and to repudiate schools of Islamic jurisprudence.

The purists are the largest group among these three factions. They emphasize the importance of each individual observing Islam and Islamic law correctly, but reject the idea that they have a duty to actively establish an Islamic political order. They believe that the right Islamic society will emerge through preaching (da'wa) and education (tarbiyya) when all Muslims adopt the right method. They oppose the tactics used by politicians and jihadists because they think their actions are counterproductive and lead to repression of the

Salafist movement. The purists, on the other hand, consider that their obligation is to listen and obey the legitimate ruler. Some important thinkers within this Salafist movement are the Saudi religious leaders Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz (1910-1999) and Muhammad Salih al-Uthaymin (1925-2001) and the Albanian / Syrian theologian Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani (1914-1999).

Politicians or activists: they want to spread their interpretation of Islam by using government and state institutions. Thus, they establish political organizations and participate in electoral processes. This approach emerged in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the 1960s, when several intellectuals from the Muslim Brothers of Egypt, including Muhammad Qutb, Sayyid Qutb's younger brother, began teaching at Saudi universities because of the repression they suffered in their country. These Egyptian teachers emphasized to their students the importance of political activism and social mobilization to promote Islamization and Salafism. They said that the methods used by the purists were not effective and therefore it was necessary to use political action to achieve the main objective of Salafism, the application of Islamic law. In the Arab world there are several Salafist parties currently participating in electoral processes and having parliamentary representation, such as the Salafist Islamic Alliance (Kuwait), the Al-Asalah Islamic Society (Bahrain), the Umma al-Wasat Party (Libya) Al-Nour Party (Egypt)

Jihadist Salafists combine their deep Salafist beliefs with a total commitment to jihad, which is as important to them as the five pillars of Islam. They argue that the purists are wrong because they are ignoring the Koranic duty that every Muslim has to immediately implement Islamic law by all possible methods, including armed struggle. In addition, they say that one can not wait for the conversion to this cause of the other Muslims because the Prophet warned that "the enlightened will always be a few." They understand that the Salafists are that small group of "enlightened" and, therefore, it is their responsibility to establish the Islamic State. In relation to the activists, they think that these are also wrong because they recognize political systems that are anti-Islamic. They believe that when one participates in politics one ends up legitimizing the same institutions that promote idolatry and secularism. Therefore, this alternative is not a good option to promote the Islamic State. Jihadists, on the other hand, understand that armed militancy is the best method for Muslims to establish the Islamic state and protect Islam.

Researcher Thomas Hegghammer uses the political objectives of Jihadist Salafists to separate them into different categories. He points out that there are five orientations: State, nation, Islamic community, morality and sectarianism. Those who have a state orientation want to change the political and social organization of the State. Those who have

an interest in the national issue wish to establish sovereignty over a particular territory that has been occupied.

Controlled by non-Muslims. Jihadists focused on the umma want to protect the entire Islamic community against aggression by foreigners. Those who have a moral orientation are intended to change the social behavior of Muslims to be more closely related to Salafist beliefs. Finally, sectarianism is defined by the desire to reduce the influence of other religious sects. Jihadist Salafists choose their opponents in relation to their central objectives. Muslim governments are the enemies of some groups because they impede the transformation of the state and commit acts of corruption, oppression or secularism. Other groups consider that some armies as could be the American, Indian or Russian are adversaries because they occupy a territory considered Muslim. The United States and other Western countries have been targeted by jihadist organizations that accuse them of assaulting the entire Islamic community. For those who combat social immorality, the opponents are all those who commit "profane acts" such as adultery, homosexuality or alcohol consumption. Shiite communities are one of the preferred targets of sectarian jihadists because they are considered heretics. A few days ago, in Iran, the country of the Shiite majority was an attack in which twelve people died


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The phenomenon of terrorism

Al-Andalus in the jihadist ideology

by Carmelo Aguilera



Basic stages in the history of Al-Andalus, during the Middle Ages.

Al-Andalus, is a term that is often used and understood in a confusing way.

It should be considered as that territory of the Iberian Peninsula and Balearic Islands that was under the rule of Islam between the years 711 to 1492.

Throughout these eight centuries, the territory under Muslim administration changed as well as levels of tolerance and coexistence between the three cultures in the area: Muslim, Catholic and Jewish.

It is therefore totally incorrect to match the territory of Al-Andalus with the current Andalusia as it is done many times.

For the radical Islamic collective unconscious, Al-Ándalus is a myth and therefore longing for what was at one time a Muslim territory and which ceased to be so (Dar al-Islam).

There is no doubt of the advances made at that time, both in agricultural matters, in mathematics (with the introduction of the Arabic numerals we use today), modern chemistry (we must not forget that the word "chemistry" comes from Arabic word "al-*quimia*") poetry and especially astronomy and medicine.

For Jihadist terrorists, the transfer of territory, the loss of any country at the hands of non-Muslim forces, is a moral and religious setback that is

dangerous and is the beginning of the moral decline of its inhabitants. So the only way to recover the Morality and the right way (expression used in ultraconservative Islamic circles) is the reconquest, reconversion and purification, which brings about among other things the physical elimination of "contaminating elements".

Defeat is a sign of weakness that can only be produced by the corruption and decay of believers who faced their enemies in Jihad. Even some radicals think they lost Al-Andalus for not being good Muslims. Those who give themselves to hedonism and decay are abandoned by God and consequently can not win their enemies .

The responsibility of the West for all the evils of the Muslim community is one of the most important claims for Islamists. That expansive, evil and corrupting West paradigm is one of the foundations of the Al-Andalus myth.

Thus the loss of Al-Ándalus left a deep imprint on the Jihadist ideology in the sense that Christian victory is only the loss of a battle within the war that is YIHAD.

And as result of this are the continuous and frequent allusions to the term Al-Ándalus in the comunicues of these terrorist groups.

Al Qaeda on different occasions, both with bin Laden, as currently with Al Zawahiri, or its various

subsidiaries have claimed this territory as belonging to Islam and therefore objective to recover.

Even Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has "christened" its propaganda apparatus as "Al Ándalus", which shows the importance that continues to have this term.

And more recently DAESH, both in videos and in comunicués refer to Al-Ándalus and his claim to release it. In fact they are frequent to place in photomontages social networks of historical monuments of the Muslim Spain like the Palace of the Alfajeria in Saragossa or the Alhambra of Granada next to the black flag of the Daesh.

Today that pride of a glorious past can not be used as a justification for fanaticism and terrorist barbarism. It is a battle in which we must fight from educational, university, neighborhood environments to avoid ammunition for these groups.



(Zaragoza) For the Daesh this is "territory to recover".

The history well explained, indicating that in the Iberian Peninsula has passed cultures like the Phoenician, the Greek, the Carthaginian, the Iberian, the Roman, the visigoda the Muslim, the Jewish can be a favorable weapon in the fight against the narrative of these Terrorist groups in the myth of Al-Andalus..

(1) Sykes-Picot agreement: this agreement that divided the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, has always been considered an insult in the Arab world and for the jihadists is a humiliation and obsession in many communications remember this treaty, Because I divide Muslim land, I eliminated the last great caliphate and was also made by "infidels".

(2) The so-called Trojan Horses is a subject of great concern to Western countries, because they infiltrate very sensitive organizations and have firsthand information.

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F-AIR COLOMBIA

Feria Aeronáutica Internacional

Rionegro - Antioquia

Del 13 al 16 de julio de 2017

The phenomenon of terrorism

ISIS the contemporary model of terrorism

by Mohammad Nusari



Dahesh parade in conquered area.

Perhaps the most prominent terrorist models and the most savage at the moment is the (ISIS) Dahesh model, which occupied the world by terrorizing and committing the worst atrocities in which this terrorist organization depends on expanding its base, especially among young people, where they hunt at the age of flowers and recruit them, either by intimidation or by carving, Which shocked the world recently because of its brutality beyond the range of all reasonable killing, bombing, demolition, burning and cutting of heads in public.

What is noticeable is that this organization clearly relies on suicide operations, and these operations require a certain psychological configuration, and the selection of certain persons to carry out these operations that will kill the bomber. Therefore, the organization depends on young people for the age of easy control and influence, and often the owner of the suicide personality is insensitive and accompanied by anger and a desire to revenge, and has a tendency of aggression and full of ideas, opinions and religious beliefs wrong, as he sees all those who disagree with the belief and opinion is infidel and must be killed.

The movements, calls and organizations that claim to be fighting the enemies of Islam play a major role in the formation of a broad generation embracing those ideas of Wahhabi origin. They create the suicide character, which is usually the weakest link in terrorist organizations. Will be created and will result in the highest and highest is the victory of Paradise), they usually rely to convince this segment of young people to the interpretation of sin and deviant verses Koranic and Hadiths, and interpret them to suit their need for it.

There is no doubt that the countries that suffered from the scourge of war and division were the most

fertile environment for the work and spread of these organizations, where an entire generation was lost and lost its identity, and Iraq is an example of a country torn by successive wars, the last of which was the American occupation in 2003, And Osama bin Laden's terrorist organization in Afghanistan, which has been able to establish extremist ideology and attract large numbers of young people, especially from poor countries, and has relied on playing the role of religious feelings, as we said Previously, the call for jihad against the atheist enemy (former Soviet Union).

And calling for jihad as a duty on every Muslim that makes many young people believe that it is a sacred duty, and this holy duty is that made a lot of (Mujahideen) take from Iraq and Syria the land of jihad must be fought, and the return of what is known as the Islamic Caliphate or the establishment of the Islamic state in the Levant And Iraq, which is known as a (da'ash). What is noticed is that the so-called Mujahideen, most of them came from countries that were previously fighting what is known as the Communist threat, such as Chechnya and Afghanistan, and other countries, or from Western European countries, especially France, Britain and Belgium, where there are large numbers of young Muslims who migrated in The 1990s from Libya, Tunisia and Algeria, and grew up on a fanatical religious discourse that does not recognize the existence of the other.

The role of the media and the means of social communication in spreading terrorism

The wide spread of social media, their availability among all members of society and their accessibility, as well as the role of many media outlets of a religious nature, have created a new culture based on hatred and hatred and the spread of sectarian and sectarian divisions and conflicts, Her thoughts quickly reached the largest and widest segment of people. As noted previously, most of the terrorist movements and organizations were carrying out their crimes without being photographed or without showing the identity of the executor of that terrorist operation. He has committed many terrorist incidents in Western European countries and the United States of America. Only the final result of that operation, which may be the detonation of explosive devices at

metro stations, hijackings, or the like, has been shown to the media. But what is noted today is that the terrorist organization, for example, calls for filming its criminal acts with high accuracy and high technical skills. It has a large media army and has a professional integrated vision that employs it in its psychological warfare as a reserve agent to help spread its objectives. In spreading terror and fear in the same as everyone sees it. And the many television channels to re-broadcast and repeat those videos, thinking that they highlight these criminal acts, but makes it progress in terms of know or do not know the free publicity for this terrorist organization, the moral and humanitarian duty of the media forces them to fight those videos in all ways, Broadcast so as not to be affected by the views of viewers, including the youth group. Thus, some media are involved in a deliberate or unintended way, and often, in devoting the heroism and personality to the executor of the process, showing it as a hero, and satisfying and amplifying the ego, which may encourage many who may sympathize with that terrorist organization to join and follow.

In addition, the role of social media (Facebook and Twitter), which played a significant negative role in attracting many young people who left their countries and their families and came to join this organization, either to search for a crazy adventure, or to escape their social reality, , And after the events of September 11, changed the view of Western Muslims around the world, and appeared more hardened, so many Western governments impose provisions and restrictions on Muslims on their territory in order to reduce the space of freedom, especially religious freedom, Da by immigrants.

The influence of the media and social networking was not limited to young people, but also to girls of young age, who worked to attract girls to join them. In previous periods, it was noted that a large number of adolescent girls of different nationalities joined the terrorist organization in search of a dream knight or a desire to fight alongside that organization, especially after what was known as the Jihad of Marriage, in which the organization called for Muslim girls to join To support the (Mujahideen). And of course the aim of this fatwa to satisfy the sexual desires of terrorists, and the exploitation of girls, especially minors. There is no doubt that these young men and women are suffering from bad psychological and social conditions, large incidences in their societies, and from a family breakdown so obvious that many families were shocked to see their children on the sites of the terrorist organization without knowing how and when to go and join that organization, And

the deliberate intention of certain governments to provide them with these young people, where they turn a blind eye to them, making the road paved for joining the organization, which tempts many of them through money and pay the cost of travel in order to join the largest number of the terrorist organization.

The difference between the leader and the leader in the terrorist organizations

Statistics on the age of terrorists or suicide bombers under this organization indicate that the vast majority of them are between the ages of 16 and 28, mostly from poorer socio-economic strata. This indicates a very important sign that the perpetrators of these terrorist attacks are category Young people at a young age need strong psychosocial support, and this is what they are working on. It encourages them in terms of providing all the requirements of these young people. They are maliciously exploiting their needs and bad psychological circumstances and attracting them to join the organization.



Public executions of opponents.

The psychological analysis of the character of the terrorist indicates that the owner of this character feels that he is oppressed in the middle and environment, and he is inflated with feelings of hatred, hatred and aggression, especially feelings of revenge, and becomes before this torrent of hateful feelings unable to control his actions and act instinctively is a time bomb may explode at any moment In the face of society.

Here we should distinguish between the terrorist as an element in the organization and the leader, or what is called the (Prince), Prince is usually a radical personality is not negotiable and inflexible and does not accept the other opinion, and is characterized by extreme severity.

This character usually has the ability to persuade by misinterpreting religious beliefs, arousing instincts, emotional and aggressive feelings, and focusing on the idea of reward that awaits the terrorist who will carry out such terrorist acts. The leader in such terrorist organizations is often of advanced scientific

status and excellent material status. He describes himself as the leader who gave up all the temptations and luxuries of life so that he can convince those who follow him to live in this life and to change all the social rules. And replace them, they believe, with the principles of Islamic law. Suicide bombers are often young adults who have been influenced by extremist ideas, are either uneducated or separated from their environment and unable to integrate into their communities.



Decapitaciones públicas de opositores.

And the biggest calamity is that it monitors the reactions of the environment sympathetic to those who preceded him by carrying out similar operations, as this environment sees him as a hero who holds the banner of truth and walks towards achieving his goal with courage, which stimulates his desire to do such acts. He dreams of testimony and glorifies what he believes to be the implementation of the provisions of shari'a, He grows the desire to walk on a line of his predecessor and get the title of hero.

This radical Islamic discourse is grasped by young people, although many of them do not understand it or do not know its content and use it to compensate for weakness and weakness to feed its delusions. The organization sells young people delusions, as well as personal, political, sexual, adventurous and exciting benefits, their communities.

This deviant discourse of religion is employed in a malicious way to influence them and their beliefs,

especially with the use of the Internet, as most of these young people do not know anything about religion or the Koran in many cases. Where the organization prepares this terrorist and exploits his circumstances to qualify for such atrocities. In addition, the organization exploited and recruited significant numbers of children who were either captured by the organization during its control of certain areas or orphaned as a result of the war in Syria and Iraq, and set up camps to train them to carry out such terrorist acts.

It is surprising that many elements of the organization took his whole family to fight in Syria and Iraq, and has shown many videos belonging to children who slaughter or shoot people who were captured by the hands of the organization, which will establish a generation of loss of humanity and out of control.

The organization has also helped to attract all speculators from all over the world. It is the organization's control of the oil sources in many areas in Syria and Iraq, which has secured a huge financial source of over \$ 2 million a day. It has become the richest organization in the world. Making many terrorists rush to join him in their desire to collect money, in addition to trading human organ organization, smuggling of antiquities, drugs and arms deals, and became a refuge for all who suffer from disorders of love of satiety, fame and sex, and out of humanitarian rules and non-compliance with the law.

Conclusion

This subject needs more than one analysis to explain and analyze this complex personality. Social upbringing based on moderation, the promotion of moderate attitudes in religion, moving away from extremist religious discourse, giving science the highest priority and working to build a society that provides psychological life.

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TRIARIUS

"The triarios (lat triarii, singular triarius) were the veteran legionaries in the organization of the Roman legion in times of the republic. The triarios were much smaller in number to the rest of the infantry of line. In the classical formation of the republican legion, they remained in the last line, as a reserve for crisis cases.

"If the situation of the battle was complicated to mobilize triarios, if they could not defeat, at least they were prepared to resist the enemy like a phalanx, giving the rest of the army time to regroup or withdraw orderly, avoiding a massacre And making the victory costly for the enemy.

"In ancient Rome there was a saying," the fight came to the Triarii, "applied to situations that were very much in reference to the difficult situation in which a legion should be seen to resort to these reserve troops. (Wikipedia)

Prevention and counter-narrative in terrorism

The counter-narrative to Daesh from Arab-Islamic countries, is it effective?

by David Garriga




Figure 5: Number of suspects arrested for religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism 2011 to 2015

To talk about ISIS, unfortunately today does not surprise anyone. Not only is it a terrorist group that has been able to create, in a very short time, military, social and economic infrastructures similar to those of a state, but today it is still present in the West, sowing terror with attacks perpetrated by its terrorists and With a speech that continues to attract some of our young people.

The increase in juvenile detention for crimes related to the terrorist group is increasing. Whether by affinity, collaboration in indoctrination or funding. According to Europol data, these detentions are increasing from year to year. In 2011 in Europe we had just over 100 detainees suspected of being linked to jihadist terrorism. Just four years later, the number increased to 687 people.

As for Spain, we closed the year 2015 with 75 arrested and we ended 2016 with more than 200. Not only did we increase the number but we tripled it in a single year.

These figures could have several readings, on the one hand the increase of radicals in the West, it is evident that the discourse of these criminals continues to convince in some of our young people that they look for a quick and easy recognition to be admired. On the other hand, the increase in the training and professionalism of the different police and intelligence services has enabled more suspects to be detected and to prevent them from perpetrating attacks here in the West. Finally, at the Spanish level, the updating of the Criminal Code in 2015, where actions that had not been criminal have been

carried out, have facilitated and enabled the police to arrest individuals who, due to their radical trajectory, would collaborate with these terrorist groups.

Transferring these figures to the minors we realize that the increase in suspected detainees of connection with ISIS terrorist group is evident (data offered in bulletin 3 by Antonio Martin) therefore, we should consider a counter-narrative to the discourse of these terrorists In schools? It seems that the answer would be yes. While ISIS indoctrinates its minors against the West and depersonalizes the infidel so that they do not shake their pulse when it comes to torturing them or killing them without remorse, our young people do not find a narrative that helps them understand why these people do what they do.

Rather, we should ask ourselves whether current terrorism is a concern that these Western minors have in their lives. Do we know if these young people wonder about what they see daily in the media? Do you wonder why someone suddenly takes a truck and trampled dozens of people, kills slashing innocent people in their path or immolates themselves by an idea that is praised in networks opened by terrorist leaders?

If so, if his questions are as obvious as what is a terrorist? Or Why do these young men kill and in the name of what? It would be important to introduce in their education a training that provides an counter-narrative capable of giving them tools to discern and criticize the discourse of the indoctrinator once they approach them in order to recruit them.

A very interesting experience in a school here in Spain and in which I could be part of his project was when by surprise of the teachers the theme chosen by the students of 5th grade to develop in class was that of jihadist terrorism. Faced with questions such as Where do these terrorists come from or how do you become a terrorist? Why do they commit suicide? Are they happy? What thoughts do they have? O Why does a child decide to commit suicide?

We entered into a crisis. On the one hand we have a problem, the minors want to know because it is an issue that has reached them and the teachers are not prepared to give answers on this delicate issue. On the other hand, every crisis has an opportunity to change, and to offer tools in the training of minors against these terrorists would be, in my opinion, a very effective tool in telling the recruiter that he approaches the exit School: NO THANKS..

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Cyber-terrorism, Cybersecurity and Cyber-defense

Ciber-analysts of intelligence vs Cyber-publicists or Cyber-informants: two faces and a single reality

by Marc Fornós



This article is defined by the different colleagues of the profession who have asked me to talk about this figure unknown and as widespread at the same time as the cyber-publicist. In order to be able to establish the differences between one or the other (cyber analysts vs cyber-publicists), given the exponential growth that has had the sector through social networks. I know that I will certainly win detractors in this article, but when we talk about security, terrorism and intelligence we are talking about one of the bases for which a part of the defense against the threats is sustained, and despite being a field of persecution Strictly governmental in the power of the forces of order, it is necessary seriousness and professionalism not to fall into the error of being disseminator of a message of terror, to which we are necessary collaborators of such cause.

In the analyst sector, we find a very controversial world where it is necessary to manage rigor and seriousness, as well as the need to establish parameters that define the sector. An analysis in any field is susceptible of being done by the professional of the same, establishing some logical parameters of data to give certain rigor to premises for a written analysis of any subject. To do this, it is advisable to give some futuribles based on the data extracted and the analysis issued, so that the higher entity can make a decision based on this analysis. It is here where the figure of the analyst is important, and being correct in the analysis can be the turning point in the field that occupies to position itself strategically in a sector.

If we take as an example an economic analyst, this can lead to a company becoming a leader in a sector by a decision made by the manager on the

basis of the analysis issued, or otherwise to lose a position and waste a lot of money for Have followed an erroneous analysis of it. It is here that the figure of the analyst is an essential figure in the future of the field that occupies, whether financial or economic, intelligence, security, terrorism, etc.

Analysts and terrorism.

Terrorist analysts have been reproducing exponentially to the "SHARE" that the evil denominated ISLAMIC CALIFATO has been spreading its terror through its actions through the networks. We can give a hashtag to twitter and observe how analysts appear in almost biblical proportions. This is where I start to beat the detractors, but it is necessary to explain and understand why some of these people should change their honorary titles based on being professional.

The figure analyst has been misunderstood on twitter, given that we observe how figures called "analysts" simply perform or are dedicated to spread the publicity of the Caliphate and its networks, without measure. Even becoming parts of cooperation to the producers of the same DAESH believing to be the first to publish the message and becoming divulgadores of something unnecessary. Here my criticism to the sector analyst twittero. But I will state the reasons to be clear and constructive to the sector, everything and know that I will be criticized.

An analyst would never give an information or establish an intelligence analysis in terrorism without a database and verified information, a deep analysis of the data obtained, and would never carry out publicity of the obtained data without taking into account what the disclosure of the data means . Therefore, an analysis requires time and study, while what some currently perform is purely ADVERTISING.

To recurrent examples of the TWITTER network I refer:

FIRST EXAMPLE: state that DAESH is reporting a number from a terrorism magazine, either INSPIRE / DABIQ / RUMIYAH / NABA, etc. On the basis of the message that the lone wolf is being encouraged to

carry out the actions proposed in the number proposed.

Analysis - Far from being a reality, rather a lie, it means being a necessary collaborator in the diffusion of the fear realized by the DAESH, in this case in the hands of the supposed "analyst". The contribution to the terror message of the DAESH is unnecessary and counterproductive in the networks since it gives more hype, it supports the intention to provoke the fear of the DAESH and even reaches the message beyond the borders that the DAESH producers themselves Channel waited. If we suppose that a TELEGRAM channel can have between 200 and 300 subscribers, the supposed analyst reaches more than 1000 in its diffusion of that message, that at the same time is RETWITTEATED, so we can see as a message of terror that would arrive only at 200 supporters or hidden informants, ends up reaching more than 5 thousand TWITTER profiles.

The reality is that DAESH's dissemination platforms are cyclically disseminating the most controversial numbers of certain terrorist magazines, whether edited by ALQAEDA or edited by ISIS.

It is not a good news or properly informed to carry out this kind of dissemination of the message, given

that we are giving a false statement in case of being a disclosure by an ANALYST. Different from the fact that someone who I do not know would call an analyst, for example a CIBER-INFORMANTE, is more correct in this kind of disclosure since it is understood that it lacks information rigor, lacks analysis, and lacks intelligence That the semantics within the professional is referred to and not at a pejorative level). Then I might be more or less agreeing on the generation of this kind of advertising, but I would never establish it as part of data coming out of an analyst. It is necessary to begin to regulate the sector of the CIBER-INFORMANTES and to understand that to obtain access to channels of TELEGRAM are things that are not of a rigor or a complicated task, in fact, the same DAESH knows and is evident, that within its channels Has supporters and informants detractors, two important figures for the DAESH. The supporters would be the ones who are fed by the information provided in the channels and the detractors the ones in charge of carrying out the publicity thus having a perfect form of diffusion of its messages - in both ambits and for each sector, with a simple CLIC, its machine Starts working

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fuerzasmilitares.org
el portal militar colombiano

Cyber-terrorism, Cybersecurity and Cyber-defense

The critical success factor of cyber-defense and cybersecurity: Human Resources "World Class"

by Roberto Uzal



Cyberspace, understood as the virtual space generated by the services of the different layers of protocols contained in the Internet, has proved to be an effective context for global intercommunication.

Unfortunately Cyberspace, in recent years, has become in the new environment or "domain" in which conflicts between nations develop.

It is also in the cyberspace where sophisticated and high-profit criminal forms have been developed such as the Cyber-Laundering of Transnational Assets and the Cyber Financing of Terrorism.

Likewise, Cyber Terrorism appears as a tremendous and worldwide threat.

Cyber Espionage, which includes both military information and fraudulent access to scientific and industrial secrets, has become a problem of the highest priority for the rulers.

Also in Cyberspace, a phenomenon of the "neo digital anarchism" or "hacker activism" type has been developed which involves the joining of young people with enormous intellectual possibilities, "religiously" convinced that all data, information and knowledge residing in the Cyberspace, must be freely available.

Both cyber-defense and cybersecurity require interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches. Professionals from different disciplines should have the possibility to access a "Fourth Level" and "World Class" training that optimizes their performance in Cyberspace.

In the context described in this introduction, we have proposed the structure of a Masters whose general guidelines are set out in this article. To receive opinions about this postgraduate course from the readers of Triarius will allow us to reflect and

surely optimize this undertaking. For reasons of space it was not possible to include in this presentation the "minimum conceptual contents" of each of the modules.

It would be great (appreciation) that through an associative scheme between government agencies of Argentina and the University of Buenos Aires this project will become a specific professional academic offer and of a very high level.

Objectives of the postgraduate course

General objective

Complement the training of government agents and business executives through a solid conceptual training and intensive training in cyber-defense and cybersecurity, so as to enable them to act in cases of Cyber Crime, especially in the cases of Cyber-Crime Transnational Organized Crime, Cyber Espionage, Hacker Activism, Cyber Terrorism and also in the cases of Cyber Aggressions between nations

Specific objectives

i. Train government agents and business executives in the design and implementation of significantly robust hardware / software architectures and outstanding resilience to all types of Cyber Aggression.

ii. Train government agents and business executives in the design, construction, implementation and maintenance of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)

iii. Train government agents and business executives in the detection and mitigation of Cyber Vulnerabilities

Iv. Train government agents and business executives in the development of secure software

V. Train government agents and business executives in detecting the circulation of malware in teleinformatics networks.

saw. Train government agents and business executives, with an important emphasis, so that they can collaborate with significant effectiveness in the preservation of Critical Infrastructure (oil distilleries, nuclear power plants, energy distribution systems, financial system, social assistance system, Health system, airports, etc.) of various types of Cyber Aggressions.

Vii. To train government agents and business executives in "backtracking" and to solve the "Attribution Problem" (identify the Ciber Agresor with a high probability of certainty and a very low probability of false Positive)

Viii. Train government agents and business executives to generate evidence on Cyber Attack and Cyber Attacker with a forensic solvency recognized by international tribunals

Ix. Enable Argentina to effectively exercise the rights deriving from Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (in the case of Cyber Aggressions).

X. Train government agents and business executives to become part of the CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) and to lead such teams.

Xi. Train government agents and business executives to perform leadership positions in various

types of ventures in the context of cyber-defense and cybersecurity.

Antecedents in national and / or foreign institutions of similar academic and professional offerings: They do not exist at national level (Argentina). The global reference is the Technological University of Tallinn (Estonia) sponsored by NATO. https://ttu.ee/studying/masters/masters_programmes/cyber-security/ Queries to which the postgraduate project was submitted: Authorities of the Defense and Security Area of Argentina and neighboring countries. Specifically, this master's degree has been developed according to the requirements of security agencies of the National Executive Branch. General Structure of the Master in Cyberdefense and Cybersecurity On the following page. Master's Thesis or Final Unpublished Work The Master's degree includes the elaboration of the corresponding Master's Thesis or Final Work Unpublished that implies an innovative approach in some area of Cyberdefense or Cybersecurity. Beginning of the development of the Master The first cohort of the Master is expected to start its activities in the second half of this year. Professors The Professors will be Doctors with extensive experience in research in the scope of incumbencies of the module in charge of the exchange of views. Alternative views and requests for clarification are welcome. Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, June 14, 2017

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Fuente de la imagen: <http://www.serverus.es/blog/>

General Structure of the Master's Degree in Cyberdefense and Cybersecurity

Cursos de formación general (comunes a las dos orientaciones de la Maestría)		Créditos	Horas
	Tecnología de la Información, ética y normativa jurídica	2	32
	Introducción al gerenciamiento innovador (entrepreneurship)	1	16
	Introducción a los paradigmas de programación	4	64
	Tecnología de la Información (orientación Ciberdefensa y Ciberseguridad)	4	64
	Subtotal	11	176
Cursos fundamentales de Ciberdefensa / Ciberseguridad (comunes a las dos orientaciones de la Maestría)			
	Introducción a la Criptología	2	32
	Evolución de la Tecnología Militar hasta el enfoque "Network-Centric Warfare"	1	16
	Tecnología de Redes I	2	32
	Malware I	1	16
	Fundamentos y Gerenciamiento de la Ciberdefensa y de la Ciberseguridad	2	32
	Ciber Ataques masivos a Sistemas de Información	1	16
	Subtotal	9	144
Cursos específicos de la Orientación Aspectos Operativos de Ciberdefensa y Ciberseguridad			
	Principios y enfoques de Diseño de Software Seguro	2	32
	Proyecto sobre Principios y enfoques de Diseño de Software Seguro	2	32
	Teoría Organizacional y Psicología Organizacional	1	16
	Diseño y Desarrollo de la "Data Exchange Layer" en ambientes de Gobierno	1	16
	Data Mining - Datawarehousing - Big Data	3	48
	Tecnología de Redes II	2	32
	Seguridad en Redes de Computadoras	2	32
	Malware II	1	16
	Subtotal	14	224
	Investigación Supervisada y/o Tutoriales en Aspectos Operativos de Ciberdefensa y Ciberseguridad	10	160
	Total de la Orientación Aspectos Operativos de Ciberdefensa y Ciberseguridad	44	704
Cursos específicos de la Orientación Aspectos Forenses de Ciberdefensa y Ciberseguridad			
	Informática forense y sistemas de información	2	32
	Informática forense en Redes Complejas	2	32
	Métodos para el manejo de incidentes: Informática Forense en el Ciberespacio	1	16
	Derechos, Obligaciones y Responsabilidades de los Actores en Internet	1	16
	Tecnología de Redes con un enfoque forense	1	16
	Curso Especial de Informática Forense I	2	32
	Curso Especial de Informática Forense II	2	32
	Práctica de Campo de Informática Forense	3	48
	Subtotal	14	224
	Investigación Supervisada y/o Tutoriales en Aspectos Operativos de Ciberdefensa y Ciberseguridad	10	160
	Total de la Orientación Aspectos Operativos de Ciberdefensa y Ciberseguridad	44	704



TRIARIUS

**Hispanic-American Observatory on
International Terrorism**

Mission

The Hispanic American Observatory on Terrorism constantly monitors the phenomenon of terrorism at the global level, disseminates information and analysis in order to generate a culture of prevention in society, as well as contributing to the academic community.

Vision

By 2020, the Hispanic American Observatory on Terrorism will be an international benchmark, both academically and informative. It will bring together intelligence and security professionals from the Spanish speaking countries with whom it will create an academic community.

Values

Respect for cultural, religious and ethnic diversity.
Rejection of violence and terrorism as a mechanism for achieving political ends.
Respect for human rights.
Plurality of points of view.
Objectivity in information and analysis.

The Jihad Generation

The Expansion of DAESH in Latin America

by Antonio Martin



Minors at the service of the FARC, in Colombia.

The adaptation by the recruiters of the terrorist group Daesh in the search for recruits and their subsequent indoctrination is a truly meticulous work of knowledge and study of the territory and its population, choosing after that the best method to fulfill their goal.

The misfortune in the poorest countries, or with less resources, of Latin America, makes them a clear target for the settling of these recruiters from Daesh. One of their tactics is to reach out to these minors with a lack of both social and economic resources, offering those who desperately seek a way out a better social, economic and of course affective life.

The history of Latin America is marked by numerous riots in many countries, making a big difference in today's society. This has caused homeless children to be recruited in the ranks of different terrorist groups, street gangs, revolutionary groups and guerrillas.

One of the most long-standing guerrilla movements has been the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (FARC-EP), a revolutionary movement of military political character created in 1964 in the mountains of the south of the department of Tolima.

This and other armed groups in Colombia recruited, both by coercion and through lies, a whopping number of 7,500 children for different tasks. These youngsters, including those that are part of reintegration programs by the Colombian government, have a close connection with active guerrillas up to today. According to the newspaper *El Colombiano*, about 5,156 of these children have been disengaged from armed groups and are being treated in the specialized care program of the Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (Icbf). Among them, 3,076 were child soldiers of the FARC.

Since 2014, the terrorist group Daesh has been recruiting children without rest, keeping the ideology extreme and the armed struggle alive. These children who are being indoctrinated will be the ones who will carry on tomorrow, recruiting and indoctrinating their children to keep the fight alive.

The methodology used by Daesh is very similar to that used by the Latin American guerrillas: the use of force, the lies as well as the desperation, besides the purchase of minors to their own parents. Their recruitment in the streets by other indoctrinated children is the same technique used by violent urban gangs. Their indoctrination is also very similar, since it consists of military training with weapons, explosives, and combat, intelligence and survival tactics. The teaching of the holy Qur'an is in the Daesh version, very far from a religion of peace, as it known is professed.

With the peace process signed last year between the Colombian Government and the FARC-EP, and the abandonment of the weapons for which the UN is responsible during the month of June, some see the end of an armed struggle that has caused countless deaths and suffering in the past 50 years.

After a ceasefire or the end of a war, history has always left factions of both sides who have continued to violently fight for their goals or ideals at a lower scale.

Recruiters saw good young blood in these children, who were recruited by the guerrillas in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods of their cities when they were only 12 years old, in order to turn them into soldiers. Growing integrated in and subjected to a strong indoctrination, they have been raised with a very specific ideology that they will never completely forget, the same ideology that will keep them active in the struggle to achieve the goal that they were taught.

It was not long ago when the CCTA (Ciber Califate Terrorism Army), the strategist branch of Daesh, announced its expansion through Latin America.

In Brazil, in July of 2016, 12 alleged members of a support group of Daesh called "Defensores da Shariá" that was coordinated through social media, were arrested for presumably planning an attack during the Rio Olympic Games.

The terrorist group Daesh will never cease to recruit and expand around the globe; recruitment is something they must keep alive to continue with their goal, with what they believe are clear and well-structured objectives, not seeing the end in the form of a peace agreement but in the submission of all humanity to their rules.

Comparing to others, two of the countries in Latin America with the largest Muslim population are Brazil and Argentina, with a little over a million people in both countries.

According to what Save the Children published in the Agencia Informativa Latinoamericana Prensa Latina, Latin America ranks as the region of the world with the highest rate of child homicide, with 12.6 homicides per 100,000 children, due to the increase in violence levels.

References:

<http://www.farc-ep.co/nosotros.html>

<http://www.prensalatina.cu/index.php?o=rn&id=90107&SEO=america-latina-y-el-caribe-region-con-mas-homicidios-infantiles>

Images source: <http://culturacolectiva.com/las-farc-entregaran-a-mas-de-50-ninos/>

Recruiters take advantage of that violence to choose their targets as if they were animals.

Children who assume death defending the name of the street gang to which they belong are "target" profiles to be recruited. By indoctrinating their anger with a radical Islamist mentality, they will change the cause of their gang for one they do not even understand.

The extreme violence is mainly caused by the precariousness of their life, and due to the lack of resources and opportunities these children are forced to live in one of those neighborhoods just to stay alive. Those children are easy to manipulate by giving them a way out and a future where they think they want to go.



Bogotá, 4 al 6 de diciembre de 2017

Expodefensa

Feria Internacional de Defensa y Seguridad

International Defense and Security Trade Fair

The Jihad Generation

Analysis of foreigners of the DAESH

by Roberto Mateos



According to sources consulted, it is very likely that as of today some 25,000 foreign fighters have traveled to the battlefield to enlist with Islamist terrorist groups, including at least 4,500 Westerners. The influx of foreign fighters who come to Syria and Iraq to fight with the Islamic state is a phenomenon that worries the European countries that struggle without getting it to eliminate their Trojan horses.

Integration and anti-radicalization policies do not seem to work in the face of a steady stream of combatants joining the Daesh from Europe, combatants who in many cases end up returning and pose a threat to the host country. In addition, the strong presence in the social networks of these radicals fosters the recruitment of adepts and fighters who in most cases are attracted by a false ideal full of promises and adventures, that when they reach the destination they vanish like smoke and show their most heartbreaking face.

The loss of strategic positions in some key cities in Syrian and Iraqi territory, the desertion of many fighters and attacks on their sources of funding are seen by the international community as a growing weakness of the Daesh, but beware, despite this emerging optimism we must forget that they have the infrastructure and means to attack in any country in Europe with a very high probability of success.

Precisely to the aforementioned lack of funding could be attributed to the fact that at the beginning of March the intelligence services and security forces of some Western governments obtained a list with names and data of foreign fighters of the Daesh, predictably sold by a terrorist deserter. Such data would contain, among many more, sensitive

information from Western people currently attempting to join or have joined the Daesh as well as those who have returned to their countries of origin and their instructions and intentions.

For the following analysis, 14 European countries have been sampled.

A large number of Daesh fighters have left European countries to fight in Syria and Iraq, the figure has been increasing since the end of 2015 and with a growth of 200 per cent between 2013 and 2015. The data are estimates although coincident according to several sources consulted.

France and Belgium, especially the latter, are notable for the number of combatants who have gone to fight with Daesh, followed by Germany and the United Kingdom. If we analyze the Muslim population living in these countries, in the case of France and Belgium we have a direct relationship between the high number of combatants and the percentage of Muslim population.

Returning combatants create a serious problem for the security of European countries, are trained and experienced in the use of military equipment. Proposed measures to mitigate this threat include pre-trial detention, withdrawal of passports or revocation of citizenship, these measures aimed at radicalization are not 100% effective, as there is no real monitoring of returnees, ignoring what they have done in the countries that have visited. This conflicts with the laws and many times with the public opinion and with the respective oppositions of the governments of turn.



In addition, since there is no European intelligence to monitor these movements, many fighters seek alternative ways to enter and exit the country in conflict, not being detected. On the other hand, that there are no borders in Europe and the natural mistrust of information sharing between the intelligence services makes the terrorists go unnoticed. It is estimated that about 20% of fighters who leave the country of origin find themselves fighting death.

As a result of the terrorist attacks in Paris, foreign ministers held a debate on new measures to combat terrorism, agreeing on the need to improve the exchange of security information with partner countries, strengthen cooperation with Arab countries and And redouble their efforts to deal with open

conflicts and crises. So far it has not paid off. Recent events in Belgium show us that information is not well used and that conflicts and crises remain open.

The measures proposed by the European Union to address this phenomenon include the creation of a register of passenger names, the fight against firearms trafficking, strengthening controls at the EU's external borders, combating the financing of terrorism And improve the exchange of information and judicial cooperation. The fighters who leave their

countries to join the Daesh are considered terrorists by their countries of origin, under this premise, knowing approximately the number of combatant from Europe who have enlisted, we could hypothetically calculate the number of confirmed terrorists that have sampled countries per million inhabitants. This proportion would require reflection on the part of all European bodies committed to national security.



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
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European stance against terrorism

How does Europe deal with "returnee" combatants?

by Javier Torregrosa



One of the major conflicts confronting Europe with regard to its anti-terrorist policy is how to act against those Western individuals (whether recent believers or professors of faith) who, having gone to war in other Muslim countries, They decide to return to Europe. Such a conflict is more complex than can be seen by the naked eye, since many variables related to European policies come into play. Thus, on the one hand, limiting the entry of a European citizen to his or her country of origin may be paradoxical, but highly coherent if we take into account the security of the country. On the other hand, any individual who travels to countries in conflict is a radicalized? Can we assure you that every individual who comes back is planning to attack in Europe? There are many issues that assail the analyst when it comes to approaching that debate.

If we analyze the data, we can verify that, until 2014, between 2,500 and 3,000 European citizens traveled to Syria to participate in the warlike conflicts of that territory (Barret, 2014). Of these citizens, a majority came from France, the United Kingdom and Germany, the considered countries most representative of the zone of Western Europe. These individuals are a constant dribbling of followers for radical religious groups (not only in Syria, but in many other countries, such as Afghanistan or Iraq),

but they also represent a double concern for Europe. What happens to all the training, practice and skills they acquire in such a conflict? Are they prepared to act as paramilitary commanders in Europe too? The terrorist cell that acted in the Paris bombings in 2015 was composed of individuals who, despite being registered by Europe (ie monitored), could travel with total freedom between the European Union and the Middle East (El País, 2015). Was the surveillance on them adequate?

One of the most evaluated risk factors for academics to determine when an individual is completing his / her radicalization process is precisely to analyze whether the individual has traveled (or intends to travel) to the countries in conflict Religious extremism. However, as Hegghammer (2013) shows, the evidence shows that it is unusual for such returnees to engage in terrorist actions in their home countries. Therefore, and although it is striking, practically none of the returnees of these conflicts would act later like a terrorist. This, however, is not an obstacle for them to carry out propaganda actions within Muslim communities, expanding their radical ideology and achieving an indirect effect: radicalize more individuals who will follow in their path, in a vicious circle. It is more usual, therefore, to find that the

individuals who attempt in the West are, precisely, of Western origin.

It is very complex to legislate to prevent an individual from going to countries in conflict. In fact, without solid evidence, it is not possible to detain an individual who decides to travel. At the other end of the problem, we find that it is possible to maintain control over them once they return (by intelligence services and the country's security forces), but it is still impossible to stop them if they are not shown to be related with some concrete crime. One of the bodies created by the European Union, the RAN (Radicalisation Awareness Network) rightly argues that repression can not be the only way to deal with the problem. But what measures are taken by the various countries to avoid such flows of radicalized uncontrolled territories?

One of the major problems that Europe seems to have experienced when legislating against terrorism is that it has had a particularly "reactive" position against it; That is to say, it was not legislated until an attack occurred in Europe. Precisely because of this, there is a risk of the so-called "hot legislation", which can lead to more decision-making to restore the affront than to stop a real problem. It was after the 9/11 attacks in the United States that cooperation in the area of anti-terrorism went from being "informal" to being subject to certain guidelines. Border control, exchange of information between the various countries and security bodies (although this is not always real), control of group funding, coordination in external actions towards other countries, etc. were key elements of The Counter Terrorism Strategy of the European Union, developed after the attacks of Madrid and London (in 2005).

This main law was, at the time, reinforced with many other strategies, such as the "Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism", which emerged in 2005 and reinforced on several occasions. This law emerged as a way of dealing with processes of radicalization and recruitment, with more specific ideas than the Counter Terrorism Strategy. This is a good example to understand how, within a same global strategy, more specific legislative initiatives can emerge (and

especially focused on Issues of relevance on the specific dates in which they are promulgated). Some of the more specific measures adopted by the various countries of Europe have been the exchange of passenger information by airplanes, the control of firearms, or the development of criminal laws against the processes of radicalization (both own and third). Groups such as Interpol emerged precisely (but not only because of anti-terrorist motivation) as elements of communication and cooperation between different countries. Another quite different thing is that they are really useful, as there has not been a strategy that has worked out prominently with respect to the others to stop the frontier crossing of radicalized individuals (I recommend reading the report of the European commission that I point out at the end). It is clear that there is still a long way to go in the field of counter-terrorism measures. Currently, despite the criminal measures imposed when there is evidence that a trip to a conflict zone has been for training, radicalization or fighting against the West, it is very complex to demonstrate that an individual has actually been there with such motivations (In addition to having simply demonstrated that it has been there, since many travel directly to neighboring countries to subsequently cross into the area). Monitoring is therefore of paramount importance in Europe today, with a view to pure prevention: if we are able to control the actions of the subject, we will be able to react quickly before another fact happens. As a last point to reflect , I would like to leave a small link to a very interesting project related both to radicalization and to the avoidance of returnees returning to attack in their countries of origin: the so-called "Transversal Plan for Coexistence and Against Violent Radicalization" (There is a small review in the bibliography), with Málaga as the first city adhered to a project of such characteristics. This being one of the pioneering projects to avoid radicalization, it is undoubtedly a pilot experience (led by a multidisciplinary and multicultural team) that can give promising results in the fight against radicalization and against the discourse of returnees. Hopefully, it turns out to be only the first of many local antiterrorist initiatives in Spain


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Intelligence and terrorism

The Intelligence Analyst: Barriers in Assessment

by José Manuel Ávalos Morer



There are numerous studies on prejudice, cognitive bias and barriers. From social psychology and cognitive psychology work has been carried out on how it affects the reality that surrounds us to perception and understanding, among many other factors.

One of the first premises that a student receives in any university where he studies sociology or social psychology is that: reality is a social construct. What does this mean? Well, we must start with one of the most important theoretical works of sociology, inspired by the phenomenology of Alfred Schütz (1), and restructured by sociologists Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann in which we are told that reality is Constructs socially, and that the sociology of knowledge must analyze the processes by which this occurs. That is, reality would be part of the environment or phenomena external to individuals and knowledge would be information or peculiarities of these. This will give rise to the theory of social constructionism, which considers that social phenomena develop particularly from social contexts.

The breeding ground for the separation between sociologists and social psychologists opens up completely behind these claims. But today we will not talk about cognitive bias, from where psychology gives a good account of it, today we will try a series of barriers with which an intelligence analyst must deal in the processes of analysis of the information with which he performs his work.

Individuals are subjected to the unconscious and persistent culturization that impregnates us with prejudices and mental shortcuts to economize cognitively our decisions, and it is important to

recognize them and take measures to mitigate their impact on our decisions.

The Captain of the Navy of the Argentine Navy, Álvaro Figueroa, details in one of his communications a list of bars that are given in the evaluation process; It is worth mentioning that it is based on the list published by the author Lisa Krizan (2) and from which we will echo today:

Barrels - according to Lisa Krizan - are: (a) dominant thinking: thinking is influenced, based on previous experiences. It tends to relate the new information to the past or to current concerns without critical sense; (B) hasty conclusion: the desire for simplicity, trouble, or both, lead to a premature closure of the consideration of a problem; (C) assumption by unconfirmed hypothesis: evidence appears to be consistent with preexisting beliefs not duly confirmed, allows for refutation of other points of view and a rapid closure of a problem; (D) inappropriate analogy: perception that an event is analogous to past events, based on an inadequate consideration of concepts or facts, or with irrelevant criteria, (e) superficial lessons in history; Uncritical and frivolous analysis of historical concepts or events that lead to an excessive generalization of factors and their inadequate extrapolation to the situation under study, (f) Unified action; Presumption of the unitary action of the organizations or countries being analyzed. Perception that the behavior of others is more planned, centralized and coordinated than it really is. Dismiss accident and chaos. It overlooks the wrong perceptions of others. Fundamental attribution error, possibly caused by cultural bias; (G) institutional adherence: also called organizational "parochialism". It is a selective approach to rigid adherence to institutional resolutions, norms or loyalties. It may also be the result of functional specialization or a stereotype of group thinking; (H) excessive compartmentalization: exacerbated secrecy. Safety is above collaborative work, artificially increasing the confidence in the partial information that each part of the organization has and can cause narrowness in it; (I) Mirror image: perception of others as one perceives oneself. It is facilitated in closed systems or excessive compartmentalization. Automorphism; (J) Ethnocentrism: projection of one's culture, ideological beliefs, doctrine, or the expectations of others.

Exaggeration of the causal importance of one's own action, (k) lack of empathy: inability to understand others' perception of their world, their role in that world, and the definition of their interests. In short, put yourself in place of the other adopting their points of view. Fundamental when studying other cultures; (L) ignorance: lack of knowledge. If it is an organizational problem, it is taken as something that happens in a partial and limited way in some areas, due to lack of curiosity, ethnocentrism, narrow-mindedness, denial of reality, etc. ; (M) negation of rationality: Belief that the ability of other actors to act outside the limits of the norms of their own behaviors or decision-making processes is due to an absence of rationality; (N) rational actor: hypothesis that others always act in a rational way, usually based on the overestimation of rationality itself. Extreme position and opposite to the previous one. (Ñ) false proportionality: unfounded expectation that the adversary is going to lavish efforts proportional to the ends he seeks. Inference about the intentions of others and full awareness of the costs and consequences of the actions they initiate; (O) rejection of evidence: challenge of information that conflicts with existing base information. It can lead to excessive pursuit of consistency. (P) idealization: perception of what has been, is, will be, or should be, as part of the belief system. (Q) defensive avoidance: refusal to perceive and understand threatening stimuli and alarms. Need to avoid painful decisions, stimulated in an illusion; (R) overconfidence in subjective estimates: optimistic bias in evaluation. It

may lead to premature or accelerated closure of the analysis; (S) Excessive optimism (Pollyanna Complex): hypercredulity. Out of this exaggeration, self-indulgence and overconfidence are born; (T) better analysis: optimistic assessment based on cognitive predisposition and general belief that actors will behave as they are expected to, will respect customary interests or anticipated political preferences; (U) conservatism: in the desire to avoid risk. Tendency to avoid estimation of extremely high or extremely low probabilities. Routine of thought. Tendency to seek confirmation of beliefs. (W) excessive skepticism (Cassandra metaphor): pessimism and extreme caution, based on cognitive predisposition based on past adverse situations, negative experiences, or also in support of personal or organizational interests or political preferences. Only some of the barriers detected by the author, we should also alert the reader that there is an extensive list of cognitive biases, which enlarge even more if the list of problems that an analyst in intelligence has to perform their duties. Finally, it should be noted that there are a number of psychological traps, structure or organization, culture, logic and probability that condition the vision and limit the freedom of compression of reality. We need to pay close attention to these barriers detailed here, the intelligence analysts face these as a challenge that must be polished throughout their professional career and must implement techniques to mitigate or counter them in their analysis..

Notes:

(1) Sociólogo y filósofo austriaco, de origen judío, introductor de la fenomenología en las ciencias sociales: la realidad social, el mundo de vida, y la situación biográfica, por ejemplo.

(2) Investigadora del Departamento de Defensa de los Estados Unidos desde 1987. Obtuvo una maestría en la Escuela de Inteligencia Militar Conjunta en 1996 y parte de los conceptos detallados forman parte de su tesis sobre la evaluación comparativa en el proceso de inteligencia "Intelligence Essentials for Everyone".

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Intelligence and terrorism

Solitary Wolves: New profiles of terrorists

by Erwin Viera

From the year 2015 to date, we are witnessing a new profile of the jihadist terrorist, which is generating fear, terror, death and paranoia on the European continent, which represents a huge challenge for government authorities, as well as for Governmental agencies responsible for preventing and repressing such criminal acts.

"Old and New Profiles"

Until a few years ago, security and intelligence agencies had certain profiles on people who could carry out terrorist attacks, namely:

- ✓ Young people under 28 years old.
- ✓ Single and childless.
- ✓ Little secular schooling.
- ✓ Immigrants (mainly of Maghreb origin) in the European case.
- ✓ No natives
- ✓ Unemployed or informal workers in the system.
- ✓ Implanted cells (recall 9-11, less than six months in the US)
- ✓ Radicalized Muslims.
- ✓ Pro-Palestinian militants or anti-Zionist and imperialist movements.
- ✓ Assiduous attendants to mosques with radicalized speeches.

When one analyzes and compares the wave of attacks of a jihadist nature, he sees that his relationship with death and suicide is recent; Did not exist in the Islamist terrorism that nitrogen to several countries of Europe in years 70 and 80, being France the country with more attacks of that time. The terrorists of that time, not immolating, planned their escape after perpetrating their violent acts.

"New Solitary Wolves"

If we analyze the latest attacks on the European continent, we see that in the last two years a certain profile of terrorist has been accentuated, namely:

- ✓ Young second- or third-generation Europeans (of Maghreb origin, mostly from Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia)
- ✓ They are not refugees or asylees
- ✓ Their ages range from 25-30 years
- ✓ Well educated or good jobs
- ✓ Little or no Islamic formation
- ✓ Even some have not even traveled to hot places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, claiming to claim !!
- ✓ They have never expressed their ideals openly, even their environments were unaware that they were Jihadists !!

According to a research and analytical prestige of the European jihadist phenomenon, the Frenchman Oliver Roy, this new relationship with death, that nihilism is, "a central dimension; What seduces and fascinates them is the idea of revolt, and violence is not a tool but an end in itself. "



A review of the identities of the jihadists who attacked in the last two years in Europe shows that almost 25 percent are converted to Islam and that almost none come from the poorer, uprooted or discriminated sectors of the population of immigrant origin.

What's more, some of them are studying at renowned universities, such as the last Paris attacker who hit a policeman next to Notre Dame Cathedral with a hammer.

All this poses a huge challenge at the level of security and intelligence agencies, as Europe in particular, faces in its suburbs, in its suburbs, a huge population of young people disenchanting with the political regime of their countries, with their conditions Of life, and looking for some sort of "lifeline" or "sense" for their lives, it would seem that the "new jihadism" would be giving it to them..

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TRIARIUS

Hispanic-American Observatory on
Terrorism

The Bulletin

The Hispanic American Observatory on Terrorism Bulletin is a tool for disseminating specialized knowledge in terrorist analysis, intelligence and security. Its objective is to present information in a clear, concise, enjoyable way, without academic pretensions, but with a certain level of rigor and academic formality. It is aimed at professionals in the security, defense, intelligence, and criminology sectors, the diplomatic corps, government officials, as well as all citizens concerned about the complex reality we are experiencing in relation to terrorism.

Terrorism and Geopolitical

Solitary wolves. Global Threat

by Daniel Martínez



The 03JUN2017 news agency Nashir urges the Solitary Wolves in the West to attack civilians during Ramadan (27MAY2017 - 25JUN2017)

In circumstances in which the Islamic State loses ground in Syria and Iraq, there are strong indications that the direction of its effort now is to expand to other regions of the world and in particular to mutate into urban guerrillas by using sleeping cells and / Or individual attackers, popularly known as "Solitary Wolves".

These types of actions against the population are characterized by increasing threats, where the surprise factor prevails. They are unpredictable (behavior of the people) and unpredictable (future actions) by the security and intelligence services, it is difficult to identify the perpetrators in advance, as it is to prevent the outcome, of indeterminate scope, by the social, psychological, economic consequences, Politics, etc. And by the crisis that can generate.

Causes that motivate the terrorist, for criminal purposes.

- 1.- Anti-terrorist operations in Islamic countries.
- 2.- Psychological problems.
- 3.- Deportation of immigrants.
- 4.- Get the attention of governments and possible recruits.
5. Ultranationalist ideas.

Solitary Wolves: Types of incitement.

The terrorist believes that he saves himself and the goals and values he defends through his unusual violence.

- 1.- Direct attacks. These actions are planned, synchronized and coordinated by the Islamic State.
- 2.- Encouraged by ISIS.
3. Inspired by ISIS or prisoners adept to Jihad.

Classification of Solitary Wolves.

1.- Lay people (Timothy McVeigh in 1995 killed 168 people in Oklahoma or Anders Breivik, a Norwegian right-wing in 2011, killed 77 people in a bomb attack in central Oslo and subsequent gunfire on a nearby island.

2.- Religious (Islam, Christianity, Judaism or any other belief). Yigal Amir in 1995. He assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, or Brothers Tsarnaev, in 2013 against the Boston Marathon (USA)

3.- Concrete cause. Eric Rudolph (a Christian anti-gay and pro-abortionist terrorist) bombed a bomb during the Atlanta Olympics and placed artifacts at abortion clinics. Radicalized on the Internet, difficult to detect and dangerous because

they act directly, without following orders from terrorist structures.

4.- Criminal purposes. John Gilbert Graham. 1955: first to blow up an airplane in flight, after placing dynamite in the suitcase of his mother, to be able to collect his life insurance. Bruce Irvin. Microbiologist from the US Army who in 2001 panicked sending letters with anthrax.

5.- Idiosyncratic. Defined by hereditary or acquired characteristics that determines the personality type of a person with psychological problems or a social group.

Solitary Wolf Tactics

1.- Use of firearms, sometimes combined with explosives, or weapons.

2.- Attack on pedestrians.

3.-Inghimasi: Infiltrated. Jihadist terrorist, equipped with a light weapon, grenades and explosive belt. It acts in conjunction with suicide bombers. Use your weapon and operate the belt as a last resort. It differs from the suicide bomber in that it operates in a group and can return alive.

4.- Car bombs or improvised explosive devices.

5. Snipers.

Methodology of attacks in the medium term.

1.- Drones with explosives, in public shows.

2.- Radiological dispersion devices (DDR or RDD) in the air, water or earth. Dirty, chemical or biological pumps, including inhaling ricin toxin, because it has no antidote and kills after three days.

3.- "The intifada of the knives" like Palestine or Xinjiang.

4.- Poisoning or adulteration of water or products intended for public feeding

Possible Objectives:

1.- Concentrations of the general public.

2.- Critical assets (tunnels, subways, passenger terminal).

3.- Security forces checkpoints.

4.- Adjoining areas of police and / or military units, when the staff makes use of a license and is disarmed.

5.- Attract media coverage and polarize society.

6.- European and American tourists who travel on cruises, when they move by land on other continents.

Measures to minimize the risk of attacks

1.- Prohibit the integral burka in public places.

2.- Improve automated border control based on the risk profile of passengers entering and leaving the country.

3.- To deny the diffusion of Salafism and its interpretation of the Koran.

4.- Greater application of bollards or hydraulic bolts anti crowd trampling.

5.- Identify and update the permanent and common attack procedures.

6.- Reinforce the actions of police criminal intelligence.

7.- Participation of civil society in prevention policies.

8.- To neutralize the use of the Internet, by virtual Heads of Islamic State and traveling magnets that enter the countries as tourists and sometimes with false passports, as a tool of indoctrination and incitement to suicide attacks and communication between recruits And manipulators.

Faced with the stimulus of the manipulator, there is an answer, often a product of frustration, which materializes in an "aggressive reaction."

9 - To adapt laws, to emerging threats and vulnerabilities, in relation to that without public security, not There is freedom and without democracy democracy is affected.

10.- Determine the psychological profile of potential Solitary Wolves. (Personality Types and Disorders: Histeroid Depressive (Amok Syndrome), Schizophrenia, Maniacs, Neurotic, Obsessive Compulsive, Narcissistic, among others).

11.- Applying the "Criminal Law of the Enemy" Expression by Günther Jakobs (German, 1985) . "The criminal law of the enemy, punish the conduct of a dangerous subject in stages prior to injury, in order to protect society as a whole, and this breaks the traditional logic between grief and guilt." Ideologist of modern jihad Mustafa Setmarijan (Syrian Spaniard), ideologue of modern jihad, said ... "the next phase of jihad has to be carried out by subjects who attempt on their own."

Author of the book "Call to Global Islamic Resistance". Al Qaeda Recruitment - Stages to recruit young people on the Internet: identification, recruitment, radicalization, internalization and action.

1.- Identification: It is tried that the new user of the forum feels good in the Place and predisposed to radicalize itself.

2.- Capture: The heads of the site test the subject to verify that it is faithful to the ideology of the terrorist group.

3.- Radicalization: Written exchanges are exchanged and small actions of aid to the jihad.

4.- Internalization: It is verified that the recruit adopted the values of radical Islam, as their own life goals. At this stage, acts of violence can be committed.

5.- Action: The conscript is already part of the jihadist organization, travels to the training camps, can commit terrorist acts or make propaganda.

Evolution of common subject to Terrorist - Indoctrination:

Call the Attention, blocking the reason, prevails the ideology of the group and the objective to fulfill.-

Dehumanization: re-socialized objectives. - Moral disconnection: Ideas that justify behavior - Dogma: Others are seen as infidels that attack Allah. Justifies any attack for the sake of the cause - Heroism: Awakens feeling of courage, it seeks the perpetrator of the terrorist act to be considered A hero Reinstatement of the jihadist terrorist. Phases for re-humanization

Phase: Emotional reactivation Rebuild the affective bonds between the victim (who had been a supporter of the terrorist group) and his family Phase 2: Confrontation with reality The components will be other former recruits of the Jihad that they had already been rehabilitated. The person suffers ambivalence, a result of the conflict he is experiencing. Phase

3: Avoid relapse into radicalization. Emotional support of family and former recruits. The therapeutic process is long and the traumatic experience of violence is at risk of being re-contextualized and re-edited. History in Latin America

Argentina 09MAY2017: Damien Straschenco, deputy secretary of the "Light and Strength" guild Zárate and worker at the Atucha nuclear power plant. Radioactive material placed in a water bottle inside the union's office in the state-owned Nucleoeléctrica.

Brasil - 21ENE2017: A young man of 20 years tried to take the direction of a bus by force, after

assaulting the driver on the President's Route Dutra, between the cities of Cruzeiro and Sao Paulo. In his belongings were found links with the Islamic State and extracts from the Koran.

Uruguay - 08 OCT2016: Carlos Omar Peralta Gómez alias "Abdullah Omar" (35 years), murderer of David Fremd (08MAR2016, businessman of Jewish origin, 55 years, in the City of Paysandú). Declared unimpeachable by justice. The expert concludes that he suffers from "schizophrenic-type chronic psychosis". Peralta had been prosecuted for the crimes of particularly aggravated homicide, hatred and injuries, as he also wounded a son of David Fremd.

Conclusions: Solitary wolf terrorism poses a particular problem for counterterrorism, as it makes collection difficult Of intelligence data, compared to conventional terrorism. The terrorist shares the ideology or philosophy of a radical group, but in general, does not communicate with the criminal group with which he is related. He executes the attack outside any authority structure. The actions of the "lone wolf" are motivated to promote the objective of the group. Suele decirse que lobos solitarios sufren una patología social, pero no psiquiátrica, deben ser imputables, en general, porque tienen plena capacidad para regir su voluntad y el alcance de sus actos. Como recomendación general, se debe minimizar la disponibilidad por internet de manuales de terrorismo, con indicaciones precisas y fáciles, para elaborar bombas caseras, pues esto está a disposición de eventuales lobos solitarios, complicando mucho más la lucha antiterrorista y aumentando las posibilidades atentados aún más mortíferos.



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Terrorism and Geopolitical

Better late than never. Doha participation in the crisis in Mali.

by Javier Valencia Martínez de Antoñana



Location of Mali on the African continent. Source: www.operationworld.org/mali

On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Libya, which were subsequently joined by other countries, have broken diplomatic relations with Qatar, considering that the country "supports terrorism". In the statement they accuse Doha of "serious violations in order to break the stability in the zone".

At the end of 2011, a delegation of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) was received in secret at the Quai d'Orsay (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in Paris by Minister Raincourt. In the meeting the political support of the government of Sarkozy was reflected to the Tuareg rebels of the MNLA.

The Tuareg took France the following message: "We can help France in the fight against al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb." France responded in a clear way: "that is very good, but it is not a compelling reason for our support against the government of Mali, do not touch the territorial integrity of Mali. "

Because of the sensitivity of the matter and as a result of the meeting, the French minister of cooperation, Henri de Raincourt, traveled on 10 February 2012 to Nouakchott, with the aim of visiting the Mauritanian President, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. This country already maintained close relations with the MNLA, even so the French minister wanted to ask their support.

At that time, the war in northern Mali had begun more than twenty days ago. The spokesman of the MNLA had its headquarters in Paris (it was no secret to anyone, because it narrated its victorious parts of war of regular form for RFI and France 24). With these data in hand it is difficult to think that Paris was not aware of the plans to start the war by the Tuareg after the December meeting.

In Mali, Menaka, Anderaboucane, Tinezaoutène, Aguelog, Tessalit, Kidal, Ansongo, Gao and Timbuktu fell, without condemnation by the Sarkozy government, but with praise from Alain Juppé, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who declared the

following: "The Rebellion has been a militarily indisputable success." He later called the Malian Government trying to enter into negotiations.

In the international broadcast of RFI / TV5 Monde on Sunday, March 25, 2012, the minister of cooperation, Henri de Raincourt, totally disassociated the MNLA from AQMI.

Sure of his management, which was still the government of Sarkozy, sent French residents there a reassuring message by SMS, on Saturday April 1, 2012, through the French Embassy in Mali. But it was not until the morning of Monday, April 3, when a statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared in RFI asking the French, whose presence was not necessary in Mali, to leave the country and close the French schools. In France they would learn on Sunday April 2 that the MNLA had been expelled from the cities of Timbuktu and Gao by Ansar Dine, the Jihadists of AQMI and Mujao. It is therefore clear that AQIM used the MNLA to have the support of France and settle more comfortably in northern Mali.

Sarkozy's government continued to say that there was no military solution and that Mali should negotiate with the MNLA. Later in Paris, on the morning of April 6, 2012, the MNLA, through its spokesman Mossa Ag Attaher, announced the declaration of independence of the Azawad (northern Mali) on its own website, either in France 24 and BFM TV.

On this occasion France and the African Union rejected the declaration of independence in the north of Mali, like the EU. As for the United Kingdom, it decided to temporarily close its embassy in Mali, and to withdraw the diplomatic staff of the Embassy in Bamako due to the unstable situation in the country.

It is hard to believe that until April 6, 2012 nobody knew what was going to happen, knowing that the weapons used in the conflict came from Libya, which is not a neighboring country of Mali, traversing the entire desert, columns of vehicles with heavy equipment crossing the Teneré, and in an area that was under the surveillance of NATO. The same day, on Friday, April 6, a cargo plane from Qatar landed in Gao to supply weapons to the jihadist groups. The reception committee formed around the plane was led by Iyad Ag Ghaly (leader of Ansar Dine), now Jamaat Nusrat al Islam Wal Muslimi of AQMI.

The French weekly *Le Canard Enchaîné*, in charge of filtering information from the French intelligence services, published on May 31, 2013 that the French Military Intelligence Directorate (DRM) had reported that Qatar was funding the terrorists of AQMI and Mujao. They also reported that the Tuareg

rebels of the MNLA (independentists and lay people), the Ansar Dine movement, AQMI and Mujao received financial aid from Qatar. The publication added jokingly that kidnappings, drug smuggling and cigarettes were not enough for these jihadist groups.

With the reports, the new Defense Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, ventured to say that "there is no information linking Qatar with jihadist groups", while the Directorate General for Foreign Security (DGSE), March 26, 2013, again accused the country of Qatar, and added *Le Canard Enchaîné* that France, through the DRM and DGSE, had known for three years, at the same time as the United States of the Qatar's activity in the Sahel.

At the beginning of 2013 several notes from the DGSE arrived to Eliseo warning of the international activities of Qatar, which were neglected in considering Sarkozy that Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani was a friend and ally. The friend and ally was handing weapons to the revolutionaries in Tunis, Egypt, Libya and Northern Mali, and so Sarkozy was told by DRM officials. Likewise, the former French president was informed of what was happening in northern Mali with the Jihadist group Ansar Dine and the activities of other groups close to his ideology in Niger, Burkina Faso and Algeria.

At that time there were other armed tourists (as defined by the French weekly) in northern Mali, the Nigerians from Boko Haram and the Pakistani instructors from Somalia with a good experience in guerrilla warfare.

The relationship between Iyad Ag Ghaly and Qatar was not recent. Its origin dates back to the time when the jihadist was consul of Mali in Jeddah. There he used his diplomatic status to establish relations with Islamic organizations in the region. To the extent that Saudi Arabia, the country of accreditation, threatened him with the expulsion.

While Qatar was delivering supplies to Gao, the MNLA refueled fuel and food in Tamanrasset (Algeria), headquarters of the Algerian Command Center for Algeria, Niger, Mauritania and Mali for the area. While wounded MNLA fighters were evacuated to Algeria and Mauritania for treatment.

On Monday, May 7, 2012, François Hollande was already emerging as the next president of the French Republic. From the knowledge that Sarkozy would not win the election, a certain section of the French press began to point to Qatar as a financier of the jihadists. The French weekly "*Le Canard Enchaîné*" published that the DRM marked the emirate of Qatar as financier of jihad groups that took control of the north of Mali..

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Terrorism and Geopolitical

Qatar and the double standard with which terrorism is measured

by Gonzalo Jiménez Mora



The small but rich emirate of Qatar. Source: Reuters

On Monday, June 5, even in the midst of the commotion generated by the attacks in the United Kingdom, came the news of the diplomatic and military break of the coalition that under the Saudi leadership develops Operation Restoring Hope to face the Houthi rebellion Allegedly supported by Iran in Yemen.

Surprisingly, although Qatar is the second country with the largest number of personnel directly involved in combat with 1,000 troops and has provided a hunting squadron as well as a considerable amount of war material (1), the remaining countries of this alliance Have expelled the emirate from it, alluding to the very ambiguous reason for "supporting terrorism," which is flimsily based on information provided by documents seized by US special forces during the operation against Osama bin Laden in March 2011, Let the Saudi Arabian channel Al Arabiya glimpse before the rupture in a note of the 25 of last May (2).

"Twits", fake news, stones and sticks...

If this information was available to the Americans, (main allies of Riyadh) for 6 years, it seems very strange that only so far, after the visit of President Trump to the Middle East, has been made available to the Saudi government. And the fact is that even

the American president confessed through one of his accustomed "trines" as the architect of the maneuver that sowed discord within the already uncomfortable alliance:

"... During my recent trip to the Middle East I stated that there is no longer any funding of Radical Ideology." Leaders pointed to Qatar-look! @realDonaldTrump ...".

With these actions Washington punishes Doha for the pragmatic but timid and cautious attempts of the emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani to seek normalization of relations with Iran, a country with which Qatar shares important natural gas deposits, all framed in a rarefied climate due To the media dynamics of recent weeks.

This activity of diplomacy of microphones and trills originated in the publication of an alleged false news that quoted the Cathari president in an open criticism to Trump and pronouncing positively on Hezbolá and Hamás; The Doha efforts to disprove the information were not enough; It seems that the Qatari Foreign Minister's statements urging the normalization of relations with Tehran (3), expressed just before the US president's visit to the Saudi kingdom in which the latter asked to isolate Iran, fell very badly on the Americans and The Saudi monarchy fearing that they will find echo in Oman

and Kuwait, countries that have traditionally shown more autonomy with respect to the foreign policy that Riyadh intends to dictate (4); In the past there were difficulties in relations between the House of Saud and the Qatari emirate because of the relationship of the principality with Youssef al Qaradawi, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, an outlawed movement in Arabia and Egypt.

The "real" reasons for the break.

And it is to these links that the displeasure of Saudis and Egyptians, main executors of the diplomatic and military rupture with Qatar; It should not be forgotten that the current Egyptian regime resulted from a military coup d'état to the democratically elected government (5) of Mohamed Mohamed Mursi Isa al-Ayya, from the Freedom and Justice Party, a Muslim Brotherhood electoral tool that only remained one Year in power; Nor can the takfirista (6) appeal of Youssef al Qaradawi be omitted to overthrow the Saudi monarchy. On the other hand, in addition to hampering the normalization of Iran's diplomatic situation in the region, the US would seek to affect the political support in the Arab world that could have Hamas, referring to the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza and the West Bank, the main opposition of its unconditional partner In the region, Israel, which coincidentally was also visited by Trump on his tour; All without changing their own diplomatic status with Qatar.

What are the accusations about?

Many of the accusations put forward officially are ambiguous, Qatar is told of: "... serious violations in recent years in order to break Saudi internal unity ..." and "... incite the abandonment of the State and endanger their sovereignty ... "; Others try to link in bizarre alliances with organizations that hate each other: "... adoption of terrorist organizations ... the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic State and Al Qaeda ..." Riyadh accuses Doha of backing Iran in Support for groups in the Qatif majority province of Saudi Arabia as well as in Bahrain, which would pose a serious threat to their own territorial integrity, and accuse it of supporting the Yemeni Hutu rebels against whom the armed forces of Qatar is fighting on the ground, and Cairo indicates that the Qatari emirate supports terrorist operations in Sinai and that it intervenes in the internal affairs of Egypt and other countries "...favoring differences within Arab societies ...".

The morality to point to another ... who sets the parameters?

The cool and calculating American ambiguity over the scoring of the sources of so-called Islamic terrorism is clearly seen in actions as disparate as declaring Hamas as a terrorist organization in keeping with its alliance with Israel while the original organization that is the Muslim Brotherhood operates with all Legality in the continental United States; Recent FBI investigations demonstrate links between this Islamic organization and many of the top US officials of current and former administrations, leads to the same Oval Office and the State Department (7).

This is a situation analogous to what happens with the British government, which pressured by the Gulf monarchies opened an investigation that yielded a very tepid conclusions, without causing the organization's outlawing in the United Kingdom; It must be remembered that according to various sources (8), the CIA and MI6 have often used the Muslim Brotherhood.

The United States, understanding the broad social base of the Muslim Brotherhood, gave its serene support to overthrowing Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, who had become an uncomfortable ally, also supported at first Mursi, who far from being the extremist who Then painted the media, spoke out in favor of religious freedom and women's rights (she even integrated a Coptic Christian woman into his cabinet) and professed tolerance towards the non-Muslim community of Egypt.

Mursi also offered to mediate between Israel and Hamas; At that time the Western press referred to the many times as "moderate", however, when the Egyptian president advocated to improve relations with Iran and allowed the Iranian warships to pass through the Suez Canal for the first time since 1.979 infuriated the United States by losing its favor and paid for it by undergoing a strategy of internal destabilization and media war that soon took him out of power and brought him to jail under dubious charges.

Washington's actions have shown that it welcomes the empowerment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, where the local branch of the organization, embracing the most radical Sunni ideals, became the fundamental pillar of opposition to the secular government of Al-Asad, the main stumbling block in the implementation of the North American strategy that seems to tend to use the Fitna (10) to divide the region and create a unique and powerful Sunni Islamic caliphate that militarily confronts Iran under its auspices. In principle it is

proposed to achieve using the Saudi monarchy as a focal point respecting the spirit of the agreements of the Quincy (11), but without renouncing to have the Muslim Brotherhood as a wild card.

All of the above seems to indicate that the US government lacks the moral fiber sufficient to point to Qatar as a sponsor of terrorism because of its connections with the Muslim Brotherhood or its derived organizations.

Although much water has passed under the bridge since that time, it must be borne in mind that since the 1970s and for many years Saudi Arabia tolerated and sheltered the Muslim Brotherhood, whose objectives were suitably attuned to the Saudi interests of the time, supporting his actions.

There are many reasons why it may be judged as an immoral fact that Saudi Arabia should point to the principality of Qatar to be involved in supporting terrorist organizations; Riyadh has promoted Salafism (12) as much or more than Qatar, which also includes its violent side (Qutbismo).

To remember is the threat made to Russian President Wladimir Putin on July 30, 2012 by Prince Bandar bin Sultan director of the Saudi secret services to promote terrorist acts by Chechen groups at the Sochi Winter Olympics in response to Moscow's support Does Syria enjoy the Saudi kingdom of morals to signify Qatar? (13)

Iran or the destruction of Islam? The goal veiled.

The United States and Saudi Arabia are adamant about Iran, they do not accept the slightest dissent from their partners, any small wink of sympathy towards the Shi'ite regime, although conceived within the logical idea of seeking peace and stability in the area is harsh Reprimanded

Notes:

(1) With regard to the number of troops contributed to the coalition, Qatar is only behind the United Arab Emirates (4,000) and ahead of Sudan (950) and Saudi Arabia itself (750). The catarian aviation elements correspond to four Mirage 2000-5EDA, hitherto stationed in Saudi Arabia. Among the other material are the Piranha II AIFV combat vehicles with 90mm cannon and VAB armored transports, some of which are equipped with HOT anti-tank missiles.

(2) This situation is very similar to what happened with the computers of Raúl Reyes, which was attributed for years to be the source of inconsistent information (and some frankly crazy) that were published very conveniently distanced in time according to The interests of the governments of Washington and Bogota of discrediting their internal and external political opponents.

(3) Oman declined to form part of the coalition that carried out the operation "Decisive Storm" in 2,015 (bombings on Yemen led by Saudi Arabia) that later derived in the present "Restoring Hope".

(4) "... We believe that we must have positive relationships, based on good neighborliness and non-interference in the affairs of others ...".

(5) These elections were held in late May and mid-June 2012, with the result that the legitimacy of their results can hardly be questioned, reflecting the broad popular base of the Muslim Brotherhood, Opposition to the government of Egypt.

(6) Accusation of infidelity to the principles of Islam.

(7) Recall among others the case of Hillary Clinton's strong relationship with Huma Abedin, editor of one of the Muslim Brotherhood's reporting bodies, whose mother runs the Saudi women's organization of the Muslim

Mursi's government cost him dearly. The current situation with Qatar seems to take the same course and anticipate the same outcome as that of the unfortunate and ephemeral government of the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt.

However, the US must carefully manage the situation so as not to risk that Doha will require it to evict US military bases on its soil, since Washington's refusal to withdraw would make it stand before the international community as an occupying power. Does not break relations with Qatar and even offers to mediate to resolve a situation that provoked, while his Secretary of State Rex Tillerson calls the Cathari intention to normalize relations with Tehran "irritating."

A possible fall of the Qatari regime would also achieve the secondary objective of eliminating the counterbalance that the Doha rivalry with Riyadh means for the leadership of the Arab Sunni Muslim world, leaving the Saudi monarchy as the only pole of power to head the future caliphate that it would face To Iran. It is to be noted that a final confrontation between the two main streams of Islam would lead to its irremediable decline or disappearance. In reminiscence of the Nazi's unsuccessful strategy against Jews more than three-quarters of a century ago, the United States might be planning to exploit the Fitna so that the final destruction of Islam may seem like something done by Muslims against other Muslims. It should be made clear that while Qatar may be singled out as a sponsor of terrorism, its accusers are no less and only raise the flag of false indignation as an excuse to torpedo any rapprochement with Iran.

Brotherhood and whose brother works for al Qaradawi ; Or the brother of former President Obama, Abon'go Malik Obama, treasurer of the Missionary Work of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan; Another case is that of Mehdi K. Alhassani who while a member of the American National Security Council from 2,009 to 2,012 remained affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood; Other members of that Islamic organization are Rashad Hussain who served as United States ambassador to the Islamic Conference and Louay M. Safi, a former Pentagon adviser.

(8) For example, Robert Dreyfuss's work uncovering the link between these intelligence agencies and the Muslim Brotherhood from as early as the 1950s, if the reader prefers something more current and light, can refer to the International press in June of 2012 explained how the CIA used the Muslim Brotherhood to supply weapons to the Syrian opposition.

(9) He was even sentenced to death in a proceeding that Amnesty International has denounced as "a farce based on void and void procedures".

(10) Discord between Sunnis and Shiites, based on an ideological gap and differences in the interpretation of Islam.

(11) In February 1945, US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Saudi monarch Abdel Aziz Ibn Saud met aboard the USS Quincy cruiser and agreed to recognize the Washington government of the Saudi royal house as the highest representative of the Arab / Muslim in exchange for the preponderance of the North American companies in the exploitation of the natural resources of the kingdom, being this the historical base on which have been built their binational relations.

(12) Right-wing Wahhabi Sunni fundamentalism historically related to the Saudi and Qatari monarchies.

(13) Recently, a US federal court has admitted a lawsuit against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia filed by hundreds of relatives of the victims of the September 11 events that had been vetoed by the Obama administration, the plaintiffs accuse the government of Riyadh to sponsor the alleged attacks and ask for financial compensation.

(14) The United States officially maintains a permanent contingent assigned to the "US Central Command" of 8,000 troops at the Al Udeid Air Base and other facilities on Catamaran soil, as well as aviation elements consisting of a strategic bomber squadron with 6 North American Rockwells (Boeing) B-1B "Lancer", a reconnaissance squadron with 4 Boeing RC-135 "Rivet Joint"; A reconnaissance squadron with 4 Northrop Grumman E-8C JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System), an aerial refueling squadron with 24 Boeing KC-135R / T "Stratotanker" and a transport squadron with 4 Boeing C-17A "Globemaster" and 4 Lockheed C-130H / J-30 "Hercules"; Also deploys two two anti-aircraft batteries equipped with Raytheon MIM-104E / F Patriot PAC-2/3 systems. The US Strategic Command is also present in Qatar with an X-band AN / TPY-2 radar station.

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Terrorist technical means

Unexpected terror, nothing new under the sun

by José Luis Franco



Mecar Grenades

Any terrorist group of the etiology that is, used, uses and will use explosive devices to be able to sow the terror. Because the terror is to monetize resources too and therefore with little infrastructure, both in technical and human means, they allow to achieve the maximum of both material and human (low) damage.

Spain has lived for years with the terrorism of ETA: lunchboxes, pots espresso, Lapas, grenades thrown from impromptu shuttles, trapping bombs for TEDAX, car bombs, letters, magazines and covers VHS Bombs, etc ... A fan All of this was part of the explosive devices that our TEDAX (Technicians Deactivating Explosive Artifacts) had to deal with and learn to safeguard our citizens and themselves during the Years of terror of the terrorist band ETA in our country.



Photo 2. Pitcher and grenade launcher Mocar

The terrorists also managed to create their own explosives in the face of the growing difficulty of going to France to steal Tytadine in civil works, as well as detonators, the most difficult part to manufacture, and also very dangerous, in fact, several terrorists were killed by the manipulation of these.

Given this and seen the current panorama of Terrorism of Yihdasita etiology, we can see that "nothing new under the sun" with respect to the use of what today is called FDI, in English "Improvised Explosive Device", because it is nothing more than that, An artifact created by a person using a type of explosive, civil, craft or military, with a device devised by him, may detonate by relief or by pressure, timed, by a detector, by movement or by any means that his twisted Idee to produce maximum damage.



Photo 3. Amonal Explosive

Many years of experience have proven to be recognized our Counter Improvised Explosive Devices of Hoyo de Manzanares in Madrid as Center of Excellence against improvised explosive devices (COE C-IED), forming members of the FAS, FCS, both national and other countries And lead the fight against FDI in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) or the EOR (Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance) of the former TEDAX Army are in charge of quenching and delivering troops from these artifacts which in 2013 cost 55% of the NATO military personnel in Afghanistan are coming down there with bikes-bombs, donkey-bombs, car bombs, etc.

Much has changed the car bomb used by ETA, FARC, IRA or DAESH, that car bomb that was placed by Mario Buda, anarchist, on Wall Street in New York on September 16, 1920 that can be attributed the first attempt With vehicle, in this case carriage. DAESH uses the vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) with the HUMVEE of the Iraqi army that fell into their hands, as well as trucks, tractors and cars to which after shielding the martyr is introduced along with the explosive charge to his

objective. He makes his own explosive TATP or the "mother of Satan". Technology advances and terrorists use it for their purposes as is the case with the Drones.




Photo 4. Mercury antismovment.

The use of remote controlled airplanes against civilian targets was already taken into account in one of the more than two thousand security plans that the Olympic Center for Olympic Safety (CSSO) had arranged during the Olympics in Barcelona.

So we can see that there are parallels in the technical media between terrorist groups of any etiology, which in this case the mentality of the members and their terrorist action is indiscriminate.

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Photo 5. Pyrotechnic Detonators.

Any objective is valid, the more the better, so the best tool to fight them, as it was against ETA and against any terrorist band, is intelligence and information obtained from HUMINT sources, such as Mikel Legarza (Lobo) and His infiltration into ETA, Raymond Gilmore, a British Secret Service spy who infiltrated the IRA or the Colombian police sergeant who for two years was infiltrated into the FARC key to the blow against the camp in the Macarena that led to The Colombian Army.

We must create HUMINT but this time with the evident nuance that the infiltrator will be and is Muslim, so again "nothing new under the sun".

Terrorist technical means

IED's in Syria and Irak

by Jordi Escofet



Improvised Explosive Artifact

Explosive devices improvised or more commonly known in military slang with IED Anglicism are a weapon widely used in armed conflicts around the world, both for its ease and economy construction as for its great military and propagandistic results.

IED's were first used on a large scale during the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan with various variants, to be more effective against the troops of the international coalition that operated there.

International coalition troops were not prepared for such unconventional or asymmetric warfare, and their vehicle armor showed the weakness of their strategy as logistical convoys were not armored. The insurgency took advantage of that weakness to attack with IED's on roads and selective attacks with the Toyota Task Force (Iraq), causing many casualties and leaving troops on the front without basic supplies to continue the fighting.

The American counterintelligence had to catch up in this type of attacks by changing their military doctrine to adapt it to the new threat.

The insurgency was developing different types of IED's to attack both armored vehicles and personnel, improving their devastating effects and complicating the task of Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance (EOR) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) deployed in the area of operations, since it was difficult for them to find out what types of IED's and mechanisms were used to neutralize them and minimize their impact.

During its beginnings, the insurgency used 4 types of IED's:

1) PPIED: Pressure-plate Improvised Explosive Device. Pressure plate activated by the victim.

2) RCIED: Radio-controlled Improvised Explosive Device. Activated by Radio Control.

3) VBIED: Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Device. Car bomb

4) SBIED: Suicide Bomber Improvised Explosive Device

Their methods were increasing according to the level of armor or vehicle that they wanted to attack. There have been cases of loads greater than 100 kg of military explosive to attack a single vehicle and analyze how it responded to improve the attack in subsequent actions.

The use of IED, besides causing casualties, was aimed at hindering military operations and provoking terror in the population to make the mission fail, and to have the people at the mercy of the terrorist group.

This weapon is asymmetric and is commonly used against technically and numerically inferior opponents.

New tactics used by Daesh on the ground

Daesh, in his eagerness to turn the war into a sum of increasingly violent and bloody actions, has been modernizing its TTP's to generate more fear.

By using western military manuals, Daesh has put his units on a military level much like a regular army. They attack with synchronized bombings, artillery and mortars, and an infantry increasingly better armed and prepared. In addition, they focus their efforts on attacking enemy lines of defense with waves of VBIED (car bomb), forcing the enemy to withdraw because they have no means to fight against this element.

Daesh's military ideologues are promoting a well-organized militia and implementing technical improvements with IED's. Some of these improvements are:

1. SLVBIED: Suicide Large Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Device

This type of vehicle is usually a heavy-duty truck that is shielded from the driver's cab to prevent it from being shot down, and add grids within 25cm of the shield to prevent any blast from RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenade) and brake the driver. Subsequently they fill the truck with the maximum of explosives (2000-6000 lbs) to make it more effective for their mission.

This new concept of car bomb is thought to attack convoys in little armored movement and parked battle tanks. Due to its large explosive capacity it is very versatile when it comes to finding targets to attack.

2. Bulldozer + SLVBIED

It is an improvement of the civil Bulldozer, with a greater armor and grids against RPG. They were used during the taking of Ramadi with excellent results.



Bulldozer used by Daesh (SLVBIED) assault of Ramadi.

This type of armament is used to attack fortified positions, missile stalls and T-Walls (T-shaped concrete walls) due to their thrust and power.

They have also modified the Humvees donated by the USA to the peshmerga and captured by DAESH, making them impenetrable against assault rifles and filling them with explosives so that the detonation was greater, always looking for it to

take place within a fortified enemy position, trying to save costs and causing many casualties.

Conclusion

Coalition troops have discovered that the best way to stop these types of heavy bomb vehicles is by using anti-tank weapons (MBT 120mm). These weapons possess a great penetrating power, reason why the armorings and the grids of the trucks are not able to stop the impact. We must keep in mind that the coalition must be re-armed with this type of armament and have the correct instructions for its optimal use.

In the safety perimeters of the barracks or Advanced Combat Bases (COP), the T-Walls are not effective in slowing the SLVBIED, being a better choice the HESCO-BASTION cestos full of dust and with an optimal depth to withstand a frontal attack. Due to their great weight, they are able to withstand an impact at a high speed of a vehicle with a great mass.

The best fortification options to repel these types of attacks are trenches against carriages, minefields (CMAS) and concertina fence to repel infantry assaults. All these obstacles must always be supported by direct fire (assault rifles of different calibers) in nearby positions and by indirect fire (mortar and artillery attacks) in the case of distant positions.).

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
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Colombia: Terrorism, War and Peace

Why young Colombians become violent

by Douglas Hernández



Responsibility in the education of Colombians. Prepared for Triarius, June 2017

Article 67 of the Political Constitution of Colombia states that education is a right in the country and that responsibility for the education of Colombians is shared between the family, society and the State. In the curriculum guidelines of formal education, issued by the Ministry of National Education, it is established that throughout the process, a series of competences must be developed in the students, among them citizen competences, which include three thematic areas, as follows:

1. Construction of coexistence and peace.
2. Participation and democratic accountability.
3. Plurality, identity, and valuation of differences.

It is assumed that at the end of secondary education, Colombian adolescents should possess and practice these civic competences (in particular those of coexistence and peace). If this is so, we can not understand why we have such high levels of crime and violence in the country. Something is failing. Therefore, it is necessary to do a review to try to understand what is happening. Assuming that every social phenomenon is multi-causal and that this writing is only a reflection, which only aims to point out some elements to contribute to the search for meaning (and solutions) in the face of this undeniable reality.

The family

Today the nuclear family is becoming less common, and is not as valued as it used to be.

Single-parent families are more common, and even today different combinations are possible for the constitution of a family, such as the case of the three men who recently formalized a "polyamorous" family before a Colombian notary, which included a quarter Man who passed away.

We have in Colombia countless dysfunctional families, where the children do not receive the love, the discipline, nor the accompaniment indispensable for their socio-affective development. In many households basic needs are not met. For different reasons, parents are often absent, and in their homes there is no structure or authority. Abundance of "Mothersolterism" and adolescent pregnancies, with all the associated socioeconomic problems. Very poor people have many children, and these grow in unfamiliar environments, in homes filled with needs, living in marginal places where they will be exposed to bad examples and dangers.

Traditional values are being gradually lost, and because of new laws that seek to protect minors from possible abuse or abuse, parents (who wish to do so) are increasingly losing power to discipline their children.

The society

The young man has an immediate environment in which he interacts daily, inserting himself in the macro through the media and social networks. The mass media are key in the "social engineering" that guides us. The novels distract, the news deceive, the

realities make you individualistic and competitive (in a bad sense), the publicity creates you needs that you do not really have, the propaganda makes you believe in things that do not even suit you.

Colombian film and television producers have a strange fixation to put on the air series or movies that show the worst of our reality, the darkest things of human nature, and people who should by no means be considered examples of life. This has led, for example, all children and adolescents to know who was Pablo Escobar, a drug trafficker and murderer, but do not know the history of our heroes, heroes of independence. So the kids want to be like "the evil boss" (that was the last TV series), a powerful boss of drug trafficking, but they do not take into account positive examples of our past and our present.

The state

The responsibility of the State in the education of children and adolescents is manifested mainly in the formal, free and universal education service at all levels (pre-primary, primary, secondary, secondary and higher). In Colombia it is compulsory between five and 15 years of age (article 67 of the Constitution) and comprises at least one year of preschool and nine of basic education.

Public schools are usually provided with a supply of school supplies, food service, free vaccination, psychological counseling (school counselor), and other needs and problems are channeled to the competent authorities. School is supposed to be a protective environment. However there are young people with all kinds of problems, traumas and bad attitudes, which have a negative effect on the educational community. Not to mention some teachers poorly prepared, without vocation or without passion, that do not contribute more to the process of training future citizens. Within educational institutions governance is difficult, many young people do not respect authority, neither in school nor in their homes, they are part of a society where there is no respect for authority, and there is a deep-rooted culture of illegality .

In Colombia, the level of impunity for serious crimes is very high. The prison system is collapsed and the justice system in a permanent crisis. At the time of writing, in the city of Medellín has been suspended the issuance of arrest warrants against criminals or suspected criminals, because there is no place to detain them, the prisons of the jurisdiction have a severe overcrowding. As if that were not enough, there is a possibility that 12,000 prisoners will be released due to a special legal situation. Summon him to that by decree the carrying of arms

is suspended for the citizens of good that have their legal arms with permission of the authorities. At the same time, hundreds of former members of the FARC, an organization that until a few months ago was classified as a narco-terrorist by the State that welcomes him today in the framework of a peace process, are being trained to be escorts of the leadership of that organization. That is to say, while citizens can not carry their weapons when they take to the streets, there are thousands of criminals out there who will not be captured because there is no place to put them, in fifteen days 12,000 more criminals could go out on the streets, Danger of running into the FARC escorts, armed to the teeth, and having some difficulty with them.

The Relay Generation

A large number of children and adolescents lack structure, are emotionally complex, weak in character, with low self-esteem, and low resistance to frustration.

In their places of residence (immediate context) they are exposed to groups and organizations that offer them much of what they lack and desire. A good way to explain it is through the Maslow pyramid.

This pyramid represents the theory of the needs of the American psychologist Abraham Maslow, presented in 1948 and that maintains full force. It establishes that every human being has a set of needs, and that the pursuit of the satisfaction of those needs is the main motivational factor of our lives. Maslow also points out that these needs are hierarchical, and that until we have satisfied the previous one, we will not be able to advance to the next level. By way of analogy, it can be understood that every person (consciously or unconsciously) tries to reach the top of that pyramid, and begins to climb by it tied to an elastic band that pulls towards the base, due to the dominance that Have the lower levels on the upper ones.

See the pyramid presented here and compare it with the brief description that has been made of the situation of hundreds of thousands of Colombian children and adolescents. Now think about having urgent needs and living in a society where illegality is the norm, violence is daily, and impunity an invitation, it is possible that many young people are tempted to do "what is necessary" to meet their needs (Real or manufactured by the media).

The pressing need to eat to stay alive could spur you to steal food, or to dock someone to have money and get food, or medicine if it was a disease. If you are in a constant struggle to keep you alive (level A), in precarious and hostile environments, and you do

not have a home or job (level B), nor a way to get them because the objective conditions of your existence did not allow you to train enough , Or your knowledge is not relevant to the job market, or what you earn with the minimum wage does not allow you a decent life, you will not be happy. Meanwhile, you can see others around you that live very well. This could generate frustration, resentment, and perhaps hatred for others. Clearly you could end up becoming antisocial and doing crazy.

But in the environment in which you live, there is a criminal band that accepts you, which gives you affection (level C), structure, sense of belonging,

authority. It promises to improve your standard of living, and through you that of your family, allowing you to access the highest levels of that pyramid. What would you do? Many young people make the decision to commit crime, to join criminal gangs or subversive groups, in order to meet their needs.

Against this background, who failed, the young person, the state, the family, the society, all ?, is enough the effort to develop citizen skills in school, facing the problems that daily involve the young, Or facing your most pressing needs?

These lines remain as an invitation to reflect on the subject.



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Colombia: Terrorism, War and Peace

Colombia. A reality that may benefit the triangle Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela

by Jorge Humberto Salinas Muñoz



Negotiators of the FARC. The National Government has given top priority to the peace process with this group, leaving aside major problems that afflict the country, which will eventually bring consequences of all kinds.

The current situation in Latin America has been fraught with feelings of anxiety and pessimism as a result of the many corruption scandals in several countries, the election of President Trump in the United States, the social and economic crisis in Venezuela and now the expectation that is generated by the Beginning of some hot and particular electoral contests in Colombia.

The current situation in Colombia is particularly particular, all the scenarios at this moment and by priority of the government are focused on the implementation of the agreements of Peace of Havana, here has not imported other issues that have been left out of reality and Which will undoubtedly befall President Santos and his governing coalition; The social and labor crisis of several sectors, such as the case of Buenaventura and Choco, the cessation of activities of the Teachers of Educators, the continuous stops of transporters, the nonconformity of public servants and others, are realities that can not be hidden and that The Government has tried to solve with lukewarm water and are going beyond being observed as minor problems and that will surely be

the beginning of others more that will deepen the polarization prevailing in the Country and surely used for the gain of sympathizers and Votes of the next presidential candidates.

The scenario of the implementation of the agreements should be a matter of a profound rethinking of the current government's policy, if it does not want this issue to become the Achilles heel in its aspiration to maintain the policy of Peace and conservation of What was raised in Havana as well as the other commitments acquired with the Narcoterrorist group of the FARC. In addition, the bad image of acceptance that President Juan Manuel Santos has in Colombian society, does not give him margin of error for more mistakes and the maintenance of an exclusionary and bureaucratic policy, aside from the profound realities of the great majority of Colombians And of course the growing and more evident repudiation of society towards the FARC and its political aspirations sponsored by the current government.

Now, on June 10 *Semana* magazine took a very interesting article titled "The Phantom of Castrochavismo" and more words, less words and

after an imaginary analysis, conclude that Colombia is far from falling into a scenario as the surrounding Currently to Venezuela, an aspect that is moderately being treated by the magazine, it is also medium the conclusion to a possible reality that could have been brewing not for 5 years but for more than four decades.

It is not healthy to compare the situation of Venezuela in its beginnings of the "Bolivarian revolution", its great social crisis of the moment, the oil boom and the populism of Hugo Chávez, with the supposed institutional solidity that Colombia currently has and that is why it is unthinkable That this type of revolution could be developed in Colombia; Because precisely that is what the current moment of the country is pointing out, not in vain are the interests of the FARC and the agreements of Havana that seek to disrupt that same institution. Venezuela was and is a different scenario, where Chávez populism took cover of a great economic muscle to sell image and the necessity of change through the infiltration of the

popular and less favored classes; In Colombia, unlike our neighbor, it seeks to break the structure of the state and from within change the system.

The fact that the current government has dismissed the results of the plebiscite, restructured the legislative management of Congress, made changes to the structural balance of the Constitutional Court and granted special powers to the President of the Republic for the purpose of presenting decrees with the character of Law and shaken by The fast track Fast Track, are the sample that we are on a different path from our democratic history and surely, without being faithful copy of 21st century socialism, if it will be a systematic mold of Castro socialism that for more than 20 years Has been shaped in Nicaragua and Venezuela. Getting Colombia to be the basis of this geostrategic pyramid of the South American Caribbean will become the consolidation and birth of the new "social democratic" left in the central patio of the entire American continent and the antechter of South America.

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Image Source: http://static.iris.net.co/semana/upload/images/2016/9/26/495483_1.jpg

Adaptation of forces and security forces to the tasks of the 21st century

Protection Professionals

by Eduardo Padrón



Vehículo en el que se trasladaba el ex primer ministro griego Lukás Papadimos.

A few days ago I was reading the press and I read an article about a Greek ex-minister who had opened a correspondence inside his official vehicle, in the company of 2 "professionals" of protection and had exploded in his hands / face. My first thought was that once again the "very important person" (VIP) controlled the escorts and not the other way around. To control, is to follow the indications of the professionals that you contract or assign to you for your supposed protection.

Unfortunately, I know that many personalities do not obey the indications of their protectors, nor do they want such protection, sometimes they are simply hired to lower life insurance quotas, drivers, publicly holding their people in public places of entertainment or with dinner parties. Friends, and if it is police escort, apart from all of the above, to be able to park in places where any other citizen is prohibited from parking, giving that cache that some human beings year. Although threatened they continue to think the same as many ordinary citizens, "I will not touch", "not me."

95% of the work of so-called escorts in Spain or bodyguard in other latitudes, is the prevention. Prevent and break the routine of a VIP, from vehicle bombing (SVBIED) (1), poisoning, spying for blackmail or just a public boo.

The escorts are not ballistic protection vests, nor dogs of prey to use against opponents in the life.

I remember an anecdote of a personality in a cold place in Spain, the subject told his escorts that he would not vary the routine of his way to work for "these bastards," referring to the terrorist organization that had him on his lists as Objective, already during the journey to this, the advanced escort had indicated that a vehicle of the stolen the previous night, coincided with the characteristics of one of the vehicles in the traced route. The escort chief, with great aplomb and conscious of his position, told him that he was in his right and that he followed the route but that they would give him 200 meters of distance to pass, after him, by the suspicious vehicle. The VIP speculated that they were their escorts and the escort boss said

something like escorts, yes, "bulletproof vests," no. Wisely, the VIP, varied route.

This story of grandfather, I have come perfect to explain the difference of what is a work of personal protection, seen by those who are not knowledgeable in the subject and those skilled in the art.

Escort personnel can not allow a personality to open their correspondence without having been reviewed by them, and must be instructed in certain notions of minimum security, if someone gives an envelope / package even if it is trustworthy, it must be brought to the attention of the Protection personnel or for example, also, if you are going to meet someone, should be brought to the attention of the escorts, these are not to assess the VIP ethic of the marriage, but for their protection. The VIP should be taught of the existence of what is known in computer science as "Honey Pot". In Spain we have the case of a newspaper director (2), which was captured by a person of female gender and recorded in possibly humiliating attitudes, being blackmailed with disseminating these images, if this person had security personnel, who at the time I imagine it was a failure, and these images were finally published.

The work of protection and protocol always collide, an example of which I do not have internal information but you can get to discern what happened, once again I use my famous words, "common sense." A politician (3) Spanish who on the eve of a few election days, the protocol and actions of the campaign prevailed that the security, being able to know the insecurity / fear / descontrol / stress that their escorts experienced, performing protection works where they knew they were "Going to the slaughterhouse" and without control over the situation. This personality, in a place of influx of people, was struck by a person and protection personnel, was not aware that this had happened, reacted after several seconds and because they saw that something had happened with a lot of nonverbal language reading . Luckily, this person, did not have

a gun or white in his power and only wanted a little fame, at the discretion of the undersigned.

Security chiefs or police officers in escort duties should not encourage their subordinates to perform domestic service duties, and only wait for "no-frills" services and collect at the end of the month. If a person is to be escorted away for repeated breaches of security measures, he must be withdrawn, the life of the protectors is at stake, they take certain risks in choosing that profession, but they continue to have an appreciation for his life and if this They do not care What image will a company or organization dedicated to the protection, that attack against its protected?

The escorts are not to open doors, to hold umbrellas or servility of any kind, the escorts are to analyze people in the vicinity, cleans itineraries, break routines, intelligence, counterintelligence, censor vehicles and neighbors habitual in the area to detect presence of people Suspicious or suspicious vehicles, to go unnoticed, in short, to prevent, if all this fails, they will have to do a reactive work of protection and evasion, which statistics play more against escorts than in prevention. The best reaction is the one that does not get to give. If a vehicle convoy has varied its route and thanks to that, they have avoided an attack of an SVBIED, it is the best service that they have realized or if they do not get to place it because during the surveillance, they have not been detected, but they have seen that The security is professional, the better.

Remember that to attack a person, will first be monitored, to detect vulnerabilities and give more security to the attackers and chances of success. These will choose, place, time, day, method and number of people who will undertake the action and the escorts will not be able to choose any of these variants, although if they are intelligent they will be able to debug their own vulnerabilities and to predict where it is more prone to an attack.

If I had to have security, I would want security, not sense of security.

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Antiterrorist Forces of the World

Audentes fortuna iuvat



35th Special Assault Command Tarántula Team



The Republic of Korea allows women to occupy positions in the Armed Forces, including first-line units and Special Forces, such as Special Forces Battalion 707 and Special Assault Command No. 35, which has a unit Composed only by women, and that receives the name of "Tarántula Team".

South Korea first established a special war unit in 1958, its commander is usually a three-star general, and his characteristic beret is black.

The Special Warfare Command (SWC) was established in 1969, and its units participated in the Vietnam War. Throughout its history the SWC has had between three and seven Brigades (1977).

During the 80's due to the increase of the regional threat, a reorganization was made inside the SWC, leaving the basic brigade organized as follows:

Each Brigade has 4 Special Forces Battalions, and an administration and logistics unit.

Each Special Forces Battalion has 3 Companies.

Each company has five teams of 10 people.

In the 1990s a group of Special Forces carried out peacekeeping missions in Malaysia, and due to experience, a unit within the SWC specialized in peacekeeping operations.

The Special Forces Battalion 707, the Special Assault Command No. 35, and its Tarántula team, are attached to the Commando of Defense of the Capital, with diverse functions that are going to respond to a warlike aggression of some neighboring country, to stifle any outbreak Of violence in the South Korean capital, to confront the terrorist threat.

Photos: © Army of the Republic of Korea

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