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## Editorial

When a decision is made in the spur of the moment and under the emotional influence, the consequences can be devastating, not only in the present but also for the future of the world. The terrorist group Daesh has joined the war game from long ago, not to fight for the freedom of those who are oppressed, but to implement by force their long-awaited Islamic caliphate.

One of the points that characterizes this terrorist group is the meticulous planning of its acts, its consequences and possible triggers. Behind some actions that may seem random, we find a great planning of previous intelligence where the subsequent consequences of the attack in the short, medium and long term are analyzed in a very thorough way making this group a very feared adversary.

The last terror-attack in Champs-Élysées in Paris, France, was performed by two terrorist who get off from a car opening fire against the french police officer just before the national elections. From the terrorist's perspective it has only been a strategical action to win vote from undecided voting people. A few votes that aim to the proliferation of racism and social segregation in the west seeking to create this dichotomy within society.

This is how Daesh develops his war mechanism to make society divided and easier to overcome. The more hateful and more difficult the integration of Muslims in the West the simpler will be their recruitment to join the struggle of an invisible cause.

It's goal that started with two innocent deaths, seeking as a final end the union of their mujahideen in the West to make an arm bigger and stronger.

*David Garriga*  
Director



As of this edition, the bulletin has version in English.

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
Fuerzas  
Antiterroristas del Mundo

**On the cover:** Elements of the Alpha Team of the Russian Security Services (FSB). © FSB.  
Unit specialized in antiterrorism, created in 1974 within the KGB.  
-Research of the unit at the end of the Bulletin-

# The phenomenon of terrorism

## Jihadist ideology: the interpretation of jihad and its main ideologies

by Enric Caballería



*Mawlana Sayyid Abu Al-Mawdudi*

The word jihad has been systematically manipulated by the mass media and Western society in general. Throughout all these years in the West the word jihad has been related to two concepts mainly. The first concept of jihad refers to the "holy war" of those who embrace Islam against the infidels and regard it as the sixth pillar of their religion. The second concept is related to the "effort" to overcome difficulties and temptations in the daily life of every Muslim.

Although the most common meaning of the jihad concept for most Muslims is understood as the effort to perfect oneself on the path to God and the struggle against selfishness. Relating the concept of jihad to holy war is a major mistake, because this expression is found neither in the Koran nor in the sunna and is unknown in treatises of Islamic jurisprudence. Rather, the term holy war is typical of Catholic translation and has its origin in the Crusades.

The position against the infidels, which some Islamic sectors defend, is nothing more than a fundamentalist and radical attitude or behavior derived from a literal reading of the Koran. In the most radical sectors, even the concept of jihad is spoken of as a further pillar of Islam, it would correspond to the sixth pillar along with the profession of faith, prayer, zaqat or alms, the month

of Ramadan or the pilgrimage to Mecca at least Once in life. For the vast majority of Muslims, the five pillars are exclusively professed.

It is important to say that in the Koran the only concept of war that appears alludes to the defensive war. Far from the idea projected by the different terrorist groups, which are far from Islam and the Qur'an no matter how much they appeal to Allah or Muhammad.

If we analyze the number of times the word jihad appears in the Koran, we can see that most of them refer to the effort. Of the thirty-five times in which this word is mentioned we can divide it into:

- Twenty-two times refers to effort or improvement in one's own behavior and in the collective
- Ten times as a defensive war, never offensive
- Three times it alludes to spiritual elevation of the believers

In the Qur'an (6: 151) a verse appears that clearly defends the position in defense of human life and condemns terrorism:

Do not take away any life, which God has made of it something sacred, except in case of justice and law: this is what He commands you so that you can learn wisdom.

It is true that in the Qur'an we find some warmongering texts, but these types of writings are found in all the sacred books of all the religions of the world. Then we can conclude that the problem is not in the texts themselves, but in the interpretation that is made of them and in their use to justify criminal and criminal facts.

Muslim leaders in the West have tried to detach Islam from terrorism. Issuing fights against jihadist organizations and condemning the attacks. It is important to remember that most of the victims of this type of terrorism are Muslims themselves.

Ideologists defending the concept of Jihad as holy war

The leading contemporary radical Islamist ideologues were inspired by the thirteenth-century Muslim theologian Ibn Taymiyya, who dictated a fatwa in which he expounded as a religious duty to combat against Islamist sects that violated some of

the pillars of Islam. According to Taymiyya, Muslims, after hearing the word of the prophet Muhammad to follow Islam, were to fight against the infidels and in return they would receive the best of rewards, paradise (yanna). Of the contemporary ideologues who defend this view of jihad, there are four that stand out above the rest.

Mawlana Sayyid Abu Al-Mawdudi (1903-1979): was a Pakistani scholar, imam and journalist. He said that under the belief of God that he is the supreme legislator and only depends on him to govern the affairs of humans, he argued that war jihad is justifiable inasmuch as Islam, an integral system, aims to eliminate other systems in the world. He opposed the difference between offensive and defensive jihad and believed that anyone who does not respond to jihad is considered unbeliever.

Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949): He was a schoolmaster, son of a watchmaker who also worked as an imam in a town halfway between Alexandria and Cairo. The city was called Ismailia, a city founded while the Suez Canal was being built, according to Western forms and ways. There, Al-Banna saw the barrios for Europeans, mostly British, enjoying all the luxuries while the quarters reserved for the Arabs reflected the living conditions of the industrial proletariat. In 1928 in Cairo he founded the Muslim Brotherhood, it is a very conservative organization dedicated to resurrect the Islamic caliphate on all the nations and to extend its power to the whole planet. Their beliefs are based on the desire to return to the precepts of the Qur'an and reject the influences that may come from the West. Al-Banna used the following motto to defend the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood:

"Allah is our goal, the Prophet our leader, the Koran our constitution, jihad our way and death by God our supreme goal"

Such ideas greatly influenced the thinking and decision making that Osama bin Laden took in the 9/11 attacks. Al-Banna's fatwas approve of jihad as a

"holy war" and make it a religious obligation of Muslims. After the coup d'état that took place in Egypt in 2013, where President Mohamed Morsi was overthrown, a minority of the organization's leaders opted for an apparently non-violent doctrine of world jihad. Even so the Muslim Brothers and their organizations are currently outlawed by the Egyptian authorities.

Sayyid Al-Qutb (1906-1966): Born the same year as Hassan al-Banna in 1906 in a village in the province of Asyut in southern Egypt, I study magisterium in the same center as al-Banna, Dar al - Ulum where he graduated in 1933. Contrary to Al-Banna, Qutb was a modernizing reformer, although he came from a deeply religious family and had studied in Islamic schools. At ten years he recited the Qur'an by heart. Politically, Qutb started in the Wafd party. It was an Egyptian nationalist party of Western character. Years later Qutb would become a staunch supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood. The end of his days he spent in prison where he was executed. The main idea he claimed was that Western governments were usurping the authority of Allah, and through jihad they were to be fought against them.

Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989): Born in the village of Silat al-Harithiya (Palestine) in 1941, he is known as the "Father of Global Jihad". He was a Sunni Palestinian Islamic scholar and founding member of Al-Qaeda. Azzam practiced a conservative and fundamentalist vision of Islam and defended the term jihad both defensive and offensive as an obligation for all Muslims.

Azzam was a teacher and mentor to Osama bin Laden. Together they would found Al-Qaeda. The first would also found the Lashkar-e-Taiba group.

This article again intends to make readers see that jihadism is a non-religious ideological problem. Among these lines I have tried to make clear that the terrorists' interpretation of Islam is totally out of context and that it is too literal a view of the Muslim holy book.

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# Prevention and counter-narrative in terrorism

## Nothing has changed from the assassins of Hassan ibn Sabbah to video games after ten centuries

by David Garriga



*Hassan ibn Sabbah*

From the mythical hashishins of Alamut led by the Ishmaelite Hassan ibn Sabbah in the eleventh century to the current jihadist etiology terrorists led by Abu Bakr Al Baghdady have shared a deceptive and engaging narrative that has enhanced their discourse of omnipresence and superiority.

In my opinion, there are four common denominators in this farce: first the attraction of the mysterious and the appealing of murderers seen as heroes, second the use of drugs to create "religious experiences," the third one, is referred to the ease of their infiltration in western societies to remain latent for years until its activation to achieve the goal and finally a proclamation of his feats of terror through the media past and present.

With so much rumor in its favor, who would not fear the assassins of Hassan ibn Sabbah who are prepared to die by killing? Who in his right mind, would not protect themselves from them, knowing that they were not afraid of dying since what they wanted with great fervor was precisely to die to return to the promised paradise?

It is believed those that Hassan ibn Sabbah had created a sect of murderers, the name came from the Arabic word "haschich" which means "hashish consumers". They told that future warriors were allowed to visit paradise in life so they could enjoy what awaited them after their death and to arm themselves with courage in this initiatory journey, it was said that they used hashish.

"... those aspirants who were led into prophet Muhammad's paradise were able to blindly execute

the orders from Hassan ibn sabbah, the old man of the mountain"

To that end, it was said that Hassan ibn Sabbah created his paradise in a secret valley located in mountains northwest of Iran near the Caspian Sea and it was described thus by Marco Polo:

"A wonderful garden, known only to those who belonged to the cult, protected by a castle. The garden was a replica of the prophet Muhammad's vision of paradise. In it can be found all the fruits and the most beautiful palaces in the world. There were three channels: from the one flowed water, from the other honey and from last one the wine; In that place there were the most beautiful women in the world, and they sang, danced and played instruments better than anyone else."

It was said that these warriors, after having been in contact with paradise, were capable of dying to return there, carrying out entrusted the mission with tremendous success. They were Feared for their courage and for the inability to stop their action because they were convinced and blinded to fulfill it the mission to the end.

It has only been necessary that this lie was widespread around the world so influential people felt victims of the ideology of these assassins. Their propaganda reached unsuspected limits when, travelers like Marco Polo, has contributed to the expansion of terror they suffered, making it immortal and enduring even centuries after the death of Hassan Ibn Sabbah.

In recent times "the black legend" of Alamut has been conveniently repeated and updated by Bernard Lewis in *The Sect of the Killers*.

This deceptive system through the false promises of paradise for the martyrs in jihad and the rumors and lies about the courage of the hashishins, continues to be used nowadays by the terrorists of jihadist etiology. This is first to convince young people to immolate themselves by guaranteeing them the promised paradise, and second to induce in Western society fear of that unexpected and sudden, action may happen.

To date the mechanisms of fear transmission and attraction for an ideology have changed. The ways of this transmission been passed from word of

mouth to literature to movies and video games (Prince of Persia movie or Assassin's Creed saga).

Although the similarity between the Alamut sect and the jihadist terrorists is far from the truth

(the sect targeted to kill were high officials while jihadist terrorists murder ordinary people) their propaganda continues to be exaggerated, false and overrated..

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# Cyberterrorism

## UCC: the new face

by Marc Fornós



After the death of the UCC leader, Osed Agha, killed by a bombing in the Conflict Area, the Daesh's cyber unit came in at low hours, performing very little activity, poor publicity with not to much credibility, such the list of the 8 thousand, how we refer to the previous TRIARIUS. These low activity seem to have ended, UCC has charged batteries, and it is prepare for the next movement. 3 factions have joined to the cyber unit, and have begun their counterattack on him Cyberspace. In the first place, the cybernetic faction to joined has been FIGHTER MUSLIM CYBER CALIPHATE, self-proclaimed with the acronym FMCC, that he began his entrance to the faction hacking the page of the National Museum of Argentina, and different pages of South America , Brásil, Venezuela, Argentina and later hacking European zone. This shows that the F.M.C.C, has a large range of attack, and above all, with an eye on the Latin American side. While some parts of South America thought, that they only had to worry about organized-crime, or mafias, Now they will have an other preoccupation, the DAESH and his cyber caliphate.

With the join to the ucc of the FMCC, came a new different faction represented by a butterfly. In the same time that the analysts were observing how the role of women in jihad was changing to a more active role, it happens in the same way in cybernetic jihad, the self-named KHANSAA of UCC, entering the virtual space with the action of hacking of multiple accounts Of social networks like tuitar, and Facebook. Not only with their ciberprints in the theft of accounts of those social networks and stamping their signature on such vulnerations, also sharing a video, like Deash have already accustomed, on Youtube. Announcing their union with the UCC group, and their role as women in the caliphate and willing to make cyber jihad stronger than ever.

Between FMCC and KHANSAA, they vulnerate more than 350 social network accounts, including people from the US, COLOMBIA, CHILE, PERU, and EUROPE, as well as multiple WEB pages.

If we thought that all of this was enough, we have to say NO, another faction has joined to the Cyber Caliphate, the so-called "SHADOW CALIPHATE ANON TERROR", that they also enter the scene of the Ciber YIHAD, but now, in this time, with not to much publicity but with an exemplification of power, hacking more than 40 Web pages in a week.

I have to say, that with this union there has been a certain look at the American continent, specifically in Latin America. One of the first web pages to be hacked, it was in Argentina, specifically the official website of the Museum of the City of ROSARIO - ARGENTINA, not only the WEB page, if not the different Email Accounts linked to the museum web page.



I have to say that these kind of hacks mean VULNERABILITY, but not means that is just the vulneration to the web page or steal some information and identities by email, some of us we will think that this is not a big deal, but this is because They do not analyze the magnitude of the consequences that an attack of these characteristics means, it is necessary to think that these systems of attack and vulnerations, can lead to attacks of Ransomware (kidnapping of information in exchange for money), or other typologies where the cyber caliphate could have obtain information relevant to operations, contacts, lists, logistics supplies, and instead lead to more actions such as phishing or other cyber-criminal typologies that can cause a real problem in the real infrastructure of every country or

state, some of you have think which would happen if this violation means an intrusion of the System of a power plant, or a port communications system, or even the health system?

We know that Latin America is further away from the Sirian conflict, and it is far away from EUROPE, but Latinamerica is not exempt from the YIHAD. We saw radical Sheiks that they appeared in photos in Brazil, or Venezuela, or that they have old

contacts with the FARC. The cyber-YIHAD declares the war to the world, just as cyberspace itself is defined, "without borders." We need to pay attention to certain actions that seem harmless at first, but the prevention of this actions can mean the difference between falling into the trap and the most absolute disaster or have a chance and became alive, and win this war.

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
Images captured by the author.



# The Jihad Generation

## Daesh and the future muyahidin's education

by Antonio Martin



A few years ago the terrorist group Daesh and its affiliates have subjected under their armed wing innumerable territories to their radical ideology and try to continue expanding throughout the Middle East with eagerness to proclaim their long-awaited Islamic caliphate.

In these territories taken from their governments, a very high percentage of children live among the population. Minors who are mostly kidnapped, sold by their parents or voluntarily join the ranks of the terrorist group looking for something to feel linked.

One of the most important phases of initial indoctrination is the education. It's carried out by the terrorists themselves in educational programs designed specifically to create mujahideen factories with two objectives, to keep alive the ideological mentality of the terrorists and to fight for an Islamic caliphate.

According to the website "El Español", the new report "In Caliphate Class" by Jacob Olidort, researcher at the Washington Institute for Middle East Policy, explains how the Daesh publishes books for the school (in Arabic) since 2014, makes Mobile applications and publishes other materials in the territories under its controls (and beyond with its expansion on the internet) to teach children and adults their "exceptionally lethal" vision of Salafism, the ultra-conservative branch of Islam especially widespread in Saudi Arabia. It is potentially domino effect that will make all those subjects make sense, since they are connected to each other by that extremist ideology that characterizes these groups in the dehumanization against to all those who are considered infidels and therefore their enemies.

All these books start with a first introduction page explaining that the "caliphate" is "a fresh oasis in the midst of a region invaded by devils" witer the objective of "a great work to move away ideologies like socialism or capitalism", as ABC for Mikel Ayestaran showed in Palmira.

The most relevant subjects of this educational program, some of them with their own book published in full color being very clear the common denominator of all of them are the following:

### Religion

To provoke a great dichotomy in the first phase of the educational program is fundamental to be able to wash the brain to these future soldiers. The aim of creating this great confusion of concepts learned earlier in their short life on the good and the evil, is the first step to soften their innocent minds and to replace those thoughts by radical extremist ideology teaching the Quran under his most Salafist and extremist vision. This conviction is instilled with the disposition they have to immolate themselves in attacks on the cause, convincing them that they will be pardoned for Allah reserving a place in the much-desired paradise with 72 virgins and the forgiveness of 70 relatives in the day Of the final judgment.

### Mathematics

Between religion class and subjection to this mental dichotomy, they teach mathematics. In this case, they don't subtract and multiply numbers but grenades, rifles, bullets and any type of war material including enemy casualties.

The newspaper El Mundo published one of the exercises called "sniper aid" which reads: "Your rifle has 24 shots and you have 7 targets of the Crusader Coalition. How many shots would you receive uniformly? The crossed enemies? " Other: "If you have three pistols in front and you have nine bullets, how many shots can you make?"

### English

Additionally they teach English classes, necessary for a possible infiltration and translation of enemy messages. Learning his first words like pistol, bullet among others in that language.

### **Combat Tactics**

When these minors are already in the phase of being completely obsessed with “the cause”, the combat subjects begin.

They are trained on assembling and disassembling an AK 47 and different types of weapons, making explosives, performing beheadings, combat tactics, personal defense, handling of weapons, etc.

The training finishes by real practices armed to the teeth in search of infidels tied up by abandoned buildings or participating in real executions under the supervision of some superior.

### **Physical education**

The terrorist group does not forget the mythical subject of gymnastics, does not want thick in its ranks, looking for a generation of future mujahideen strong and without fear of death. Soldiers who never look back to try to hide from the enemy, warriors prepared to fight for the cause and

die for it. Paradise is their reward, for them there is no defeat, if they live they will continue fighting for the cause and if they die they will be rewarded with going to paradise.

There is no enemy more dangerous than he who does not fear death.

### **Graduation**

These minors, after passing their indoctrination or school year ... have become soldiers willing to give everything for the cause and not only in the Middle East, will also be transferred to missions and objectives clearly defined for the West.

Who would look at one or some innocent-looking minors or teenagers playing or strolling peacefully in any of the great western cities? Have Daesh been teaching for years?

The minors have been trained to go unnoticed in different areas and their goal is very clear ... the journey has already undertaken to the West..

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## European terrorist profile: 8 risk factors

by Javier Torregrosa



One of the main problems on counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization is the lack of data that researchers can obtain. Approximately, only a quarter of the empirical researches carried out in the field of terrorism have first-hand data, where the rest are reviews and studies about already existing articles or samples that are neither radicalized nor suspected to be involved in terrorism. Due to this great disadvantage, terrorism field of study is still in its infancy. The constant evolution of the phenomenon further increases this, with groups appearing and disappearing, changes in strategy, new theoretical approaches and, in general, a constant change, provoking a void in this field of knowledge that affects not only scholars, but also to anti-terrorist policies created to stop radicalized people.

One of the great gaps in knowledge about terrorism is the lack of awareness about radical and jihadist terrorists profile. This circumstance, so striking in an era in which criminal profiling seems to have gained special repercussion, turns out to be particularly important in the creation of anti-radicalization measures. If we cannot identify what profile a terrorist born in Europe has, how are we going to be able to prevent the whole process of radicalization?

In fact, this circumstance has an explanation that already warned by several scholars of the study of terrorism, and it is related to the limitation that the generic profiling presents to explain why one individual is radicalized and another, with very similar conditions, does not. Here lies a small branch of profiling called "Risk factors analysis", understanding them as elements that increase the possibility that the individual decides to take the road that will lead him to radicalization.

What are these risk factors? There is a wide debate about them. However, although each author focuses his attention on a group of them, we can divide them into two important fields: the individual and the social. In turn, both fields will combine to give rise to the ultimate reason for radicalization: the motivation. In Europe, some of the most common risk factors are:

- Being young, even a teenager, people no older than 30 years old: the great identity crisis experienced at these ages is taken advantage of by recruiters to attract potential followers.

- Being second or third generation immigrants: the distance between the culture of the parents (immigrants) and the territory's own culture (majority culture) means that second and third generation people often feel between the two worlds, without belonging to none of them.

- Having suffered discrimination: all those who have tried to integrate into the majority culture and have been separated for ethnic, religious, or cultural reasons.

- Individuals who have experienced a serious harm (such as the death of a family member, a divorce, etc.) or feel victimized: the search for contact may cause a person to lead their way to groups such as DAESH or Al Qaeda, which exploit very well their "group facet" to attract members and give them a role that makes them feel an important part of it.

- People who justify violence as a path to achieve goals: the justification of violent actions as tools for claiming can be the first step towards their use.

- Individuals in contact with people already radicalized: the first steps of recruiting members are usually carried out in social networks, with less and less face-to-face situations for the radicalization process. Therefore, all those in contact with radicals may be being evaluated by a recruiter, as well as exchanging ideas and extreme approaches with them.

- Individuals who share propaganda with radical or extremist content: one of the main paths to radicalization in Europe (where lone-wolves predominate over other territories) are the dissemination tools, such as YouTube videos and INSPIRE or DABIQ magazines. This facilitates a process known as "self-radicalization".

- Support for terrorist groups and hate speech in networks: Radicalized individuals often use

DAESH or al Qaeda vocabulary designed to polarize individuals: in favour of the West or in favour of Islam. For them, every pro-Western act is considered a grievance to the true faith, and those Muslims who try to adapt to that culture are acting directly against authentic Islam.

As can be seen, many of these factors are obvious, but we find here a paradox: many of them may occur, but the individual does not radicalize, or there are few of them, and the individual gets radicalized. This is where the debate is currently

open, valuing which factors are more important than others.

However, all these factors, combined, create in the individual a motivation, a search for the identity that leads him to radicalize. This is where anti-terrorist policies must focus, in order to give these individuals an alternative to radicalization. The worst thing that can happen is that the radicalized ones see in the terrorist groups a substitute of everything that Europe did not offer them: identity, possibilities, and social integration.

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# Intelligence and terrorism

## Black on white: the counternarrative

by José Manuel Ávalos Morer



*De izquierda a derecha: Fotos de gatos en Twitter tras los atentados de Bruselas. Canales de difusión en español de Daesh. Revista periódica de difusión de Daesh. Distinas fuentes.*

It seems that the metonymy "The pen is mightier than the sword", coined by the English author Edward Bulwer-Lytton in the mid nineties, remains solid over the years, indeed, it can be said that it is absolutely still relevant. With it, the author indicates that it hurts more an information directed to an opponent's weak point than a lunge. In other words, narrative is situated over military resources.

Fighting against any group, person, or even Governments does not only happen in a strictly operational plane of coercive techniques. For a long time, the design of a counternarrative exists and it's adapted to the moment specifications. It has been improved and adapted with the aim of fighting against the speeches from these radicalized groups. With this, we try to mitigate or, at least, affect their recruitment capacity and reduce its support.

During the I World War, lots of news were emitted from the written press redactions from the different implicated States. They tried to stop the contraries progress by exalting their own values and achievements. In the II World War, this strategy was improved because, not only the press by these means was improved, but also other means were used in order to organise the different resistances. At this point, the radio was determinant. With the aim of gaining and convincing adepts, leaflets were strategically bombed inside and outside the borders of each implicated country. With this, they wanted to influence the moral of the armies and civil population

so that they stopped fighting and surrender without resistance.

Thus, the aim of violent and extremist speeches is to radicalize people and to affiliate them to its files. However, sometimes it promotes the birth, the development and the transformation of the existing extremist organizations. Nowadays, lots of organizations, trying to gain adepts to their files, explode the religious, ethnic and national extremism by using the Internet and social networks, being them their main mean of diffusion.

We should take into account that, over the history, we find many examples of people that, after consuming extremist narrative through the Internet, have committed terrorist acts. Nowadays, we are immersed in the jihadist terrorism fear, which finds in social networks their mean of diffusion. In order to avoid this, some Governments and digital companies have initiated different programmes to prevent jihadism diffusion via the Internet. Even the European Union has created a unit to combat the Daesh advertising.

However, techniques like informatics sabotage, deleting domains, creating profiles in social networks, hacking their forums etc., did not have much effect. For this reason, the diffusion of a counternarrative has risen to combat their speech and the European diplomatic service has recruited a dozen of people for creating a counternarrative unit called Stratcom South. It will disclose its messages in Arabic in order to reach all the population. But this is

not the only project to fight against the Daesh's message. From years, EEUU is the leader in this task and many Governments are replicating its model.

From left to right: Pictures of cats after the Brussels terror attack on Twitter.

Daesh diffusion channels in Spanish. Daesh diffusion periodic magazine.

Different sources.

Apart from that, a digital immersion war is being planned as supporters of the different terrorist groups find ways to avoid the sabotages that their counts suffer. Digital immersion consists of a real time neutralization of the communications sent by the

terrorists thought the social networks. We can find an example of this in the first months of 2007: 3 numbers of the magazine "Rumiyah" were replaced with false stories instead of the originals. Another example are the different pictures of cats published in social networks immediately after an attack to counter the Daesh message diffusion.

Finally, the response from occidental democratic societies towards terrorism, no matter the aetiology, should be unanimous. Diffusion and propagation of a collective conscience that fights against the diffusion of the message of terror through any mean, specially the Internet, is the key to fight against these groups.

#### Notas:

- (1) Countering daesh's propaganda, recuperado: <http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/countering-daeshs-propaganda/>
- (2) Twitter cierra 235.000 cuentas por promover el terrorismo, recuperado: [http://www.abc.es/tecnologia/redes/abci-twitter-cierra-235000-cuentas-promover-terrorismo-201608181934\\_noticia.html](http://www.abc.es/tecnologia/redes/abci-twitter-cierra-235000-cuentas-promover-terrorismo-201608181934_noticia.html)
- (3) La UE crea una unidad para combatir la propaganda del ISIS, recuperado: [http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2017/01/29/actualidad/1485645254\\_004332.html](http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2017/01/29/actualidad/1485645254_004332.html)

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Bogotá, 4 al 6 de diciembre de 2017

# Expodefensa

Feria Internacional de Defensa y Seguridad  
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# Terrorist technical means

## The police response in Europe to an act of Terrorism of jihadist etiology. To reinvent.

by José Luis Franco



*Atentados del 11M en Madrid, España. Foto AP*

Since the 11-M attacks in Madrid, the concept of terrorism that we had until that date changed to immerse ourselves in a continuous risk, of any objective and in any space. The message of Bin Ladem after the attacks of 11-M in New York, made clear the scenario that we were going to live: "You will never know security again" was the message that gathered the West and the democratic society that could not allow to see Their liberties and their way of life diminished. The FCS and the Intelligence Services began their arduous work of establishing the stolen tranquility and allowing to enjoy life in a modern and plural society.

Since then Europe has experienced a series of Black Swan attacks, which have put in check the best European policemen. The intelligence services of Europe do not provide or have sufficient resources to follow and monitor all suspected returnees or radicalized jihadists without having traveled. Each follow-up requires at least four troops and the public coffers do not give so much. It requires the involvement of civil society and to be all part of this fight against Terror. It also requires interconnection between Intelligence Services and that requires breaking a taboo and schema of what is a service created to be hermetic and not sharing sources.

They can enter into public places creating terror by any material means to plant it: a Kalasnikov, a machete or a truck, force our politicians and police officers to adapt to an enemy to study and analyze constantly in order to stop or neutralize it, if Neutralize it, when its thirst for terror materializes.

We must think of redefining forces, means and tasks as the terrorist attacks "soft" targets easily accessible and executed, as well as minimal risk of starting execution making sure to create terror and end their action having caused some casualties. He has the surprise factor of: when, how and where.

Level 4 of indefinite terrorist alert, is difficult to carry by the FCS if it continues in the time. Drift in a descending line of care and most importantly self-protection. To do this, to make constant reminders as an analysis of enemy procedures in different civilian areas "modus operandi" and an increase in theoretical and practical training in the subject, will allow to raise the attention and to be up to date of the movements of the enemy. Also the rotation of personnel in fixed positions fleeing from the monotony, increase of specific preventive and operative controls with so to update procedures taking advantage of the interiorization of the society of the police figure and the acceptance of this one.

A greater use of information shared with Private Security since they are in places of passage, meeting or large static influx of public will allow to collect a greater amount of data to the Police Information services to turn them into Intelligence.

Giving public security units that are on the war-weapon street, it begins to be habitual and the citizenship begins to see it normal. It is not a matter of more weapons, but have them formed to use them and near the areas where these attacks could occur, however complicated it may be to anticipate.

Redistributing units and tasks so that an Intervention Operation Unit can be activated at the beginning of the attack in the first 15 minutes is vital to ensure the success of the mission. It tends to barrage Special Units, in unique places making their deployment over those 15 minutes.

The need to increase the training and use by Citizen Security units of elements reserved to these SPECIAL UNITS will make it possible to act in a more forceful way in the first minutes of the attack (Ballistic Shields and Submachine guns or Compact

assault such as the HK G36C, FN P90 with optics and suitable shooting aids). It would also be possible to combine Special Units and Citizen Security Units, or to highlight units outside the barracks for immediate activation, with camouflaged means, as well as civil tactical uniformity, equipped with the means to be able to act with guarantees (Ballistic Shields and Individual Protection Equipment against firearms Level III, weapons of war gauges (5.56x45mm and 7.62mmx51mm), Stun grenades and tear gasses, as well as a sniper filler with its binomial of use. Van armored camouflage to be able to interpose it between the attacker and the civilians or allow to progress guarded in her to the equipment.

The first minutes of a hostage-taking attack are crucial for the aggressor not to intrude and know the facility, as well as designate hostages as human shields or allow them to organize. This was the case at the Bataclan, where police officers could not protect themselves behind a vehicle or progress with protection shields until the arrival of Special Units.

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Image Source: <http://hd.clarin.com/post/79258283568/madrid-11-de-marzo-de-2004-737-horas-una-bomba?route=%2Fpost%2F%3Aid%2F%3Asummary>


A blue rectangular box containing white text. The text is arranged in two lines: "ADVERTISE HERE" on the top line and "CLICK FOR INFORMATION" on the bottom line. The font is a bold, sans-serif typeface.

**ADVERTISE HERE**  
**CLICK FOR INFORMATION**

# Terrorism and Cyber terrorism in the Southern Cone of South America

## Cyber Terrorism and Cyber Transnational Organized Crime. The priority need to have a Strategic Planning for Cyberdefense and Cyber Security

by Roberto Uzal



Mentions and statements related to the event of undoubted "Value Added" organized on April 20, 2017 by the Directorate of International Relations of the Chamber of Deputies of the Congress of the Argentine Nation

### Introduction

The International Relations Office of the Chamber of Deputies of the Argentine National Congress held a relevant and timely event on Cyberdefense and Cybersecurity on April 20, 2017. This article is not intended to constitute a chronicle of that event. This will be done by the organizers of the meeting who have an audiovisual record and abundant photographic material of what happened on the date highlighted in the "Delia Parodi" Chamber of the Chamber of Deputies. It is of fundamental interest to the author of this article to receive the opinion of the usual readers of TRIARIUS, the Hispanic American Bulletin on Terrorism, since it had tried, in its character of invited exhibitor, to argue in the sense of granting, to the Cyber Terrorism of ei - , A special priority in Argentina's forecasts in the area of cyber-defense and cybersecurity.

In this paper observations are made and proposals are made to ensure that, in the short term, Argentina has an effective and consistent Strategic Planning for Cyberdefense and Cybersecurity.

Opinions of the author of this article regarding the priorities of Argentina in Cyberdefense and in Cybersecurity.

The very prestigious journalist, specialist in International Relations and thinker Rodolfo Terragno, expressed an article published by Diario Clarín on 02/02/2015: "The president of the Foreign Relations Committee of the US House of Representatives, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen , Said in July 2011 that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez "would have interceded with Argentina in favor of Iran for Venezuela's obtaining of nuclear technology in Argentina."

The complaint was not endorsed by the State Department, for which there was no "evidence" that an Iran-Venezuela-Argentina triangle had been formed to help Iran in the development of its nuclear program.

However, on the 27th of that month, the Gatestone institute, a specialist in international politics, said: "There is reason to believe that, with

the help of Venezuela, Argentina is cooperating with Iran on nuclear matters as part of an agreement Which includes the readiness of Argentina to withdraw the accusations of the 1994 bombings in Buenos Aires, in exchange for conducting business. " That was the first time that there was talk of an Argentine-Iranian agreement that included the AMIA case. ", Concludes Rodolfo Terragno.

Those interested in the subject will be able to easily accede to numerous and concurrent indications regarding the fact that the delirious idea of transferring Argentine nuclear know-how to a country indicated by the Judicial Power of Argentina of at least to have given support to the terrorist group Hezbollah in Their devastating attacks on Argentine territory

The author of this article adds, according to information accessed through his own sources and his own experience in technological topics of military interest, that the absurd project included, at some point, the installation of several reactors of "intermediate power" (from Uranium 238 ) In Venezuela that would act (the waste from the fission process) as providers of "input" to a sophisticated "solvent extraction" (reprocessing) plant that would provide Iran with "military grade plutonium" in sufficient quantities to To elaborate several artifacts similar to the one that was used, during World War 2, in the Japanese city of Nagasaki.

The Iranians, being flown by Cyber a large number of centrifuges belonging to the enrichment plant (Uranium 235) of Natanz, seven years ago, already knew that they did not have the know how to carry the limited performance of Natanz, 18% "enrichment", to the much higher percentage required to have "military grade Uranium 235".

Encouraged by his then very numerous and also powerful South American friends, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would have decided to follow the path of "the atomic bomb of the poor countries" (use of Plutonium from the reprocessing of fission residues of reactors operating with Uranium 238).

Thanks to God and also to the way in which the people of the Argentine Nation voted, the nightmare elaborated by those who worked for a new global geo-strategy based on the joint venture of populist governments of South America with the Islamic Republic of Iran , He concluded..

However, the frustration of Iranian technologists who hoped to receive the Argentine nuclear know-how and also part of Iran's political leadership is profound (this is also contrasted by sources of the author of this article).

A "concurrent" contribution is cited (<http://www.fuerzasmilitares.org/triarius/Boletin-Triarius-0001.pdf> page 16) already referred to by TRIARIUS, published by Clarín in Buenos Aires - Argentina, with the signature of Claudio Savoia The 26/09/2016: "... the ghost of a possible terrorist threat persists in obstructing the steps with which the government seeks to keep him away." Savoia continues: "While multiplying alerts, intelligence and tracking operations and drills, the Ministry of Security (Argentina) runs behind every suspicion and every rumor."

Clarín confirmed the latest version analyzed by the Minister of Security, Patricia Bullrich: Two months ago, for the commission of a supposed group of Lebanese, in the area of the Triple Border Brazil - Paraguay - Argentina, a former member of a Security Force Of Argentina, with criminal records, would have obtained and sold the plans of three water treatment plants that supply the Federal Capital of Argentina and Greater Buenos Aires ... "

By means of his own sources, the author of this article acceded to indications that indicated a special interest of the Lebanese in question in the wiring that links the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) corresponding to the twelve pumps of the water treatment plant of Bernal - Quilmes.

Access to the PLCs means having the possibility of placing the device "controlled" under operating conditions (pressure, temperature, revolutions per unit of time) that exceed its possibilities of mechanical or thermal resistance causing it to become unusable.

It is generally recognized that the area of the Triple Frontier is a sort of "free zone" for terrorists of different extractions and for very dangerous criminals of all kinds.

Hezbollah has been linked by several investigators to the attacks against the Israeli Embassy and against the Israeli Mutual in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Moreover, Hezbollah has been identified as associated with the death of Attorney Alberto Nisman the day before the filing of his complaint about the existence of spurious agreements between members of the then government of Argentina and officials of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran , Especially with those included as imputed by the blasting of the Israeli Mutual (AMIA).

Preliminary conclusion: Surely, when the highly recommended stages prior to the Strategic Planning of Cyberdefense / Cybersecurity, ie the elaboration of the Cyber Risk Matrix and the construction of the Table detected Vulnerabilities /

Capacities to be developed, the potential cyber attacks Terrorists will be in the "red zone" of the Cyber Risks Matrix and will be related to the more sensitive Cyber Vulnerabilities. See examples of the Cyber Risk Matrix and the Construction of the Table Detected vulnerabilities / Capabilities to be developed in Figure 1

Contributions regarding the Strategic Planning of Cyberdefense and Cybersecurity

goals and intermediate goals makes it possible to define the budgets associated to the strategic plan.

Not because it is a truism truth, it is no longer useful to recall the expression of Alfred Chandler (1962): "Structure follows Strategy" (Structure is a Consequence of Strategy). Let's first decide whether we will face a rugby or tennis match and then think about the team's formation. A "gravitational" consequence: When we have a strategic plan in



Briefly you could say that a strategic plan is a tool that expresses what an organization, corporation or government wants to achieve to fulfill its mission and achieve its own vision (future image). The "force idea" is to position itself with advantages, in the future, regarding the current situation. Vision expression and mission specification are undeleagable tasks of the number one organization, corporation or government. In the case of the Strategic Planning of the Cyberdefense and of the Cyber security, this responsibility, undoubtedly, is of the President of the Nation. In this case, "voluntary contributions" from tactical or operational levels are not only irrelevant, they interfere when strategic planning is considered according to a robust methodological approach.

From the vision and the mission can define objectives, goals, intermediate goals and policies. The association of calendars to the intermediate goals and goals allows to elaborate the programs of work to be undertaken. The association of economic values to these schedules of accomplishment of

force only then we can define the needs of contracting goods and services.

The last component of the book of strategy books developed by distinguished professors of Harvard University, Robert Kaplan and David Norton is entitled "Alignment" (still in its Spanish version). The remarkable genius is that of having defined in the title of the work what is the expected result of a strategic plan put into effect successfully.

To round off this paragraph is quoted the "guru" Russel Ackoff (1919/2009): "The future should not be predicted but created. The goal of planning should be to design a desirable future and invent the way to achieve it."

Our country urgently needs its strategic plan for cyber-defense and cybersecurity, which will never arise from the good will of the tactical / operational levels but from the highest levels of political decisions.

About the well-known tendency to use the prefix "Ciber"

We understand that cyberspace is the virtual context generated by the different layers of protocols that enable the existence of what we understand by Internet (Network of Networks). This assertion acquires strength from the network layer (layer 3). Coincidentally when addressing the issue of heterogeneous network interfaces (essential responsibility of routers) it clearly makes sense to "inter-networks".

If we consider a large office with a very complex network of computers but these network devices are identified by the physical addresses (MAC addresses) that were assigned by their manufacturers, we are in a "non-virtual" context and in that environment would be Totally inappropriate to use the prefix Ciber. It not only constitutes a conceptual error, it causes confusion.

If we now consider a delinquent who, optic support through (binoculars, for example), from afar watches elderly ladies withdraw cash from ATMs. That way, find the PIN (key) of the corresponding bank card. Subsequently, in most cases through approaches "sloppy" or simply outbursts, it is made from the bank card and immediately withdraws all possible money from the available accounts. Are we facing a cybercrime? No way! It is a simple "chicken thief".

Another example (something exaggerated and also something histrionic: A mother-in-law maintains a terrible relationship with her son-in-law.) One day, that bad treatment reaches an extreme limit: her mother-in-law takes a notebook that was within her reach and hits her several times, Poor son-in-law on his head, causing him serious injuries. "We are facing computer crime!" No "is blunt, computer use was not relevant and even less essential, could be replaced, with advantages, by many other objects.

It is considered very important to reserve the prefix Ciber for what it involves from the network layer (IP Protocol), Transport Protocol / Control, HTTP Protocol, etc.

What is expressed is not "cosmetic details"; Avoiding extreme generosity by using the prefix "Cyber" causes a very pernicious effect "Tower of Babel.

#### The Critical Factor of Essential Success

In cyberdefense and cybersecurity the Critical Success Factor is the availability of "world class" human resources. Cyber-defense and cybersecurity require an eminently qualitative approach. This is an eminently asymmetrical subject. Small teams but with a remarkable level of knowledge and highly trained, can reposition with

advantages to a country in the global context of Cyberdefense and Cybersecurity.

In this regard, it is worth mentioning what was announced at the meeting in the Chamber of Deputies; Soon will begin the dictating of a Master's Degree in Cyberdefense and Cybersecurity (guidelines for operational aspects and forensic aspects). This post degree is the product of an agreement between the University of Buenos Aires and the National School of Intelligence. It was elaborated taking into account the standards and the recommendations emanated from the most outstanding institutions, globally, in Cyberdefense and Cybersecurity.

Attendees' concerns regarding the Cyber Transnational Washing of Assets. Assessment on the Cyber Financing of Terrorism.

Attendees showed interest in the topic Cyber Laundry Transnational Assets. This is an issue on which we have, in Argentina, such knowledge that a more proactive position is possible to combat this scourge. Cyber Laval Transnacional de Activos implies a "turnover" of the order of 5% of the P.B.I. global.

It would also constitute an interesting contribution of our country a very clear and tangible position against the Cyber Financing of Terrorism, felony "cousin sister" of Cyber Transnational Asset Washing.

#### CONCLUSIONS

- Cyberspace has become in the most relevant technological context for its contribution to the existence of an intercommunicated world such as never dreamed. Its scientific, technological, economic and cultural impact is immense.

- However, cyberspace has made possible the development of weapons that surpass in power and by its insidious nature to the nuclear weaponry. Cyber espionage has been adopted by certain countries as one of its priority factors of economic growth. Cyber Terrorists have Cyber Weapons of Mass Destruction. Transnational Organized Crime has revitalized its "business environment", examples of which are the Transnational Cyber-Laundering of Assets and the Cyber Financing of Terrorism. There has also emerged a "religious / ideological" current of the type "neo digital anarchism" whose members are even willing to give their life in post of the ideal that they have no contents neither secret nor confidential in cyberspace.

- The Critical Success Factor in this environment, without a doubt, is the availability of "world class" Human Resources. Argentina can and should address the training and training of these

Human Resources. Argentina can reposition itself with advantages in the global context because it has the capacity to face really serious programs of training and training, adjusting to standards that are already accepted almost universally.

- Finishing one of the author's idols / references, the father of the Argentine steel industry, Manuel Nicolás Savio used to repeat frequently: "The important thing is not to wait for more!"

Thanks

- To the Directorate of International Relations of the Chamber of Deputies of the Congress of the Argentine Nation for inviting me to explain the subject. I especially thank Ms. Mariana de Giuli for her attentions and for the effort she has made in the organization. Readers of this article, inside and outside Argentina, who wish to have additional

information regarding the mentioned event, may request it to Mariana (mpdegiuli@gmail.com)

- To the National Deputies that directly or indirectly made possible the transcendent event referred to in this article.

- To the National Deputies who acted as moderators. The event was a transcendent example of the semantic scope of the expression "Freedom of Expression".

- To my colleagues, the other invited speakers, who made brilliant contributions.

- Those interested in the subject that filled, beyond its capacity, the Delia Parodi Hall of the Chamber of Deputies of the Argentine Nation

Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, April 24, 2017

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
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# Colombia: Terrorism, War and Peace

## What happens in Colombia. The new scenarios of security and defense

by Douglas Hernández



Fuente: Elaboración propia para Triarius, mayo de 2017.

### Geopolitical Considerations

China, Iran and Russia are trying to increase their presence and influence in Latin America, responding to what the US is doing, and their allies in their peripheries. Among the Latin American countries with which they have had the closest approaches are Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

The Russian spy base in Cuba was revived, a Russian warship recently crossed the Caribbean Sea, and two strategic bombers carried out long-range patrols in the region. In addition, a Russian base of the Glonass system in Nicaragua has just been put into operation.

Venezuela is perhaps the country that has the strongest ties with these extracontinental powers. The Venezuelan government has signed important cooperation agreements in different areas with these countries, and military cooperation agreements are particularly important. This has allowed Venezuela to equip itself with powerful and modern Russian and Chinese weapons, under the justification of defending its sovereignty against possible attacks of the United States, openly opposed to the political model of the Bolivarian Revolution.

Nicaragua has begun a process of strengthening its military forces, acquiring modernized T-72 tanks to complement and eventually replace its old T-55s. In addition, Russian

airborne troops move to Central America to carry out joint maneuvers with the Nicaraguan armed forces, maneuvers called "anti-terrorist" type. Nicaragua is expected to continue the process of modernization of its armed forces, particularly its naval and air forces, which are now extremely light.

It is important to note that Colombia has border differences with Venezuela and Nicaragua, differences that are a permanent source of tension. The internal situation of Venezuela at the moment is quite unstable, the opposition is carrying out street actions to protest against the government, and the government in turn is repressing the opponents, and the whole process is receiving much attention from the international media.

The region has just passed through a stage in which the left strengthened and gained power in different countries, establishing a system of alliances, formal and informal, through which they supported each other. During that stage, the Colombian government was quite alone because of its traditional support for the United States of America.

USA Has made every effort to reverse this predominance of the left, exercising different political, economic and military pressures, with the aim of maintaining its influence in the region and preventing leftist governments within the region, or extracontinental powers, Power and influence it has

had over the last century. Venezuela has been the country that in the last two decades has resisted the United States. It remains to be seen what will happen to the new government of Donald Trump.

### **National Objectives**

The Political Constitution of the Republic of Colombia of 1991 defines to a large extent which are the objectives that the nation should pursue. In order to achieve them, it is possible to find various obstacles and multidimensional threats that could degenerate into conflict. Taking into account the geopolitical considerations set out above and the national objectives, the Colombian State determines some hypotheses of conflict, on the basis of which high strategy determinations are made for international relations and security and defense. This directs investments, the organization of the armed forces, as well as their endowment and doctrine.

The priority of the current Colombian government has been to achieve peace with the main illegal armed groups of izuierda. But there has been a parallel process of alignment of the Military Forces to change its anti-subversive orientation to something more conventional, which implies important changes in all orders. This has been synthesized in what is known as the "Damascus Doctrine" that specifies the different changes to adapt the military forces to the challenges posed by postconflict (with leftist guerrilla groups).

The Colombian government had been handling three hypotheses of conflict:

X1: Subversive groups that seek to seize power through armed struggle. This hypothesis of conflict was materialized. It is now overcoming the various peace accords.

X2: War with Venezuela for the non-delimitation of the marine and submarine waters of the Gulf of Venezuela.

X3: War with Nicaragua for possession of the Islands of San Andrés and Providencia and adjacent waters.

These three hypotheses that Colombia managed for decades, must be reformulated in the light of geopolitical changes, the internal situation of the country, international relations and new threats.

Colombia remains perhaps the largest US ally in the region, and there is a belief that if the country were to be attacked, US troops would come to its defense. The Colombian government is doing its best to strengthen its alliances. It has offered up to 5,000 troops to the UN, participated with a ship in Operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia, participated in high-level joint air maneuvers such as

Red Flag, Maple Flag and Angel Thunder in joint naval maneuvers Of high level like Unitas, and the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), looking for the interoperability with its western allies. In addition, and not least, the Colombian Air Force tanker aircraft are NATO certified.

In addition, Colombia seeks to position itself as a provider of training and training services in the security and defense sector, given the experience accumulated in 50 years of war. Likewise, the Social and Business Defense Group (GSED) is offering products, weapons, ammunition, vehicles, airplanes and ships that are manufactured in Colombia to the international market thanks to the Know How accumulated over the years.

### **Threat System**

Type 1 - Persistent National Order Threats: ELN, Criminal Banners, Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, Kidnapping, Extortion, Forced Disappearance, Forced Displacement, Terrorism, Social Inequity (maldistribution of land and unfair income distribution).

Type 2 - New National Order Threats: Cyberterrorism, Cybercrime, Illegal Mining, Illegal Talking.

Type 3 - Persistent Threats of International Order: Armament, Terrorism, Instability, Transnational Crime, Border Disputes, Trafficking in Persons, Social Inequity (land misallocation and unfair income distribution), Drug trafficking.

Type 4 - New Threats of International Order: Cyberterrorism, Cybercrime, Endangered Species Trafficking, Global Warming, Climate Change, Bioterrorism.

Note that terrorism is present in the four quadrants of the threat system, therefore it is a factor generating violence and instability that must be given priority and that must be tackled in a multidimensional manner and through international cooperation. This Bulletin is a contribution to that purpose.

### **Defense Sector Response**

Joint Operations: Those carried out between two or more military institutions.

Coordinated Operations: Those carried out between a military institution (or more) and a police officer.

Interagency Operations: Includes the Armed Forces and other institution of the Colombian State, for example the Public Prosecutor's Office.

Multinational operations: the Colombian Armed Forces and those of another friendly country participate. In these operations skills are developed for interoperability, establishing common procedures for communications, logistics, organic, and tactics, for example.

#### **Components of the Defense Sector**

**Army:** The Colombian Army is made up of 8 Divisions (Infantry), 1 Special Forces Division and 1 Aviation Division. He has a high degree of professional soldiers, and his staff is in permanent training and retraining. The Colombian Army has a large number of aircraft and has important capabilities for air assault.

**Armada:** It is in the process of modernization. Its main ships are 4 Light Frigates FS-1500 armed with anti-ship C-Star missiles, and four submarines (2 U206 and 2 U209) armed with DM2A3 torpedoes. Currently it is about to receive the third domestically produced OPV80. One of these OPVs has made two scientific expeditions to Antarctica.

**Air Force:** Its main combat aircraft are Kfir C.10; C.12 and TC.12, armed with air-air missiles

Python 5 and Derby, in addition to the guided bombs Spice 1000, Griffin and GBU-12 Paveway II. Kfir are able to be refueled in mid-flight fuel, which increases their strategic capabilities. The Colombian Air Force has full night flight capability (NVG), as well as all the elements to logistically support the deployment of a combat or humanitarian force.

**National Police:** It has great experience in the fight against drug trafficking.

**GSED:** It groups all factories in the defense sector, which are in a position to provide the weapons, systems, quartermaster, munitions and consumables required by the Military and Police Forces, as well as in the process of offering their products and services to the market international.

It is hoped that in post-conflict, the Military and Police Forces of the Republic of Colombia will not lose their acquired capacities, but rather that those capacities will be strengthened and put at the service of the international community, The Threat System that jeopardizes the peace and stability of Colombia and the world. Giving much importance to the phenomenon of terrorism in all its manifestations.

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# Fight against jihadist terrorism in Spain

## Fight against jihad in Spain. Special situation of minors

by Pilar Rangel



Since 2014 to 2017 there are 17 minors who have been arrested or surveillances by the law forces of Spain. The range of arrests it goes to joining a jihadist in a local town group or travel to Syria or Iraq to join Daesh.

The National Court has already condemned these 17 of 8 of them. The age usually varies but it goes between the 14 to the 17 years. Which is the work that we have to do with these minors after being detected?

In principle, it is necessary to start with unradicalization plans, in addition to complying with the penal sentences imposed by the National Court, it is also necessary to move them away from the environment where it could be radicalized.

In most cases they are not even known by the media when the cases are about minors. The first official office to hear these cases is the Juvenile Prosecutor's Office, which, in case that they have indications of these minors did a crimes, goes to the Central Juvenile Court who is the responsible for imposing the sentence and ensuring that it is enforced. In some cases the sentence goes through an internment in closed regime and in other occasions by the imposition of social tasks. At the time of deciding the penalty is previously assessed individually to the child by a specialized professional team.

So, according to our legal system (SPAIN), a minor never goes to jail but goes to an especial center that try to re educate this kind of minors, that we call this center "retirement center". If the center has a minor with compressed age of 14 or 15 years, they can be stay a maximum of 5 years in closed regime and if it is 16 or 17 can be up to 8 years.

These penalties are reviewed every 6 months to see the child's progression. In the case of a favorable outcome of this closed regime, it can be commuted to a custodial internment.

Part of the work to be done with them it is by the collaboration with the professionals of the "Reform Center" and they control and surveillance them freedom.

As well as interviews with the child and his family and his social environment. What we want to find or we want that happen, is that the child does not fall-down again this situation and does not establish relationships with the radical people in their social zone and that he doesn't be radicalized again, being of vital importance that once the minor incorporated into his normal life and start an academic or professional training.

Equally and within the unradicalization process we must work with the counter-narrative theme to confront radical ideas with the values of our society. Our target is that the minors do not see any attraction in Jihad.

The usually difficulties found in these cases are the refusal by the minor or the affective to the Muslim religion like justification. In these cases we have to work that minor seen the differences between Islam and terrorism as two totally different and a contraposition.

In the process of unradicalization we want to find it in its origin what is involved, we want to see what are the causes that led the child to become radicalized. And once this evaluation phase is passed, the child is being guided, starting first within the family.

The most of children radicalized in Spain are from Moroccan with Spanish nationality mainly being its city of origin Ceuta, Melilla and Catalonia.

The way they were radicalized in most cases was by Internet but also by the influence in the family or friends, and by the recruitment of jihad groups.

Although there are several reasons, but it is necessary especially in the case of minors to work more on the topic of prevention in violent radicalization and a counter-argument so that these cases do not happen again.

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Image Source: <http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2015/03/31/551a253922601d6a7c8b456c.html>



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# Adaptation of forces and security forces to the tasks of the 21st century

## The Security in the Airports

by Eduardo Padrón



The profile of the agents of the State security forces, intended at airports, should be a profile of a border agent, with basic knowledge in IED, some knowledge of operational intervention, surveillance and that could recover some intelligence information, the airports being the perfect zone for recover many intelligence information HUMINT.

These agents in their jobs have to work with a little pseudoparanoia, within limits, that all the people that pass through the security control, suspect of any object, suitcase or clothing, and trying to anticipate the situations that could be used to evade the security controls, thinking all the time what would happen to them in a Terrorist attack or sabotages to the flights, with any objects or not, carried by people passing through his security controls.

We think that when a flight shall be attacked in a "Western side", made by an electronic device, they will not stop restricting the access of this kind of devices in hand luggage by security controls. In the United States has recently done, with flights from some specific countries, where the population is mostly Muslim. As well as lighters and other flame initiating utensils. Airports should have portable systems to reduce the damage of an explosive, such as "anti-explosive blankets", which security personnel can cover or try to avoid the damage as much as possible.

A serious fault in the check points is the medical devices that can not be inspected by x-ray machines, without the means to be manually inspected by security personnel, as well as by persons not passing through the arch of metal detection by medical problems, or that are

transported in wheelchairs, which, private security companies, lack the legal backing to make a "exhaustive" registry of these people and places for these tasks, preserving the image, honor and personal privacy of these.

As well as people legally exempt from passing this security procedures, which should not have this type of protocol, being a security measure, not demeaning for the human being.

Critical infrastructures, such as airports, should not have temporary personnel working in these facilities, for any reason.

They are giving security permits to temporary employees, that means that they have access to different controlled areas, an internal knowledge of security and above all a knowledge of security personnel. How much more temporary employees they have working in these airports, the officers have more difficulty to have the "control", always having new personnel who do not know who they are, what they are engaged in, the justification of being in certain areas and their true motivations.

The security measures of a passenger, an airport employee or a crew member must be the same, not making distinctions, the only trustworthy personnel that may exist in these facilities are the Police Officers or Government Forces of those airports. As much as a pilot in the Barcelona airport can crash an airplane and have access to "dangerous" material inside the plane, which has an inventory, does not mean that it is allowed to pass any dangerous object, for example this could be passed on to another person and abduct or sabotage a plane in Belgium.

Part of the work of the Officers at airports is to create networks of intelligent information that alert agents of possible strange events, suspects or infrastructure anomalies. From the staff of car rentals, cleaning staff, store personnel, transporters, firefighters, maintenance staff, etc. How do you get this? For creating interpersonal relationships of trust, with airport employees and crew members, this should be encouraged by the different police command, without these relationships taking their toll on the permissiveness of the security controls.

This network will be based on the trust of both informants and agents and them with their superior commands, otherwise the information of the network will not work in the detriment of public safety. The informants will stop transferring information if they think that the information transferred is not necessary or the officer doesn't recognize this information of their work. This network of informants should not be limited to the airport itself, but also to nearby infrastructures such as gas stations, supermarkets, kiosks, bars, hostels, etc.

the airports are critical infrastructures, and it is necessary to prioritize the safety to any other circumstance, remember that an attack on an airport in the Balearic Islands or the Canary Islands, could end the local economy that lives on tourism, without mentioning the victims.

The airports have become centers of transport, where the income is obtained by the provision of other services, to shopping centers. The more merchandise entering restricted areas, it augments the percentage of merchandise that is not inspected. The merchandise that fails to the check points, it became a probability of an attack, without entering the issue of smuggling and "suppliers of trust," which term should not exist in the regulations. If there are to be commercial zones within the restricted areas, there should be the minimum possible for all merchandise to pass security

measures, and if you want to give a small approach, that the shopping areas are in the public areas of the airport.

It seems that today we have not learned about the attack in the T4 zone of the airport of Barajas (MADRID), where they placed a VBIED, in the parking of the terminal, that was is near of the airport, today still exist. The passenger in the terminals of airports without any kind of surveillance on the vehicles that enter the car parks, and some under the airports themselves.

we have to think that the officers in his work do not have to keep in mind the commercial relations of the companies of the airport, they are for guarantee the security, it is not their business think if the company earns you more or less Money to that airport, or if it puts obstacles in obtaining more benefits or less. Recall the existence of crimes of the Penal Code, and prosecute crimes. A malfunction of the security of an airport does finalize to will stop obtaining benefits to all the companies involved and will put in danger to all the workers and passengers of this one.

Security works if the methods used are effective. Officers equipped and formed do not cause social alarm, social alarm causes an agent on the ground with two shots in the chest and the population running around in panic..

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# Antiterrorist Forces of the World

*Audentes fortuna iuvat*



FSB - Russian Security Forces

## Alpha Team



In Russia they use the word Spetsnaz to name the Special Forces commandos, both military elite and police forces. Its literal translation would be "Unit of Special Designations".

In the West Spetsnaz is often used to refer to the Special Forces of Russia and other countries that were members of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Spetnaz is an abbreviation (Spetsiálnogo Naznachéniya), meaning "special purpose".

In the Soviet Union the public did not know much about their Special Forces. It was only until Mikhail Gorbachev advanced the opening process called Glásnost, that many secrets of the State, hitherto under the most rigid Hermeticism, were revealed.

It was then that some details were known about the organization, training, and operations of the Special Forces. As well as many stories about exploits carried out over the years. Numerous books were also written, like the one of the exaggerant Viktor Suvórov, call "Spetsnaz: the history behind the Soviet SAS". Precisely books like this contributed to publicize the term "Spetnaz" in Western countries.

The security service of the Russian Federation is called FSB, it is the old KGB. This organization has two Special Forces groups: Team A (Alpha) and Team B (also called Výmpel or "Vega").

The Russian FSB Alpha Team is specialized in counterterrorism, and enjoys great prestige within and outside of Russia. The second team was made up of elements of the Vega Squadron (which belonged to the MVD before the dissolution of the USSR), and personnel who formerly belonged to Výmpel, one of the most feared groups of sabotage during the cold war. Currently they have the mission to protect critical infrastructure of strategic level.

In this way, while the Alpha Team is directly acting against terrorist activities and groups, Team B provides security against foreseeable threats.



**Photos: © FSB.**

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




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