

ISSN: 2538-9610 (on line)

# TRIARIUS

Volume 4 - Issue 64



February 1, 2020



COLOMBIA



2538-9610

Prevention and Security Bulletin on  
Terrorism and the New Threats





ISSN: 2539-9610 (online)  
Medellín - Colombia  
Volume 4 - Number 64  
February 1, 2020

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This bulletin is a publication of the International Observatory on Terrorism and New Threats. It is produced fortnightly, in pdf format, and its distribution is free.

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## EDITORIAL

We start the year 2020 with an edition of TRIARIUS quite diverse in its contents. Our prolific senior analyst, Guadi Calvo, has sent us from Argentina eight very important analyses, through which he takes us through Niger, Afghanistan, India, the Sahel, Somalia, and Iran. Studying in each case the most important and current elements of the political, geopolitical and military scenario, always with his entertaining and stark style.

From Spain, Juan Pablo Pardo Retortillo, who is an active naval officer, presents us with an analysis of the path that, in his opinion, the UN should follow to evolve towards a world government.

Then Ulises León Kandiko, from Argentina, presents us with the second part of his interesting series on Intelligence-Oriented Police Activity (ILP).

While, from Venezuela, Pablo Escalante, active officer of the Military Aviation, presents us with a brief review of the operations that have been carried out in the Strait of Hormuz.

Closing this edition with an article that tells us about the Russian helicopters in the Colombian Army.

Thank you all for reading us.

Know to win!

*Douglas Hernández*

Editor



This newsletter has a Spanish version.

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## TRIARIUS

With this edition we open the year 2020. First of all, we want to thank our readers - who are more every day- for their support and loyalty to this altruistic project of knowledge exchange in search of improving security against terrorism and new threats. . We especially want to thank those who have sent us material for publication, thanks to them TRIARIUS is still alive and active. It is worth remembering again that this publication does not have resources, and is supported by volunteer work and thanks to the contributions of articles and analyzes by different experts in different countries. We take the opportunity to request our kind readers, to send their writings to spread the knowledge about security, defense, intelligence, counterterrorism and cybersecurity among our wide group of subscribers.

On the cover, **Colombian National Army Troops.**

See more information at the end of the magazine.

TRIARIUS privileges freedom of expression, however, the responsibility for what is said in the articles is exclusive to their authors.

Very special thanks to the international analysts who have sent us their articles for this issue free of charge.

# Niger, no place for peace

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



*Troops of the 7th Division of the Nigerien Army patrolling a sector of the border.*

At least 73 Nigerien army soldiers were killed – two on the afternoon of Tuesday the 10th, in an attack on the military camp near the village of Inates, a pastoral community, near the Niger River, 250 kilometers north of Niamey, the capital. from the country and about five from the border with Mali, where the attackers came from, as recognized by Daesh commandos for the Great Sahara. A few kilometers from the Malian side are the villages of Akabar and Tabankort, an important crossroads for both drug traffickers and terrorists who, last November, near Tabankort, in a raid against insurgent Malian troops, assassinated about thirty soldiers.

With the classic strategy of the Wahhabi organizations, whose operations extend to the north of Burkina Faso, the north of Mali and the west of Niger, some 200 mujahideen arrived on motorcycles, armored units and

all-terrain vehicles, opening fire on the base on three different flanks, combining artillery fire, with the attack of vehicles loaded with explosives, driven by suicide bombers or shabib (martyrs) who launched themselves against different objectives of the base.

The fight that lasted at least six hours. According to the army spokesman, it became the deadliest the Nigerian army has suffered throughout its history. Among the dead are the garrison chief and his deputy. In addition to the fatal casualties, a dozen wounded and an unspecified number of missing soldiers were reported. Some unofficial sources speculate that there would be about thirty. The Defense Ministry report also refers to a "significant number" of casualties among the terrorists.

The attackers would have just left the place of the attack when they were overwhelmed by the arrival of army units mobilized to help their comrades. The terrorists

withdrew seizing a large amount of weapons, ammunition, 16 vehicles, including some armored vehicles. The operation takes place despite the fact that since the beginning of November the Nigerien command ordered the deployment in the area of three additional battalions, concentrating on controlling the borders with Mali.

According to the diagram of the attack, the terrorists had meticulously prepared the operation, since in the first wave they concentrated their efforts on the destruction of the arsenal and the communications center, thus cutting off the Nigerien troops from the possibility of resupplying ammunition and ask for reinforcements abroad. Several hours after the first shots were fired and the communication center was destroyed, a vehicle from the attacked camp was able to reach the Ayorou military post, 80 kilometers from Inates, to ask for support.

Knowing the seriousness of the attack, President Mahamadou Issoufou was forced to suspend the official tour of Egypt to return to his country on Wednesday.

During 2019, the Inates area was particularly violent, as fundamentalists, in addition to their attacks on army units, often target civil authorities. In this last operation they would have executed the village leaders who had refused to collaborate with them. This latest assault occurs just 80 kilometers from where in October 2017, in an ambush, four Green Berets were killed along with five Nigerien troops, a fact that revealed that the United States was operating in Niger, beyond the excuse of building a base for the deployment of drones (See: Niger: Hunting in the Sahel).

The entire Sahel is on alert due to the proliferation of insurgent groups linked to Daesh, such as Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (Group Supporting Islam and Muslims or GSIM), tributaries of al-Qaeda, given that in the region, after the martyrdom of Colonel Muhammad al-Gadaffi in 2011 and the subsequent dismemberment of Libya, its arsenals were literally emptied, to supply these insurgent groups that operated until 2014, with a certain autonomy, and that today they are aligned with one of the two terrorist organizations, which have always had the material support of Saudi Arabia and at least the political complacency of the United States and Israel, thereby disrupting important French investments fundamentally in the exploitation of uranium deposits, vital for the French energy supply.

#### **The classic French touch.**

After learning of last Tuesday's attack, French President Emmanuel Macron, after a

telephone conversation with President Issoufou, decided to postpone until January the summit scheduled for December 16, with the countries of the G5 Sahel group (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Mauritania) focused on the evolution of the Sahelian conflict, in which France has been stuck since 2013, with the Barkhane operation, a crew of 4,500 men, which on November 24 in a clash between two helicopters killed 13 soldiers of that endowment. Although the Elysee was quick to recognize the fact as an "accident", the Daesh of the Great Sahara claimed to have caused the collision.

The meeting, now postponed to January, was to take place in the city of Pau, in southwestern France, where most of the 13 soldiers killed in November originated.

Macron needs to clarify the positions of each of the G5 Sahel countries on his country's military presence in the region, given that public opinion in these countries is increasingly against the French presence.

According to a statement, in the conversation between Issoufou and Macron, the determination to continue united in the face of the terrorist threat and to redefine, in January, the political and operational framework to provide security to the populations of the Sahel was made clear.

For its part, Paris has once again asked its European partners to become more involved in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, to support local armies and prevent, perhaps too late, the region from becoming a sanctuary for the fundamentalist groups, which operate with absolute freedom in various countries crossing their borders without any difficulty.

In recent months, attacks and bombings in Burkina Faso have become much more frequent, since these gangs are concentrating their operations around the Boungou gold mine, exploited by the Canadian Semafo in the province of Gnagna, in eastern Burkina Faso.

For its part, the United States continues to collaborate with the government of Niger. Just one day after the Inates attack, Washington made the previously scheduled delivery of military equipment for the G5 Sahel Joint Force, worth some twenty million dollars, which includes 13 armored personnel carriers, 86 radio sets and four containers of weapons of different calibers.

The first delivery had been made in Niamey, on June 6, which included transportation for fuel and water, GPS navigation systems; fuel containers; military tents and complete uniforms. In 2016, it had already donated four medical planes, with the corresponding training for pilots and maintenance teams, and another four Cessna 208 Caravans configured for surveillance. Last February, the Pentagon granted 16.5 million dollars to the Nigerian army, in modules for the construction of buildings, two mobile tactical operations centers, specialized communications equipment and radios.

While and in return? the United States Air Force (USAF), since the beginning of November, operates Air Base 201 in Agadez, in central Niger, built by the United States for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance with drones, UAV MQ-9 Reaper armed and unarmed to monitor and counter the actions of terrorist organizations in the region. At the base, with a runway 1,900 meters long and 50 meters wide, large aircraft such as the C-

17 Globemaster III will be able to operate.

The base that was built at a cost of 110 million dollars on a plot

of about 10 square hectares, which were granted by the Nigerien government in 2014, in

full expansion of terrorism. A region with no place for peace.

Image Source:

<https://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2016/04/04/57023046ca4741be5a8b4645.html>

**Guadi Calvo**

(Argentina) writer and journalist. International Analyst specialized in Africa, Middle East and Central Asia.

**Here could be the advertising of your company.**  
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# Afghanistan or how to hide a failure

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



Rarely is a cliché like: "The first victim of a war is the truth" -a phrase that would have been pronounced by the North American senator Hiram Johnson in 1917-, is as true as on this occasion. An investigation by *The Washington Post* (TWP) released on December 9, after a three-year legal battle in federal court, reveals that the US government has been hiding information regarding the course of the war in Afghanistan, which has just turned eighteen, becoming the most extensive armed conflict that the country has maintained throughout its history.

The project, spearheaded by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), created by Congress in 2008 under Special Inspector General John Sopko, to investigate colossal spending and potential fraud in the war zone. In 2014, SIGAR abandoned its specific mission of carrying out audits, and began an \$11 million project to diagnose

policy flaws in Afghanistan, known as Learned Lessons, in order to not repeat mistakes the next time the United States "invades a country or tries to rebuild a shattered one."

The Sopko commission has discovered that successive US governments since 2001 have lied, making optimistic statements when they knew they were absolutely false, in addition to hiding incontrovertible evidence that the war was impossible to win. Something that for those of us who have followed the evolution of the conflict and particularly since 2005, was an absolute certainty.

The American people are now facing a truth that is too harsh for their political class not to resort to their well-known disinformation tactics, since the self-inflicted damage with the almost 800,000 US troops that were deployed in Afghanistan in these almost twenty years, many of these men with more than one campaign, after 2,400 deaths and some 21,000 wounded in combat -

according to figures from the Department of Defense-, which does not count the hundreds of thousands of Afghan deaths, nor the of their NATO allies, who meekly marched to the slaughterhouse, have been utterly useless. Not to mention the huge sums of money wasted to convert an ancestrally tribal nation, where ethnic rivalries are at times insurmountable, inserted in a cultural system that is practically indecipherable to the Western gaze, without a history of a strong central government and with a self-perception of a historically invincible nation, which the United States seems to be validating now, wanting to turn it into a "democracy" in the image and likeness of the Western ones, which today are tragically rethinking their objectives. For which Washington spared no expense, as a senior official of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) declared, "90 percent of what they spent was exaggerated:

We lost objectivity. They gave us money, they told us to spend it and we did, for no reason."

According to experts, since the beginning of the conflict in 2001, there has been no exhaustive control of spending in Afghanistan, although it is estimated that the different departments that have intervened (Department of Defense, Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development) in total have used between 934 billion and 978 billion dollars, according to an estimate adjusted for inflation. This account does not include the expenses of other federal agencies such as the CIA or the Department of Veterans Affairs, responsible for the medical and psychological care of the wounded, already in American territory.

In these long years of war, the North-American intervention, if somehow it had been true that it intended it, has not been able, neither to reduce the corruption of the local political class, to create an effective Afghan army and police force, nor much less to intervene in the increasingly prosperous activity of opium traffickers, which in 2018 contributed 82 percent of world production.

As for the Afghan security forces that the State Department tried to create, their American instructors described them as incompetent, unmotivated, and riddled with deserters. It is known that in many cases Afghan commanders hide desertions and even fatal casualties in order to retain salaries for themselves.

TWP's research, from more than 2,000 pages of documents generated by the *Learned Lessons project*, conducted more than 600 interviews between 2014 and 2018, ranging from high-ranking US military personnel and diplomats, to Afghan aid workers and officials, all with personal experience in war. Although most of the interviews were conducted with Americans, NATO allies, in England, Belgium and Germany, were also interviewed, in addition to some 20 Afghan officials, whose

identities have been withheld, as well as their comments and opinions. , those that contradict the public statements of the three presidents with mandate during the war George W. Bush and Barack Obama and Donald Trump, and those of their officials, their military commanders and diplomats who for years assured that progress was being made in Afghanistan, for what was worth fighting for.

### **The protective shield of lies**

In 2015 General Douglas Lute, who served in Afghanistan under Presidents Bush and Obama, in a lengthy statement to the investigating commission said: "We were devoid of a fundamental understanding of Afghanistan; we did not know what we were doing", "We had no idea what we were starting", much more succinct in his statement was Marine General John Allen, Commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan from 2011 to 2013, which barely reached five paragraphs.

Among the data that emerged from the investigation, it was learned that the stabilization plans and the programs applied for this were not in accordance with the Afghan context, and that the few successes achieved lasted as long as the physical presence of US troops or the NATO.

The American objectives were initially to punish al-Qaeda, to avoid a new September 11, in the course of the invasion, the mission changed its strategy. The one that was constantly changing as geological investigations were reporting the presence of rich deposits of gas, oil, uranium and lithium among other minerals that the United States has not been able to access, much less exploit, given the inalienable Taliban fight. Another key value and perhaps the most important for the United States, to maintain its presence there, is given by the geographical location of Afghanistan, for which the Department of State, managing to stabilize the Central Asian country, end the Wahhabi

violence and install a democracy, could turn the "new" Afghanistan into a factor of power in the region, to reshape the balance between none other than Pakistan, India, Iran, China and Russia, key players in shaping the strategic diagram of the United States.

It is difficult to understand the astonishment of the TWP, due to the reports to which it had access, when it is known that since 2005, after the strategic withdrawal of the Taliban, in 2001, not a moment has passed without the mujahideen conquering more and more space in Afghan geography.

Already in September 2003, the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, in the few papers he made known, which he called "snowflakes" admitted: "I have no visibility of who the bad guys are, we are woefully deficient in human intelligence". By 2006, retired General Barry McCaffrey, returning from a fact-finding mission in Afghanistan, reported that the Taliban had made an "impressive" comeback and predicted that things would get worse in the next two years.

He was certainly right. A conservative calculation indicates that Kabul has control over half of the territory, or perhaps less, while the Taliban controls the rest and advances unstopably against the positions of the Afghan National Army, and the Afghan Police, whom US officials described as "drug addicts or Taliban", which on very rare occasions can resist the siege. This has caused more than 60,000 deaths among these troops, according to the US commanders, "an unsustainable casualty rate." Despite the fact that the United States still maintains 13,000 men, waiting for President Trump, after restarting talks with the Taliban, closed last September, to find a more or less honorable way out, to return home and forget the nightmare.

Faced with this panorama, the media swarm that is hiding the true destiny of the war, justifies the increasingly frequent attacks in Kabul, arguing that they are a clear sign of the desperation of the Taliban, too weak to participate in

the combat. direct. While the mounting casualties among US troops is proof that they are at the forefront of the war against the Taliban. Without taking into account another factor of

belligerence, which are the Daesh Khorasan commandos, who are increasingly active and powerful.

As we have said in dozens of articles, the United States is painstakingly building a new

Vietnam in Central Asia, and beyond the lies, it is thoroughly successful.

Image Source:

[https://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2011/11/08/article-2059169-0EB629FF00000578-998\\_1024x615\\_large.jpg](https://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2011/11/08/article-2059169-0EB629FF00000578-998_1024x615_large.jpg)



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# Towards a new UN

By Juan Pablo Pardo Retortillo, naval officer (Spain)



## Need for a global authority

The ever-increasing progress in science and technology has motivated a current international situation of planetary globalization of the economy, social progress, order, security, etc., as well as the existence of problems that affect all nations. (integral development, peace, care for our common home, climate change, poverty, wars, migrations, terrorism, human trafficking, organ trafficking, new forms of slavery, among others) , make, by imposition of the same moral order, the protection of the common good of all peoples (which is not the sum of mere private interests, but rather act according to a hierarchy of values and intrinsic human dignity, to at least have legitimacy of exercise) can only face them a public authority whose power, structure and means are sufficiently broad and whose radius of action has a global reach, since all States and peoples have an increasingly close relationship between them.<sup>1</sup>

## The current UN

As is known, on June 26, 1945, the United Nations Organization was created, known in Spanish by the acronym UN, which has been entrusted with missions of great importance and worldwide scope in relation to economic life and social, cultural, educational and health. However, the fundamental objective entrusted to the United Nations Organization is to ensure and consolidate international peace, favor and develop friendly relations among peoples, based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and multiple collaboration in all sectors of human activity.

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<sup>1</sup>Pope John XXIII, *Encyclical Pacem in Terris*. Point IV. Organization of world relations. Points 130-145. (online), (consultation date: 12/19/19) Available at: [http://www.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/es/encyclicals/documents/hf\\_j-xxiii\\_enc\\_11041963\\_pacem.html](http://www.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/es/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html)

However, when it comes to putting such good intentions into practice, in reality, the UN is currently not a propitious body for nations to seek justice, being more constituted as a structure to serve the interests of the most powerful countries. This is so since arbitrariness is imbricated in its system for resolving international conflicts, by granting five countries the great right to be judges and parties in any lawsuit in which they are involved. This makes these five countries (the five victorious powers of World War II and with an atomic arsenal: China, the US, Great Britain, Russia and France) "category A partners", having veto power over any resolution that is not to your liking or interest, for which any other country that has a conflict with these five "category A partners", will hardly be able to expect justice.

This has been the fundamental cause of the ineffectiveness of the UN during the so-called "Cold War", where there was no way to sanction "de jure" any of the great powers, no matter how enormous their responsibility or iniquity in an international cause. In other words, the UN is structured to impose sanctions on the rest of the countries of the world, unless one of the groups of "five" interposes the veto in its favor. In this way, the aspirations and interests at stake of the rest of the countries are conditioned. countries ("category B partners"), however pure their rights may be.

But the current situation is even worse since, in the midst of the globalization era, the UN is acquiring a large internationalist component and a dangerous desire to become a super-state that can control the entire human race in a totalitarian and all-encompassing way. Thus, along with the danger of becoming a servant of the mainly economic interests of the dominant groups, currently (advised by obscure NGOs with hidden financing) it presents itself as the new Church of the New Age, with the new religions of environmentalism, animalism, antinatalism, gender ideology and veganism, and with the Earth Charter as a new alternative to the 10 Commandments, as a new "politically correct dominant thought" to be followed by all the peoples of the earth.

It is noteworthy that the Popes, in numerous encyclicals and documents, have analyzed and extracted with surgical precision, the main dangers and defects in which the necessary World Authority that must watch over the Common Good of the humanity, as well as highlighting the need to improve existing institutions. Specifically, the following characteristics must be highlighted:

### **Definition of world authority**

The necessary World Authority (UN) must be a public and universal judicial authority that is totally effective and recognized by all, with effective power to guarantee security, compliance with justice, respect for human rights and enforce their own decisions to the various parties, as well as the coordination measures adopted in the different international forums. It must be regulated by law, abide concretely by the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity, be ordered to the realization of the common good, and be committed to realizing authentic integral human development inspired by the values of charity in truth. and in a social order conforming to the moral order. It must reject war and use all legal instruments for the peaceful settlement of disputes (institutions of negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration).<sup>2</sup>

It is necessary to point out, due to its great importance, that in order to be a "fully effective" authority, and to have "its own decisions respected", it is necessary to have an instrument of coercive force, that is, armed forces or similar security forces that, similar to the current "blue helmets" of the UN, impose the international order wherever it has been sent. According to the structure and objectives of the World Authority that we will see below, it is obvious that one should not resort to military structures already created with other motivations (we are thinking fundamentally of NATO), to avoid fears, temptations or suspicions by other nations, but that they must be military forces created ad hoc for the specific situation and formed preferably by neighboring countries or belonging to the ethos or civilization of the country in which the injustice to be corrected occurs.

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<sup>2</sup>Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church. (online) (consultation date: 12/19/19) Available at: [http://www.vatican.va/roman\\_curia/pontifical\\_councils/justpeace/documents/rc\\_pc\\_justpeace\\_doc\\_20060526\\_compendio-dott-soc\\_sp.html](http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_sp.html)

Also highlight the appeal to "integral human development" and a "social order in accordance with the moral order" as pillars appointed to ensure that no totalitarian attempt of doctrines contrary to human anthropology manages to dominate and direct the immense power that this World Authority would hold.

### **Objectives of the world authority<sup>34</sup>**

Once the World Authority has been correctly defined, it is necessary to outline its main objectives:

1. Solve problems of a global dimension presented by the search for the common good (integral development, peace, care for our common home, climate change, poverty, wars, migrations, human trafficking, organ trafficking, protection of the common good, new forms of slavery, etc.).
2. Consolidate the principle of mutual trust.
3. Prevent the law of the strongest from prevailing. Avoid the danger of economic and ideological colonization by the superpowers, avoiding the oppression of the strongest over the weakest, paying attention to the global dimension without losing sight of the local, national and regional dimension.
4. Tend mainly to the natural rights of the human person are recognized, are held in due honor, preserved intact and increased in reality.
5. To support, in the first place, the consolidation of the constitutional, legal and administrative systems. Strengthen the guarantees of a rule of law. It is not necessary for the State to have the same characteristics everywhere.
6. Develop intermediate groups (development of other non-state political instances, of a cultural, social, territorial or religious nature), so that they can more safely carry out their functions, fulfill their duties and defend their rights. The State is at the service of the person and of the natural groups of people such as the family, the cultural group, the nation as an expression of the will and deep customs of a people, the common good and peace.
7. Do not limit the sphere of action or invade the competence of the public authority of each State. Nations must be recognized as having the power to act in what they can achieve, on the other hand, groups of neighboring nations, as is already the case, can strengthen their cooperation by attributing the exercise of certain functions and services to intergovernmental institutions that manage their common interests.

These objectives limit, on the one hand, the powers of this supreme world Authority, while entrusting it with very important moral duties in today's world. Respect for inalienable human rights (Nonnegotiable Principles of Benedict XVI) and the development of intermediate intergovernmental bodies will guarantee the subjection of the world Authority to the moral order.

### **World authority structure<sup>56</sup>**

Finally, it is necessary to establish the columns on which the structure of the best form of World Authority should be based:

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<sup>3</sup>Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Caritas in Veritate, Points on a World Authority, points 41, 57, 67 (online), (access date: 12/19/19) Available at: [http://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf\\_ben-xvi\\_enc\\_20090629\\_caritas-in-veritate.html](http://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate.html)

<sup>4</sup>Pope Francis, Address to the participants in the Plenary of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, May 2, 2019 (online), (access date: 12/19/19) Available at: [http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2019/may/documents/papa-francesco\\_20190502\\_plenaria-scienze-sociali.html](http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2019/may/documents/papa-francesco_20190502_plenaria-scienze-sociali.html)

<sup>5</sup>Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Caritas in Veritate, Points on a World Authority, points 41, 57, 67 (online), (access date: 12/19/19) Available at: [http://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf\\_ben-xvi\\_enc\\_20090629\\_caritas-in-veritate.html](http://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate.html)

<sup>6</sup>Pope Francis, Address to the participants in the Plenary of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, May 2, 2019 (online), (access date: 12/19/19) Available at: [http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2019/may/documents/papa-francesco\\_20190502\\_plenaria-scienze-sociali.html](http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2019/may/documents/papa-francesco_20190502_plenaria-scienze-sociali.html)

1. It is essential that this authority be the fruit of an agreement between all nations and not of an imposition by force.
2. It should not be like a "global super-state", a dangerous universal power of a monocratic type. It is not necessary for the State to have the same characteristics everywhere, there are ideological colonizations that want to enter the culture of the peoples and change that culture and homogenize humanity. It is the image of globalization as a sphere, all points equidistant from the center. Instead, true globalization is not a sphere, it is a polyhedron in which each people retains its own identity, but joins all of humanity.
3. The government of globalization must be of a subsidiary type, articulated at multiple levels and diverse planes, which collaborate reciprocally. It must implement a "multifaceted" way, supporting a healthy struggle for mutual recognition between the collective identity of each people and nation and globalization itself.
4. The States must be effectively represented, with equal rights and duties, to avoid the growing hegemony of powers and interest groups that impose their own visions and ideas, as well as new forms of ideological colonization, often disrespectful of identity, uses and customs, of the dignity and sensitivity of the peoples concerned.
5. It must be impartial to all, completely free from partisanship and directed to the common good of all peoples.
6. Not be subservient to the interests of a dominant group, mainly for reasons of economic benefit.



It seems that everything indicates that the ideal structure should include, for example and following the principle of the need for intermediate social bodies, a kind of mini-UN for each ethos/civilization/identity, or for each continent, etc..., and all of them, due to the necessary subordination to the moral order, could be under the highest authority of the Holy See, as the ultimate international guarantor of the safeguarding of the structure and objectives of the world Authority.

The call to avoid a "monocratic ideological colonization" is very important, since the different forms of social organization of the peoples must be respected and not try to impose, as is happening now, the inorganic liberal secular and partisan democracy (which inexorably becomes brief time in ochlocracy or the "government of the crowd", whose first implementation freed Barabbas and condemned our Lord Jesus Christ), together with public and mixed education, to all nations, resorting if necessary to violent and hardly morally justifiable "springs of the peoples", in a new twist to Machiavelli's anti-moral principle of "the end justifies the means". It is not necessary for the State to have the same characteristics in all places, there is also organic democracy, leadership and other forms of government that, if, at a minimum, comply with the legitimacy of the exercise seeking the common good, must be accepted a priori .

Finally, the current structure of "category A partners" and "category B partners" of the UN must end, finding an improved formula in which all nations have equal rights and duties and are effectively represented. As long as the structure and objectives of the UN are not changed and perfected as stated in the previous points, humanity will not have an effective body that dictates fair sentences for the resolution of international conflicts, which will be the cause of the creation of new problems and future conflicts for humanity.

Image Source:

<https://medium.com/@ManuRR/las-naciones-united-can-and-must-provide-electoral-assistance-to-venezuela-197d19463a38>

**Juan Pablo Pardo Retortillo**

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2020

# EUROSATORY

8 AL 12 DE JUNIO 2020 / PARIS

LA FERIA  
**MUNDIAL**  
INELUDIBLE



**1,802**   
expositores +14,7%

de 63 países  
65,9% son internacionales

**65 startups** en Eurosatory LAB

**98,721**  
Asistencia total

(expositores, visitantes,  
prensa, organizadores)

**227**  
Delegaciones oficiales

de 94 países  
y 4 organizaciones  
(en representación de 760 delegados)

**696**  
periodistas  
de 44 países

**75** Conferencias  
**2 102** Reuniones de negocios realizadas



# India, between civil war or genocide

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



Political Hinduism has gradually become a threat not only to Indian democracy but also to regional peace. The latest advance towards that destination by the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi is the sanction of the controversial *Citizenship Amendment Law (CAA)*, which grants citizenship to immigrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan or Bangladesh, who will have to prove that belong to any of the religious minorities of those countries: Hindus, Christians, Jains or Buddhists and who entered India illegally before 2014. The measure clearly excludes Muslims, particularly the 40,000 members of the Rohingya community, who arrived fleeing the genocide that, in his country,

Burma, is practiced against this Muslim community. If the expulsion occurs, many of them will march to the practically certain death that awaits them in their own country.

The approval of the CAA has only been a first step, a preparatory measure for what is believed to be the coup de grâce against migrants of Muslim origin, as the government prepares, according to Modi's Interior Minister, Amit Shah, the preparation of a national registry where all Indian citizens must prove their status as such. The measure is eagerly awaited by the most extreme right-wing sectors such as the one led by Mohan Bhagwat, who assured: "no Hindu" would be expelled from the

country, he is the leader of the paramilitary group Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Patriotic Association or RSS) founded in 1925, which advocates for Hinduism to rule over all minorities, is a fundamental ideological contributor to the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP (Indian People's Party).

The CAA, which was voted by the upper house on Wednesday, December 11, while the previous Monday, had already had the approval of the lower house, only needs to be promulgated by the president of India Shri Ram Nath Kovind, that will surely be verified as soon as the great protests, which are taking place after the approval of the Law, stop.

Large sectors of India have taken to the streets to demonstrate against the measure and these protests, which have already left three dead and nearly 2,000 detained, have intensified and spread since then, led by human rights organizations and different Muslim groups to the six northeastern states, New Delhi, and to the states of West Bengal and Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh. the most populous of the subcontinent.

The law awaited approval, after being presented to parliament, prior to the elections last May in which Modi won not only his re-election, but also a large legislative majority, which would allow him to govern without major shocks, but now everything has changed. Seven months after that victory, it has been whitewashed that the economy is in ruins, in June it was learned that the Modi government had lied with the GDP growth figures by almost double.

The international reputation of the country has fallen off the cliff, several states have entered a severe crisis and civil society is fractured. So Modi, in order to carry out his plan to create a truly Hindu India, a "Hindutva" nation, will have to resort to a heavy hand and intensify his fundamentally island-mophobic policies.

The resistance to this supremacist dream has put more than 33 universities in a state of belligerence, which have interrupted their activities, and both students and teachers are in a state of permanent assembly blocking streets and routes.

In the state of Assam, in the northwest of the country, where nearly two million people are already on the verge of being declared stateless or being deported due to a bureaucratic modification of identity and origin,

protesters burned tires and blocked traffic, making sitting on the roads and forcing businesses to close. In some areas, the local authorities had to request the assistance of the Indian army, to contain the protesters, in addition to closing Internet access and cell phones, a curfew was imposed.

In the city of New Delhi, the capital of the country, with a population close to two million inhabitants, the vehicular chaos on Thursday has blocked all activities, while images where the police are seen entering the library of the University Jamia Milia, throwing tear gas and beating students, have added more drama to the crisis, which forced a joint statement by national law schools, criticizing the Chief Justice of India for not respecting fundamental rights. —mental and refusing to listen to claims of police brutality.

Washington, despite being a key ally of Modi, after segregationist policies placed India on the "genocide watch" list and issued a statement warning New Delhi and the United Nations of the possible consequences of a law like the CAA.

The anti-Muslim sentiment, although it has not been a creation of Modi, the current Prime Minister and his party, the ultra-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP (Indian People's Party) have historically fueled these differences, even sabotaging the integration policies successfully articulated by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, both assassinated precisely for their integrating positions of all religions and ethnic groups in India.

Modi's policies, towards the Muslim community of India, almost 200 million people who represent about 14 percent of the 1,300 million Indian citizens, have been persecutory rather than discriminatory. Already as Prime

Minister (governor) of the State of Gujarat between the years (2001-2014) his neglect caused the most important outbreak of religious violence in recent decades in India, in which nearly 2 thousand people were killed, in its majority Muslims, in just three days (See: India: A dangerous drift to fundamentalism).

### **Hey Modi!**

Since Modi was elected Prime Minister of India in 2014, he has dedicated his efforts to rewriting the country's history, seeking to change a secular, broad and open democracy, which allows containing the rich, varied and contradictory religious, cultural, philosophical and ethnic to a nation framed and protected by the ideology of Hindutva, which seeks to reinvent the Hindu identity with a new structure of beliefs and a new vocabulary. As part of the Hindutva project, the BJP have "corrected" school books, erasing much of the very rich and fundamental Islamic presence in India's history, erasing the Mughal (Muslim -Mane) emperors, who ruled the subcontinent for three centuries. Changed, names and modifying historical situations and even limiting the use of Urdu, the language of Muslims in the north of the country.

The actions of Modi and his party have revived the always dangerous Kashmiri bonfire, (See: Kashmir: Modi's dirty war) where the recent suspension of article 370 of the Constitution, which grants autonomy to Kashmir, the only one with a Muslim majority in the India has set off all the alarms not only in that state but also in Pakistan, which has been fighting for it since 1947, which has already caused three wars and endless border clashes.

Kashmir, since August, has been "invaded" by the Indian army, since then human rights violations are constant and the prohibition of informing about it is absolute. It is important to remember that the partition of 1947 gave rise to the rise of Pakistan, causing the largest migration in recorded history as tens of millions of Hindus and Muslims crossed the new borders in one direction or another. process that left at least two million dead.

Modi's policies have installed a repressive and persecutory state throughout the country that is very reminiscent of Nazi Germany,

thugs from the "student" wing of the BJP harass both students, professors and authorities in universities, who are not open – mind aligned with Hindutva and its caste order; at the Central University of Hyderabad, a fierce campaign against Dalit students (untouchables or outcasts) the system's "lower" caste, caused the student, Rohith Vemula, to commit suicide after his scholarship was suspended due to "his condition" of Dalit

Narendra Modi, who knew as a child what it means to belong to a low caste, he is a ghanchi, whose members are traditionally oil


sellers; knew how since he was a child to put himself under the protection of the RSS from where he was ascending bureaucratically and deepening his ideology which led to the psychologist, Ashis Nandy after a long series of interviews with members of the RSS including Modi himself, who after a long study defined as "authoritarian, rigidly puritanical, with a restricted emotional life, fear of his own passions and a huge ego that protected a persistent insecurity". After which he concluded: "Modi is a fascist in every way, not as a term of abuse, but as a diagnosis."

Image Source:

<https://countercurrents.org/2019/04/india-under-narendra-modi-a-throwback-to-the-germany-of-the-1930s-or-are-we-imagining-things>

# Sahel: Terrorism, a reason to survive

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



*Pastor of the Fulani ethnic group, now classified as a "terrorist" by the Niger government.*

After the attack last Tuesday, December 10, against the military camp near the village of Inates, in which 74 Nigerian soldiers died, the deadliest in the history of Niger, (See: Niger, no place for peace.) finally recognized by the extremist group Wilāyat (province) of Daesh for West Africa, or ISWAP, has exposed the serious security situation that not only the Sahel in general endures, but also large rural regions of Niger, further complicating its internal situation since it is considered the poorest country in the world, despite being the world's third largest producer of uranium, exploitation in the hands of France.

The coordination errors of the troops of the local armies (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) that collaborate with the French units of the Barkhane operation, have allowed the ISWAP to control large extensions on the borders of Niger and Burkina Faso, producing large

operations more and more frequent and more deadly.

The increase in these attacks is in line with the increase in the number of sympathizers, who become militiamen of the ISWAP and terrorist organizations, such as the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (Support Group for Islam and Muslims or GSIM) affiliated with al-Qaeda. Among them, a significant number of young people from the Fulani ethnic group or nomadic Peuls from the North Tillaberi region, north of Niamey and bordering Mali and Burkina Faso, have been detected. These recruitments are being pushed by government development policies, which, since the country's independence in 1960, the Fulani have been consistently marginalized, giving them no other job opportunity than to join the armed struggle of the Wahhabi gangs. In a 2009 report on herding, the main activity of the

Fulani, state investment represented only one percent of the state budget, a situation that 10 years from now has not been reversed.

Given the demographic growth of the 1960s, the farmers of Tillaberi del Norte, with the complicity of the government authorities, have been conquering territories ancestrally dedicated to grazing, forcing the herders to migrate north, where the pastures are ostensibly of lower quality, even many Fulanis have had to take their herds to graze in Malian territory, in search of better food, which has caused friction with the Tuareg of the Daoussahak tribe.

This situation has generated the growth of robberies and attacks against Fulani herders, who according to the North Tillaberi Breeders' Council, between 1990 and 2007, 316 were killed in the Gao region (Mali) and in Tillaberi, Niger. This puts the

authorities of both nations on alert since, in a similar situation in 1997, a water well in the Menaka area (Mali) between Tuaregs and Fulanis resulted in more than fifty deaths and the theft of Fulani cattle. In November 2013, a relative of El Hadj Ag Gamou, a Malian army general, founder of the militia, the Tuareg Imghad Self-Defense Group, was killed in his village by a Fulani. It was not clear whether it was an organized attack or the result of a fight linked to a land dispute, but the fact caused that a few days later, fifty Fulanis were killed on the border between Mali and Niger. This began a cycle of massacres, beginning in February 2014, with the deaths of forty Imghad in a village in Anchawadi commune in the Tamkoutat region, some 125 kilometers from Gao.

Since then, the Fulani herdsmen, who returned from Mali to Niger, decided to form a self-defense group, which the authorities have tried to disarm on several occasions, mainly after the latest Tuareg rebellion of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), in the north of Mali in 2012, but they have not succeeded, on the contrary, the Nigerien authorities presented these self-defense groups as terrorists, which led to a strong rapprochement between the self-defense groups and the tributary group of al-Qaeda, *Jamā'at at-tawḥīd wal-jihād fī gharb 'afrīqīyā* or Mujao (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa), so these groups not only remain armed, and operate independently in some cases carrying out assaults and looting, against farming villages, but also joining as mercenaries, the different fundamentalist factions that operate in the region.

### **Too late for peace**

The government of the president of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou, has tried to open channels of negotiation with the young Fulani fighters, who have joined the terrorist groups, but all the approaches ended up being a failure. Although for the mediators appointed by the government, there is still some possibility of negotiating, but so far the hard line has prevailed not only on the side of the mujahideen, but also on the side of the Nigerian army, wounded in self-esteem after the humiliating defeat of the last December 10. We must also remember the Tongo-Tongo ambush in October 2017, in which not only four Green Berets, Americans, but also five soldiers from the powerful Security and Intelligence Battalion (BSR), elite troops, who were the pride of the army, died. of the Nigerian Army.

The failed negotiations have opened a campaign of harassment against the Fulani, producing violent arbitrary arrests, focusing on the youngest members of the herding community, which has led to complaints from Human Rights organizations, while the army alleges that the detainees belong to terrorist organizations.

On the other hand, in mid-2017 the Nigerien government made an agreement with two Tuareg militias, which operate in Malian territory, to collaborate with the army in its fight against fundamentalists, one is the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA), Daoussahak and the other is the Gatia, from the Imghad tribe, both communities with pending accounts with the Fulani. For which Niamey grants the two contracted militias the authorization to carry out military operations in the country, in


addition to committing to provide them with operational support. It was also known that the same pact with the Tuareg would have been made by the French army, so that they operate on the three borders (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso).

Beyond the agreements, the Tuareg groups seem to have their own battle plan and are apparently out of control, without distinguishing between the Mujahideen and the Fulani. So dozens of civilians have been killed in recent years, assaulted in their own camps, who are looted, their wives raped and rodeos robbed or slaughtered. Many of these attacks, according to the complaints in the presence of French troops, who only limited themselves to watching the "show", after which the arrangements between the Tuareg and France were deactivated in the last months of 2018.

The aberrant joint operations between the MSA, the Gatia and the men of the Barkhane operation, have acted as a catalyst for more young Fulanis to join the fundamentalist groups that spread out in a wide area that extends from Gossi to the Ansongo forest, in Mali, where on November 1 an assault on Camp Indelimane, in Malian territory, caused the death of 49 Malian soldiers and one civilian. That spill also pervades much of northern Burkina Faso, where the group has closed schools, collects taxes and administers justice through Sharia law, and has killed many tribal chiefs, six in the last November, as well as accessing water and fresh pastures, which undoubtedly benefits the Fulani herdsmen, who have joined Daesh's Wilāyat (province) for West Africa as a reason to subsist.

Image Source:

<https://www.thetrentonline.com/armed-fulani-herdsmen-terrorists-senate/>



**fuerzasmilitares.org**  
el portal militar colombiano

# Intelligence-led policing (ILP). Part II: Making way in the world of intelligence

By Ulises León Kandiko (Argentina)

In the last installment we began the journey on the ILP model used by the OSCE, we laid down some work bases, we gave some parameters to start the activity, always keeping in mind that there is no template to follow but rather some limits on which work and adapt the model to the needs and particularities of each country at its various levels (National, Provincial and Local) together with their cross-border interaction.

On this occasion I want to address some aspects that make up both the ILP model and most Criminal Intelligence activities. As many know, I consider that the activities of Public or Citizen Security that do not have a consolidated, professional, firm and entrenched structure in the Rights and Guarantees of citizens, will never be able to give a true technical response to security problems. in any of its dimensions.

## Analysis and decision making

As stated above, Public or Citizen Security requires intelligence and strategic planning. In addition to the increased requirements to improve resource efficiency, transparency and accountability, a number of external and personal influencing factors affect decision makers, as presented in the graph below:



*Graph External and personal influences on decision makers Source: Ratcliffe (2016: 118).*

Today's Public or Citizen Security decision-makers have to live with the fact that a wide range of influencing factors affect their daily work and their key decisions. Quality police management, including decision making, requires quality analytics products and expert analysts who can help middle and senior management provide tailored reports. Since most decisions in this area directly affect people's lives, and since all law enforcement officers are accountable for their actions<sup>1</sup>, the information base for their decisions becomes especially important. These facts still emphasize the relevance of ILP as a managerial decision-making framework.

Although analysts should always build their analytical findings on a neutral assessment and evaluation, they should have a sense of the decision maker's environment, including potential legal, political, organizational, and financial constraints. This should be taken into account when developing and presenting recommendations. It is useless for analysts to come up with recommendations that are clearly not suitable for clients or that are beyond their reach.

### **Levels of Criminal Intelligence mechanisms**

ILP requires organizational structures, administrative and decision-making procedures, and communication mechanisms between all levels. Here we will try to see intelligence mechanisms (units / departments / agencies) that support the execution of ILP. One of the key tasks of the Criminal Intelligence mechanism at each level is to provide management structures with analysis and evaluation to make informed decisions.

#### **Local Criminal Intelligence Mechanism (at police station / police station level)**

The Intelligence mechanism at the local level covers crimes, criminals and security problems that affect the basic unit of police command at the community level or police station / police station. Depending on the size and structure, each local level should have a Criminal Intelligence unit or team responsible for all relevant operational Criminal Intelligence tasks at their level. It is evident that this is subject to the realities of each Police Institution, it is very likely that at the Provincial level it is not very likely that each Police Station will have a Criminal Intelligence unit, but in the Departmental Headquarters or Regional Units. Without prejudice to the reality of each Country, the unit must be headed by a Chief Officer or Superior who holds the same rank as the Heads of the Operational and Investigative Units at the local level (as appropriate, Police Station, Departmental, etc.).

Local Criminal Intelligence supports local planning, operations and investigations. More specifically:

- supports general operational policing services to address everyday crime and maintain public safety and order at the local or Police Station/Precinct level;
- provides analytical support to investigations at the local Police Station / Police Station level;
- provides police records, databases and Criminal Intelligence processes with data and information;
- sends relevant data, information and intelligence to the Regional and/or National Criminal Intelligence departments for further processing;
- conducts and presents analyzes and risk assessments for local events; Y
- provides analytical support to local crime prevention.

#### **Regional Criminal Intelligence Mechanism**

In the model proposed by the OSCE, the Regional Criminal Intelligence area covers tasks that affect more than one basic police command unit. As we have seen, this is subject to the reality of each Country, where it can arise that, in States of Federal Systems, the National Level has its own Units at the Provincial Level, that is, its Regionals, and that the Regionals of a Province are Units that conglomerate the departmental ones. In either case, the key tasks and responsibilities are the identification of common regional criminal threats, the sharing of appropriate information, and the provision of capacities and resources to support activities at the local and regional level. The Regional Criminal Intelligence Unit should be at the same level and headed by the same rank as the regional heads of operations and investigations.

The Regional Criminal Intelligence Unit (whether Division, Department or Directorate) supports the local Criminal Intelligence units upon request. Its main function is to support planning, operations and investigations at the regional level. More specifically:

- develops and implements annual Regional Criminal Intelligence plans;
- systematically collects relevant data, information and intelligence at the regional level and sends them to a centralized regional database, accessible to the Centralized Criminal Intelligence entity (National level) in each country (hereinafter referring to the OSCE model we use the acronym NCID -National Criminal Intelligence Department-);
- sends relevant data, information and intelligence reports to the local and national levels;
- conducts strategic analyzes and evaluations to support decision-making and management planning at the regional level;
- supports regional crime prevention; Y
- supports investigations and operations against regional and cross-border crime, including transnational organized crime.

#### **Criminal Intelligence Mechanism at the National/Central level**

The NCID must be located within the National Public or Citizen Security headquarters. For some countries, the NCID would be under the purview of the Ministry of Security or Secretary of Security, it should have a Director at the National level who is responsible for the entire Intelligence process and said Area should be made up of personnel from the various Federal Forces or Corps Police according to the reality and government model of each country. In the case of Argentina (my country) that responsibility would fall on the National Directorate of Criminal Intelligence.

The main role of the NCID, according to the OSCE model, is to develop intelligence reports to support decision-making in the fight against serious national threats, in particular transnational organized crime, terrorism and Violent Extremism and Radicalization leading to Terrorism ( VERLT for its acronym in English). Although this is a base, I remember that it is the OSCE model that contains the concerns about threats that are their own, so the VERLT is not something very developed in all the countries of the New World. Key responsibilities include:

- develop and implement an annual national criminal intelligence plan;
- write and present a national serious and organized crime threat assessment.
- Drafting and presentation of other strategic evaluations to support the management and planning of Public or Citizen Security at the national level;
- provide criminal intelligence support at the regional level;
- establish standards and coordinate criminal intelligence work within the country;
- act as the National point of contact with foreign authorities and organizations regarding criminal intelligence work; Y
- conduct research and strive for professional development at local, regional and national levels2.

Notwithstanding the previously exposed detail, at this level they can and should also incorporate prioritization in operations and investigations, certainly generate accountability documents, identify information gaps at all levels and last but not least understand in the identification of the needs of technical and financial resources for the materialization of the annual strategic plans.

Ideally, the NCID should be its own entity made up of or made up of multiple Security Forces and Police Forces, with experts from various areas of knowledge, each expert having access to the information and databases of their institution, and permitted by law share data and information with the staff of other agencies/institutions represented in the NCID. Depending on the structures of the security sector in each country, the following State authorities could be represented within the NCID (in a variety of ways, from meeting elements with operational and non-organic dependence, to the figure of liaisons):

- Security Force and/or Border Police
- Prison Authorities
- Customs
- Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)
- Coast Guard and/or Maritime Police
- Intelligence and Security Agencies
- Police Forces
- Fiscal authorities

### **Tasks and Coordination Meetings.**

Several OSCE participating States have developed proactive, intelligence-led decision-making mechanisms, commonly referred to as "task and coordination meetings", "leadership and coordination meetings" or "information exchange meetings". Task and coordination meetings are held at three levels: local, regional and national. Its primary purpose is to: bring together relevant law enforcement representatives at every level to make decisions about plans, prioritization, operations, and investigations, based on analysis and evaluation documents; identify information/intelligence gaps to address; and decide on the allocation of financial and human resources. This configuration is at the heart of ILP, as it translates the results of analysis into management procedures, making decision making more informed, intelligence-driven, transparent and accountable. In addition, the creation of Criminal Intelligence mechanisms that serve for decision-making at each level allows the administration to prioritize tasks according to the threats identified and evaluated, and allocate the financial, human and other resources available for that prioritization. . Identifying intelligence gaps, intelligence requirements and the analysis tasks of the Departments / Units to meet these requirements is also an important task of the decision-making meetings at each level. To ensure the flow of information and coordination between

levels, the highest political authority with direct competence (Minister / Secretary) or another representative of the next lower level participates in the above meetings.

This guide suggests that task and coordination meetings be divided into strategic task and coordination meetings and operational task and coordination meetings.

### **Strategic Task and Coordination Meetings**

As the name implies, these meetings should focus on strategic issues and are held much less frequently than the operational ones, usually twice a year or every three months. In some countries, Strategic Tasks and Coordination meetings are held at all three levels, but more commonly, only at the central/national level. These meetings should focus on strategic planning and setting strategic priorities and goals, based on strategic analysis and threat assessments, as well as organizational business planning and budget cycles. It is recommended that Strategic Tasking and Coordination meetings determine and prioritize national intelligence, prevention, and enforcement requirements, based on the results of strategic analysis and threat assessments. Having made these sets of decisions, these meetings should decide on the resources needed to implement the strategic options.

### **Operational Tasks and Coordination Meetings**

OCSE guidance recommends that operational ILP decision-making mechanisms take place at all three levels once a week or every two weeks. The Operational and Investigation Chiefs or Commands must attend to them together with the Chiefs or Commands of the Criminal Intelligence area and the relevant Analysis Unit, as well as other experts if necessary. It is recommended that the highest ranking Operational Chief or Senior Officer lead each meeting. Depending on the national/regional/local levels and circumstances, operational tasks and coordination meetings are primarily responsible for: turning strategic plans into action plans, fulfilling requirements, priorities and resources; evaluate new or updated operational intelligence reports and make decisions about new investigations or operational activities, or closing or combining activities; identify information and intelligence gaps and assign Criminal Intelligence Units to close them; and monitor ongoing operational progress.

### **Training and awareness.**

One of the premises with which I most identify is about the 3 pillars of Training or Training in the most general context, which are Repetition, Repetition and Repetition, for which I will not tire of indicating that Training is a key factor for progress in any organization. When planning and implementing ILP, it is essential to develop a training plan and conduct coordinated training of all law enforcement agencies. All staff members are expected to learn not only the skills necessary for their performance, but also to understand the roles of other members in contributing to the overall results of ILP. Through training, staff must understand ILP, how the intelligence process works, what and how to contribute to the process, and how to use it. The culture of information exchange must be a special focus within the training for all levels. In addition, the training must include legal requirements related to the functions of ILP and the relevant international data protection and human rights standards to an appropriate degree according to the level and functions of the officials.

### **high level awareness**

As highlighted above, high-level Political support and Government commitment to ILP are prerequisites for successful implementation. This requires increased awareness at higher levels, including among Politicians, Government Officials in all relevant Ministries and State Agencies, Attorneys General and other key representatives of the Public Prosecution Service, and high-level management of all Law Enforcement Agencies and Services. the law.

### **Training of leadership and management of law enforcement.**

The main objective of this training is to demonstrate how the ILP framework and analysis, in particular, can help Policymakers and Law Enforcement leaders in their decision making and planning. Successful leadership training will result in a higher level of understanding of the potential of ILP, how to assign tasks to analysts, and how to use analytics products in strategic and operational planning and decision making. Such training should also provide decision-makers with an understanding of relevant international and national data protection and human rights standards, as well as potential human rights issues that may arise in ILP and how they may be addressed.

### **Analyst training.**

This training is commonly divided into strategic and operational analysis training, in line with the two main categories of analysis. Analysts must undergo the most complex training to understand the role and functions of crime analysis within the law enforcement and legislative framework and the legal requirements that apply to different methods of information collection, as well as to share and use information. The development of skills and competencies in collecting and structuring data and information and in conducting detailed analyses, drawing conclusions and presenting recommendations should also be integrated into the training. In addition, analyst training covers: report writing skills; collaboration between analysts and researchers, and between analysts and decision makers; analysis methods, tools, techniques and analysis software; information sources; evaluation codes; and legal frameworks, human rights and police ethics related to all these tasks. Training can be presented in several phases and for different levels.

### **Researcher training.**

The investigations include operational intelligence work. Therefore, investigators must undergo appropriate ILP training before beginning work on investigations. Investigator training should include an introduction to operational analysis and how it can support criminal investigations, as well as cooperation between analysts and investigators.

### **Uniformed Police Training**

The uniformed police are in direct contact with the public and with people involved in crimes and, therefore, represent a valuable source of information for the intelligence sector. All uniformed officers must receive general training on the ILP and its main components, including their responsibilities within the ILP model.

### **cadet training**

ILP training should already be introduced during basic police training. It is particularly important to clarify all the basic concepts within the ILP framework to avoid any unnecessary mystification around Criminal Intelligence matters. Efforts should be made to introduce Criminal Intelligence work as part of normal police activities, an attractive area for future Police Officers and Cadres.

As we are seeing in this new installment, the process of implementing an ILP model is much more than completing a series of spreadsheets and filling in forms with tables. It is a cultural process, which impacts both the uniformed personnel, their middle and upper management, as well as the political leadership at all levels. Once again, training processes become a key element for all development, not only from the perspective of knowledge but also as an element of awareness and agglutination of ideas and processes.

Certainly the ILP model based on the OSCE has brought significant results, in future articles I will explore some practical cases and models in progress.

### **Ulysses Leon Kandiko**

(Argentina) Degree in Security, graduated from the University Institute of the Argentine Federal Police. Professor of the IUPFA in the Security Sciences career, analyst, Director of Air Planning of the Ministry of Security of the Province of Buenos Aires. Specialist in cyberterrorism and criminal intelligence.

# Somalia, with foreign guests

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



*Terrorists from the al-Shabbab group in Somalia.*

Once again and forcefully, the Somali fundamentalist group al-Shabbab has shown signs that it is still active and in a position to carry out major operations, despite having carried out low-intensity actions in recent months, such as the attack on 11 December to a military camp near the capital, in which four civilians and one soldier died. The day before, the SYL hotel, in the city of Mogadishu, the Somali capital, frequently used by members of the government, journalists and foreign visitors, had been attacked for the fourth time since 2015, in which three civilians were killed.

In the attack on Saturday, December 28, a truck loaded with explosives, driven by a shahid (martyr), detonated in front of the police post known as "Ex-control Afgoye", one of the most important and busy points of access to Mogadishu, from the routes that go to the south of the country. The attack that left at least 93 dead, 128 wounded and 25 missing, occurred at eight in the morning, the hour of greatest traffic congestion. This attack, in which 16 Mogadiscia

Banadir University students who were traveling on a bus also died, becomes the most important since the one that took place on October 14, 2017, in which 587 people died, 228 were injured, 56 disappeared (See: Somalia on the brink of everything) This latest attack shows the organization's ability to infiltrate the city, escaping all controls, a truck loaded with explosives and take it to one of the most guarded points in the capital.

On Monday the 30th, the official spokesman for the Wahhabi organization, Ali Mohamud Rageh, alias Ali Dhere from the clandestine Radio Andalus, the group's radio station, acknowledged responsibility for the new attack and reported that the objective of the operation was a Turkish convoy and the troops of the security forces escorting him. And although he lamented the death of civilians, he also justified it by saying: "The defense of religion comes before saving a life." In the same address as the terrorist organization's statement, Somali President Mohamed Farmajo Abdullahi blamed the Mujahideen, accusing

them of their efforts to kill civilians and children. Those of "al-Shabbab do not build, they destroy. They don't build schools, they don't build health centers, they don't feed children. They are hired to prevent progress and kill the people and children of Somalia."

The contingent of Turkish workers attacked, from which two engineers died, was devoted to a road construction project, in its statement al-Shabbab, says that in reality they were dedicated to the training of the Somali security forces, with the pretense final, by Ankara, to seize the natural resources of the country.

It is true that since 2015, Turkish President Recep Erdogan has launched a diplomatic offensive on the Horn of Africa country, which not only includes the creation of a four square kilometer military training center with three residential complexes, located in the coastal area Jaziira, south of Mogadishu, inaugurated in September 2017, where two hundred Turkish army personnel provide military training and equipment to periodic batches of

1,500 Somali recruits, but also their equipment. In addition, Turkey is developing plans for the reconstruction of roads, buildings and hospitals. Some of the victims were transported to Turkey, and after the latest attack Qatar also sent a military plane to evacuate 22 seriously wounded to Doha.

Although al-Shabbab acknowledged responsibility for last Saturday's attack, the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) reported the following Monday that there were indications that the massacre was planned by a foreign country, so the authorities have requested cooperation from international intelligence agencies. The NISA avoided giving signals about which was the country involved in the attack. The security agency's report was made known after the Turkish official newspaper Yeni Safak assured, without mentioning the source, that it was the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia who were behind the attack. It is important to point out that both Ankara, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, have a serious dispute over conflicting commercial interests in Somalia and other parts of Africa, which is being seriously verified in Libya, where they support each of the two blocs militarily. rivals, fighting for total control of the Mediterranean country.

The denunciation of the Somali intelligence agency did nothing but heat up the opposition, who

accused NISA of "misleading the public". Abdirahman Abdishakur, of the Wadajir Party, declared that with this diffuse information: "not only is the government's failure deceived and it is attempted to be concealed, but also the blame is diverted from those responsible, clearly collaborating with the terrorists."

Beyond the responsibilities of international powers in the African country, everything tends to get worse, since by 2021, the presence of peacekeepers from AMISOM, the African Union mission in Somalia, with a presence since 2007, will end and composed of a fluctuating amount of 20 thousand men from the armies of Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia and Kenya.

#### **United States attacks**

Meanwhile, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) on Sunday 29, carried out three new air strikes in Somalia in response to the bombing in Mogadishu in the Lower Shabelle region, in the south of the country. Two of the attacks reportedly killed two militants and destroyed some vehicles in the city of Kunyo Barrow. The third shelling killed another two mujahideen in Aliyow Barrow village. Some sources have assured that among the dead would be an important figure of the fundamentalist organization. Air strikes coordinated by AFRICOM seem to have the "prodigious" characteristic

of never involving civilian casualties.

The group continues with a strong presence in vast regions of the center and south of the country, despite the fact that the United States, since the inauguration of President Donald Trump, and which declared the Somali south as an "area of active hostilities", has carried out a significant number of aerial actions against terrorist targets, without succeeding in subduing the group that in 2010, made its bayaan or oath of allegiance to al-Qaeda and has between 5 and 9 thousand combatants, who despite being strongly rooted in rural areas, since 2015 they have carried out 11 attacks with more than 20 deaths in Mogadishu, all with car or truck bombs.

For his part, according to the commander of the 16th Somali Special Forces Unit, Ismail Abdi Malik, who operate in Lower Shebelle, on Tuesday the 31st, they managed to kill twenty militants. Furthermore, his forces managed to expel the insurgents from many villages during the operation, such as Mordinle, Bula Maskin, Faqayle and Bula Bashir.


Somalia, which, according to its authorities, will have to hold general elections in 2020, is facing a year that is perhaps even more complex than the previous ones, due to the increasingly urgent interests of foreign guests.

Image Source:

<https://world.sputniknews.com/africa/201903191086158035-al-shabab-attack-near-mogadishu/>

# Qassem Suleimani, who will stop death?

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



*Iranian General Qassem Suleimani, assassinated on the orders of Donald Trump.*

Since the assassination of Iranian General Qassem Suleimani, in a concerted action between the United States and Israel, became known, the world has been left in a tense attitude of waiting. We all know that something is going to happen, although no one knows when, where, or how.

These questions open up the possibility of hundreds of answers. Mainly if the diplomatic capacity and the possibility of pressure from nations such as Russia or France, can contain, on the one hand, the very justified punitive desires of the Iranian government, as promised by its president, Hassan Rohaní, and the supreme leader of the nation, the Ayatollah. Ali Khamenei, the two highest

authorities in the country; On the other hand, if Vladimir Putin, and Emanuel Macron, can reduce the homicidal madness, at best electoralist, of Donald Trump, who has not stopped threatening after having recognized that he is the mastermind behind the assassination.

But in the crisis, which has escalated to unknown levels in the already very conflictive relationship between Tehran and Washington, since the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, many other factors of interest play a role that could accelerate the factors that intervene at this crossroads, beyond of the decisions of the two involved.

In the attack on the Baghdad airport, the drone that fired the

missile at the official convoy in which the general was travelling, not only cunningly assassinated a high-ranking soldier and part of his entourage, including Abu Mahdi Muhandis, the leader of the Falange Hezbollah, but also killed a living legend with millions of followers not only in Iran, but also in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq and many other Islamic countries, mainly among the younger sectors of those societies that they saw in the charismatic Suleimani, a figure to follow summoned for his integrity, his integrity, leadership skills and personal courage, achieved on the battlefield personally commanding the platoons of the al-Quds force, an elite body of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard ( IRGC),

becoming one of the key figures for the defeat of Daesh in Syria and Iraq. The political projection of the general, outside the strictly military sphere, left him as a number placed to reach the presidency of the Persian nation, if he had considered it after his retirement from the armed forces. Therefore, beyond the will and interests of Tehran, always very discreet when executing its few operations outside its borders, armed groups with a high level of training and operations such as the Yemeni Houthis movement, the armed wing of the party Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah or the Falange Hezbollah, which operates in Syria and Iraq that also lost its leader, without direct control of Iran, could take revenge on the United States, for the crime, while among the men commanded by General Soleimani, if a sufficiently categorical act of compensation is not officially produced by the Iranian authorities, they could try it autonomously, they have the capacity to plan a major punitive operation, which would force Trump to respond and from there to war open there would be a step.

But it is not only the lethal admirers of General Suleimani, who could accelerate the conflict, the United States throughout its history and particularly in the Trump era, who have known how to reap too much hatred or for strictly geostrategic interests, a false flag attack, perfectly in any large capital, whether they are embassies, consulates, American or Zionist community, commercial or cultural entities, or against their own officials who are thousands around the world, materially impossible to monitor all of them efficiently and in a time that could be very long, the list of those organizations that could be planning an attack of these

characteristics is too long, but among the main ones there are undoubtedly internal elements of the US government itself, including the CIA, let us remember that in impeachment, to which Trump is being subjected, originates from not-so-anonymous complaints from an agent of "the comp year". To these must be added other sectors that are very displeased with Trump, due to his erratic policies in handling the wars he is waging abroad, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Libya, the Sahel and some others that are never lacking, without forgetting the Mossad's friends, his snubbed al-Qaeda or Daesh partners and even Trump's own decision, to place himself in the position of victim and act with his hands free, an old US policy since the outbreak of Maine in Havana Bay in 1898. Spilling blood of their own to the United States has been a good business to start new wars.

### **The battles to come**

With Trump's absurd decision to assassinate General Suleimani, anti-American sentiments have been given a new Che Guevara, who will be raised every time there is a lawsuit against Washington anywhere in the world, as has happened since 1967 with the legendary Argentine -Cuban. In addition to subjecting the American people to a new period of concern and alert, where anything can happen at any time, as the Boeings of September 11 have already made it more than clear. Every North American who dares to undertake a trip outside its borders knows that their head can have a price in any sordid alley of Karachi, in the cheerful Tuscan countryside or in Montevideo's Brito del Pino.

To prevent this from being true, Trump has no alternatives, he

must continue to strike, which is to continue adding deaths and hatred, in recent hours new attacks against targets in Iraq, the first against a convoy of an Iraqi Shiite militia, which probably outside the Popular Mobilization Forces (FMP), also known as al-Hashd al-Sha'abi; although this information was not verified. The attack near the Taji camp, north of Baghdad, left five dead and three wounded, whose identities were not released, although it is believed that a religious leader and some assistants were traveling. The second attack occurred near the city of Mosul, 400 kilometers from Baghdad, of which no casualties or material damage were reported.

This type of attack, which will be repeated again, shows that the ruddy genocidal has locked himself in a labyrinth that he has built with his own ineptitude and from which he will not be able to get out, beyond the fact that he can surely win the elections next November, if He evades impeachment, which seems very possible and if the clumsiness of last Friday does not generate an anti-American wave that could produce some of his own deaths and attacks on US interests and assets abroad.

The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, announces that General Suleimani will be replaced by Brigadier General Ismail Ghaani, commander of the Revolutionary Guards, a veteran of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), and one of the men closest to the extinct general.

While the twangy, screeching, mannered voice of Trump continues to harass the world announcing more threats, now against targets inside Iran, 52, to be more exact, in "tribute" to the number of prisoners captured after the takeover of the American

embassy in Tehran in the days of the Revolution.

Neither the United Nations nor the European Union have made

their voices heard after the assassination of General Qassem Suleimani and they watch from a distance as if this party did not

involve them, although it will not be precisely them, as always, who can stop death.

Image Source:

<https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2020/01/03/el-dia-en-el-que-qassem-soleimani-si-managed-to-escape-from-an-air-attack/>

# War Operations in the Strait of Hormuz

By Pablo Escalante, Military Aviation Officer (Venezuela)



*Iranian Raad 3rd Khordad anti-aircraft system, domestically manufactured.*

One of the most important geostrategic regions on the globe is undoubtedly the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian Gulf with the Indian Ocean and through which a third of the oil produced in the world passes. This strait has witnessed actions including attacks on ships, seizure of tankers and shooting down of drones.

Part of a series of "war operations" was the recent US provocation towards Iran, in an escalation of tensions that took place on Thursday, June 20, 2020, when Donald Trump ordered an attack on certain targets, but decided to stop them minutes later. before because it compromised many civilian casualties, according to his advisers, after the shooting down of a Northrop Grumman RQ-4A Global Hawk - BAMS-D (Broad Area Maritime Surveillance) Drone, when it was operating, according to US sources, in international waters of the Strait of Hormuz.

The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) reported that it was a violation of its airspace, so it operated its anti-aircraft system according to defense protocols, since the drone turned off its transponders, as a clear sign that he was conducting espionage operations, gathering intelligence on his way back by discreetly turning toward the port of Chabahar.

The drone's departure point was at midnight from a US airbase in the southern Persian Gulf. At

approximately 4:04 a.m. on its way back, it entered Iranian airspace, triggering the 3-Khordad air defense system developed entirely by Iran, and equipped with the Sayyad-2 missile.

Subsequently, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, published on his Twitter account several images with the maps indicating the maritime jurisdictional limits, the drone's flight paths, the warning points and the point of demolition. Until now, the US has not denied said information nor has it published its evidence indicating the contrary.

It was also commented that the drone was followed by a P-8 Poseidon plane, with a crew of 35 people and equipped with electronic espionage technology, which was not hooked as a target, since it was decided not to shoot it down.

This fact has several readings, on the one hand, Iran sent a clear message to the US and Israel, that it is equipped with missile technology capable of dealing with stealthy enemies, by testing its Khordad 3 system, incorporated four years ago, whose range is between 50 and 74 km. and a maximum height of 30 km. Since one of the main defenses of the RQ-4 drone is its flight ceiling of 19 km, which makes it unattainable for many SAM systems.

There is a rivalry between Iran and Israel, since cooperation between the two nations ceased in the

1980s when Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Shah of Iran was overthrown by the Islamic Revolution on February 11, 1979. Even more so when Iran recently declared that it would erase from the face of the earth to Israel, this has moved the pieces of the regional chessboard, Trump's decision to abandon the JCPOA (nuclear agreement) in 2018, in clear support of Israel, the transfer of its embassy to Jerusalem, as well as the hardening of sanctions, are signs that the US is taking seriously the idea of a war with Iran, however, this has had its detractors in US public opinion. Trump is now caught between Republicans demanding a response to the drone crash, and Democrats in Congress who warn the president could lose control of the situation and lead the United States into war.

There is an old saying that says "Dog that barks does not bite" logic indicates that the US and Israel will not let Iran develop its nuclear potential, since it would change the balance of the region and the Muslim world would expand with the imminent danger to Israel, key partner and recipient of millions of US dollars, to ensure a "competitive military advantage"

In November 2020 will be the presidential elections in the US, in 2011 Trump described Obama as weak and ineffective accusing him of trying to start a war with Iran to win elections. We do not know if this is part of an electoral strategy, the truth is that war operations in the Persian Gulf are increasing.

Image Source:

<https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/iran-s-raad-3rd-khordad-long-range-missile-system-responsible-for-downing-220-million-american-drone-implications-of-the-successful-combat-test>

Paul Escalante

(Venezuela) Engineer and Colonel of the Active Reserve of the Bolivarian Military Aviation.

*Editor's Note:* This article predates the assassination of Iranian General Qassem Suleimani, so the event is not mentioned. The article was on the waiting list for publication when events took hold.

# India: Modi in tune with Trump

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)



*Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India.*

While the world has been waiting expectantly for the resolution of the crisis between Iran and the United States, after the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, where all the cards are on the table, (See: Qassem Suleimani, who will stop death?), the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, seeking to distract public opinion in his country and internationally, to advance on the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), with the prior development of a National Registry of Citizens (NRC), which censuses the entire population, registering particularly non-Hindus.

Said amendment tries to modify the citizenship law in force since 1955, in which it prohibited illegal migrants to apply for citizenship, for which now it will be allowed that immigrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan or Bangladesh, of Hindu origin, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians, those who could be persecuted in those nations, with vast Muslim majorities, can apply for Indian citizenship, so

they will have to prove that they belong to any of the aforementioned minorities, from which the Rohingyas, refugees are excluded. from Tibet and Sri Lanka.

This amendment has not been designed to receive new foreign migrants, but rather, fundamentally, to leave thousands of Muslim citizens without an identity, who despite having been born in the country, and even many of them coming from families settled several generations ago in India, they will not be able to prove their Indian origin, given the precarious conditions or the lack of knowledge of this obligation on the part of the inhabitants of many isolated rural areas in the depths of the country, so that they could register the birth of their children, by the that as of the validity of the CAA, they may be expelled from the country, without further ado and at the discretion of the New Delhi authorities.

How we have highlighted (See: India, between civil war or

genocide) the articulation of the law has overheated the already very conflictive relationship between the Muslim community, some 200 million citizens, and the ultra-nationalist government of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), producing hundreds of important demonstrations in different parts of the country, which have already produced at least 22 deaths, hundreds of injuries and thousands of detainees.

Like a night robber, appealing to international distraction attentive to the new crisis in the Middle East, Modi continues to generate new factors of conflict against the Muslim population, now dusting off an old conflict with Bangladesh, a country of nearly 170 million inhabitants., whose 90 percent are Muslim and almost seven percent profess Hinduism, the religious majority of India, with which to buy one of the longest borders in the world: 4,156 kilometers.

Relations between New Delhi and Dhaka have always been

surrounded by private Indian interests. During its war of independence from Pakistan (1971) it had the support of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who was decisively involved in the context of the always complex and tense relations that both nations have maintained since the partition in 1947 until today -now both nuclear powers-, these countries fought wars in 1947, 1965, 1971 to which countless border roses are added in the Kashmir region, the last One of these periodic crises occurred in February 2019, reaching an escalation that put them on the brink of a new war

During the conflict between East Pakistan, today Bangladesh, and West Pakistan, Indian interference was absolute throughout the almost ten months that the war lasted. Indira ordered the opening of the borders to receive the civilian population, establishing refugee camps in the states of West Bengal, Bihar Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura, which were used by India and the high command of the East Pakistan Army to recruit and to train the future militias of the Mukti Bahini in Bengali, "Fighters for Freedom", a paramilitary organization created by the foreign intelligence agency of India, the RAW (Research and Analysis Wing), which was already operating in East Pakistan, attacking Islamabad interests.

The Mukti Bahini used terror, murder, torture and mass rape as a weapon of war. It is believed that around 400,000 women were raped by their militiamen in that year and that between 100 and 150,000 Biharis, an ethnic group minority group also known as "stranded Pakistanis", were killed around the same time.

India received nearly 10 million Bangladeshis, many of

whom never returned to their country and whose descendants, along with millions of other Indian Muslims, are today threatened by the application of the CAA. In many places in India the term Bangladeshi is associated with an illegal immigrant.

### **Bangladesh a good excuse**

In the current context of India, the Bangladeshi Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, is not finding it easy to maintain an overly diplomatic stance while supporting the rise of anti-Indian voices in her country, which have treated Hasina as "soft". , for his actions before the Modi government.

Despite the fact that before the amendment was approved on December 11, the Bangladesh Foreign Minister, AK Abdul Momen, and the Interior Minister, Asaduzzaman Khan, had canceled their previously scheduled trips to India. Delhi did not want to hear that message so its Foreign Ministry spokesman said "that the cancellations and the enactment of the CAA were not linked".

On the first day of this year, the Bangladeshi authorities ordered its four mobile telecommunications operators to shut down their networks along the border, arguing that it was being done "for the security of the country, given the current circumstances." ", although the decision lasted barely 18 hours, since Dhaka re-established communications, for fear of deepening the rift with New Delhi, although government officials interpreted that the message had been heard by India and that it was evident that the CAA, it was no longer an internal matter of his neighbor.

Meanwhile, it has become known that the government of Bangladesh has demanded from India a document in which it would commit to "not send immigrants across the border" after the enactment of the CAA, to which India has not responded until now. now.

Dhaka's concern is that in only one, Assam, of the five Indian states that borders Bangladesh, it has been known that, after the August 30 census, or NRC, they were excluded from Indian nationality, almost two million persons. Which would be impossible for Bangladesh, which is already burdened with just over a million Rohingyas, who, fleeing the Burmese genocide, entered through the eastern border in the last three years.

To add further concern to the tense India-Bangladeshi border, it has become known that a confusing episode took place at a Border Security Force (BSF) post in Meghalaya, (India) about five kilometers from the border, in which According to Indian sources, an unidentified group of Bangladeshi use 15, attacked two jawans (gendarmes) of the BSF who after beating, took away their weapons, which were found hours later in a nearby forest. Another group would also have looted a resident of Meghalaya, who was robbed of money, mobile phones and a gun.

This apparently inconsequential episode has a precedent that occurred ten days earlier in the same sector, when another unidentified group attacked a car after which they escaped with some of the occupants' belongings.

Although these facts are insignificant, compared to the hours that are lived in the Middle East, they clearly mark Modi's policies, with respect to his

Muslim neighbors, which could generate a conflict in line with what Trump wants to unleash in the Gulf. Persian.

Image Source:

<https://www.rcinet.ca/en/2014/05/16/narendra-modi-will-be-the-next-prime-minister-of-india/>

# Afghanistan, a neutral space for the Iranian-American war

By Guadi Calvo (Argentina)

In the tense situation in relations between Iran and the United States, since the assassination of General Qassem Suleimani (See Qassem Suleimani, who will stop death?), the rocket attacks on US bases in Iraq, the new sanctions of Donald Trump to the Persian country, the North American refusal to withdraw the almost six thousand men that it has stationed in Iraqi territory, despite what was voted unanimously by the parliament in Baghdad, must be added the accidental shooting down of the Ukrainian plane that left 176 dead, a circumstance that leaves open all possibilities for the deepening of the war escalation to unsuspected limits.

In this framework, it will be necessary to focus on Afghanistan, again Afghanistan, always and a thousand times Afghanistan, since in the Central Asian country,

into account that Afghanistan and Iran share a 960 kilometer border.

This reality has put the Kabul government on alert, which not only fears that once again the peace talks with the Taliban will stall, which had reached a point of concretion never before reached, but that their territory will be a favorable field for a military confrontation between Tehran and Washington, despite the fact that Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has conspicuously stayed out of the dispute between his neighbor and his main "partner" in the war against the Taliban.

In a statement signed by President Ghani, a few hours into the conflict, he clarified: "The government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan assures the people and its neighbors that, in accordance with the security agreement with the United States, the territory of Afghanistan will under no circumstances be used against another country", an announcement that was also

and Secretary of Defense Mark Thomas Esper.

Despite the fact that General Austin Scott Miller, the main commander of the United States in Afghanistan, has demanded discretion from his officers, it was learned that they are discussing what types of operations, mainly aerial, could be carried out against Iran from Afghanistan and the possible responses to Iran.

Despite the long American presence in Afghan territory, which Iran has always seen as a latent threat, the ayatollahs' diplomacy has been particularly contemplative and pragmatic, which while respecting the tangled and deep political, cultural and economic ties between the two Asian nations. Tehran has allowed almost five million Afghan refugees, who have fled to its territory, in almost fifty years of conflicts, revolutions and wars, to settle without too many inconveniences, in different areas of the country such as the capital, Zabol, capital of the Iranian Baluchistan, Mashhad the second most populous of the



Washington still maintains some 13,000 troops ready to go into operations immediately, taking

communicated by telephone to Iranian President Hassan Rohani, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo

Persian country located in the northwest of the country and in different camps near the border, for which the Afghan government

must necessarily maintain a line of non-intervention, since Tehran's decision to expelling the Afghan refugees would further exacerbate the country's deep social conflict, as well as the security conflict.

But many of these refugees, Shia Hazara Afghans, it is estimated up to 50,000 formed what is known as the Liwa Fatemiyoun, (Flag Brigade of Fatima) or the Afghan Hezbollah, created precisely at the behest of General Soleimani, in 2014, which together to the al-Quds Force of the martyr general, they had a decisive action in the war against Daesh in Syria, whose main mission was to protect the holy sites.

For their part, some Afghan politicians such as Hamid Karzai, president for 13 years, supported by the essential support of the United States, described General Suleimani as a "worthy man", condemning the attack on January 3, and Mohammed Hanif Atmar, former national security adviser who signed the strategic security agreement between Afghanistan and the United States, also praised the assassinated general and even Abdullah Abdullah, the second man in the country after Ghani, an ally of the United States, appeared at the Iranian embassy in Kabul where he gave his condolences and signed the commemorative book for General Suleimani.

### **Real possibilities?**

Richard Olson, a former US official in Afghanistan, considered that despite the many possible targets the United States has in the country, Iran will be more likely to attack elsewhere, possibly in Iraq, Syria or Lebanon, where the nation Islamic society has more support in the spheres of power.

Undoubtedly, if a prolonged but necessarily low-intensity conflict between the two nations materializes, the withdrawal, always announced and never materialized, of US troops from Afghanistan would be postponed

again, which in fact must have been postponed beyond the agreements that can be reached with the Taliban. An issue that in some way can play against President Trump in the face of the elections next November.

Regarding Iran and its presence in Afghanistan, it has never been conducive, much less since the Taliban came to power in the 1990s, viewing Mullah Omar's men as an enemy force oppressing the Shiites and deeply hostile to Iran. Remember that in 1998 in the Afghan city Mazar-e-Sharif, in the midst of the war between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance backed by Iran, led by the mythical Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Lion of Panjshir, the Iranian consulate was assaulted by a Taliban command where 10 Persian diplomats were assassinated along with a journalist from Iran's state news agency, bringing Iran to the brink of invading Afghanistan.

Following the US invasion in 2001, Tehran changed its attitude towards the mujahideen, whom it has financed at various times over the last 18 years. Even allowing some Taliban leaders along with their families to take refuge in Iranian territory, and they have even turned a blind eye by allowing smuggler gangs who collaborate with the financing of the insurgents to pass without too much inconvenience through their territory.

It is known that, in 2016, when the Taliban's supreme leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, was assassinated, he had begun to weave anti-American strategies together with the Iranians, which forced him to travel frequently from his refuge in Pakistan to Iran, where in several cities of the country the organization had offices, was hit by a missile fired from a North American drone, when he was returning from one of those trips.

This relationship makes US officials fear that in this new context, Iran will have a greater participation in the internal conflict in Afghanistan, and could even wreck the peace talks between

the Taliban, the Afghan government and the United States, contributing to the insurgents sophisticated weapons such as a type of portable anti-aircraft missile, used by the Taliban in recent years, causing serious damage to both Afghan troops and their commanders.

Given the current regional conditions, it is practically impossible, beyond any agreement that the United States reaches with the Taliban, that complies with one of the essential points of what was discussed, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country, essentially the North American ones, for which the Bagram Air Field, 50 kilometers from Kabul, and the Shindand Air Base, in the west of the country, would have to abandon their key points, whose retention, beyond the difficulties of a political nature, would entail many complications regarding the resupply of its facilities and troops, since it must be done using Pakistani airspace, which would put Islamabad on the brink of conflict with Iran, with whom it shares a 900-kilometer border occupied by the separatist province of Balochistan, always ready to complicate Islamabad.

A United States war against Iran using Afghan territory will unleash internal conflicts, not only because of how oiled the relations with Tehran of various Pakistani minorities and militias may be, but also because of the deep-seated hatred of many militants and even military leaders against Washington, which they could react against their own government.

Late on Saturday, January 11, it became known that two US Army men died and two others were injured when the vehicle in which they were traveling along a route in southern Afghanistan stepped on an IED or Improvised Explosive Device, a Bad news for Trump, who will have to control his anger so as not to turn Afghanistan into a neutral space for his war with Iran.

# Russian Helicopters in the Colombian Army

By Douglas Hernandez (Colombia)



*Mi-17 helicopter at the service of the Colombian National Army.*

During the Cold War (1947-1989), the western-capitalist bloc led by the United States of America, held a political-ideological-economic confrontation with the eastern-communist bloc led by the Soviet Union (Russia). Each bloc had areas of influence and allies in different parts of the world. Although the powers never confronted each other directly, they were behind several important conflicts, mainly as providers of resources, weapons, training, advisors, etc. Each bloc tried to attract other governments to its circle, while the opposing bloc tried to prevent it, sometimes the situation became extremely tense leading to wars between third countries and civil wars.

The United States maintained that the American continent was for them an area of strategic influence, and for this reason it did everything possible to prevent the rise to power in this region of regimes affected by socialism/communism. Signing different defense agreements, among which the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) stands out, training/indoctrinating the region's military under the premises of "national security", and in many cases encouraging or favoring coups that deposed governments of a socialist nature or suspected of sympathizing with the Soviet Union or its allies.

Despite all the actions of the United States to prevent it, in Cuba (1959-present) and Nicaragua (1979-1990) two governments came to power that became allies of the USSR, and received all kinds of

props to keep them in power, including military supplies. But these two countries were not the only allies of the USSR in the region, nor the only ones endowed with non-Western weapons. In Peru, General Juan Velasco Alvarado took the Presidency of that country through a coup d'état, showing affection for the USSR. Among the most important measures during his government (1968-1975), he re-equipped the Armed Forces with weapons of Soviet origin, most of which are still in service.

Cuba and Nicaragua became satellites of the Soviet Union, and within their process of expanding communism, they supported different subversive movements in the region with weapons and training, including the armed groups of the extreme left in Colombia and Venezuela.

Under these conditions, the governments and, in particular, the military of the other Latin American countries, closed ranks to contain the threat. Generating a series of consequences, among them the aversion to military equipment of Russian origin, regardless of the fact that in many cases the equipment of the Eastern-communist bloc was better or cheaper, a rapprochement with the Soviets in this sense was unthinkable. This aversion, after the fall of the USSR, mutated into mistrust. Western governments and arms companies created the myth of the technical/technological inferiority of Russian armaments, which is only now fading away. Today,

different countries in Latin America use military equipment of Russian origin -including helicopters- with great success.

Today, it should be mentioned that although the Soviet Union disappeared, Russia is rebuilding (with great success) its position as a world power, and that one of its fronts of action is precisely the world arms market. On the other hand, the situation in Venezuela is noteworthy, because with the socialist/Chavista government, there has been a distancing from the West and Venezuela has attached itself to other poles of power, such as Russia, China, and Iran. It is precisely Venezuela, one of the main buyers of arms from these countries, including a large batch of Russian helicopters.

### **The Colombian case**

Despite being an ally of the United States for decades, and being in its "area of influence", the Government of Colombia had the fortitude to carry out a serious process for the acquisition of helicopters with which to provide its Aviation with the Army. In the midst of which, the Mi-17 1V model of Russian origin was favored, due to its technical and operational characteristics. Of these units, an initial batch of 10 units was purchased with its own resources, and over time -tested in combat- two additional batches were purchased.

Presidential Decree No. 1422 of 1995 orders the reactivation of the Aviation Arm of the Colombian Army. The same that had been deactivated by Law 102 of 1944. In 1996, an item of 108 million dollars was assigned to the Colombian Army to develop the Aviation Weapon. With this money, among other things, the Army's first 7 UH-60L helicopters were bought, and -surprisingly- also the first batch of 10 Mi-17 1V helicopters of Russian origin. Once these aircraft arrived in the country, the Army Aerotactic Battalion (BATCO) was formed to receive them.

The Mi-17 1V initially operated from Bogotá, at the facilities of a private company that also operates the aircraft. Later they were transferred to the Military Fort of Tolomaida, where they still have their headquarters.

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Army aviation has progressively been strengthened with the acquisition or transfer of new aircraft, both fixed-wing and rotary-wing, although most of the aircraft are Western models, the Colombian Army has carried out -with its own resources- the acquisition of two additional batches of Mi-17 helicopters, which speaks highly of their capabilities and performance against the multiple threats they must face.

The Colombian Mi-17 Helicopters are attached to the Air Assault Aviation Division of the National Army. There are three different versions, namely:

- Mi-17 1V, version of which 10 units were received in 1997, and whose registrations range from EJC-3375 to EJC-3384. Upgraded to version V5
- Mi-17 MD, of this version 6 units were received in the year 2001. Its license plates range from EJC-3385 to EJC-3390.
- Mi-17 V5, of these version 4 copies were received, whose license plates range from EJC-3391 to EJC-3399.

The EJC-375 and EJC-381 helicopters, of the Mi-17 1V model, with false registration HK-3733 and HK-3781, participated in the Check operation.

There is a gun version of the Mi-17 called the Predator. Which consists of the application of two semi-wings that carry two M-134 Minigun multi-tube machine guns, and two rocket launchers with a capacity for 7 70 mm rockets each.

It is curious that in Colombia the military fleet of Mi-17 helicopters of the National Army maintains high operational rates, when its government is not close to the Russian government, and the military doctrine is clearly Western. Apparently, this is due to the fact that there is a strong presence of private companies that have aircraft of Russian origin in their inventories and this has led Colombia to generate an infrastructure for logistics support, maintenance, training and repair, which is used by the army.

# Fuerzas Antiterroristas del Mundo

*Audentes Fortuna Iuvat*



## Colombia

### Joint Special Operations Command

The Joint Special Operations Command (CCOES) is the Joint Unit responsible for fulfilling the strategic objectives of the General Command of the Military Forces (CGFM), contributing significantly to the results obtained in the War Plans, carrying out Joint Special Operations against military objectives.

designated by the Ministry of National Defense, and in a complementary way in support of the operational plans of the Joint Commands and Major Operational Units (Divisions), throughout the national territory, to obtain the strategic advantage, facilitating the achievement of the objectives and interests nationals in compliance with constitutional legal precepts.



As a general reference, the history of Special Operations in Colombia offers a vision of growth and evolution of unique capabilities, which constitute an essential form of precise action and with strategic effects, integrating exceptional means and resources that are based on a tradition of discipline, mystique and military honor.

The history of the Joint Special Operations Command in particular dates back to 2002, in which the Ministry of National Defense, under the recommendation of the General Commander of the Armed Forces, summoned the Intelligence agencies in charge of monitoring the leaders of high level of the Farc, creating the initiative called "Cancerbero" (Ospina, 2014, p.545). This initiative would allow the formation of a joint and interagency work team, with the "General José María Córdova" Military School of Cadets as its first headquarters, to initiate a

process of accompanying and monitoring the information available in order to focus military efforts. to the location and military action against the command and control subsystem of the Farc.



Subsequently, after a continuous strengthening of the Intelligence production process and the monitoring of targets, thanks to the implementation of the highest technology and a human talent with extensive experience, some important results are achieved through its integration with the execution of special operations, but with limitations for their timely use, demonstrating the need to strengthen and optimize the integration between Intelligence and the operations process. For this reason, the Minister of National Defense, aware of the relevance of Intelligence and its role in an effective counterinsurgency strategy, and with the support of advisors from the United Kingdom, Israel and the permanent presence and advice of the United States, then to study successful models worldwide, and carry out a detailed analysis, according to which:

The objective was to achieve intelligence [sic] in real time that, once obtained, would turn into concrete operations in a very short time. Because what is the use of information about a guerrilla camp if, due to lack of coordination and speed, when the troops arrive it has already changed places? (Santos, 2009, p. 116). On this understanding, a one hundred and eighty degree (180°) turn is given to the strategy that was used in terms of the management of Intelligence and creates the National Group for Planning Special Operations and Intelligence through the "Transitory Directive 300-9 of 2007" (Joint Command of Special Operations, 2014, p. 58) and that would remain under the supervision of the General Commander of the Armed Forces, which was consolidated in 2008 as the Joint Special Operations Headquarters (JOEC) (Santos, 2009, pp. 117-118), with the main mission of ensuring that the information obtained is shared in a timely manner for its precise execution using Special Forces Units with joint and interagency support at the highest level.

Consequently, the JOEC then becomes a coordinating center that receives and processes intelligence on high-value targets, enabling the use of the available resources of the Armed Forces, the National Police and State Agencies to act decisively and effectively on a target with the best Intelligence available (Santos, 2009, p. 118). With success and perseverance under the strategic direction of the integration of Intelligence by the JOEC, important results are achieved, transcendental for the evolution of the Special Operations capacity. However, although this new organizational architecture allowed a dynamic interaction of information and its adequate link to operationalize it, the lack of autonomy and operational control of the special troops by the JOEC limited its complete integration.



Thus, in July 2008, a request was submitted to the Vice Ministry of Defense for Strategy and Planning (Joint Special Operations Command, 2014, p. 59), to articulate an external advisory process, with the support of the Operations Command. United States Special Operations (USSOCOM), in order to know in detail a model that would serve as a guide for the creation of a Special Operations Command in Colombia, which should have the capacity to integrate Intelligence as the JOEC did, and in turn had organic troops under its command and operational control to execute the action on the OMAVE and OMINA in a precise and timely manner.

A few months later, in January 2009, a seminar was held with the support of USSOCOM, for two weeks, to identify, define and design the preliminary model of a joint organization, called the Joint Command for Special Operations (CCOES), with its own General Staff. , strong in Intelligence integration but with the ability to autonomously plan all types of coordination and requirements directly with the Force Commands (National Army, National Navy and Colombian Air Force)

and coordinate and integrate in an interagency manner with the National Police and State Agencies, and with its organic components of Special Land, Amphibious, Air and Urban Forces, being officially created in June 2009, through Ministerial Provision 2650, where its Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) is approved (Joint Special Operations Command, 2009).

This is how this new organization at a strategic military level assumes the responsibility, under the guidelines of the General Commander of the Armed Forces, of conducting Joint Special Operations throughout the national territory, achieving with the important sacrifice of the Commandos and with surgical precision the rescue of four soldiers kidnapped in the jungles of Guaviare in June 2010, during Operation Chameleon, and a couple of months later, the neutralization of who until then was considered the most important military leader of the FARC secretariat: Jorge Briceño Suárez alias "Mono Jojoy", in Operation Sodoma. But, these were not the only

objectives that the CCOES would have to complete. It is during the year 2011, that an unprecedented event is achieved: the neutralization of the leader No. 1 of the Farc at that time: Guillermo León Sáenz alias "Alfonso Cano", in a military action considered as "the most important blow that has been given in the history of the fight against that subversive group": Operation Odysseus (First Magazine Line, 2011, p. 8).

However, having achieved a result as transcendental as that of Operation Odysseus, the CCOES continues in its process of evolution, maintaining its efforts in the assigned objectives, and at the same time that it begins the process of transformation and vision of the future, under the command of General Alberto José Mejía Ferrero, in the so-called Strategic Review and Innovation Committee (CREI) of Special Operations, in 2014, laying the foundations for the projection of new and modern capabilities, interoperable and capable of continuing confronting groups outside the law (Joint Command of Special Operations, 2014), strengthening its commitment to structurally affect the subsystem of command and control of said organizations outside the law, while they persist in the use of violence against the people Colombian.

With this restructuring, the Joint Special Operations Command redesigns its General Staff, strengthening standardization and the generation of differential capabilities, opening the way to the integration of all the Special Operations Units of the Armed Forces. under a unified command and with the mission of: Planning, synchronizing and executing Special Operations (OO.EE), in all environments, scenarios and levels of war, through the orientation, coordination and integration of Intelligence, which allows strategic advantage and facilitate the achievement of national objectives and interests, in times of war or peace (CCOES, 2014).

Therefore, the CCOES then renews its commitment to the nation, to integrate Intelligence and provide the elite Force to face threats to stability and national order, through joint, coordinated and interagency action, using defeat mechanisms, leading to the weakening of groups outside the law. This long-term vision defined the parameters for the integration of the Special Forces Units that were in command of the National Army, and thus form the Special Forces Division (DIVFE), as the land component of the CCOES, thus facilitating interoperability and integration of capabilities and optimization of resources, guaranteeing the fulfillment of the missions imposed on the Commands, with a standardization of common techniques, tactics and procedures, which characterize the "DNA of a Command" (Joint Command of Special Operations, 2017, p. 4), but with differential capabilities, better equipped, with exceptional training, to carry out special operations in all operational environments.

### **Special Operations as a pillar of Land Power**

Unified Land Operations (OTU), constitute the operational concept of the National Army, based on: Capture, retain and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations, through decisive action (offensive, defensive, stability and ADAC), in order to prevail in war, prevent or deter a conflict and create favorable conditions for its resolution (Center for Army Doctrine, 2016, p. 1).

Special Operations (OO.EE.) as part of the OTU concept constitute a distinctive competence because they are conducted specifically to achieve strategic goals and objectives, determined by the National Government, through the Security and Defense policy, or within the framework of international security cooperation agreements, with a high degree of risk in their execution and with political and diplomatic consequences (Centro de Doctrina del Ejército, 2017).

In the Colombian Land Power, it is the Special Forces Division of the National Army, the military organization that has the trained and selected personnel, the means and resources to create the combination of capacities that materialize the integration of the different forms of action of the Special Forces, specifying their coordinated and integrated use, in the midst of the complexity of the current strategic environment, which needs to act against a range of complex and interdependent threats, through the use of Special Purpose Forces, with "multipurpose, flexible and interoperable" (Gómez & Garzón, 2017, p. 46).



Within the Special Operations executed by the Special Forces Division, there are a series of missions that are, in turn, part of two major categories of Special Operations: Special Warfare (SG) and Surgical Precision Attacks (APQ). These two categories of mission constitute a broad spectrum that encompasses all types of military actions of a specialized nature, carried out by the organic Units of the Special Forces Division, both in times of peace or war, using actions that require the use of force as a means of coercion and deterrence and those that require non-lethal actions, in support of political, economic, social and information objectives (Gómez & Garzón, 2017, p. 47).

### **Relevance of Special Operations for Security and Defense**

Now, the OO.EE. They essentially contribute with their operational and tactical results to the objectives of the national strategy, generating an effect of "strategic utility" (Gray, 1996, pp. 163-164),<sup>48</sup> which is defined based on the Colombian model, in three general properties, which would allow us to propose a general conceptual typology to understand the scope and effect of Special Operations, as follows:

- Ability to manage crisis situations offering a range of options to the political power for the precise and effective use of military force, as in the case of Operation Chameleon, on June 13, 2010, where thanks to a bold military action, offered a successful solution to the persistence of kidnapping as a method of action of the insurgency, reaffirming the will of the Government to effectively address this complex problem (Villamarín, 2011).
- Permanent innovation platform, given the wide versatility and adaptability of its procedures, to ensure response options to complex scenarios. In the case of Operation Jaque, on July 2, 2008, where through the execution of a tactical deception maneuver with high innovation and initiative, fifteen kidnapped persons were rescued without using force, including three North American citizens, in what which has been called "a spectacular rescue" (Davies et al, 2015, pp. 39, 134).
- Strategic tool to decisively influence the decision-making process of the threat and support the political decision Reflected in the long-term effects of Operation Red Lightning, permanently sustained in execution since 2015, to date constituting a conditioning factor for the negotiation process with the National Government of the ELN, under a prevailing position of the State (Davies et al, 2015), given the direct pressure generated by the forcefulness and effectiveness of the operations.

As a preliminary conclusion, despite showing the absence of specialized literature that can precisely define the strategic relevance of special operations, the factual evidence verified in the successful experience of the Armed Forces. of Colombia, suggest its strategic usefulness, as a result of its ability to manage crisis situations

effectively, offering great versatility in complex scenarios, and influencing decision-making in a threat system, strengthening the objectives set in the national security policy. a State, developing capacities and adaptability, thanks to its flexibility, and the contributions of cooperation partners through training and capacity transfer processes, in particular from the United States of America and the United Kingdom, in order to evolve and be in the ability to face irregular and conventional scenarios, with interoperability in organization, equipment, training, procedures and national and international certification processes, which place them at the forefront of the continent.

On the other hand, within the framework of the vision of transformation of the Colombian Military Forces, and under the guidelines of the National Government in the Development Plan, the participation of Colombian military personnel is projected in support of multinational operations, either as part of framework agreements with intergovernmental organizations, such as the case of the United Nations (UN) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in compliance with an important strategic objective (Comando General, 2016).

Additionally, the initiatives developed by the Ministry of Defense converge to this objective, in terms of reaching an agreement that allows Colombia to contribute with its experience through NATO, in what is known as "collective security" (Flockhart, 2014), in the so-called "Partners around the world" program (Padilla, 2018, p. 26), which gives it the category of association required as a formal requirement for its integration, since in no way would it have the category of member according to the geographic location requirements that gave rise to such a military alliance in 1949 (Padilla, 2018). Within the framework of this new association, two main objectives arise, such as participation in missions led by NATO and achieve high interoperability standards (Padilla, 2018, p. 27).

As a consequence of the above, there is an important opportunity to capitalize on the experience obtained in the execution of precise and impeccable Special Operations in the framework of an irregular war, to participate and teach with the maximum authority and capacity possible to counterparts in multinational deployment. , on how to prevail against an adversary in a contemporary counterinsurgency scenario. The challenge now is to be able to appropriately adopt the organizational standards and capacity requirements that are demanded for international deployment, of which experience in this regard is very limited and subscribed to multinational training exchanges, but not to combat missions.

Finally, it can be affirmed that the Colombian experience in the strategic use of its Military Forces offers an important source of analysis, which will be decisive for future studies on the contemporary strategy aimed at confronting insurgencies within a country, in a world increasingly complex.

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# TRIARIUS

POR UN MUNDO MÁS SEGURO, ESTABLE Y EN PAZ