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EDITORIAL

We open this edition with an interesting reflection by our senior analyst, Guadi Calvo, regarding the recent assassination of the French professor Samuel Paty, and the indifference of the French people in the face of the chain of previous historical events that lead to that specific event. It has no waste.

Below is a text by Jairo Aponte, an official from the Colombian War College, who honors us with an analysis of the violent protest that has taken place in recent months in Colombia, its motivations and implications.

In the first two articles of this edition, we find contrasts that show what TRIARIUS intends to be. These are two international analysts, of different origins, who approach reality from very different political and ideological positions, supporting their analyzes with completely rational arguments. Both contribute their articles to enrich the debate on the great problems of the world. TRIARIUS collects them, and true to its sole editorial policy: "always insist on the search for the truth, beyond what seems obvious", makes them available to its valued readers, to contribute to their intellectual and professional enrichment.

In the following article, Guadi Calvo tells us about the situation of Daesh in sub-Saharan Africa where, among other worrying things, the attack on prisons is being presented for the release of militiamen/terrorists, who go on to strengthen the groups that operate in the region. Next, the same author tells us about the disagreement that is taking place between the governments of France and Turkey, telling us what seems to be the main motivation, but also what the geopolitical background is.

Between the two previous articles, there is a review that illustrates some advances in the Colombian military industry, which can be attributed to its decades of fight against terrorism.

We close this edition with an article by Ulises León Kandiko , who, from Argentina, presents us with a review of the National Intelligence Systems, and the need to adapt them to the new realities.

Know to win!

Douglas Hernández

Editor



This newsletter has a Spanish version.

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TRIARIUS

The results of the recent elections in Bolivia, which gave the winner to Luis Arce, candidate of the Movement for Socialism (MAS), unmask the perfidious action of the OAS headed by Luis Almagro, in relation to the coup d'état a year ago against Evo Morales, who has been vindicated with these results.

Morales was accused of having carried out electoral fraud, thus delegitimizing his re-election as president of that country. Social protests were promoted by the followers of those who had lost in the elections, and extreme right-wing factions within the Armed Forces were encouraged to stage a coup, which materialized in November 2019. The OAS validated the entire matter, and supported the dictatorship of Jeanine Áñez and her clique, despite the brutal repression and serious human rights violations. Arce won where Evo had won, and even the vote increased. Now it is the OAS that is losing credibility, and has become a danger to peace and stability in the region. All an absurdity.


On the cover, **Belarusian troops**.
See more information at the end of the magazine.

TRIARIUS privileges freedom of expression, however, the responsibility for what is said in the articles is exclusive to their authors.

Very special thanks to the international analysts who have sent us their articles for this issue free of charge.

France: Je suis hypocritical

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



Among the restrictions to which the French government is forced given the outbreak of the coronavirus, which has already caused some 34,000 deaths, the authorities have imposed a severe curfew, between 9 at night and 6 in the morning, since last Saturday, October 17, which will last for the next four weeks, with the possible extension of two more weeks. Covering, together with the Paris region, eight other large metropolitan areas: Lille, Saint - Etienne, Toulouse, Lyon, Aix-en-Provence-Marseille, Montpellier, Grenoble and Rouen. The provision will affect about twenty of the 67 million inhabitants.

The restrictions begin at a time when the cries of Professor Samuel Paty, 47, a professor of history and geography at the Collège du Bois-D'Aulne in Conflants -Sainte-Honorine, a north-western suburb of Paris, are still resounding. 35,000

inhabitants, beheaded last Friday, October 16, by a man armed with a 32-centimeter knife and an *Airsoft* gun, who arrived at the Collège in the middle of the afternoon, asking the students about Professor Paty.

After reaching him, he proceeded to behead him, to finish, uploading the photos of the crime to *Twitter* with a message, no less creepy -nante : "In the name of Allah , the all-merciful, addressed to Macron, the driver of the infidels I have executed one of your hellhounds who dared to mock Mohammed."

The killer is Abdullak Abuezidovich, an 18-year-old Chechen, born in Moscow, living legally in Évreux, some 80 kilometers from the murder site, who last March had been granted a residence as a refugee for ten years, which implies that he had no police record, nor was he considered a radical.

The young man was executed by the police, receiving nine shots by the three agents, in the vicinity of the place of the attack, when the aggressor approached them firing his gas capsules.

The French national prosecutor against terrorism, Jean-François Ricard, reported that eleven people were arrested, following the first results of the investigation, including parents, grandparents, and a 17-year-old brother, in addition to the father of one of the victims. students of Paty, who had denounced him to the authorities and in circles of the Islamic community for having announced to his class that he was going to show images similar to those published by the French weekly *Charlie Hebdo* , where the Prophet was ridiculed, which caused the January 2015 attacks against the editorial office of the hebdomadary, in which twelve people died, most of them

members of the editorial office of *Charlie*, including its director Stéphane Charbonnier.

After the complaints of the now detained father, who began the virulent campaign on the networks against Professor Paty, after which he began to receive insults and threats accusing him of spreading pornography. In addition, the furious father personally went to the school to complain about the teacher and demand his expulsion from the educational center.

Professor Paty, who finally exhibited these images, blasphemous for about 1,500 million faithful, had warned his thirteen-year-old students of his intentions at the beginning of October, for which he clarified that whoever might be in disagreement or feel affected for that fact, they could leave the classroom or simply look the other way.

Prosecutor Ricard said that several texts were found on Abuezidovich's phone confirming his responsibility.

Professor Paty, willing to challenge religious radicalism despite not only the complaints and threats against him, but also the actual events such as the attacks against two employees of a film production company, who now occupy the offices of *Charlie Hebdo*, where The 2015 massacre took place, for which a Pakistani was arrested, as was the Chechen, also 18 years old.

Since the 2012 attack on a Jewish school in Toulouse, France has suffered more than fifty acts linked to *Islamic terrorism*, which have left 290 dead.

Friday's attack seems to have exhausted the patience of the French authorities for what they have launched in addition to an in-depth investigation to find out if the young Chechen acted alone or was part of an organization, possibly more names to add to it.

the list of 231 foreigners suspected of having links with some kind of religious fundamentalism, who are already being targeted by the authorities to be detained and expelled from the country.

It's pain only when its own

The French people once again reacted to this brutal attack on what they consider freedom of thought, of expression, of the press... once again, as happened with the attacks on the satirical magazine, posters appeared where the already iconic *Je suis* esta once changed the *Charlie Hebdo*, for some more anonymous *Je suis Samuel*, *Je suis blaspheme* or *Je suis Prof*, with whom they expressed their solidarity and indignation at the death of the teacher, who, in the absence of better elements, has just carried out the most extraordinary practical work, perhaps, in the history of teaching. Ruining without a doubt and forever the minds of hundreds or thousands of French students who will undoubtedly not understand, nor will they be taught the already long chain of accidents that occurred so that a boy so equal to them, has decided to liquidate a *prof*, who believed he was fulfilling his mission forgetting the responsibility of his country, so that a few thousand of those 1.5 billion *Muslims* consider that the best way to resolve a dispute is to slash the presumed offender's carotid artery, at the cry of *Allah Akbar*.

In order not to go deep into history and dust off, for example, the exploits perpetrated by *France*, in the Algerian war, where the heroic French legionnaires exterminated thousands of villagers in the mountains of Kabylia, drowning them with the smoke of the bonfires they lit in the entrances of the caves, where they

had taken refuge from the bombardments, blocking their exit, or how they solved certain strikes by the charcoal burners in Vietnam, or their pacts with the genocidal *Alaouite dynasty* of Morocco, to allow the Saharawi people to be massacred, and dispossess them of the territory that belongs to them.

Perhaps it would be enough to remember just eight years ago, when their intervention in the north of Mali once again *robbed the Tuare* people of the possibility of finally creating their mythical Azawad, and igniting a war that not only continues, but from northern Mali, it has already spilled over into four Sahelian nations.

That's why no one marched through the streets of Paris with a sign saying *Je suis touareg*, *saharien*. Not to mention the war against Libya and Colonel Mohammed Gaddafi, whom then President Nicolas Sarkozy himself, in order to hide having been financed by the Colonel in his presidential race in 2007, together with the United States initiated the tragedy in Libya, which is still it continues to generate rivers of blood. It is good to point out that Sarkozy is currently being prosecuted for this same cause in the French courts. At that time (2011), no one wrote with tears *Je suis libye*.

Y So we could continue for a long time, recounting the great achievements of French foreign policy, although if we wanted to go back and skate on the edge of the Chechen Abuezidovich's knife, and honestly trace the lines to discover the true owner of that knife, do the traceability of all this crap, no doubt the lines would take us to Riyadh, where its corrupt monarchy, which with concupiscence, has become the best customer in the West, from next-generation aircraft to high-

end can openers, are the real responsible for having put thousands of weapons in the hands of so many young people, who know that the only way to have a better life here on earth is to play theirs for the dollars that international power pays to articulate its policies.

That began in Afghanistan in the eighties and they continue to prove it, as they have done and continue to do in Palestine, in Syria, in Iraq, in Yemen, in Chechnya, in the Philippines and at least a dozen other African countries, where the power, the interest and the manipulation of

the Faith, are paired in an extremely sinister way.


Many of those who today march sadly with those little signs in France really should have one that only said *Je suis hypocrite*.

Image Source:

https://meltthecrown.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/dollarphotoclub_58274654.jpg

Guadi Calvo

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From social protest to terrorist aggression

By Jairo Alfonso Aponte Prieto (Colombia)



Violent demonstrations in Bogotá, Colombia.

Different studies related to violent demonstrations in society, start from two general approaches, aimed at determining the causes, the procedures used and their consequences, both individually and collectively. On the one hand, a behavioral theory that seeks to explain the violent behavior of individuals and groups involved in the protests, from an eminently psychological perspective. On the other, a rational theory that seeks to explain such behaviors as a result of previously studied strategic decisions.

The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate the transition that Colombia is currently experiencing, towards a new form of terrorist aggression, probably less perceptible, but with the same purposes outlined in the strategic plans of the extremist organizations FARC and ELN in the dark years of our history. recent. To do this, it starts with a succinct exploration of

the exposed theories, from a holistic perspective, oriented to the analysis of the movements that currently seek to shake the political, economic and social structure of the country, through violent demonstrations. Next, it explores the characteristics of terrorism, establishing its relationship with the aforementioned strategic plans to, finally, demonstrate the emergence of a new threat against national security and the stability of institutions.

Violent behavior at the individual level

At this level, psychology refers to two types of aggressive behavior, which differ mainly in their motivation or origin. In the first place, **hostile or impulsive aggressiveness**, characterized by a strong emotional charge, which is due to an individual's reaction to a

threat, real or perceived, or to a provocation, and whose fundamental purpose is to cause harm. In this regard, Rodríguez (2009; 88) indicates that "the threat underlying impulsive aggression is linked to the perception of a threat that is not, in most cases, a real threat to our survival or physical well-being, but rather, on the contrary, it is psychological". This means that the aforementioned aggressive behavior satisfies a **reactive emotion** of the individual. On the other hand, various scientific studies have shown that this type of behavior is influenced by a series of psychological, cognitive, social and affective factors.

Second, **instrumental or premeditated aggressiveness**, motivated by objectives other than causing direct damage. This type of aggressiveness is used simply as a means to achieve an objective, materialized in rewards or benefits,

whether material (access to resources) or psychological (social-affective recognition). It is, as Rodríguez (2009; 88) indicates, an "...action perpetrated at a given moment, consciously, deliberately and carefully". Bearing in mind that this type of aggressive behavior seeks to obtain personal benefits, it is classified as an eminently **proactive emotion**.

The two types of conduct mentioned above have been observed, at the individual level, in the participants in the recent violent demonstrations in different cities of the country. Both through the traditional means of communication and on social networks, it has been possible to clearly demonstrate the aggressive attitude of those who call themselves indignant; some, trying to justify their actions as a reaction to alleged abuses –justified or not– of the " establishment "; others with private interests to obtain material resources (this is the case of the assault on supermarkets, banks , etc.), or social recognition (the case of the A. *Epa Colombia* , among many others).

However, various studies carried out from the social sciences show that violent manifestations are not due solely to the psychological conditions of the individuals who participate in them, nor do they occur as an exclusive reaction to the environmental circumstances that threaten their well- being. They are, rather, the result of strategic decisions by political actors who, through professional agitators, channel individual frustrations, taking advantage of the needs of broad sectors of the population, to

achieve their goals. In this sense, the perverse use being made in Colombia of some objective conditions, such as poverty, unemployment, inequality and lack of education, among others, to channel individual emotions to through populist speeches that incite the population to demonstrate aggressively, in pursuit of previously outlined objectives. It is, then, an eminently political phenomenon, motivated by political interests and for political ends.

Precisely what has been evidenced in the violent protests of recent months is not simply an impulsive aggressiveness or an expression of instrumental aggressiveness conducted at the individual level, but rather, as some authorities have stated, it obeys a previously orchestrated plan. to delegitimize authority and destabilize the country. Its particularities are part of what the *Sao Paulo Forum* called the "social war" strategy, characterized by a broad mass movement, supposedly apolitical, that rises up against social injustice, but whose real purpose is create a general state of anarchy that justifies a system change. At this level, it would be, then, a phenomenon of "collective violence" that threatens the essential purposes of the Colombian State enshrined in the Political Constitution of 1991 ¹.

At the collective level

Regarding the social or collective level, the World Health Organization (WHO) refers to violence as "the **deliberate use of physical force** or power, whether

threatened or effective, against oneself, another person or a group or community, which causes or has a high probability of causing injury, death, psychological damage, developmental disorders or deprivation" and **collective violence**, such as "the **instrumental use of violence** by people who identify themselves as members of one group, whether transitory or long-term, against another group, whether real or imagined, in order to achieve certain political, economic and social objectives" ²(emphasis added).

Based on the above concepts, it is clear that, although social protest is a constitutional right (Article 37 of the Political Constitution), the deliberate and instrumental use of violence in the aforementioned protests, for private purposes, whether political, economic or social, brings together a set of crimes against life and personal integrity, against property, against public security, against public servants, as well as crimes of common danger, among others, contemplated in the Colombian penal code.

However, thinking that these are exclusively isolated criminal acts such as damage to the public good, destruction of property and facilities of a health nature, personal injury or attack on authority, among many others, does not allow us to visualize the true projection of this strategy, resulting from a detailed analysis of costs and benefits by its perpetrators. It is not either, as some interested in hiding the true intentions would have public opinion believe, that the ELN and

¹- 009/95 of the Constitutional Court is exhaustive in stating that the coup "contradicts one of the purposes of the State, such as a just political, social and economic order. The coup, by preventing tranquility, deprives members of civil society of one of their

fundamental rights, which is tranquility, in addition to disrupting security; in doing so, it is unjust, then such conduct is incompatible with the just social order".

²World Health Organization. World report on violence and health 2002.

Retrieved from https://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/abstract_es.pdf

FARC dissidents infiltrated the protests or, as the mayor of Bogotá recently stated, that they are exclusively infiltrators. hired. The infiltration is due to the strategic plans of the aforementioned terrorist organizations and began more than half a century ago in unions, trade associations, public schools and universities, and today it continues in private ones, as well as in different state institutions. To understand it, it is necessary to analyze the next level in the scale of collective aggressive expressions; level that we have called "Of the terrorist strategy", based on the study of its characteristics, the means it uses and the objectives it seeks.

Terrorist strategy level

Although there is no international consensus regarding the meaning of the term terrorism, a detailed review of its multiple definitions allows us to extract several characteristics that are common to them: 1. The use of physical violence against people; 2. The use of moral violence, represented in the threat or social pressure; 3. The use of various forms of violence against public or private property; 4. The premeditation of the actions; 5. The execution of actions by clandestine groups; 6. The search for political ends. These purposes, as determined by the United Nations Organization UN, aimed at "...intimidating a population or forcing a government or an international organization to carry out an act or refrain from carrying it out...", which "...are **unjustifiable** in any circumstance, whatever the

political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other considerations that may be invoked to justify them"³.

For its part, the Royal Spanish Academy defines the term terrorism as the "Criminal action of organized gangs, which, repeatedly and usually in an indiscriminate manner, intends to create social alarm for political purposes"⁴. Likewise, the Colombian Penal Code (Law 599/2000) refers to terrorism as the act of "provoking or keeping the population or a sector of it in a state of anxiety or terror, through acts that endanger life, physical integrity or freedom of persons or buildings or means of communication, transportation..." (Article 343), including within the circumstances of punitive aggravation the assault or seizure of facilities of the Public Force or Security Corps of the State (Art. 344).

A detailed analysis of the violent protests that have occurred in recent months in Colombia allows us to observe that they fall within the characteristics mentioned in the previous concepts. These are **systematic** and **premeditated attacks** committed by **organized gangs** (neighborhood groups, clandestine student groups), against people, materialized in murders and personal injuries not only against State agents but also against individuals (**physical violence**); violent social pressure generating restlessness and uncertainty (**moral violence**); and considerable damage to private property and public property, in addition to the destruction of means of mass transportation and

the assault on facilities of the Public Force, among others, with the purpose of delegitimizing the national government (**political purpose**), generating chaos and anxiety in society (**psychological weapon**), under pretexts of social justice, but with eminently political and ideological motivations.

Although, it is argued by some sectors, the vindication of the population's rights, which, as the United Nations correctly determines, are **unjustifiable** in any circumstance, the reality shows organized gangs that have been using, systematically and under structured plans, violent protest as a method for fulfilling their strategic plans aimed at taking power. This was demonstrated in the documents seized by the National Police in raids carried out after the generalized, simultaneous and coordinated riot against the Immediate Action Commands, CAI. Regarding the active participation of students in violent demonstrations, it should be remembered that this is not a recent phenomenon. On the contrary, as documented by Jaime Arenas Reyes, A. Gonzalo, one of the founders of the ELN assassinated by the urban network of that same organization, since the 50s of the last century, the student movement "... already had an interesting trajectory of combativeness and its development was an important chapter in the qualitative and quantitative growth of the ELN"⁵, a group that is still recognized by the European Union and the United States Department of State as a terrorist organization. Also in the strategic plans of the FARC, widely

³United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 51/210, "Measures to eliminate international terrorism", adopted at the 88th Plenary Assembly on December 17, 1996. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/es/ga/sixth/links.shtml>

⁴Royal Spanish Academy. Spanish dictionary. Retrieved from <https://dle.rae.es/terrorismo>

⁵In his book ELN The Guerrilla Inside, Arenas recounts the role of the student movement at the beginning of the revolutionary war in Colombia and its

active role in the ELN and other revolutionary organizations. See Arenas, R. ELN The guerrilla inside. Editorial Icon Ltda. 2009. Bogotá, DC

known by the State security forces, the indoctrination and recruitment of students for the formation of urban networks and execution of terrorist actions is contemplated.

Understanding terrorism

Cronin (2004; 26) refers to terrorism as "A psychological weapon whose target may not be immediately apparent". Two elements stand out in this concept: 1) Terrorism as a **psychological weapon** whose purpose is to influence decisions and the perception of citizens; 2) The immediacy of its objectives, but its futuristic vision. Hence the importance of clearly knowing the strategic plans of terrorist organizations and analyzing their projection. In the Colombian case, it must be taken into account that, as established by the statutes and strategic plans of the FARC and the ELN, they are political-military movements that carry out actions of an ideological, political, organizational, propaganda and armed nature with a specific objective. specific: the seizure of power through the combination of all forms of struggle, following the guidelines drawn since the last century by the Colombian Communist Party, PCC.

Furthermore, Cronin (Ibid) expands that "In these days of globalized communications, indignation is not only an individual phenomenon and can be much more widely contagious than in the past." This indignation is precisely what has been methodically cultivated among the population (especially young people) through the formation of urban cells in the neighborhoods and indoctrination in schools and universities, to later channel it towards the execution of

actions violent. It also obeys an international ideological movement, sponsored in Latin America by the Sao Paulo Forum⁶, whose purpose is, in addition to centralizing the Ibero-American left, to coordinate and sponsor all kinds of violent social protests in the region.

On the other hand, when studying the causes of terrorism, Cronin (2004; 27) emphasizes the importance of group dynamics, indicating that "Much of the research carried out in recent decades has led to the conclusion that terrorism it is fundamentally a **group activity** that cannot be understood without reference to concepts such as **shared ideological commitment** and **group identity**" (Own emphasis). Hence the importance of systematic indoctrination and the formation, training and training of urban cells that has been carried out for decades in Colombia. Among the advantages of organization by groups, we find that these represent a source of individual and collective power, a circumstance taken advantage of by their managers to structure them. At the individual level, its members feel that they count as people, that they belong to something in a society from which they considered themselves excluded, that they are visible and that they matter to the organization, reasons for which they are easily influenced by the group dynamics. At a collective level, the group generates identity and cohesion. In it they find values in which they see themselves represented, they feel that they are fighting for a common ideal and that their work will be rewarded with better living conditions and social recognition.

For his part, Post (1998) analyzing the violent behavior of individuals and terrorist groups as a product of psychological forces, determines a wide variety of causes, among which the following stand out: 1. Psychologically they believe that they are defending themselves from an aggressive world, intrusive and unfair. This constitutes the basis of his speech and it is common to hear it in his proclamations. 2. They feel their survival is threatened, due to the lack of opportunities that supposedly have been denied them by society itself. 3. The state is directly responsible for meeting their aspirations. Hence, its ideology is based on social injustice. 4. They justify their actions by considering the establishment as the source of their frustrations. They do not feel responsible for the violent acts, but instead attribute them to a reaction to unjust conditions that the government has imposed on society. The previous aspects constitute, in addition to the source for the structuring of the cells, their main motivation and the justification for their vandalism.

Regarding the evolution of terrorism in history, Rapoport (2004; 46-73) determines four waves, understood as cycles of activities in a given period of time. The first is defined as the "Creation of a doctrine and a culture of terror", which emerged at the end of the 19th century, with the emergence and rise of new forms of communication that allowed messages to be spread more quickly and influence the population. Radicalism and nationalism were combined in it and materialized, mainly, by the assassination of political figures and opponents. The second,

⁶On the Colombian side, they are part of the Sao Paulo Forum, in addition to the ELN and the FARC, the Green Alliance

Party, the Alternative Democratic Pole, the Patriotic Union and the Common Alternative Revolutionary Force, among

other opposition parties to the government.

arising as a result of the Treaty of Versailles that ended the First World War, was characterized by the use of a new language, more attractive to obtain political support, in which the perpetrators called themselves "freedom fighters". Their main targets were the forces of order and their families, seeking disproportionate government responses to favor the perception of public opinion and support for their cause. The third, which he called the "New Left", stimulated by the effectiveness of the primitive weapons used by the Viet Cong against modern American technology in Vietnam, was mainly characterized by high-impact actions such as the hijacking of aircraft, the taking of hostages, the assassination of prominent figures as punishment for their bad behavior, the bombing of official installations and the use of urban guerrilla tactics. A fourth wave called the "Religious Wave", emerged from the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the arrival of the New Islamic Century, characterized by mystical motivations and ethnic identity of individuals and groups, where, in addition to the conjugation of the

previous actions, suicide bombings appear as a new deadly tactic.

Given the current circumstances and as a result of the emergence of new developments in the field of communications as a result of the fourth industrial revolution, the accelerated expansion of nonconformity worldwide, the implementation of XXI Century Socialism in several countries of the region and the resurgence of populism, the world, and very particularly Colombia, is threatened by a new wave of terrorism materialized, this time, by violent social protest, as part of the so-called social war.

Conclusions

Knowing the threat that violent demonstrations represent for the security of the country, the stability of the institutions and the democratic regime, and once its magnitude has been measured, it is necessary to become aware of the need for a comprehensive strategy of the State (Grand Strategy) and not only a strategy in police and/or military terms, to deal with what we have insistently demonstrated in this article: "the

emergence of a new modality of terrorist aggression".

A strategy whose purpose is to delegitimize terrorist actions against institutions; that effectively confront the "social war"; that combines domestic intelligence work with strategic intelligence capable of anticipating the purposes of countries and organizations aligned with XXI Century Socialism; that combines the efforts of all the estates and institutions of the country; a democratic training strategy that teaches public and private colleges and universities the risks of totalitarianism; that it seeks not only to prosecute the material authors of the excesses, but also those who, with demagogic and populist discourses, incite violence and civil disobedience and the masterminds behind this new form of terror; that it contemplate more aggressive diplomatic actions against those who represent real threats to national interests; to save Colombia from anarchy and its pretended totalitarianism. Let us remember that the strategy is simply a means and not an end; the ultimate goal is to save Colombia and its future is at stake.

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Image Source:

<https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/protestas-en-bogota-y-otras-ciudades-dejaron-siete-muertos-y-148-heridos/702431/>

MG. Jairo Alfonso Aponte Prieto

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Daesh, grows in sub-Saharan territories

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



Two reports on the presence of *Daesh* in Sub-Saharan Africa show that what has been happening in the Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado since 2017 is not an isolated phenomenon, but rather part of an escalation that threatens to reproduce the phenomenon that began in April 2012 in northern Mali and today it has spread to Niger and Burkina Faso, as well as threatening Chad, Mauritania and Ivory Coast.

Daesh has claimed responsibility for the escape of some 1,300 men from the central prison of Kangbaji, in the city of Beni, in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where in 2017 some five hundred terrorists had managed to escape after a riot.

In a statement, *Daesh* reports that the operation was carried out by its franchise in that country known as the *Allied Democratic Forces* (ADF), an organization militiamen founded in 1985, to

overthrow the government of neighboring Uganda and that in the mid-1990s it aligned with *takfirist forces*, relaunching their actions as of 2013. In February 2018, after the assault on an ADF camp near Beni, they seized documents, advertising material and books that linked them to *Daesh*.

Prior to the assault on the prison that took place on Monday the 20th, the *mujahideen* attacked a nearby military base, according to a statement from the group led by Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, who on October 31 will celebrate a year as *emir* of the organization, after the death of the founder Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, explains that the release was carried out as part of the campaign announced on the 18th of this month: "*Answer the call*" after the successful operation of August 2 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, where the franchise known as *Willat Daesh Khorasan*, attacked a prison from which about a thousand militiamen escaped, the vast

majority of whom, according to the Afghan security forces, were recaptured. In the message of the 18th, the *emir* clearly states that: "all the militants must tear down the walls of the prisons that contain their brothers, to destroy the *Tawaghi t* (tyrant or oppressor) and his fortifications.

The ADF, through a statement calling itself part of the *Wilāyat Wasat Ifriqiya* or (WWI) (Islamic Province of Central Africa) subscribed to *Daesh*, also recognizes its responsibility regarding the assault on the prison, which was also classified as a torture center. *Daesh*'s first operation in the DRC took place in March last year and since then it has been linked to around seventy more attacks, in which around a thousand people have already died, while another 500 were kidnapped by the insurgents.

Since October last year, throughout the Beni and Ituri region, the Armed Forces of the Democratic

Republic of the Congo (FARDC) have launched a series of large-scale operations against the *Allied Democratic Forces*, producing a large number of deaths among the population. civilian, those who are concealed among the *mujahideen* and buried without being identified, so that the populations of that region, such as in the Oicha , Kamango and Mayi -Moya areas, where clashes between the army and the terrorist *khatibas* are They have multiplied, as have the complaints from relatives of the “disappeared”, which have not been addressed by the government of President Félix Tshisekedi .

Since the start of FARDC operations, the fundamentalists have abandoned their bases and divided into small groups with greater mobility capacity and have begun to act with more virulence against the civilian population.

Tanzania, a new opportunity

On October 14, some 300 *mujahideen* attacked the village of Kitaya , in the Mtwara region , an area particularly rich in gas, in southern Tanzania, near the border with Mozambique. The attacked village is located on the banks of the Ruvuma River, which serves as the border for both nations. It was also reported that there were attacks on the Mahembe village, some eight kilometers from the first, although it is not known if there were any casualties.

After surrounding the town, the *takfirists* reportedly beheaded some 20 people, after which they looted some homes and destroyed an armored vehicle, in addition to

taking money and military equipment. According to some information, the attackers also killed three Tanzanian soldiers. The global *Daesh* claimed the operation just a few days later.

This type of action would be the first recorded in the country, although the authorities believe that some of the men who participated, of Tanzanian origin, were also responsible for the murders that occurred in the coastal city of Kibiti in 2017. In 2019 Six farmers were killed in a sector near the village attacked on the 14th, although on that occasion no organization claimed responsibility for the action.

The *khatiba* attacker is believed to belong to the *Ahlu insurgent group sunnah Wa - Jamo* or *Ansar al-Sunna* (Followers of the Traditional Path or Defenders of Tradition) , which has been operating in Mozambique since 2017 and is commonly called *al - Shabbab* , in imitation of the Somali terrorist group , since its appearance they have killed more 2,100 people, forcing the displacement of another 310,000.

The Tanzanian authorities have set out to locate those responsible for the attack on the village of Kitaya , although everyone agrees that the assailants are already back in Mozambique, whose northern sector today is practically a terrorist sanctuary, and where the authorities of Maputo, they have no access and control. Although the Tanzanian police have reported that they have already made a series of arrests including both locals and foreigners related to the attack.

It was also known that the assailants were in charge of

clarifying that they were not linked to the next elections that are taking place in Tanzania, assuring that: “We have nothing to do with the next elections. We are here and we are going to kill and leave heads on the road. They are pigs. *Allah Akbar* (God is great). We are the *al - Shabbab* of Mozambique and we are here to teach you our doctrine”. In one of the videos a *mujahideen could be seen* tearing up a poster advertising Tanzanian President John Magufuli , who is running for re-election.

It is believed that the terrorists acted in revenge because Tanzanian troops have already intervened in Mozambican territory to contain the insurgents. In addition to sending important military contingents to the border to avoid what they obviously could not do in Kitaya.

The new situation should put the Dodoma authorities on alert, since not far from the attacked village is the city of Mtwara, with approximately one hundred thousand inhabitants, and where any terrorist action could cause many more victims.

Tanzania has historically developed plans to contain fundamentalism in the south of the country. Managing to disperse some hard cores, so it would not be strange that the Tanzanian takfirists were already related to their Mozambican brothers and the *Allied Democratic Forces* (ADF) of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose actions, as we have seen, aim to fortify era beachhead that *Daesh* is trying to open on the eastern side of Central Africa.

Image Source:

<https://alliance-lab.org/etude/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/%C3%81Sub-Saharan-Africa-1024x576.png>



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Colombian Military Industry: Aviation Bombs

By Douglas Hernandez (Colombia)



Indumil stand at Expodefensa 2019, Bogotá - Colombia.

The long internal conflict that Colombia has suffered has had multiple consequences, one of which has been that its Military and Police Forces have acquired a set of capabilities necessary to face the multidimensional threat against the security and stability of the country. Said capacities are today put at the service of the international community, where the high level of education and training that Colombia can offer is recognized. Similarly, to meet the material needs of the Military and Police Forces, the Vice Ministry of Defense for the Defense Social and Business Group (GSED), coordinates a group of companies dedicated to supplying many of the elements that are required by Colombian military and police institutions, including the manufacture and maintenance of weapons, ammunition, explosives, ships, aircraft, quartermasters and artifacts of various kinds.

In this context, the company called Colombian Military Industry, INDUMIL, is one of the most prominent. Among other things, it is capable of manufacturing free-fall or "dumb" aviation bombs to meet the needs of the Colombian Air Force, with which they have ceased to be imported, generating significant savings in foreign exchange and boosting the national industry.

Mk.82 series bombs have been in wide use in Colombia. When the war against narco-terrorist groups was at its highest peaks, the importation of these bombs was constant, which meant a strong investment of foreign currency by the Ministry of Defense. Now the money stays at home, and as if that were not enough, now the GSED companies are exporting what they are capable of producing.

The national bombs of the Xué series have already been tested in real attacks from different platforms and are currently offered to the international market with the *proven in combat seal*. The fuses, which are given the name of NATIVA, are also manufactured nationally.



Nativa aviation bomb fuses, manufactured in Colombia by Indumil.

Next, the main types of aviation bombs produced in Colombia are distinguished.

Indumil pumps (1)	BMI XUÉ 125 LB PG.	BMI XUÉ 250 LB PG.	BMI XUÉ 250 LB PF.
Type	General Purpose (PG)	General Purpose (PG)	Purpose Fragmentation (PF)
Diameter	190mm	232mm	232mm
Total length	1030 mm without fuze.	1791 mm with tail and without wishbone.	1826 mm with tail and without wishbone.
Overall Weight	125lbs	250lbs	250lbs
Gravity center	348mm	650 mm (From the nose).	650 mm (From the nose).
Explosive and Weight	TNT / 20kg	TNT / 40kg	TNT / 30kg
Fuze Type	Percussion activated nose.	Percussion activated nose. Tail activated by deceleration.	Percussion activated nose. Tail activated by deceleration.
Distance Between Bolts	14 inches (NATO)	14 inches (NATO)	14 inches (NATO)
Tail Type	Conical tail, 4 equidistant fins with inspection window.	Conical tail, 4 equally spaced fins with inspection window and window for weathervane fuse.	Conical tail, 4 equally spaced fins with inspection window and window for weathervane fuse.
Lethal Action Radius	By explosive wave: 15 m.	By blast wave: 20m By fragmentation: 75 m.	By explosive wave: 15 m. By fragmentation: 75 m.

Source: Own elaboration based on data from Indumil.

Indumil pumps (2)	BMI XUÉ 500 LB PG.	BMI XUÉ 500 LB PF.	BMI XUÉ 500 LB BEL.
Type	General Purpose (PG)	Purpose Fragmentation (PF)	Mk82 Bomb Limited Effect
Diameter	274mm	274mm	274mm
Total length	2,160 mm with tail and without fuze.	2,160 mm with tail and without fuze.	1,530mm
Overall Weight	500lbs	500lbs	500lbs
Gravity center	868mm (From nose)	868mm (From nose)	868mm (From nose)
Explosive and Weight	TNT / 82kg	TNT / 50kg	TNT / 4.2kg
Fuze Type	Percussion activated nose. Tail activated by deceleration.	Percussion activated nose. Tail activated by deceleration.	Adaptability for standard MK 82 type fuze and compatible with guided systems.
Distance Between Bolts	14 inches (NATO) or 10 inches (WARSAW), according to customer requirements.	14 inches (NATO) or 10 inches (WARSAW), according to customer requirements.	14 inches (NATO) or 10 inches (WARSAW), according to customer requirements.
Tail Type	Tapered tail, 4 equidistant fins with window inspection and window for wind vane fuse	Tapered tail, 4 equidistant fins with window inspection and window for wind vane fuse	GRIFFIN and PAVEWAY guided system.
Lethal Action Radius	By explosive wave: 45 m. By fragmentation: 100 m.	By explosive wave: 25 m. By fragmentation: 100 m.	By explosive wave: 10 m. By fragmentation: 7 m.

Source: Own elaboration based on data from Indumil.



Exhibition of XUÉ bombs from Indumil at Expodefensa 2019, Bogotá.

In 2019, within the framework of the International Defense and Security Fair, Expodefensa , in Bogotá, it was announced that INDUMIL had completed all the tests and had started manufacturing 1,000-pound XUÉ bombs, as well as different types of bombs. practice.

This GSED company also developed a special mount to improve the ability of OV-10 Bronco aircraft to carry and drop bombs, it is called the IM-2 bomb carrier. Likewise, there is a national device, developed jointly with the private company, so that the OV-10 Bronco and the AT-27 Tucano aim and launch their load of bombs (“delivery of arms” they call it in Colombian military jargon). It is worth noting that the remaining OV-10 Broncos were withdrawn from active service in November 2015.

INDUMIL has made several approaches with different manufacturers of guidance kits, pursuing a technology transfer agreement that allows them to manufacture said kits in Colombia and thus also start producing smart pumps.

In this way, in the midst of the terrible consequences left by a decades-long conflict, the Colombian defense sector has been strengthened, and is now able to offer the world not only its capabilities, but also effective, high-quality products that have been tested in combat.

All photos are by the author.

Douglas Hernandez

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France-Turkey, a teacher, a lot of gas and oil

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Emanuel Macron in a high-level (mis)meeting.

The escalation, until now, pseudo-diplomatic and mediatic after the declarations of President Emanuel Macron, which deserved a response from his Turkish counterpart Recep Erdoğan, are closer to increasing than turning the page.

The -at least- clumsiness, paid for with his life by the history teacher Samuel Paty, who taught at a secondary school in Conflans-Sainte-Honorine, in a middle-class Parisian suburb, beheaded after showing his class, the same caricatures that cost the lives of a large part of the editorial team of *Charlie Hebdo magazine*, (See; Je suis hypocrite), it does not finish producing consequences.

After the assassination on October 16, the French president treated some members of the country's *Muslim communities* as "separatists" and added that "Islam was in crisis throughout the world and that he would take measures to protect both France and Muslims from a subset of extremists", that his country "would not give up caricatures" and that it would demand new laws to: "defend the republic and its values" that it will

respect its promise: "of equality and emancipation".

Macron's statement gave the opportunity to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who aspires to become the political head of the 1.5 billion *Muslims*, to respond virulently, in addition to saying that: "Macron needs treatment on a mental level", he called *Muslims* of the world to boycott French products. What was not clear was whether that appeal included, for example, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar, which have become important recipients of the French war industry, or Saudi Arabia, one of the largest clients of that industry despite the ban on the sale of weapons to the *Wahhabi kingdom*, which since 2105 has been subjecting the Yemeni people to a true holocaust. France is Ankara's 10th exporter, while France is the 7th market for Turkish exports.

Following Erdoğan's remarks, the French ambassador in Ankara called the comment "unacceptable" and accused the Turkish president of "stoking hatred against France."

German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, last Monday, came out in support of Macron, saying that

Erdoğan's words meant a new insult.

For their part, some leaders of *Muslim countries*, who see this opportunity to add some points of popularity to their always debatable leadership, have adhered to what Erdoğan said. More, after the outrageous cartoons of *Charlie Hebdo*, making fun of an almost divine being for *Islam* such as the Prophet Mohammed, were projected on the facades of some government buildings in Toulouse and Montpellier. Morocco, a country with an intense relationship with France, in an official statement said that it considered that France was not free to express opinions that offended *Muslims*. While the Pakistani Prime Minister, Imran Khan, asked the social network *Facebook* to ban Islamophobic publications and assured that Macron's statements: "Would lead to greater polarization and marginalization of *Muslims* in France" While recalling that the *The Islamic* community throughout history has suffered *pogroms* similar to those experienced by the *Jewish community* at the time.

The repercussions of Macron's remarks spread throughout the

Muslim world, not only in the press but also in important demonstrations in various capitals. On the front page of a hardline Iranian daily, the French president is referred to as the "Demon of Paris." The Cairo University of al-Azhar, the most important intellectual center of *Islam*, also expressed itself in a statement calling the French president's comments "racist". In Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, thousands of people took to the streets to express their outrage and accuse Macron of "worshipping Satan". At the gates of the French embassy in Baghdad (Iraq), where images of Emmanuel Macron and French flags were burned. Thousands of people also expressed their disgust. In Amman (Jordan), in different cities of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and in Syria, over the days, as Macron's words and Erdoğan's responses became known, the same images that were captured in Dhaka, Baghdad or Aman and the boycott of French products, which could generate a reaction that aggravates the already critical French economic situation due to the pandemic, whose second wave is once again hitting the main cities fiercely. Paris has already come out to demand that the measures be reviewed, while in different cities of the Persian Gulf French products for daily use such as milk and cheese have already been withdrawn from sale; while in Kuwait more than 400 travel and tourism agencies suspended flights and their reservations in France.

The exchange of opinions between the French neoliberal and the Turkish despot is reminiscent of another crossover that Macron has had with the famous fascist Jair Bolsonaro, being that on that occasion the disrespected was Macron, when the president of Brazil, referred in an inelegant way the wife of the French president.

A maritime interdict

The exchange of verbal artillery between Erdoğan and Macron reveals an even more critical and dangerous situation, due to the differences between these two nations in the Eastern Mediterranean, where just a couple of months ago naval forces from both countries were on the verge of initiating a conflict as unexpected as it is delicate.

Last Monday, August 10, when the Turkish ship *Oruç Reis*, designed to study the seabed in search of gas or oil, headed south of the Greek island of Kastellorizo, accompanied by five warships, precipitated the Greek government's complaint to which Erdoğan replied with a laconic message "In no way will we allow them to lock us up on our shores" referring to the agreement signed between Cairo and Athens a few weeks earlier, in which the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) are defined, which begins after the territorial waters (340 kilometers) where each country has the exclusive right to exploit any resource.

The waters that Greece assumes as its own are also claimed by Turkey, after a dispute that has been going on since the beginning of the 20th century and has not yet been resolved. In response to this Turkish intimidation, French President Emmanuel Macron ordered "to enforce international law", and sent two *Rafale warplanes*, along with two ships.

The issue between Ankara and Paris began in 2018, when both nations became interested in the gas and oil fields in the vicinity of the island of Cyprus. Area in which the Italian energy company *ENI* was already carrying out studies, in agreement with the government of the Greek part of the island, while

the gas treatment will be carried out by Egyptian companies. A project to which the French company *Total* also wanted to join, to bring gas to Europe through the sea, without taking Turkey into account, for which it created the *Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum*, based in Cairo in the in which Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Italy participate, and to which France and the United States aspire to enter, but Turkey, which has nearly a thousand kilometers of coastline in that sector, has no place.

Therefore, Turkey began its investigations alone, although in November 2019, it agreed to delimit its EEZs with the Government of Tripoli, one of the parties to the Libyan conflict, in fact, its only ally in the Mediterranean. The agreement gave Ankara exclusive rights in the waters south of the Greek islands of Rhodes and Crete, in addition to those surrounding the small island of Kastellorizo, almost a rock, hundreds of kilometers from Greece, but only two from Turkey.

The crisis between Athens and Ankara, both NATO member countries, did not take long to break out, and in July it reached its maximum level, immediately having France on the Greek side, although they were quickly contained by the diplomatic intervention of Spain and Germany.

For its part, France has granted Turkey on the 25th, a period of two months to stop its oil exploitation in the eastern Mediterranean, so if Erdoğan does not comply with the request, "he will face measures".

Beyond the death of a fanatical professor at the hands of a fundamentalist, the dispute between France and Turkey is being waged by another type of fanaticism, more linked to the fundamentalists of interest.

Image Source:
https://m.dw.com/image/54075630_401.jpg

Intelligence System Reform: A tireless need in South America

By Ulises León Kandiko (Argentina)



The reforms are a clear necessity, given by the simple evolution of the human. Not only political systems, government bodies such as Intelligence Agencies, but also business systems evolve. Perhaps in the market economy, companies are more willing to reform and transform because if they do not do so, they will be out of the game, as the Creole (Argentina) saying goes: "crocodile that falls asleep wakes up wallet". However, we have witnessed that the reforms in the Intelligence Systems and Agencies in Latin America and in Southern and Eastern Europe have been somewhat chaotic reforms to say the least. Assessing and comparing models of Intelligence Agencies is somewhat difficult, starting from the premise that all their activity is marked by secrecy, disinformation and counterintelligence. However, intelligence systems in different countries undertake a similar set of missions and functions. They vary in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy according to the relative institutional history, political culture, power and wealth of each country.

The distinctive way each country organizes its National Intelligence System (SIN) may indicate a greater or lesser adaptability and resilience to face current and future strategic challenges. Without prejudice to this, we will see that the reforms are and will be necessary, and that not in all countries, despite the fact that the same need (generating Intelligence) is faced in a similar way, not all of them tend to have democratization and accountability.

Who vadis

Intelligence reform (ICIA) is a central element of modern democracies, but it often tends to be relegated to the background. This is due, in part, to a reflexive aversion to what was often the most brutal legacy of dictatorial regimes in Latin America. The populations in transition tend to favor the destruction of the Icia apparatuses, and not their reform.

For example, in post-communist transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, competing priorities also diverted attention from Icia reform,

as political, economic, and other security institutions underwent changes simultaneously. Liaison staff posted to the region were primarily responsible for obtaining useful information for their countries. If information flowed satisfactorily, the unintended consequence was a distinctly anti-reform ethos driven by logic: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."

Accurate ICIA is essential to identify risks to the broader reform process. Western INS have viewed Icia Services in reformed states as tactical opportunities and sources of Icia, rather than reform targets in the context of a broader reform agenda. The sensitivities inherent in ICIA collection in States with a recent history of corrupt and unscrupulous governments, make the relationship between ICIA Services and civil society crucial for ICIA Services to be effective and play a positive role in post of the state and its citizens.

Western models of ICIA oversight and accountability tend to be ill-suited in states without developed traditions of democratic governance, and weaknesses in the

broader political culture mean that these models are not effective in giving INS popular legitimacy. Therefore, it is necessary to identify alternative models to structure the relationship between the SInS, the parliament, the executive and the citizenry.

Although the Icia activity is considered the "second oldest profession" in the world, the SInS were one of the last components of the modern State to be formally instituted. This paradox underscores the informal and secret nature of what is essentially a professionally driven endeavor. The characteristics of informality and secrecy reinforced the tendency of intelligence bodies to operate within limits established mainly by their relative effectiveness, unhindered by restrictive mandates or clear regulations. The potential for abuse has always been inherent in such broad discretionary powers.

The vital need for Icia and the often-secret nature of Icia collection make the effectiveness and control of INS two of the most important challenges facing all Democracies. Lacking effective SInS, a State cannot anticipate, prevent or protect itself against the main threats to its National Security (1). When control is lacking, Icia 's activity cannot be directed to serve legitimate national interests, civil liberties are compromised, and democracy itself can be undermined (2).

Until the end of the 20th century, the reforms were an internal concern of the respective Services, just as the supervision and control of Icia 's activities were a monopoly of the executive. Neither reform nor control was considered an appropriate topic for public discussion. Legislative oversight, the essence of democratic control, was completely absent even among established democracies; Virtually no standards of democratic accountability were applied to the ICIA beyond that exercised by the democratically elected executives to whom the services were subordinate. As a result, the SInS enjoyed an extremely high degree of operational autonomy in the realm of National Security. These autonomies led to abuses of

citizenship and in other cases of democratic systems, this occurred both in America and in Europe (3). These abuses generated scandals that ended up causing the creation of Intelligence Committees in Congress with the participation of both chambers, whose purpose was to guarantee that abuses could not be perpetrated so easily in the future (4).

One thing that is important to keep in mind is that the resulting reforms were carried out in a relatively benign security environment. The general consequence in the northern half of Europe was the creation of several supervisory bodies, mainly legislative, with the right to the necessary levels of information that would allow them to better control the intelligence bodies, among them is the control of expenses.

A relevant fact is that the wave of the SIN reforms did not reach the shores of all the democratic states. It mainly affected services in North America and Northern Europe, and barely affected services in Southern Europe. In 2004, parliamentary oversight of intelligence was virtually absent in France and marginal in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (5).

What happened or is happening in Latin America is a separate chapter. Although it is true that many countries in the Region made substantial changes, such as Law No. 25,520 of the Argentine Republic, which lays the foundations for Parliamentary Control, or Law 27,479 of Peru, where it had a clear concept of professionalization even for the highest level of political leadership (both laws were later modified and in the case of Peru the requirement of professionalization of political authorities was removed), and to be honest similar cases have occurred in Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia among others. Nor is it less true that from the paper to the effective application of the reforms, no concrete steps have been taken towards what is written and the spirit of the laws. Unfortunately, in some countries of the Region that have weak Democratic Institutions and/or highly corrupt Executives, they have

continued to use the SInS as an element of control to subjugate opponents or guarantee a certain impunity in their agendas.

Notwithstanding this, the central tasks brought by this wave of reforms to Icia 's activity were to establish effective civil control over the SInS, reduce the role of the SInS in areas that are not their own, and guarantee respect for the civil rights. The widespread consensus on the need for substantive reform to allow for real democratic oversight was accompanied by a similar consensus on the need for highly competent and professional SInS. The goals of the reformers were to restructure the legal and supervisory frameworks, the Icia bodies, and the Icia procedures and practices in full compliance with democratic principles and in such a way as to maintain their effectiveness. Democratic oversight and operational effectiveness remained equal goals, even if effectiveness was not an explicit element of the reform project.

After the attacks of 11-S, as well as those known as 7-J and 11-M, brought new reforms, which focused more on efficiency and functional coordination than on control per se. The driving force behind these changes was the recognition that the fight against the new threats of terrorism and the activities by which it is financed (drug trafficking, money laundering and organized crime) required communication, cooperation and exchange of ICIA between agencies, much improved at the national and international level. Closer in time, the explosion of new technologies, IoT and Artificial Intelligence, among others, generate a space for a new upgrade of the SIN.

Closing ideas

A few weeks ago I shared an article in which we saw what the Strategic Intelligence of the future will be like, so we see that the evolution in the areas of Icia is not something different from the life of any organization, so talking about reforms should not be something bad or traumatic, provided that it is

in the interest of the common good and carried out professionally and within consolidated democratic governments .

In more technical terms, the ICIA must be worked on and examined in terms of networks in the three main "actors": State, Company and Community. This constitutes a major challenge to conventional notions of democratization. Only the State can ensure adequate resources and protect the public interest in general in matters of public safety and ICIA. There are two key aspects to this: control and supervision. Control refers to the management relationship between the ministers or political officials appointed by the executive and the SINs made up of the professionals/staff of the agencies. The task is to ensure that INS do not become appendages of the ruling political party (as they do in authoritarian and/or corrupt regimes) nor so autonomous from elected and responsible officials that they become "States within the State". Legislation is required to

define the mandates, powers, budgets of agencies, and the procedures by which covert measures can be authorized.

Bicameral parliamentary committees are a central element of almost every new system developed in the last thirty years. However, some are hardly more than symbolic given their lack of resources and powers to conduct investigations. Judges have a permanent role in some countries, for example by authorizing covert surveillance or post hoc review of it. But their involvement is often occasional through legal cases or investigations into specific controversies. Other types of external oversight come from specialized bodies such as the Dutch Intelligence and Security Services Review Committee and the Belgium Permanent Intelligence Agencies Review Committee. However, if oversight is only external, it is very likely to fail because it is easy for professionals to see judges and parliamentarians as interference, people who "know

nothing". As a result, a real reform of organizational cultures and practices requires complementary methods both within the control body and within the agency itself.

Reforms are certainly necessary, either because the SINs have not accompanied democratic growth or because they are not technically competent to face the challenges that are theirs to guarantee the future and security of their Citizenship and State. However, a reform does not imply that the SINs donate televisions to soup kitchens, although they could do so, but in no way does this guarantee democratization or any reform. The reforms of the SINs in Latin America are necessary, although in many cases they are more of a campaign slogan than a reality, and end up being the same as before, as the grandmother would say "to the monkey no matter how much the silk dress is being cute", so the reforms continue to be a necessity and a debt for the democracies of the Region.

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Belarus

Armed forces



The Armed Forces of Belarus are made up of the Army and the Air Force, all of which are under the control of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus. Being a landlocked country, Belarus lacks a naval force.

The former Belarusian National Republic (1918-1919) did not have time to establish armed forces due to its ephemeral existence, but even so there are documents that attested to the intention to create a military body.

The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus is the government organization that bears the responsibility of commanding and directing the Armed Forces of Belarus. The constitution of this ministry took place in 1992, a year after the end of the Soviet Union.

History

On September 20, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of Belarus adopted the resolution "Towards the formation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus", and on January 11, 1992 the resolution "Deploying the Armed Forces on the territory of the Republic of Belarus". Republic of Belarus". On March 18 of the same year, the Minsk Duma approved the first of the two previous resolutions, after which they charged the Government "to begin the formation of the Belarusian Armed Forces".

On November 3, 1992, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus could be considered constituted.

Ground forces

The United States Library of Congress stated in 1994 that Belarus had 52,500 troops in the Army. They were organized into three headquarters, two motorized divisions, one parachute division, one artillery division, three mechanized divisions, one parachute brigade, three surface-to-surface missile brigades, two anti-tank brigades, one special forces brigade, and seven surface-to-air missile brigades. Also including 3,108 battle tanks (79 T-54s, 639 T-55s, 291 T-62s, 299 T-64s, 8 T-80s and 1,800 T-72s), 419 medium-range missile launchers, 60 ground-to-air missiles, ground, and 350 surface-to-air missiles.



Air forces

In 2007, the Air Force and Air Defense Force consisted of 18,170 personnel (two fighter/interceptor bases, four FGA/reconnaissance squadrons, one airborne base, trainer aircraft, attack helicopters, support and SAM units). Air Force equipment in 2004 included 260 FGA/trainer aircraft and 80 attack helicopters.

Structure

Until 1992, the Belarusian Military District of the USSR comprised the V Tank Army, the VII Tank Brigade, the XXVIII Red Army, the CXX Motorized Rifle Division, the LI Airborne Brigade, the LXXII Guards Training Center and logistics units of the Red Army.

In May 1992 the Belarusian Military District was abolished, by January 1, 1993 all Red Army personnel either swore allegiance to Belarus or retired from military life. This explains why almost 90% of the Belarusian military leadership is ethnically from Russia, as well as the good relations between the two armed forces.

On December 21, 2001, a major reorganization of the ground forces produced two territorial-operational commands, from two former headquarters. All Belarusian ground forces are now grouped into these 2 commands: The Western Operational Command in Grodno, made up of the former Soviet Army 28th Corps; and the Northwest Operational Command, made up of the 65th Army Corps, in Borisov.

In 1995, the Belarusian Military Academy was formed on the basis of two military educational institutions - the Air Defense and Rocket Defense School of the Minsk Air Defense Forces and the Minsk Higher Command School. The 10 departments train officers in 38 specialties for almost every weapon in service. Also, in 1995 it was given the character of a government secondary educational institution of military specialty for young men.

Since about 2001, the territorial defense forces, which as of 2002 number around 150,000 troops, have been formed and organized into battalions, companies and platoons scattered throughout the entire national territory of Belarus.

In 2012 it was reported that there were six mechanized brigades in the Ground Forces: three full strength, the 6th (Grodno), the 11th (Slonim), and the 120th Guards Mechanized Brigade in Minsk. The others were of reduced strength, where there was one battalion, the 19th (Zaslouva), the 37th and the 50th (Baranovichi). By 2017 the number of mechanized brigades had been reduced to four, with two at full strength and two at reduced strength.

Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus

- Central Command of Support Elements
- General Staff of the Armed Forces
 - ground forces
 - Western Operational Command
 - Northwest Operational Command
 - Air Force and Air Defense
 - Tactical-Operational Command West
 - Northwest Tactical-Operational Command
 - Armed Forces Combat Support Elements
 - Recognition
 - Electronic Warfare
 - signs
 - Engineers
 - NBC Defense
 - Topography and Navigation
 - Maintenance
 - Logistics Elements of the Armed Forces
 - Support material
 - Logistical support
 - Medical Support
 - Veterinary Support
 - Military Construction

Young Belarusians must perform military service for 12 months (if they are in higher education) or 18 months (if they are not).

Independent forces

Special Forces

Belarusian Special Force is airmobile and performs functions as a strategic deterrence force. He has participated in Lebanon as a UN troop, and in the Libyan civil war.

Troop carrier

The Belarusian transport troops are responsible for the movement of personnel and material by truck, rail and air. It is also designed to carry out the support transport tasks of military formations from other service branches. Overall leadership is exercised by the Minister of Defense, while direct control is exercised by the Head of the Transportation Support Department, a position who reports directly to the President.

Territorial Forces

The Territorial Forces are a homeland defense organization in the armed forces. It is managed by the Department of the Territorial Forces, is a support department of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus and is operated by the General Staff. It is currently located on Kommunisticheskaya Street in Minsk. The Territorial Defense system was established in the early 2000s. More than 120,000 soldiers make up the size of the Territorial Forces, which is double the number serving in regular military service. During a speech by President Alexander Lukashenko on February 18, 2016, he announced the allocation of arms to the territorial forces and the minimum and

maximum number of district troops ranging from a company to a battalion. The staff of these units is hired from residents of their respective administrative-territorial regions.



Specialized forces

Special troops are designed to support the combat activities of the Ground Forces and solve their inherent tasks. They include military formations and units for intelligence, communications, engineering, radiation, chemical and biological defense, electronic warfare, navigation, and surveying.

- electronic warfare troops
- transmission service
- engineer troops
- NBC Protection Troops
- Topographical Navigation Service
- Security forces
- internal troops

The Internal Troops Special Purpose Unit

The Belarusian Internal Troops were formed from the former Soviet Internal Troops after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They consist of three independent brigades and seven independent battalions (numbered consecutively).

Border Guard Service

The Border Guard Service is the paramilitary force of the State Border Committee of the Republic of Belarus. It covers the borders with Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia.

Personal

The Government Directive of March 20, 1992 on the establishment of the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus founded the Belarusian army. The Soviet troops of the BMD were smoothly converted into Belarusian military units. However, one of the first tasks of the Belarusian government was the reduction of their number. 240,000 soldiers and officers served in the Byelorussian military district. At the beginning of 2013, the number of military personnel had been reduced almost four times since 1991. In February 2014, Belorusskaya Voyennaya Gazeta, the official publication of the Defense Ministry revealed that the Belarusian Armed Forces numbered around 59,500 personnel, including 46,000 soldiers and 13,000 civilians.

Team

Belarusian military forces are almost exclusively armed with Soviet-era equipment inherited from the Soviet Union. Although they are large in numbers, some of them are considered by some Western experts to be outdated.

“The Belarusian armed forces receive about 100 new and improved systems a year,” Deputy Defense Minister for Armaments and Chief of Arms of Belarus, Major General Sergei Simonenko , said in late July 2018 . MBTs are Russian type T-72, T-62 and T-55, APCs and IFVs are Russian type MT-LB, BMP-2, BMP-1 and BMD-1, and Russian type trucks are the GAZ-66 and KAMAZ-6560. While the IISS Military Balance 2016 listed 69 T-80s in service, by 2018 the list had been removed, with the only MBTs listed being 527 T-72s and 5 T-72B3s.

The Air Force is equipped with MiG-29 fighters, Su-25 attack aircraft, as well as Mi-8, Mi-24 and some old Mi-2 helicopters built in Poland. In December 2005, Belarus purchased 10 L-39C jet trainers from Ukraine, and in 2017 a contract was signed to purchase 12 Su-30SM fighter jets. In 2006, four batteries (divisions in Russian terminology; approximately 6 systems each) of S-300 anti-aircraft systems were acquired from Russia to reinforce the Joint Air Defense System CIS. The 2018 Military Balance listed one brigade with the S-300P and one brigade with the S-300V (SA-12 A Gladiator / SA-12 B Giant).

Military Doctrine

The military goals of the Armed Forces of Belarus are to defend the interests of the Belarusian state. However, sometimes this objective is ambiguous, and it becomes more complex with the different treaties signed with Russia. Membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as in the Treaty of Union of Russia and Belarus signed in 1996 and the Treaty on the Formation of a United State in 1999, has confirmed a close relationship with Russia. Much of the air defense system is integrated into the Russian defense network, and in 2006 the two nations signed an agreement to create a unified air defense system.



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